JUDGMENT
J. Gupta, Judicial Member
1. By the instant application under Section 8 of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987, the applicants, viz., Bengal Stoneware Products Pvt. Ltd., and one of its directors, challenge the order of the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Special Cell (respondent No. 3), whereby the applicant-company’s (hereinafter referred to as “the company”) prayer for extension of the validity of the eligibility certificate (E.C.) for a further period of 4 years has been rejected. They also challenge the two revisional orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (respondent No. 2) and the Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (respondent No. 1) affirming the said order of the respondent No. 3. The case of the company is that it is registered dealer under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 and that at its factory situated at Hatasuria, in the district of Bankura, it manufactures salt glazed stoneware pipe and pipe fittings. The company was granted eligibility certificate for this industrial unit under Section 10G of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 (in short, “the 1941 Act”), effective from January 30, 1993, i.e., from the date when the tax became first payable by the company. Under this E.C. the applicant-company became eligible to enjoy tax remission for 5 years from that date in terms of Rule 48G and such remission was enjoyable to the extent of 90 per cent of the gross value of the fixed capital assets of this industrial unit. It is contended by the company that by Notification No. 1128 dated April 12, 1993 which came into force on April 15, 1993, the period for tax remission available under Rule 48G was made 9 years for a unit situated in the districts like Bankura, Purulia, etc., and the extent of such remission was made 100 per cent of the fixed capital assets. According to the company, since the provision enhancing period for tax remission came into force during the period of validity of its (company’s) E.C., it is entitled to the benefit under the amended provisions. The applicant-company avers that the revenue authorities below erred in rejecting its prayer for amendment of the E.C. extending the validity of the E.C. for 9 years from January 30, 1993.
2. Mr. K.K. Saha, learned advocate for the respondents, has resisted the company’s prayer on the ground that the company’s substantive right to enjoy the benefit under Section 10G of the 1941 Act having been fixed on the basis of law prevailing on the date on which the company became liable to pay tax for the first time, it cannot take advantage of the amended provision which has no application to the company.
3. At the time of hearing on the question of admission of the application Mr. Sharodindu Biswas, learned advocate for the company, has contended that if a manufacturer-dealer is still in the process of enjoying any tax benefit for a statutory period, and if the statutory provision, whereunder such benefit is available, undergoes an amendment whereby the period is extended, the dealer is entitled to avail of the benefit under the amended provision. To derive support to his contentions he relies on the decision in the case of Seimens India Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [1986] 62 STC 40 (Bom). But the ratio of this decision has no bearing with the issue as is before us. It would suffice to quote a few lines from that reported decision for better appreciation of the ratio :
“The law of limitation is a procedural law. It does not take away any right. It bars only a remedy. Where, however, a right has accrued to a party because the prescribed period of limitation has expired, that accrued right cannot be taken away by any subsequent Act which enlarges time. If any subsequent Act, however, enlarges time while the period of limitation prescribed under the old Act has not expired, the subsequent law will govern the proceedings.”
4. The very first line of the excerpt quoted above makes it clear that the principle laid down in the said decision applies to a procedural law. It is the settled position of law that if the provision of a procedural law undergoes an amendment, the amended provision applies to the pending proceeding unless the statute itself dictates otherwise or by necessary implication something different is indicated. This principle applies to the law of limitation with greater force because the expiry of the period of limitation does not extinguish a legitimate right, but only debars the remedy in regard to such right. Therefore, if by a subsequent amendment the period of limitation is enlarged before the expiry of the period under the unamended provision, the clog on the remedy that would have set in with the expiry of the period of limitation under the old provision would stand removed and the period available under the amended provision should apply and the holder of such right can seek the remedy to enforce his right within such enlarged period. Mr. Biswas has referred to some other reported decisions which are related to amendment of procedural law or to departmental circular which attempted to curtail the right available under the relevant statute. Therefore, these decisions have little relevance to the dispute before us.
5. In the case before us the dispute is not related to procedural law but to one which creates a substantive right. Under Section 10G of the 1941 Act and Rule 48G of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules, 1941, as they stood prior to April 15, 1993, a manufacturer-dealer, subject to fulfilment of the statutory conditions, could become eligible for the benefit of tax remission for the period prescribed under the said provisions (i.e., as they stood prior to April 15, 1993). One such condition was that the newly set up industrial unit, in respect of sale of whose products (or on account of whose purchase of goods for use directly for manufacturing such products) the benefit was admissible, must be the one set up prior to June 1, 1990. For newly set up industrial units situated in the districts like Bankura, Purulia, etc., the prescribed period available for the benefit was 5 years from the date on which the tax became first payable. Undisputedly, the company became liable to pay tax from January 30, 1993. Once the period of eligibility and the commencement thereof was settled under the statutory provision applicable at that point of time, the status of the company in regard to such benefit got fixed and was not dependent on any subsequent amendment changing the period or the extent of amount. In other words, the company’s substantive right to enjoy the benefit under Section 10G read with Rule 48G was determined on the basis of the rule as existed on the date it became eligible. Therefore, any subsequent amendment to the provision by way of enlargement or reduction of the prescribed period will not affect this right, unless the amended provision itself provides otherwise.
6. Secondly, the amendment to Rule 48G brought in a significant change as regards the class of industrial unit to which the amended provision would apply. In defining the expression “newly set up industrial unit”, as found place in the Explanation to this rule, it is made clear that the amended provision would apply to an industrial unit which has been established and commissioned by the dealer for the first time on or after the first day of June, 1993. The company’s unit was established and commissioned much earlier than this date. This unit even incurred tax liability on January 30, 1993, i.e., prior to June 1, 1993. Hence, the company’s unit remains outside the ambit of the amended provision. The amended Rule 48G cannot be applied to the applicant’s unit.
7. In view of the above circumstances, we find no ground to maintain the instant application which is accordingly dismissed. We make no order as to costs.
D. Bhattacharyya, Technical Member
8. I agree.