IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 02.04.2008 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.D.DINAKARAN and THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R.REGUPATHI Criminal Appeal No.248 of 2006 Kuppan .. Appellant vs. State, rep. by Inspector of Police Vellore South Police Station Vellore. Crime No.65/2003. .. Respondent Criminal Appeal filed under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the judgment of the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Vellore (Fast Track Court), Vellore District, dated 23.12.2005, in Sessions Case No.294 of 2005. ----- For Appellant : Ms.Rajalakshmi for Mr.D.Rajagopal For Respondent : Mr.N.R.Elango Addl. Public Prosecutor ----- JUDGMENT
(Delivered by P.D.DINAKARAN,J)
The appellant was charged and faced trial in accordance with law for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 324, 506(ii) of the IPC with reference to an alleged occurrence said to have taken place on 20.2.2003 at about 8.15 p.m., when, according to the prosecution, the accused stabbed the deceased Sagadevan @ Mosses with a knife and caused his death and thereby committed the offence of murder; and that while doing so, he voluntarily caused hurt to the child Rekha and also committed criminal intimidation to cause the death of Valli, wife of the deceased Sagadevan @ Mosses. The learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Vellore vide his judgment and order of conviction dated 23.12.2005 in S.C.No.294 of 2005 found the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months.
2. Initially, upon appearance of the accused and after supply of documents to him, charges were framed against the accused, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
3. To prove its case, the prosecution examined 20 witnesses as P.Ws.1 to 20, marked Exhibits P1 to P24 as well as M.Os.1 to 5.
4.1. The brief facts of this case, as unravelled by the prosecution at the trial, are as follows:
4.2. P.W.1 Valli is the wife of the deceased Sagadevan @ Mosses. P.W.6 Selvi and P.W.9 Sarathkumar are the daughter and son of the deceased respectively. The accused is the sister’s son of the deceased. P.W.2 Moorthi, P.W.3 Murugan, P.W.4 Vatchala and P.W.5 Pachayammal are the relatives of the accused and the deceased.
4.3. It is alleged that the deceased family failed to attend the marriage of the cousin of the accused. On the fateful day, viz., 20.2.2003 at about 8.15 p.m., when the deceased, P.Ws.1, 6 and 9 were in their house, the accused went there and engaged himself in a wordy quarrel and used filthy words. When P.W.1 questioned him, he replied that he would not give any respect to her. When the deceased asked him, the accused replied that the deceased did not deserve any respect, as he failed to attend the marriage of his cousin and immediately went to his residence, which is at the back side of the house of the deceased, returned with M.O.1-knife and stabbed the deceased on the left side of his abdomen. When the accused continued to stab the deceased, P.W.1 intervened with the child Rekha in her hand and during the course, the child sustained injuries. P.W.1 raised hue and cry. The accused fled away from the scene of occurrence with the weapon. P.Ws.6 and 9, daughter and son of the deceased respectively, are eye-witnesses to the occurrence and their evidence corroborates the evidence of P.W.1. P.Ws.2 to 5 have not supported the case of the prosecution and turned hostile.
4.4. P.W.1 took the deceased to the Government Hospital, Vellore, with the aid of P.W.8 Devaraj, auto driver, where P.W.12 Dr.Bharani, admitted the deceased. On examination, she found an incised wound 1cm x 1cm x 1cm on the left side of abdomen with a contusion 5cm x 3cm x 5cm and referred him to Surgery department for further treatment. She also intimated to police. Ex.P6 is the accident register issued by her.
4.5. P.W.16 Rajmohan, Head Constable, on receipt of intimation from the Government Hospital, Vellore, on 22.2.2003 at 2.00 a.m., went to the hospital and recorded the statement of P.W.1 and registered a case in Crime No.65 of 2005 under Sections 324 and 506(ii) IPC. He proceeded to the scene of occurrence and prepared Ex.P2 observation mahazar and Ex.P15 rough sketch in the presence of P.W.7 Ramasami and Selvam. He examined P.Ws.1, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 and the deceased and recorded their statements. The statement of the deceased is Ex.P16.
4.6. P.W.13 Dr.Kothandapani, attached to Vellore Government Hospital, had deposed that the deceased died in the hospital on 23.2.2003 at 12.20 a.m. and he sent Ex.P7 death intimation to the police.
4.7. P.W.17 Perumal, Head Constable, on receipt of death intimation, informed to P.W.20 Settu, Inspector of Police, Vellore South Police Station, who altered the case into one under Section 302 of IPC and sent Ex.P18 Express Report to the Court as well as to the higher officials through P.W.19 Munusamy, Head Constable. He took up the case for investigation, went to the hospital and conducted inquest over the body of the deceased and prepared Ex.P19 inquest report. He sent the body with Ex.P23 requisition for post-mortem through P.W.18 Kalyanaraman, Head Constable. P.W.18 handed over the clothes worn by the deceased under Ex.P17 special report to P.W.20.
4.8. P.W.14 Dr.Kathiravan, attached to Vellore Government Hospital, conducted post-mortem on the body of the deceased and noticed the following injuries:
Punctured like wound on left side of abdomen (hypochondrium) = x = cm. On probing, wound enters into abdominal cavity. The whole abdomen is distended and rigid.
Exploration of the wound:
Part of the omentum is attached to under surface of the wound. Erythroma surrounding the under surface of the wound present. Omentum congested. The greater wall of the stomach has perforating wound measuring 1cm x 1cm x entering into the stomach with a surrounding haematoma. Edges of perforation is irregular and soft in consistency. Inner wall of stomach adjacent to perforation is congested. Stomach empty. Jejunum shows 4 perforating wounds measuring (1) 1 x = cm entering into the cavity on the proximal segment of jejunum. No.2, 3 and 4 perforating injuries are found in the superior part of middle portion of jejunum. In all the above injuries margins irregular. Soft in consistency with surrounding haematoma.
The doctor was of the opinion that the deceased would appear to have died of septicaemia 1012 hours prior to autopsy due to perforating injury to stomach and intestine and that the injuries could have been caused with M.O.1 knife. Ex.P8 is the post-mortem certificate.
4.9. P.W.20 has examined the witnesses and recorded their statements. He prepared Ex.P21 rough sketch and caused the place of occurrence to be photographed through P.W.10 Photographer. Ex.P2 series are the photos with negatives. Based on the intimation given by one Valliammal, he arrested the accused on 23.2.2003 at 4.30 p.m. in the presence of P.W.11 Pon Sivasankaran, Village Administrative Officer and his menial. The accused gave a confession statement voluntarily in the presence of P.W.11 and his menial. Ex.P4 is the admissible portion of the confession statement and Ex.P3 is the signature of P.W.11 in the confession statement. Pursuant to the confession, the accused took the police and P.W.11 to the place, where he hid M.O.1 knife. P.W.20 recovered M.O.1 bloodstained knife and M.O.3 bloodstained shirt under Ex.P5 Mahazar. P.W.20 prepared Ex.P20 arrest card and remanded the accused to judicial custody. He sent the material objects to the Court for subjecting the same for chemical examination through Exs.P22 and 24 Form-95.
4.10. P.W.15 is the Magisterial Clerk, who despatched the material objects to the Chemical Analyst under Exs.P9 and P10 Court’s letter and received Ex.P11 Viscera Report, Ex.P12 Chemical Examiner’s Report and Ex.P13 Serologist Report.
4.11. P.W.20, Inspector of Police, completed the investigation and after following all the legal formalities, filed the final report in the court against the accused under Section 302 IPC on 11.4.2003.
5. When the incriminating circumstances inculpating and connecting the accused with the crime were put to the accused, in his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he denied the same and did not lead any evidence.
6. The trial court, on consideration of the oral and documentary evidence placed before it, found the accused guilty and convicted and sentenced him as referred to earlier.
7. The learned counsel for the appellant assails the conviction and sentence as under:
(i) P.Ws.1, 6 and 9, who are relatives of the deceased, and P.Ws.2 to 5, who are independent witnesses, have witnessed the occurrence. When the independent witnesses have turned hostile, the Sessions Judge ought not to have convicted the accused based on the evidence of P.Ws.1, 6 and 9, who are interested witnesses.
(ii) The evidence of P.W.12, who treated the deceased, that there were two injuries on the body of the deceased, does not corroborate the evidence of ocular witnesses, viz. P.Ws.1, 6 and 9 that the deceased was stabbed only once by the accused.
(iii) As per the evidence of ocular witnesses there is no prior enmity between the deceased and the accused and therefore, the prosecution has not proved the motive for commission of the offence and accordingly, the conviction and sentence have to be set aside.
(iv) Alternatively, it is contended that the occurrence took place, without premeditation in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and hence, the act of the accused would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder coming under Exception-4 to Section 300 I.P.C.
8.1. Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that:
(i) The evidence of P.Ws.1, 6 and 9 cannot be disregarded on the ground that they are interested witnesses, since their evidence is cogent, natural and corroborates in all respects.
(ii) Even though the evidence of P.W.12 Doctor, who gave treatment to the deceased, was that the deceased suffered two injuries, since the second injury is the consequence of the first injury, there is no contradiction between the medical evidence and the ocular evidence.
(iii) As per the evidence of ocular witnesses, the accused came to the residence of the deceased and shouted at him for not attending his cousin’s marriage, and when it was questioned by the deceased, the accused used filthy words and went to his house, brought M.O.1 knife and stabbed the deceased and also his child. The above evidence would clearly prove the motive for commission of the offence.
8.2. However, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor concurs with the alternative submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the occurrence took place without premeditation in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and hence, the act of the accused would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder coming under Exception-4 to Section 300 of IPC.
9. We have perused the entire materials on record and heard the submissions of both sides. The question that arises for our consideration in this appeal is whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt.
10. The case of the prosecution that the deceased Sagadevan died due to homicidal violence stands proved by the evidence of P.W.12, the doctor who examined the deceased initially and P.W.14, the doctor who conducted autopsy over the dead body, coupled with Ex.P6, Accident Register and Ex.P8 post-mortem certificate.
11. To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution examined P.Ws.1, 6 and 9 as eye witnesses. P.W.1 is the wife and P.Ws.6 and 9 are daughter and son of the deceased respectively. P.W.1 has deposed that the accused came to her house and shouted at the deceased and herself using filthy words for their failure to attend the marriage of his cousin. When the deceased questioned him as to his behaviour, he told that the deceased does not deserve any respect. Pursuant to the altercation between the deceased and the accused, the accused went to his house, brought M.O.1 knife and stabbed the deceased on the left side of his abdomen. When P.W.1 intervened, her child, whom she was carrying at that time, sustained injuries on her head. On hearing the hue and cry of P.W.1, the accused ran away from the scene of occurrence with M.O.1 knife. The evidence of P.Ws.6 and 9, who witnessed the occurrence, corroborates and strengthens the evidence of P.W.1. The statement of the deceased, Ex.P16, recorded by P.W.16 under Section 161 Cr.P.C., is also supporting the version of P.Ws.1, 6 and 9 in all fours. Therefore, the testimony of P.Ws.1, 6 and 9 has established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused stabbed the deceased on his abdomen.
12.1. Of course, the learned counsel for the appellant contends that the evidence of P.Ws.1, 6 and 9 is not trustworthy since they are interested witnesses. But, the law on the point is well settled. Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness. It is more often than not that a relation would not conceal actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent person.
12.2. In Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, (AIR 1953 SC 364), the Apex Court held as hereunder:-
“26. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to which to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close relation would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalisation. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts.”
12.3. Again in Masalti v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 202, the Apex Court observed that:
“But it would, we think, be unreaonsable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses. …. The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of justice. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated. Judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence; but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct.”
12.4. Further, in Pulicheria Nagaraju v. State of A.P. (2006) 11 SCC 444, the Apex Court observed that:
“.. that evidence of a witness cannot be discarded merely on the ground that he is either partisan or interested or closely related to the deceased, if it is otherwise found to be trustworthy and credible. It only requires scrutiny with more care and caution, so that neither the guilty escape nor the innocent wrongly convicted. If on such careful scrutiny, the evidence is found to be reliable and probable, it can be acted upon. If it is found to be improbable or suspicious, it ought to be rejected. Where the witness has a motive to falsely implicate the accused, his testimony should have corroboration in regard to material particulars before it is accepted.”
12.5. In the instant case, the evidence of P.Ws.1, 6 and 9 is that the accused had stabbed the deceased on his abdomen, pursuant to the altercation between the deceased and the accused. The overt act attributed against the accused is corroborated by the medical evidence, P.W.12, the Doctor, who had treated the deceased initially and deposed that she found an incised wound on the left side of abdomen; and P.W.14, the Doctor, who had conducted post-mortem, deposed that the deceased died due to septicaemia due to perforative injury to the stomach and intestine. Further, he has opined in Ex.P8, post-mortem certificate that the injuries would have been caused with M.O.1 knife. Therefore, the evidence of P.Ws.1, 6 and 9 cannot be rejected on the ground of interested witnesses.
13. The ocular evidence of P.Ws.1, 6 and 9 that the accused stabbed the deceased only once is corroborated by the medical evidence of P.W.12 that she found an incised wound 1 x 1 x 1 cm on the left side of abdomen with a contusion 5 x 3 x 5cm and therefore, the deceased suffered only one injury and the contusion is the result of the first injury and hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that there is contradiction between the medical evidence and the ocular evidence is rejected.
14. In view of the hostile attitude of the deceased in not attending the marriage of the cousin of the accused, a sudden quarrel took place between the appellant and the deceased, and on account of heat of passion, the appellant went home, brought a knife and stabbed the deceased. If the accused had really no intention, naturally he would have taken some weapon at the place of occurrence and hit the deceased. The action of the accused in going to his house and bringing the knife and thereafter, coming to the house of the deceased and stabbing him, for the only reason that the deceased had not attended the marriage of his cousin, would explicitly prove the intention of the accused in committing the crime. Further, the commission of crime was witnessed by P.Ws.1, 6 and 9, which is corroborated by the medical evidence of P.Ws.12 and 14. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that it is only the accused who attacked the deceased at the time and manner as projected by the prosecution.
15.1. However, the next question for consideration is whether the offence established by the prosecution against the appellant is ‘murder’ – as held by the trial Court or ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’ – as contended on behalf of the appellant?
15.2. The distinction between ‘murder’ and ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’ has been clearly stated by the Apex Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr., [1976] 4 SCC 382.
“16. In Clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words ‘likely to cause death’ occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the words “sufficient in the ordinary course of nature” have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real, and, if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference between clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of Section 300 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word “likely” in clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of ‘probable’ as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words “bodily injury … sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death” mean that death will be the “most probable” result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature.
17. For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Rajwant v. State of Kerala (AIR 1966 SC 1874) is an apt illustration of this point.
18. In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (1958 SCR 1495), Vivian Bose, J. Speaking for this Court, explained the meaning and scope of clause (3), thus (at p.1500):
The prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under Section 300, “thirdly”. First, it must establish quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; secondly the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the injury proceeds further, and fourthly it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.
19. Thus according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh’s case, even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be ‘murder’. Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point.
20. Clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) of Section 300 both require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that clause (4) of Section 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general- as distinguished from a particular person or persons being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
21. From the above conspectus, it emerges that whenever a court is confronted with the question whether the offence is ‘murder’ or ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’ on the facts of a case, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be, whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. Proof of such causal connection between the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to “culpable homicide” as defined in Section 299. If the answer to this question is prima facie found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the operation of Section 300, Penal Code, is reached. This is the stage at which the court should determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four clauses of the definition of ‘murder’ contained in Section 300. If the answer to this question is in the negative the offence would be ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’ punishable under the first or the second part of Section 304, depending, respectively, on whether the second or the third clause of Section 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the positive, but the case comes within any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’, punishable under the first part of Section 304, Penal Code.”
