ORDER
Nainar Sundaram, J.
1. These writ petitions mainly challenge the validity of the final Inter-State Agreement dated 3-6-1975 comprised in G. O. Ms. No. 1000/- Home Department, Government of Tamil Nadu, dated 3-6-1975 and published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, Part II, S. 2 dated 4-6-1975 in so far as the petitioner is concerned. Amongst the other grounds of attack, what is being primarily urged is that the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity to be heard in person, as contemplated under S. 63(3-A) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, hereinafter refefred to as the Act, which governed the situation at the relevant point of time; and this violated the principles of natural justice. The factual position with regard to non-hearing of persons like the petitioner is not in dispute, and the respondents have not filed any counter, offering any stand or explanation over this contention. Section 63(3-A) of the Act read as follows:–
“Every proposal to enter into an agreement between the States referred to in the proviso to sub-section (3) and every proposal in such agreement to fix the number of permits which is proposed to be granted or countersigned in respect of each route or area, shall be published by each of the State Government concerned in the official Gazette together with a notice of the dale before which representation in connection therewith may be submitted, and the date not being less than thirty days from the date of such publication on which, and the authority by which, and the time and place at which, the proposal and any representations received in connection therewith will be considered;
Provided that no person, association or authority, other than those mentioned here-under, shall have a right to make such representation, namely:–
(i) any person already providing passenger or goods transport facilities by any means in the proposed area or along or near Ihe proposed route.
(ii) any association representing persons interest in the provision of road transport facilities recognised in this behalf of the State Government;
(iii) any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed area or route lies.”
It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that
the provision contemplated providing an
audience to persons like the petitioner and in
the present cases the petitioner could not be
stated to have had been aggrieved by the
Draft Agreement and the petitioners is
aggrieved only by the Final Agreement where
there has been a significant omission of the
concerned route itself and viewed from this
angle the failure to afford an opportunity of a
personal hearing must be held to have vitiated
the Final Agreement as per the impugned
Government order.
2. When we look into the language of S. 63(3-A) of the Act, we arc led to conviction that the provision contemplated an oral hearing of personal audience to fhe parties who are likely to be affected by the ultimate decision. The provision laid down that a notice shall also be published giving the date, not being less than thirty days from the date of such publication, before which representations in connection with the Draft Agreement may be submitted. The notice should further say the authority by which, and the time and place at which the proposal and any representation received in connection therewith will be considered, on the date. It is not in dispute that the notice issued did not comply with the requirements of S. 63(3-A) of the Act. The provision contemplated consideration of the proposal and if there should be an alteration, lack of opportunity to be heard not afforded to parties like the petitioner vitiates the proceedings. A similar question came up before Padmanabhan, J. in K. Ramachandra Naidu and others v. The State of Tamil Nadu rep., by its Secretary, Home Department and others (W. P. Nos. 4702, 6585 and 6586 of 1979, 802 and 6894 of 1980, order dated 13-10-1982) and the learned single Judge was obliged to countenance this grievance of the parties before him and struck down the very same impugned Government order. We have not been persuaded to view the question from a different angle. Sustaining this point taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner, we allow these writ petitions to the extent of quashing the impugned Government order as prayed for in the writ petitions. It must be noted that the prayer in the writ petitions is two-fold. The first part sets forth the attack on the impugned government order and the second part seeks a direction to include the concerned route in the inter-State Agreement. With regard to the second part of the prayer, it is the admitted position that already two orders have been made by this Court and we are told that the matter is under consideration by the State. We do not think it necessary and proper to give a further direction, in super-imposition of the directions and orders already given. Furthermore, we find that the purpose of the petitioner seems to have been served with reference to the tax liability which is the ultimate problem by the quashing of the impugned Government order. Hence, the writ petitions are allowed to the above extent. No costs.
3. Petition allowed.