JUDGMENT
Arun Madan, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed by the above named petitioner in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of alleged violation of Articles 14, 16, 19, 21, 300A and 311 of the Constitution of India and in the matter of relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
2. The petitioner who is a project based employee of the respondent and was appointed as daily wager in the office of Tehsildar, Sikar (respondent No. 3) vide order, dated 3.10.1987, has filed this writ petition claiming the right of continuity in service on the ground that he has completed more than 240 days of service and since the office of Tehsildar is an industry within the ambit of Sections 2J and 25 respectively of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (here in after referred to as “the Act”), and as such the petitioner could not be retrenched from service as the same has resulted in deprivation of his right to live and liberty.
3. The facts giving rise to the filing of this writ petition briefly stated are that the petitioner is a resident of Sikar and after passing his Higher Secondary Examination in Commerce in the year 1986 from Sikar, enrolled in the office of District Employment Officer, Sikar, he was appointed as daily wager as Lower Division Clerk (for short ‘LDC’) in the office of Tehsildar, Sikar vide order dated 3 October, 1987 on daily wages of Rs. 15/-per day which was later on increased to Rs 20/-per day upto 28.2.1988 or till any other order whichever was earlier. The petitioner was appointed on the newly created post of LDC as daily wager. The petitioner joined his duty w.e.f. 5.10.1987 in the office of Tehsildar, Sikar and continued on the said post till 28.2.1988 and there after the services of the petitioner were extended, by respondent No. 2, Collector. Sikar. Thereafter the services of the petitioner were terminated vide order, dated 30 September, 1988 vide Annexure 3 passed by Tehsildar, Sikar.
4. It has been contented in the writ petition that the petitioner had been performing his duties sincerely and diligently and that a certificate was issued in his favour by the Tehsildar, Sikar on 21st October, 1988 and since the petitioner had completed more than 240 days of service, he has a right of continuity in service and his services could not be terminated in the manner it has been done by respondent No. 3. It the grounds taken in support of the writ petition, it has been further contended by the petitioner that 10 post of LDCs were lying vacant when the petitioner was discontinued from service, in the office of respondent No. 2 and 6 and that the posts are still lying vacant. In has been contended by the petitioner that the office of the Tehsildar is also an industry and the. petitioner is a workman with in the definition of industry as defined under Section 2J and 25 respectively of the Act. Since the wages of the, petitioner at the time of retrenchment were less than 600/-per month and he was not employed in ministerial, administrative or supervisory capacity he had acquired a right of continuity in service as a workman. It has been further contended that the petitioner was not served with any show cause notice or paid compensation as provided under Section 25F of the Act.
5. On the principle of equal pay for equal work, it has been contended by the petitioner that since he was performing the same duties of LDC as regularly appointed LDC, he should have been given the pay scale of regularly selected LDCs, i.e., Rs 950/- 1250/-instead of being paid Rs. 20/-per day. The services of the petitioner were terminated by retrenchment order, dated 30th September, 1988 (Annex. 3) which is illegal and without jurisdiction and is violative of petitioner’s fundamental rights under Articles 14, 16. and 21 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner has prayed for quashing and setting aside the impugned order, dated 30th September, 1988 and has sought direction from this Court to reinstate the petitioner with back wages and has further prayed for payment of balance amount of wages as admissible to regularly selected LDCs. to the petitioner from 5th October, 1987 and thereafter regular pay-scale of LDC may be paid to him.
