JUDGMENT
A.P. Deshpande, J.
1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.
2. An order passed by the Taxing Officer directing recovery of Rs. 69.250/- as deficit court fees has been challenged by the present application. In the instant petition there are 278 petitioners, petitioner Nos. 1 to 277 are the workmen employed in M/s. Ahmednagar Forging Ltd., a registered Company, whereas petitioner No. 278 is a registered Trade Union. The respondent No. 1 is a Company engaged in manufacturing of engineering goods and the respondent No. 2 is a recognised Union. A complaint came to be filed by the present petitioners alleging indulgence by the respondents, in unfair labour practices under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act. In the said complaint, the respondent No. 1 moved an application and contended that the complaint is not maintainable as there is a challenge to the settlement. The Industrial Court accepted the preliminary objection raised by the respondent No. 1 and as such dismissed the complaint. Dissatisfied with the order passed by the Industrial Court dismissing the complaint, the present petition is filed by 278 petitioners. It is material to note that only one complaint was filed before the Industrial Court by the present petitioners. There is only one proceeding filed before the Industrial Court which gave rise to a single petition filed before this Court. In the petition so filed, court fee of Rs. 250/- came to be paid. The Registry raised an objection in regard to the amount of court fees and as the petitioners disputed the office objection, the dispute came to be referred to the Taxing Officer to determine the objection in regard to the court fees. The present application is moved under Chapter V Rule 4(v) of the High Court Appellate Side Rules.
3. It is not in dispute that the petition in question is covered by the provisions contained in Schedule II of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959. Schedule II deals with fixed fees and Entry 1 in the said Schedule is in relation to the application or petition. Entry 1(f) provides thus :
(f) Application or Petition when presented to the High Court.-
(i) for directions, orders or writ, under Article 226 of the Constitution for any purpose other than the enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III thereof;
…One hundred twenty five rupees.
(ii) for directions, orders or writs, under Article 226 for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 thereof;
…Two hundred and fifty rupees.
(iii) in any oilier case not otherwise provided for by this Act;
…Twenty rupees.
It is obvious that as there is no challenge based on violation of fundamental rights contained in Part III of the Constitution, Part 2 of Clause (ii) would govern the situation and the court fees would be Rs. 250/-. The Taxing Officer has held that as the number of petitioner exceed more than one, each petitioner is liable to pay the court fees individually and hence by calculating proportionate court fees, deficit has been found. The reasoning given by the Taxing Officer in regard to interpretation of Entry No. 1 of Schedule 11 reads thus :
The Schedule It of the Bombay Court Fees Act shows that there is fixed court fees of Rs. 250/-. The word application or petition is mentioned in column No. 1 of the Schedule. The word petition as mentioned in this Schedule must be taken as petition of one petitioner. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has riot shown any provision to show the number of petitioners who may be joined in one petition. The purpose of the Court Fees Act is to collect revenue and the word petition must be taken as petition ot” one petitioner.
So, on two grounds the Taxing Officer has found that each of the petitioners need to pay court fee of Rs. 250/-. The first ground being that the term ‘petition’ necessarily has to be interpreted as petition by a single petitioner, and secondly that, as the provisions contained in the Bombay Court Fees Act. are the provisions contained in taxing statute, intending to collect revenue, the same has to be construed with a view to recover maximum tax,
4. The learned Counsel for tile petitioners has submitted that the Taxing Officer has committed an error in interpreting the term “petition” so as to mean the petition by a single individual. He submits that plain reading of the provision does not indicate that the “petition” need, to be interpreted as one having been filed by a single individual. It is submitted that the Taxing Officer has done violence to the language used in Entry No. 1 and thereby saddled additional court fees. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, placing reliance on the language used in Entry 1 has submitted that what is relevant is the number of proceedings and not the number of persons filing the petition. In his submission, if the proceeding is one, meaning thereby a petition, then irrespective of fact as to whether the same is filed by one person or more persons has no relevance to the payment of fees. In the present case we are really concerned with a dispute raised under labour and industrial law by the workmen, wherein the cause of action is one and not separate. Normally an industrial dispute is raised by workmen collectively through a Trade Union as and when a. grievance is the same and/or the action affects of the workmen. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Chancier Bhan Gosain v. State of Orissa , wherein it is observed thus :
The present ease however originated out of one petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of various assessment orders. Obviously here, there was only one proceeding. It could not be said that there were as many proceedings as there were assessment orders for the petitioner had by a single petition challenged them all together. When an appeal is taken to this Court from the judgment of the High Court in such a petition, it is impossible to contend that there arc more appeals than one. Therefore, the appellant before us is liable only to pay one set of court fee and other charges as in a single appeal.
