IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 23.07.2008 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.NAGAMUTHU Writ Petition No.24640 of 2006 and M.P.No.1 of 2006 and M.P.No.1 of 2008 The Management, M.N.M. Jain Engineering College, Jothi Nagar, Thuraipakam, Chennai 96. ... Petitioner vs. 1.The Deputy Commissioner of Labour II, (Authority Appointed Under the Minumum Wages Act), DMS Compound, Chennai 6. 2.Then Indhiya Tharaivazhi Pokkuvarathu Uzhiyargal Sangam, rep. by its, Secretary Sr.V.P.Chinthannenaivagam, Lawyer Jaganathan Street, guindy, Chennai 600 032. ... Respondents Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issuance of a Writ Certiorari to call for the records on the file of the first respondent in connection with the order passed in Ku.Pa.Kuu.Sa.I.A.2 of 2006 in M.W.No.22 of 2006 dated 16.03.2006 and quash the same. For Petitioner : Mr.P.John For R1 : Mr.V.Arun, AGP For R.2 : Mr.N.G.R.Prasad for Mr.V.Stalin O R D E R
Though the miscellaneous petition is listed today, by consent of both sides, the writ petition itself is taken up for final hearing.
2.The petitioner is the Management of M.N.M. Jain Engineering College. The second respondent is a trade union known as “Then Indhiya Tharaivazhi Pokkuvarathu Uzhiyargal Sangam” represented by its Secretary. 31 Members of the second respondent trade union claim that they are workmen under the petitioner Management and they are also eligible for minimum wages as per the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act. On behalf of the workmen, the second respondent Union made claim applications before the first respondent under the provisions of the said Act. But, there had occurred delay. The number of days delay was wrongly described as 905 instead of 94 days in paragraph No.3 of the typed set of papers. Seeking to condone the said delay, the second respondent Union filed I.A.No.2 of 2006, before the first respondent. The first respondent by order dated 16.03.2006, condoned the said delay. Challenging the same, the petitioner has come forward with this writ petition.
3.Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the first respondent and the learned counsel for the second respondent.
4.In the Interlocutory Application filed by the second respondent Union, before the first respondent, the reasons stated for condonation of delay are as follows:-
“We had been working as drivers/conductors & mechanics in the respondents college. We were not aware of the payment of minimum wages act prevailing in the state, only after joining the union we had been informed about the minimum wages and the facts of the case explained after which we had filed the claim before the Honourable Authority.”
5.A detailed counter was filed by the petitioner before the first respondent. In the said counter, it was contended that the Members of the second respondent Union are not at all entitled for minimum wages. But, the said question as to whether the members of the second respondent Union who are working under the petitioner Management are entitled for minimum wages or not, is a matter to be decided only in the main case and not in the delay condonation petition. The crux of the objection raised by the petitioner before the first respondent was that ignorance of law as pleaded by the second respondent is not an excuse and on that ground, the delay cannot be condoned. However, the said objection of the petitioner was rejected by the first respondent and the first respondent accepted the said explanation and has condoned the delay.
6.The learned counsel for the petitioner would now contend that the first respondent was not right in accepting the explanation offered by the second respondent. He would submit that ignorance of law can never be a ground for condoning the delay.
7.But the learned counsel for the second respondent would rely on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in S.Ramcharan v Nagrashna (1959 (1)L.L.J 29). In the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the question as to whether ignorance of law could be an excuse to condone the delay and has held as follows:-
“The principal objection which has been agitated in the Court and before the authority was when ignorance of law can be said to constitute sufficient cause within the meaning of proviso……….
As I have already noticed, the authority has held against the appellants on two grounds, one that ignorance of law cannot be a sufficient cause, and second that, even if it was in fact the appellants had not explained the delay made by them in making the present applications after they knew of the decision in the case of Ruby Mills (vide Bombay Labour Gazette, dated January 1953. Vol.32, No.5, p.521) on 2 May 1952. This later conclusion is a finding on a question of fact and its propriety or validity could not hav ebeen challenged before the High Court and cannot be questioned before us in the present appeals. Unfortunately it appears that the attention of the learned Judges of the High Court was not drawn to this finding, otherwise they would have considered this aspect of the matter before they proceeded to deal with the interesting question of law raised before them.