6. In the reply filed on behalf of the respondents pursuant, to show cause notice served on the said respondents, it has been contended that the petitioner had been appointed on daily wage basis against a post of LDC which had been created temporarily under Famine Relief Works. It has been further stated in the reply that the duration of post created for Famine Relief Work was extended by the Relief Department of the Government vide its order, dated 29th February, 1988 and, therefore, the staff employed therein was also ordered to be retained for that duration only vide Annexures R1 and R2 respectively. It has been further stated that the Relief Department of the Government vide its order, dated 26.9.1988 ordered the abolition of all such posts which had been created for execution of Famine Relief Works w.e.f. 30.9.1988. and the staff that had been employed for the said work was ordered to be relieved on 30.9.1988. In pursuance the aforesaid order, dated 26.9.1988 respondent No. 2 issued necessary orders on 29.9.1988 terminating the services of the junior accountants and senior accountants w.e.f. 30.9.1988. hence the petitioner alone was not affected by that order but many others similarly situated employees were equally terminated in pursuance of the said order. It has been further contended on behalf of the respondents that the Relief Department of the Government vide its order, dated 26.9.1988 had directed the abolition of all such posts which had been created for execution of famine relief works w.e.f. 30.9.1988. and the staff that had been employed for the said work was ordered to be relieved on 30.9.1988. It is in pursuance of the said order that respondent No. 2 had issued necessary orders on 29.9.1988 which was applicable not only to the petitioner but also to the similarly situated employees as referred to above. With regard to the point of discrimination, it has been stated in reply to para 9 that the posts of L.D.Cs. which were vacant at the time of termination of the services of the petitioner did not belong to the famine relief works but related to different departments. It has been further contended that at present no posts of LDCs were vacant either in the office of Collector or in any other subordinate office. In para 12 of the reply it has been contended on behalf of the respondents that the office of Tehsildar does not fall within the ambit of definition of word ‘industry’ and the petitioner cannot be regarded as ‘workman’under the Act. The provisions of Industrial Dispute Act are inapplicable to the facts of the present case inasmuch as the petitioner had been engaged as LDC in famine relief works and the application of the Act is excluded in the case of the employees who are engaged on a particular project, i.e., famine relief work by the Rajasthan Famine Relief Works Employees (Exemption from Labour Laws) Act, 1964 (here in after referred to as “the Act of 1964”). Section 3 of the said Act reads as under:
3. Labour Laws not to apply to famine Relief works etc.:Notwithstanding anything contained in any Labour law no such law shall apply nor the same shall be deemed ever to have applied to the famine relief works or the employees there of in respect of any matter covered by any such law.
7. Relying on the aforesaid provisions of the Act, 1964, it was contended at the Bar by the learned Counsel for the respondents that the I.D. Act. has got no application to the facts of the present case as the same is excluded from the perview of the Act of 1964 and hence compliance of the provisions of Section 25F of the said Act was not required to be made by the respondents. It has been further contended that since the petitioner was a project based employee and that the project stood completed on the relevant date, the respondents were within their rights to terminate the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 26.9.1988, since the post created for famine relief work stood abolished w.e.f. 30.9.1988 and once the post having been abolished by the department on completion of the project the question of the petitioner being retained in service does not arise.
8. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties and after examining their rival claims and contentions as well as the relevant documents placed on the record. I am of the considered opinion that the project based employees have no right to claim continuity in service inasmuch as they were employed against a particular project as daily wagers and since the employment of the; petitioner was in respect of famine relief work which itself is a project the services of the petitioner automatically stood terminated on completion of the said project w.e.f. 30.9.1988. I am further of the considered opinion that the provisions of the Act are. inapplicable to-the facts of the present case, since the applicability of the Act is excluded in the case of the employee engaged on the famine relief work by the Rajasthan Famine Relief Works Employees (Exemption from Labour Laws) Act, 1964 as referred to above. Since the provisions of the Act are inapplicable to the petitioner the question of petitioner being considered as a workman falling within the definition of the “workman” under the Act, does not arise. I am therefore,of the considered opinion that the termination of the services of the petitioner is not open to challenge in this writ petition and no interference is called for by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
9. I would like to mention in this connection that the vires of the Rajasthan Famine Relief Act, 1964 were challenged before the Division Bench of this Court in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3324 of 1986, titled Devaram v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. decided on 8.11.1990 and the question which arose before this Court was as to whether the Act of 1964 is violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of of India? This Court vide its order, dated 8.11.1990 dismissed the said writ petition and upheld the constitutional validity of the Act of 1964. I am thus, of the opinion that in view of Division Bench judgment of this Court, as referred to above, the case of the petitioner is not even maintainable on merits and no interference is called for in the impugned, order, dated 30.9.1988 which, in my considered opinion, is in absolute conformity with the relevant provisions of the enactments as referred to above. I am further of the opinion that the provisions of Act are not applicable to this case and, therefore, the question of violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioner does not arise.
10. Consequently this writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.