JUDGMENT
Satish Kurnar Mittal, J.
1. This revision petition has been filed by Smt. Sarla Devi, the landlady against the orders passed by both the Courts below, vide which her ejectment application has been dismissed.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner-landlady filed the ejectment application for ejectment of the respondent-tenant from the ground floor of House No. 1110, Sector 29-B, Chandigarh, which, consists of two small rooms of the size 9’x9; and one kitchen, which is on rent with the respondent, at the rate of Rs. 400/- per month, on two grounds: firstly that the demised premises is required by her and her husband for personal bonafide use and occupation and secondly on the ground of non-payment of rent for the period 1.5.1993 to 31.8.1993. In the ejectment application, the petitioner alleged that her husband was serving in the Haryana State Electricity Board and after his retirement in the year 1988, he had taken employment at Karnal and started living there with her. The petitioner and her husband were not maintaining good health. Therefore, they decided to leave the private service and to come back to Chandigarh to settle down there. They are intending to lead their entire life in Chandigarh as they also require, the medical treatment at P.G.I. Except the house in question, they are not owing any other house in the urban area of Chandigarh nor they have vacated any house.
3. The respondent-tenant contested the aforesaid ejectment application filed by the petitioner. On the first date of hearing, he tendered the entire rent claimed by the petitioner. He submitted that the petitioner does not require the demised premises for her personal use and occupation as her husband is fully settled at Kamal after retirement from the Haryana State Electricity Board and doing job there. It is also alleged that the petitioner wants to get the house vacated from him with an ulterior motive to sell the same at premium to a third person or to rent out the same at higher rate of rent. It is further alleged that the requirement of the petitioner-landlady is not bona fide and the ejectment application filed against him is liable to be dismissed.
4. Both the Courts below have dismissed the ejectment application of the petitioner,
after holding that the requirement of the petitioner-landlady is not bona fide and the tenant made the valid tender of the arrears of rent on the first date of hearing. Against those orders, the present revision petition hat; been filed by the landlady.
5. Shri Ashwani Talwar, learned counsel for the petitioner contested that the finding recorded by the Courts below regarding the bona fide requirement of the petitioner of the premises in question, is erroneous and contrary to the evidence and the pleadings of the parties. While referring to the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Arora v. Smt. Surjit Kaur, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 2179 and Rai Chand Jain v. Ms. Chandra Kanta Khosla, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 744, learned counsel for the petitioner canvassed that the scope of the revision filed under Section 15 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) is much wider than the jurisdiction provided under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court while exercising this jurisdiction is competent not only to see the irregular or illegal exercise of jurisdiction but also to see to the legality or propriety of the order in question. He submitted that the findings recorded by the Courts below that the personal necessity of the petitioner is not bona fide and the same is mere wish of the landlady, is not correct and per se against the evidence on the record and this Court while exercising the re-visional jurisdiction under Section 15(5) of the Act, can reverse the findings of facts, as the same were improper and illegal. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that both the Courts below, while recording the aforesaid findings, have not taken into consideration that both the husband and wife remain ill and they are getting treatment at P.G.I., Chandigarh. He further submitted that both the Courts below have drawn a wrong inference against the petitioner on the ground that her husband is owing a house at Karnal and there was no exceptional circumstances for the petitioner to sell the house at Karnal and to shift to Chandigarh with her husband. He submitted that the respondent-tenant did not lead any evidence that the husband of the petition is owing a house at Karnal and the aforesaid finding of the Courts below regarding owing a house at Karnal is without any basis and evidence available on record. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the finding recorded by the Courts below regarding personal necessity of the petitioner being not bona fide, is a pure finding of facts and the same cannot be interferred in the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
6. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record of the case. On the basis of the evidence available on the record, the Courts below have come to the conclusion that necessity of the landlady in the present case is not bona fide and the same is mere wish. To show their medical ailment, the petitioner produced on record Ex.P-1 and P-2. These are two O.P.D. Tickets of the P.G.I. Both the Courts below have found these documents, which were issued on 12.6.1993, whereas the ejectment application was filed on 13.6.1993, not to be genuine and were got prepared to make up a ground of personal necessity. The Courts below have observed that except the aforesaid two documents, the petitioner did not lead any other evidence to show serious ailment to them. Both the Courts below have also found that husband of the petitioner has settled at Karnal after his retirement and their requirement to settle at Chandigarh does not appear to be genuine.
7. I have considered the respective contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the orders passed by both the Courts below. I am of the opinion that no different view can be taken in the matter, as has been taken by the Courts below. There is no infirmity or illegality in the finding recorded by the Courts below regarding the personal necessity of the petitioner, which is a pure finding of facts. There is no force in the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the findings recorded by the Courts below regarding owing of a house at Karnal by her husband, is incorrect and against the evidence on the record, as the petitioner did not take any such ground before the Appellate Authority in the grounds of appeal filed by her. Actually,
the petitioner does not say either in her ejectment application or in her statement that her husband is not owing any house at Karnal, though in the statement she stated that they are residing at Karnal in a house for which they are not paying any rent. Thus, it cannot be said that the observation made by the Courts below regarding owing of a house at Karnal is without any evidence and pleadings.
8. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in the present petition and
the same is hereby dismissed.