JUDGMENT
1. In the suit which is the subject-matter of this appeal the plaintiff alleged that a consignment of woollen fardis and handloom table cloths was booked by Messrs. Dasmall Baijnath from Amritsar to Jharia railway station for being delivered to the plaintiffs. The consignment arrived at Jharia station on or about the 18th November, 1950, and when plaintiff No. 2 went to take deli-very it was discovered that the consignment was in a torn condition and some of the articles from the consignment had been removed. The Parcel Clerk declined to give delivery of the consignment and referred the matter to the Claims Inspector posted at Dhanbad. After some correspondence plaintiff No. 2 asked for delivery of the consignment in open condition, but the Claims Inspector also refused to give delivery of the consignment and told plaintiff No. 2 that the matter would be referred to the higher authorities. Ultimately there was no delivery of the consignment to the plaintiffs who brought the present suit for realisation of damages from the defendant.
The suit was contested on the ground that the package contained woollen fardis which are articles of special value and Section 75 of the Railways Act was a bar to the claim of the plaintiffs. It was also contended that the suit was barred under Article 30 of the Indian Limitation Act and the period taken in the correspondence between the plaintiffs and the railway authorities cannot be excluded in computing the period of limitation. The lower appellate court has held that the suit was not barred by limitation and that Section 75 of the Indian Railways Act has no application to this case and the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for compensation from the defendant for the value of the consignment which was not delivered by the railway authorities.
2. In support of this appeal two arguments were advanced by learned Counsel for the appellant. It was submitted in the first place that the 64 pieces of “woollen fardis” booked in the railway consignment were “shawls” within the meaning
of item (m) of the Second Schedule of the Indian Railways Act and that as the plaintiffs had not complied with the requirement of Section 75 of the Indian Hallways Act they were not entitled to get a decree in the suit for compensation for the loss of the consignment. In our opinion there is no merit in this argument.
The lower appellate court has rightly held that the woollen fardis included in the consignment were not “shawls” within the meaning of item (m) of the Second Schedule of the Indian Railways Act. In our opinion the point is covered by, a decision of this High Court in Dominion of India v. B. L. Butt, AIR 1957 Pat 328 where it was pointed out by a Division Bench that the word “shawls” as used in item (m) of the Second Schedule of the Railways Act meant Kashmere shawls of special value and not things of inferior quality as that of Alwans, Tushi or ordinary Chadars. The same view has been taken by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Sarat Chandra Bose v. Secy, of State ILK 39 Cal 1029 where their Lordships observed as follows:
“The learned Subordinate Judge, in dealing with the question as to what is the meaning of ‘shawl’, as used in the schedule, has referred to the definition of the word ‘shawl’ as given in Webster’s Dictionary. He considers that, as the term ‘shawl’ is used in a law enacted in the English language, it must be understood in the English sense, irrespective of its meaning in India. He, therefore, arrives at the conclusion that the word ‘shawls’ as used in the second schedule of the Railways Act must be taken to be a cloth of wool, cotton, silk or hair used specially by women as a loose covering for the neck and shoulders and he thinks that garments such as alwans which are manufactured with cotton or wool must come under this definition. On the other side, it is contended that the word ‘shawl’, as used in the Act, means valuable articles such as are produced by the looms of Kashmere and Amritsar, and it is argued that the goods contained in the parcel certainly must fall within that description, if the plea of the defendants is to succeed.
We have given the question our best consideration, and we are of opinion that the view which the learned Subordinate Judge has taken as to the meaning of the word ‘shawl’ cannot be accepted. It is clear from the other items included in the second schedule of the Railways Act, that that schedule was intended to cover articles of special value. The Act which was passed in 1890 took the place of other Railways Acts which were then repealed and were passed in 1879, 1883 and 1886. Schedule II appears in the previous Acts and also in the Acts previous to them which they repealed, and we think that in determining the meaning of the word ‘shawls’ we have, first, to consider what was the probable meaning which the Legislature intended to apply to such a term at the time when the schedule was first drawn up, and, secondly, to consider how far its meaning can be determined by reference to the other items in the schedule.
Applying those rules, we are of opinion that there can be little doubt that, at the time when the schedule was first drawn up, it was intended to cover Indian shawls of valuable materials. The term ‘shawl’ is originally a Persian term, and was applied to valuable and special articles, and certainly had no possible application to the articles to which the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court has thought the word ‘shawl’, as used at present in the English language, now applies. The term ‘shawl’ as used at the time when the schedule was drawn up obviously referred to valuable Indian shawls, as then understood in India., and could not The taken to apply to articles of inferior value such as the articles contained in the parcel, the subject of the present suit”.
The same view has also been expressed in E. I. Rly. Co. v. Dayabhai Vanmalidas, ILR 47 Bom 18: (AIR 1922 Bom 416). Learned Counsel for appellant referred to Shudarshan Maharaj Nandram v. E. I. Rly. Co., ILR 42 All 76: (AIR 1919 All 50) and G. I. P. Rly. Co. Ltd. v. Challa Ram Gianchaud, 41 Mad LJ 603: (AIR 1921 Mad 510). But we see no reason to differ from the view expressed by a Division Bench of this High Court in AIR 1957 Pat 328 and also by the Calcutta High Court in ILR 39 Cal 1029 and by the Bombay High Court in ILR 47 Bom 18: (AIR 1922 Bom 416). In the present case there is no finding that the woolen tardis booked in the consignment were Kashmere shawls of special value and so the provisions of Section 75 of the Railways Act do not apply to the present case. We, therefore, overrule the argument of learned Counsel on this point.
It was submitted in the second place that the suit is barred by Article 30 of the Limitation Act. We do not accept this contention as correct In our opinion the proper Article to apply to this case is Article 31 of the Limitation Act and not Article 30 of the Limitation Act, because the admitted position is that the consignment was not delivered at all to the plaintiffs at any stage. When plaintiff No. 2 had gone to the railway station to take delivery it was found that the consignment was in torn condition and some articles from the consignment were removed. The parcel Clerk declined to give delivery of the consignment, saying that the matter would be referred to the Claims Inspector of Dhanbad. Later on the Claims Inspector also made inquiries and refused to give an open delivery of the consignment to the plaintiffs and referred the matter to the higher authorities.
There was an allegation of the plaintiffs in this case that there was no delivery of the consignment at all, even in the damaged condition. It follows, therefore, that the suit is not governed by Article 30 of the Limitation Act but by Article 31 of the Limitation Act. We, therefore, reject the argument of learned Counsel on this point also.
3. In our opinion there is no merit in this second appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs.