JUDGMENT
Neeladri Rao, J.
1. As similar points are involved, all these writ petitions are heard together. The petitioner in W.P.No. 11868/89 was elected as the President of Mandal Praja Parishad (for short M.P.P.), Sangareddy, while the other petitioners were elected as Sarpanches of various Gram Panchayats. Election Petitions were filed challenging the elections of these petitioners. While the petitioner in W.P.No. 11868/89 is a workman in B.H.E.L., the petitioners in the other writ petitions are workmen in Singareni Collieries. The election of the petitioner in W.P.No. 11868/89 was challenged inter alia on the ground that he was disqualified, being an employee of B.H.E.L., a public sector undertaking, for being elected as the President of M.P.P. The Election Tribunal set aside the election of the above petitioner by accepting the contention of the election petitioner that his nomination was wrongly accepted as he was disqualified from contesting to the post of president of M.P.P. The election of the other petitioners was challenged on the sole ground that they are the employees of Singareni Collieries, a public sector undertaking, and hence, they are disqualified from contesting for the post of sarpanch. Those petitioners filed the writ petitions praying for quashing the election petitions by alleging that they are not disqualified for the post of sarpanch even though they are working in Singareni Collieries, a public sector undertaking. The petitioner in W.P.No. 11868/89 filed the writ petition challenging the judgment and order of the election tribunal setting aside his election.
2. Before adverting to the contentions of the petitioners and respondents, it is convenient to refer to the relevant provisions of the A.P. Gram Panchayats Act, 1964 and A.P. Mandala Praja Parishads, Zilla Praja Parishads and Zilla Pranalika,’ Abhivrudhi Mandals Act 1986 (for short ‘Act of 1986):
3. The relevant portion of Section 17 of the A.P. Gram Panchayats Act after it was amended by Act 32/86 is as under:
Section 17. Disqualification of officers and servants of State or Central Government or of local authorities or employees or workmen of industrial undertakings:-
No village servant and no other officer or servant of the State or Central Government or of a local authority or an employee of any Co-operative Society registered under the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act 1964 or an employee of any Corporation or any industrial undertaking owned or controlled by the State or Central Government shall be qualified for being chosen as or for being a member of a Gram Panchayat.
Explanation:- x x x
(i) x x x
(ii) x x x
4. The relevant portions of Sub-sections (1) and (6) of Section 12 of the A.P. Gram Panchayats Act reads as under:-
Section 12. Election and term of office of Sarpanch:- (1) There shall be a Sarpanch for every Gram Panchayat, who shall be elected in the prescribed manner by the persons whose names appear in the electoral roll for the Gram Panchayat, from among themselves. A person shall not be qualified to stand for election as Sarpanch, unless he is not less than twenty-one years of age.
x x x x
x x x x
(1-A) x x x x
(2) x x x x
(3) x x x x
(4) x x x x
(5) x x x x
(6) The provisions of Sections 17 to 22 shall apply in relation to the office of the Sarpanch as they apply in relation to the office of an elected member of the gram panchayat:"
x x x x
5. The relevant portion of Section 10 of Act of 1986 reads as under:
“Section 10. Disqualification for becoming a member:-Subject to the provisions of this Act, a person shall be disqualified to become a member of the Mandala Praja Parishad, if such person, on the date fixed for scrutiny of nominations for election under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 or on the date of becoming a member as the case may be-
(a) x x x x
(b) x x x x
(c) x x x x
(d) x x x x
(e) x x x x
(f) x x x x
(g) is disqualified to become or continue as a member of a member of a Gram Panchayat under Section 17 of the Andhra Pradesh Gram Panchayats Act, 1964;
x x x x,
6. Section 5(6) of Act of 1986 is as follows :
"(6) The provisions of Sections 10 and 11 shall apply in relation to the office of the President as they apply in relation to the office of a member of the Mandala Praja Parishad."
7. A reading of the above provisions indicates that an employee of any industrial undertaking owned or controlled by the State or Central Government shall be disqualified for being chosen as member or Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, or member or President of M.P.P.
8. The contentions for petitioners are two-fold:
(1) Employee of an industrial undertaking as referred to in Section 17 of the A.P. Gram Panchayats Act, does not include workman; and
(2) If it can be held that the employee therein includes a workman, it is unconstitutional as it offends Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
9. It was urged for the election petitioners that the employee referred to, includes a workman in an industrial undertaking also, and it does not offend Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India.
10. The learned Government Pleader supported the contention of the petitioners that the employee of an industrial undertaking as referred to in Section 17 of the Gram Panchayats Act, excludes the workman in such undertaking. It was further contended for the Government that Section 17 of the A.P Gram Panchayat Act does not offend Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India.
11. Before adverting to the above contentions, it has to be stated at the outset that the employees of the industrial undertakings owned or controlled by the State or Central Government are being disqualified from being member or Sarpanch of Gram Panchayats or Member or President of M.P.P. by the Amendment Act 32/1986. When Bill was introduced for amendment of Section 17 of the A.P. Gram Panchayats Act, Hon’ble Members of the Legislature belonging to the various parties appealed to the Government to exclude the workmen of the industrial undertakings owned or controlled by the State or Central Government from the proposed disqualification and the Hon’ble Minister agreed to the same.
12. Section 17 of the A.P. Gram Panchayats Act was sought to be amended by Section 5 of the Amendment Act 32/86 and when it was at the stage of Bill, the relevant portion was as under:-
“5. For Section 17 of the Principal Act, the following Section shall be substituted, namely:-
17. No village servant and no other officer or servant of the State or Central Government or of a local authority or an employee or workman of any industrial undertaking owned or controlled by the State or Central Government shall be qualified for being chosen as or for being a member of a Gram Panchayat.
Explanation:- x x x x
(i) x x x x
(ii) x x x x
13. The words a workman, from the Bill were deleted when it was passed as the Act.
14. In view of the above Section in the Bill and the discussion in the Legislature and the acceptance of the Hon’ble Minister for the suggestions of the Hon’ble Members of the Legislature for deletion of the workman from the proposed disqualification, the petitioner in W.P.No. 11868/89 had come up with a reply to plead that the employee of an industrial undertaking as contemplated under Section 17 of the A.P. Gram Panchayats Act excludes workman, and the same contention was urged for the other petitioners, though they had not so pleaded in the affidavits filed in support of their respective writ petitions. As it was a pure question of law, the petitioners were permitted to argue about the same.
15. It was contended for the election petitioners that there is no ambiguity in the expression ’employee’ used in Section 17 of the A.P. Gram Panchayats Act and if so interpreted, the word ’employee’ includes all the persons working in industrial establishments, i. e., technical, non technical, manual, workman, clerical, administrative, officers, etc., and as such, the contention that it excludes workman is untenable. When an expression used in a Statute is clear and unambiguous, there will not be any need to resort to internal or external aids, urged the learned counsel for the election petitioners. The further argument for them is that in any case, the debates in the Legislatures or Parliaments cannot be looked into for interpreting the statutory provisions.
16. The learned counsel for the petitioners urged as under:-
The marginal note to Section 17 of the A.P. Gram Panchayats Act refers to employees or workmen of industrial undertakings, while the workman is not referred to in the Section. Though the marginal note does not control or limit the main provision, still it indicates the drift. When the word ‘workman’ which was referred to in the marginal note, does not find a place in the main provision, the word ’employee’ in the main provision cannot be given wider meaning. It has to be given a narrow meaning. Though generally, the debates of the Legislatures or Parliament cannot be treated as an external aid for interpreting a statutory provision, still if a decisive conclusion can be arrived at with reference to such debates to ascertain the intention of the Legislature, the same can be looked into.
17. The statement of objects and reasons for coming up with Amendment Act 32/86 for amending the provisions of A.P. Gram Panchayats Act, 1964 is as under:-
“Under the Andhra Pradesh Gram Panchayats Act, 1964 as it now stands, an employee or workman of any industrial undertaking owned or controlled by the State or Central Government is not disqualified for being chosen as or for being a member of a Gram Panchayat. Experience has revealed that such employees and workmen who have been chosen as member of Gram Panchayat are not able to devote much of their time for the work of the Gram Panchayat. Hence, the Government have decided to disqualify such employee or workman for being chosen as or for being a member of a Gram Panchayat by suitably amending the Act.
As a consequence of the abolition of the offices of village officers, opportunity is taken to omit the reference to village officers in Section 17, to omit Section 78 and to substitute a new sub-section for Sub-section (1) of Section 138 of the Act.
As the Panchayat Sami this and Zilla Parishads have been abolished and in their place the Mandala Praja Parishads and Zilla Praja Parishads have been constituted, opportunity is taken to make necessary consequential amendments in the Gram Panchayats Act also.
xx xx" 18. The Concise Oxford Dictionary (New 7th Edition) defines 'employee' at p:316 as 'person employed for wages' In the same dictionary at pages 1241 and 1242, 'workman' and 'worker' are defined as under:- Workman - Man hired to do manual labour person good, bad skilled etc., at his job). Worker - Employee esp. in manual or industrial work.
19. The learned counsel for the petitioners had not referred to any treatise on industrial law or any other material to show that in industrial law, the word ’employee’ is applicable to a person other than a workman working in an industry. The expression ’employee’ is wide enough to include all persons working under an employer for wages or salary whatever might be the category in which he is working. Employees may be group under various categories, technical or non-technical, clerical or official skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled, workman and employee other than workman. Of course, there might be some words which are of wider meaning, but in technical or in popular sense, they may be used for limited purpose. But as already observed, it is not shown for the writ petitioners that the word ’employee’ is used for the employees other than the workman in an industry.
20. One of the basic rules of interpretation is that “the language is presumed to be used in its primary and ordinary sense, unless this stultifies the purpose of the statute or otherwise produces some injustice, absurdity, anomaly or contradiction, in which case some secondary ordinary sense may be preferred, so as to obviate the injustice, absurdity, anomaly or contradiction, or to fulfil the purpose of the statute”. Allenbury v. Ram Krishna, (1973) 1 SCC P. 12.
21. All the persons working under an employer for wages or salary are employees. There is neither absurdity nor contradiction, if the said word is read as including ‘workman’. As the ‘workman’ is also working for wages, he too comes in the ordinary and natural sense of the word ’employee’. Thus, there is no ambiguity in the expression ’employee’ used in Section 17 of the A.P. Gram Panchayats Act. In fact, even in the affidavits filed by the writ petitioners who were elected as sarpanches, they were referred to as employees, for that is the sense in which the word ’employee’ is understood in common parlance. In fact, it is not understood in any other way, unless any other word is used in the statutory provisions to give a limited meaning for the same. Of course, in the marginal note of Section 17 of the Gram Panchayats Act after it was amended by Act 32/86, the word ‘workman’ is still referred to, though it does not find a place in the Section.
22. The following passage in “Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes”, 10th Edn., at P. 50, was referred to with approval in Bhinka v. Charan Singh, :-
“The headings prefixed to sections or sets of sections in some modern statutes are regarded as preambles to those sections. They cannot control the plain words of the statute but they may explain ambiguous words.”
It was further observed in the said case that “if there is any doubt in the interpretation of the words in the Section, the heading certainly helps us to resolve that doubt”. but, as already observed in the present case, there is no doubt in the interpretation of the word ’employee’ in Section 17.
23. in Muslim Wakfs Board, Rajasthan v. Radha Kishan, , it was observed as under while referring to the scope of marginal notes for interpreting statutory provisions : –
“The weight of authority is in favour of the view that the marginal note appended to a section cannot be used for construing the section. Lord Macnaghten in Balraj Kunwar v. Jagatpal Singh (1964) ILR 26 All. 393 : (1904) 1 All. LJ. 384 (PC), considered it well settled that marginal notes cannot be referred to for the purpose of construction. This Court after referring to the above case with approval, said in Commr. of Income-tax v. Ahmedbhai & Co. :-
Marginal notes in an Indian Statute, as in an Act of Parliament cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the statute.
As explained by Lord Macnaghten in the Privy Council, marginal notes are not part of an Act of Parliament”.
By relying upon the above observations, a Full Bench of this Court held in N. Bujjimma v. Tahsildar, Rapur, AIR 1980 AP P. 118 that the marginal note of Section 4 of the Andbra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act (37 of 1956), cannot be relied upon for construing the statutory provisions in Section 4 of the said Act.
24. When marginal note cannot control the statutory provision, it is not proper to hold that the expression ’employee’ is ambiguous, if it is read along with the words ’employees or workmen’ in marginal note in Section 17.
25. In Beswick v. Beswick, 1967 (2) All E.R. P. 1197, it was held that :
“In construing any Act of Parliament we are seeking the intention of Parliament, and it is quite true that we must deduce that intention from the words of the Act. If the words of the Act are only capable of one meaning we must give them that meaning no matter how they got there. If, however, they are capable of having more than one meaning we are, in my view, well entitled to see how they got there. For purely practical reasons we do not permit debates in either House to be cited: it would add greatly to the time and expense involved in preparing cases involving the construction of a statute if counsel were expected to read all the debates in Hansard, and it would often be impracticable for counsel to get access to at least the older reports of debates in select committees of the House of commons; moreover, in a very large proportion of cases such a search, even if practicable, would throw no light on the question before the court, but I can see no objection to investigate in the present case the antecedents of Section 56.” (Section 56 of Law of Property Act 1925 was referred to therein.)
26. The Supreme Court held in Anandji Haridas and Co. v. Engg. Mazdoor Sangh, that even the speech of the Finance Minister cannot be looked into for construction of a statutory provision.
27. In Sushma Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, it was observed that :
“…. …. It is well-settled that speeches of the Members of the House could at best be indicative of the subjective intention of the speakers but would not reflect the inarticulate mental processes lying behind the majority of those who voted which carried the bill to become an Act…………”
28. But, in Warner v. Metropolitan Police Comr, (1968) 2 All E.R. P. 356, the circumstances under which the parliamentary debates can be consulted, are referred to. In that context, it was observed as under :-
“…………The rule is firmly established that we may not look at HANSARD, and in general I agree with it for reasons which I gave last year in Beswick v. Veswick (1967) 2 All E.R. 1197 at p. 1202 : (1968) A.C. 58 at pp. 73, 74). This is not a suitable case in which to reopen the matter, but I am bound to say that this case seems to show that there is room for an exception where examining the proceedings in Parliament would almost certainly settle the matter immediately one way or the other. Members of both Houses are particularly interested in the liberty of the subject, and if it were intended by those promoting a Bill to extend the old but limited class of cases in which absence of manse is no defence I would certainly expect Parliament to be so informed. Then, if Parliament acquiesced, those who dislike this kind of legislation would know whom to blame. If, however, the words of the Act are not crystal clear and Parliament has not been told of this intention, I would hold without hesitation that it would be wrong to impute to Parliament an intention to depart from its known desire to prevent innocent persons from being convicted.”
29. In Utkal Contractors & Joinery Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, , it was held that:
“…………….A statute is best understood if we know the reason for it. The reason for a statute is the safest guide to its interpretation. The words of a statute take their colour from the reason for it. How do we discover the reason for a statute? There are external and internal aids. The external aids are Statement of Objects and Reasons when the Bill is presented to Parliament, the reports of Committees which preceded the Bill and the reports of Parliamentary Committees. Occasional excursions into the debates of Parliament are permitted…………….”
30. In Express Newspaper Ltd. v. Union of lndia, it was observed that there was a consensus of opinion that statement of objects and reasons attached to the Bill or the circumstances under which the word (‘minimum’-in that case) came to be deleted from the provisions of the Bill, and the fact of such deletion when the Act came to be passed. (The vires of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 45 of 1955 was considered in the above judgment) were not the aids to the construction of the terms of the statute which have of course to be given their plain and grammatical meaning.
31. Earlier decisions in England and in India indicate that it is not permissible to look into the debates of the Parliament or Legislature for construction of statutory provisions. Such a principle at the first flush may appear to be anamolous for when it is necessary to ascertain the intention of the Legislature, why the debates in the Legislature have to be excluded. But, the reasons that were given for exclusion are-(1) if it is a bicameral legislature, one House may not be knowing about the debates in the other House; (2) the debates of the Legislature or Parliament are not easily accessible and it is too much to expect the individual or his legal adviser to go into those debates to ascertain the intendment of the Legislature; and (3) even if such debates are available in many a case, it is difficult to know the intention of the Legislature. But, in later judgments, both in England and in India, it is held that such debates can be looked into to know about the reason or object for legislation, which may be helpful in construing the statutory provisions.
32. But, when the statutory provision is precise, clear and unambiguous and when the context in which it is used does not indicate that it is susceptible of a meaning other than the plain meaning and if the primary meaning of the same does not lead to any absurdity or if it does not make it unconstitutional or if such an expression if understood in its normal meaning is not in conflict with any other provision, then the scope of such an expression cannot be limited by solely relying upon the debates of the Legislature or Parliament.
33. In this case, the expression “employee” in its literal meaning includes “workman”, for the latter is but one category of employee. If it is interpreted in its primary meaning, it does not come in conflict either with the statement of objects and reasons for the introduction of Act 32/86 or with any other provision either in that Amended Act or in A.P. Gram Panchayats Act, 1964. Can it be stated by solely relying upon the debates in the Legislature, that the expression ’employee’ used in Section 17 of the A.P. Gram Panchayat Act after it was amended by Act 32/86, had to be construed as an employee other than workman? Of course, it is well-established principle of interpretation whereby some words can be added for reading down a provision to make it constitutional or to avoid absurdity or conflict with other provisions. But as already observed, no such contingency has arisen in this case.
34. It is an obvious case of mistake. When in this context the words ’employee’ or ‘workman’ are used, the latter word ‘workman’, is a case of redundancy or surplusage, for ’employee includes ‘workman’. But, when the Hon’ble Minister in deference to the wishes of the Hon’ble Members of the Legislature, agreed to exclude the workman from the disqualification, the word ‘workman’ was deleted without noticing that even after the deletion of the word workman’, the remaining word ’employee’ includes ‘workman’. In such a case, it should have been drafted as ’employee other than workman’. But, when it is a case of mistake in drafting, it has to be seen whether it is open to the Court to interpret a statutory provision by proceeding on the basis that there is a mistake in drafting?
35. In Richards v. Me Bride, (1881) 8 Q.B.D. 119. 122, the scope of the phrase ‘the day next appointed in Section 3 of the Sunday Closing (Wales) Act, 1881, had come up for consideration. It was argued that the said phrase meant ‘the next day appointed’ as the intention of the Legislature obviously being that the Act should come into force in the year 1881, whereas the words of the Act would delay its operation till 1882. While adverting to the said contention, it was observed as under:-
“No one, in construing a statute or any other literary production, could put such a construction upon the words unless by supposing they were a mistake. But we cannot assume a mistake in an Act of Parliament. If we did so, we should render many Acts uncertain by putting different constructions on them according to our individual conjectures. The draftsman of the Act may have made a mistake. If so, the remedy is for the legislature to amend it.”
36. As already observed, it is a mistake in drafting in not noticing that even after deleting the word ‘workman’, the remaining word ’employee’ includes ‘workman’. It is not open to the Court to interpret by presuming that there was a mistake in drafting. So, the word ’employee’ in Section 17 of the A.P. Gram Panchayats Act cannot be construed as ’employee other than the workman’. The remedy is for the Legislature to amend it as observed in Richard’s Case (11 supra).
37. In this context, a grammatical error, though innocuous which was not noticed, has to be referred to, for remedying the same. It is again necessary to extract the relevant portion of Section 17 of the A.P. Gram Panchayats Act after it was amended by Act 32/86, for dealing with this aspect.
“No village servant and no other officer or servant of the State or Central Government or of a local authority or an employee of any Co-operative Society registered under the Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1964 or an employee of any Corporation or any industrial undertaking owned or controlled by the State or Central Government shall be qualified for being chosen as or for being a member of a Gram Panchayat.
xx xx xx xx xx
It is manifest from the above that ‘no’ qualifies employee of any cooperative society, corporation or industrial undertaking referred to in Section 17. When ‘no’ qualifies the word ’employee’, the word ‘an’ should not be used. The same is referred to for the necessary amendment, if the Legislature chooses to amend Section 17 to make it clear that the employee of an industrial undertaking excludes the workman of an industrial undertaking. Then, of course, if necessary, the marginal note has also to be amended to incorporate the employee of the co-operative society also.
38. Hence, the word ’employee’ in Section 17 as it stands in regard to the industrial undertaking referred to therein, had to be construed as all the persons working in such undertaking and it does not exclude workmen.
39. In para 9 of the reply affidavit in W.P. No. 11868 of 1989, it was pleaded as under:-
When (he same Legislature indicates a number of connected laws, their combined operation may be taken into consideration for determining whether the provisions of any of them are discriminatory. Sections 19, 21 and 21-A of the A.P. Co-operative Societies Act lay down qualifications and disqualifications in the matter of elections to co-operative societies. In none of those provisions, an industrial employee or workman is disqualified. Such employees are not disqualified for being elected as councilor or Chairman of the Municipalities covered by the A.P. Municipalities Act, 1965 or the Municipal Corporations of Hyderabad, Vijayawada or Viskhapatnam. They are also not disqualified for being members of Legislature or Parliament. Hence, it is discriminatory to make them disqualified for being a member or Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat or a member or President of M.P.P. and thus, it offends Article 14 of the Constitution.