In the case before the Apex Court various assessment orders were challenged and the Apex Court categorically observed that if the proceeding is one, before the Court below so also in the appeal, only one set of court fee need to be paid.
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioners then relied on the judgment of a learned Single Judge of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Heavy Electricals Employees’ Union and Ors. v. State Industrial Court, M.P., Indore and Ors. . The learned Judge in para 9 observed thus :
In an industrial dispute of a collective nature between the employers and the employees, the employees are usually represented by their Unions before the Labour Court or the Industrial Court. They can also join as petitioners in such a case if they so desire. When they came up before this Court for challenging the order of the Labour Court or the Industrial Court, the relief claimed by them is one and the same and the cause of action is also the same, hi such a case, if they join as petitioners either because they are not represented by any Union or for some other reason court fee of Rs. 25 alone would suffice because each of them is not expected to file a separate petition for an identical relief.
In the said judgment the learned Single Judge has applied the principle contained in Rule 1 of Order I of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that all persons may be joined in one suit as plaintiffs, in whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly or severally, where, if such persons brought separate suits, any common question of law or facts would arise. Rule 2 of Order I of the Code of Civil Procedure, however, empowers the Court to order separate trial where it appears that the joinder of plaintiffs may embarrass or delay the trial of the suit. If the Court finds that separate or distinct causes of action are joined in one proceedings then the Court may for the sake of convenience allow the petitioner to prosecute a joint petition subject to the condition that each of them pays a separate court fee. Separate court fees can be demanded from each of the petitioners only where it appears to the Court that causes of actions are distinct and separate and each of the petitioners should in fact have filed a separate petition.
6. Placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court and that of the Madhya Pradesh High Court it is contended that only one set of court fees is payable.
7. It is then contended that the provisions contained in the Bombay Court Fees Act is not intended to levy a tax for collection of revenue. The learned Counsel submits that what is levied is fee and not a tax. He submits that fee need to be commensurate with the service rendered unlike tax and as such whether petitioner is one in number or more than one no additional services are required to be rendered. The learned A.G.P., on the other hand has submitted that the Bombay Court Fees Act is a taxing statute and as such, need to be strictly construed. The learned A.G.P., has placed reliance on a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Pushpabai Shankerlal Sura and Ors. v. The Official Liquidator, Sholapur Oil Mills Ltd. and submitted that the Bombay Court Fees Act is a taxing statute. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has pointed out the observations made in the said judgment in para 5 wherein this Court has held that taxing statute has to be strictly construed “but it is equally well settled that every statute must be reasonably construed, and if a case is brought within a particular provision it must be applied. It is only if there is ambiguity that the question of strict construction in favour of the citizen can be applied”.
8. In my opinion, there is no ambiguity in so far as the construction and interpretation of Entry 1 (f) of Schedule II is concerned. The term ‘petition’ if given its natural meaning it. would be a petition either filed by one individual or by more individuals and as such a fixed court fee stamp of Rs. 250/- would be chargeable. Applying any test, of interpretation, to me, it would be doing violence to the language used in Entry No. 1 to construe that the term “petition” so as to mean petition by only one individual. Having regard to the judgments referred to hereinabove, I am of clear view that the order passed by the Taxing Officer holding that the petitioners need to pay deficit court fee of Rs. 69.250/- is wholly unsustainable in law.
9. In the result, the revision application is allowed. The impugned order dated 8.1 0,2002 passed by the Taxing Officer is quashed and set aside and it is declared that the petitioners have paid proper court, fee stamp as payable under Entry 1 Clause (f)(ii) of Schedule II of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959.