(emphasis supplied)
15.3. In the said decision, State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr., referred supra, it has been observed by the Apex Court that the secured way of approach to the interpretation and application of Sections 299 and 300 IPC is to keep in focus the key words used in various clauses of the said Sections. The Apex Court observed that whenever a Court is confronted with the question whether the offence is ‘murder’ or ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’, on the facts of a case, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be, whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. Proof of such causal connection between the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to ‘culpable homicide’ as defined in Section 299 of IPC. If the answer to this question is prima facie found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the operation of Section 300 of IPC, is reached. This is the stage at which the court should determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four clauses of the definition of ‘murder’ contained in Section 300 of IPC. If the answer to this question is in the negative the offence would be ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’, punishable under the first or the second part of Section 304 of IPC, depending, respectively, on whether the second or the third clause of Section 299 of IPC is applicable. If this question is found in the positive, but the case comes within any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 300 of IPC, the offence would still be ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’, punishable under the first part of Section 304 of IPC.
15.4. Every Court must methodically follow these steps before coming to a conclusion whether the offence of murder has been proved and whether the offence of murder would slide back to the offence of culpable homicide defined under Section 299 of IPC. In this case, we find that without considering whether the offence would be one of culpable homicide under Section 299 IPC and whether it would be one of murder under Section 300 of IPC, the trial Judge had come to the conclusion that the offence would be only culpable homicide amounting to murder.
16.1. Now, let us analyse the facts of this case, in the light of the well settled law laid down by the Apex Court in the decision in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr., referred supra.
16.2. The first stage to be considered is whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. We have already held that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and it is only the overt act attributed against him, which caused the death of the deceased.
16.2. The second stage to be considered is, whether that act of the accused amounts to ‘culpable homicide’ as defined in Section 299 of IPC. The definition of Section 299 of IPC makes it clear that whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide. In this case, the accused engaged himself in a wordy quarrel with P.W.1 and the deceased at the scene of occurrence. Not stopping with that, he went to his residence brought a knife and stabbed the deceased. This overt act, as already observed by us, has been clearly established by the evidence of the eye-witnesses. The act of the accused in going to his residence, bringing the weapon and stabbing the deceased is, in our considered opinion, with an intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death of the deceased and the said act of the accused amounts to ‘culpable homicide’ as defined in Section 299 of IPC.
16.3. The next stage for consideration is whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four clauses of the definition of ‘murder’ contained in Section 300 of IPC. In this case, we have already held that the act of the accused was with an intention to take away the life, and therefore it would attract the ingredients of Section 300 of IPC. However, we have to examine, whether the act of the accused would come within any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 300 of IPC. It is not the case of the prosecution that before the occurrence, the appellant had pre-meditated the crime of murder. From the facts, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that in view of the hostile attitude of the deceased in not attending the marriage of the cousin of the accused, a sudden quarrel took place between the appellant and the deceased, and on account of heat of passion, the appellant went home, brought a knife and stabbed the deceased. At the most, it can be said that he had the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and as such, the present case would fall within the second clause of Section 299 of IPC. Thus, in our opinion, the offence committed by the appellant was only ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’, punishable under the first part of Section 304 of IPC.
Resultantly, we partly allow the appeal; set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of IPC and instead convict him under Section 304 Part I IPC. The sentence of rigorous imprisonment for seven years would meet the ends of justice.
(P.D.D.J) (R.R.J)
02.04.2008
Index : yes/no
Internet: yes/no
ATR/sasi
To
1. The Additional District and Sessions Judge
Vellore District (Fast Track Court).
2. The Inspector of Police
Vellore South Police Station
Vellore District.
3. The Public Prosecutor
High Court
Madras.
P.D.DINAKARAN,J,
and
R.REGUPATHI,J.
ATR/sasi
Crl.A.No.248 of 2006
02.04.2008.