Mr.Phadke fairly conceded that he could not effectively challenge the finding of the authority that no satisfactory explanation had been given for the delay in question. He, however, argued that the said finding would not affect the final decision because, according to him, once it is held that ignorance of law can be a sufficient cause, then the period until 2 May 1952 would be covered by the appellants ignorance about the true scope and effect of the provisions of S.70 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act. This position may be conceded.”
8.A glance through the above judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court would go to show that in legislations relating to Labour Laws ignorance of law is also an excuse to condone the delay.
9.The learned counsel for the petitioner per contra would rely on a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Sri Gandhiban Bus Service v. Labour Court (1964 (I) LLJ 709). In my opinion, the said judgment would, as a matter of fact, support the case of the second respondent rather than the case of the petitioner. The operative portion of the said judgment is as follows:-
“Unless there is a finding that the workers were ignorant of their lawful rights or were prevented from putting forward their claims by reason of other circumstances, the decision that ignorance of the law could be regarded as a sufficient excuse in certain circumstances cannot apply.”
10.This would go to show that, ignorance of law could be regarded as a sufficient excuse in certain circumstances. In the case on hand, the second respondent has stated that the Members of the second respondent Union who are employed under the petitioner Management were ignorant of the minimum wages to be paid to them as per the Act, and they came to know the same only after joining the second respondent Union. The said excuse of ignorance has been found to be bonafide and the same has been accepted by the first respondent. I do not find anything perverse in the said finding of the first respondent.
11.The learned counsel for the petitioner would rely on yet another judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Mgmt., Saveetha Den. Col. & Hos. v.Dy. Commr. Of Labour (2008 (II) LLJ-90 (Madras)). In paragraph No.11 of the said judgment it has been held as follows:-
“11.Now in the instant case, the delay caused is more than six years. The Court is of the considered opinion that such an inordinate delay, in the absence of any unacceptable and convincing reason, cannot be condoned,….”
12.In the case on hand, the delay is not enormous. Secondly, there are acceptable and convincing reasons stated by the second respondent Union before the first respondent which has also been rightly accepted. Thus, I do not find any reason much less a valid reason to interfere with the order of the first respondent. In my considered opinion, the ignorance of law stated by the second respondent Union is reasonable and convincing and the same has been rightly accepted by the first respondent.
12.In the impugned order, the first respondent has stated that it is illegal on the part of the petitioner Management to have failed to pay the minimum wages to the workers. In my considered opinion, the said observation on the part of the first respondent is unwarranted. Since, it is hotly contested by the petitioner that the Members of the second respondent Union who are working under the petitioner are not at all entitled for minimum wages and, according to the petitioner, the Minimum Wages Act, is not applicable to the petitioner Management, the first respondent ought not to have made such observation in the order as he was concerned only with the question relating to condonation of delay, whether the Members of the second respondent Union who are working under the petitioner Management are entitled for minimum wages and whether the said act is applicable or not are to be decided by the first respondent independently on evidence after affording sufficient opportunities to both parties.
13.For all the above reasons, the writ petition is dismissed. However, the observation made by the first respondent in the impugned order that the petitioner Management is liable to pay minimum wages to the Members of the second respondent Union alone is vacated. The first respondent is directed to independently decide the said question in the main petition after affording sufficient opportunities to both parties. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
jbm
To
1.The Deputy Commissioner of Labour II,
(Authority Appointed Under
the Minumum Wages Act),
DMS Compound,
Chennai 6.
2.Then Indhiya Tharaivazhi Pokkuvarathu
Uzhiyargal Sangam, rep. by its,
Secretary Sr.V.P.Chinthannenaivagam,
Lawyer Jaganathan Street,
guindy,
Chennai 600 032