40. Somewhat similar argument was considered in Sarju Prasad v. Stated, . An Ordinance was promulgated by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh whereby inter alia it was laid down that the Adhyaksha, Upa-Adhyaksha and members of the Zilla Parishad ceased to hold their respective offices. Then it was argued that it is a case of discrimination, as such a provision was given effect to Adhyaksha and Upa-Adhyaksha and members of Zilla Parishad, but not to Adhyaksha, Upa-Adhyaksha and members of Kshettra Samities. It was held therein that such an Ordinance was promulgated as there was a general complaint of mala administration in the Zilla Parishads and hence, they can be put in different class and there was no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
41. It may be noted that co-operative societies deal with the affairs of their members only and they do not administer or govern in regard to the general public. So, it is obvious that co-operative societies cannot be equated with Gram Panchayats or M.P.Ps. in laying down disqualifications for being a member or a President/Sarpanch of the M.P.P. or the Gram Panchayat as the case may be.
42. Gram Panchayats and Mandala Praja Parishads deal with the affairs of the rural areas, while the Municipalities and Corporations deal with the affairs of the urban people. It cannot be stated that the affairs of the rural areas are identical with the affairs and problems of towns and cities. In view of that difference, it cannot be stated that there is no nexus between the object and the classification, when the disqualification laid down for being the member or Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat or member or President of M.P.P. was not laid down for being the Councillor or Chairman of Municipality or Corporation.
43. In State of M.P. v. G.C. Mandawar, , it was held that there was no discrimination when the State Government had not adopted the D.A. Scale prescribed by the Central Government, for its employees.
44. In Naryana Reddy v. State of A.P., , it was held that there was no discrimination when the market committees were constituted for only vegetables and fruits and not for other commodities and that too for Hyderabad and Secunderabad only and not for Andhra Area.
45. In Municipal Board, Abu Road v. Jaishiv, , Section 104 (2) of Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 which lays down that a direction may provide for levy of taxes at different rates in different municipalities having regard to their varying local conditions and needs, was held to be valid by negativing the contention that it offends Article 14 of the Constitution. Therein, the question that had arisen for consideration was whether the direction whereby the levy in some of the municipalities is on the value of the goods, while in others it is on the basis of the weight, was discriminatory ? It was observed therein that the State Government seemed to have taken into consideration that in smaller municipalities, there is not much of demand for costly and fine clothes which have higher price, while the position is otherwise in bigger municipalites and hence no valid objection is available against the differential treatment. It was further observed therein that law is well-settled that if unequals are treated unequally, there is no discrimination and Article 14 of the Constitution is not available to be invoked.
46. It cannot be stated that the institutions which administer in regard to the affairs and problems of rural areas, are similar to the institutions which administer the affairs and tackle the problems of urban areas.
47. It is also just and proper to refer to Sakhawant Ali v. State of Orissa, in this context. Section 16 of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 was considered in the above case. The said Section prescribed the disqualifications of candidates for election and it provided inter alia that no person who is employee as a paid legal practitioner on behalf of the municipality or as legal practitioner against the municipality, was qualified for election of a seat in municipality. It was observed that such a disqualification was prescribed on the ground of avoidance of conflict between interest and duty. It was argued that it amounts to discrimination, when only the legal practitioner who appeared for the party in a proceeding against the municipality was disqualified when such a party was not disqualified even in such a case also there will be conflict between interest and duty. While adverting to the said contention, the Supreme Court observed as under :-
‘The simple answer to this contention is that legislation enacted for the achievement of a particular object or purpose need not be all embracing. It is for the Legislature to determine what categories it would embrace within the scope of legislation and merely because certain categories which would stand on the same footing as those which are covered by the legislation are left out would not render legislation which has been enacted in any manner discriminatory and violative of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution.”
48. Even assuming that in laying down the qualifications or disqualifications for being a member/Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat or member/ President of M.P.P. on one hand and Councillor or Chairman of municipality or corporation on the other, all those institutions are similar, still in view of the above judgment of the Supreme Court in Sakhawant Ali’s Case (16 supra), Section 17 of the A. P. Gram Panchayat Act cannot be held as discriminatory, when such disqualification was not laid down for being a councillor or Chairman of a municipality or corporation.
49. It is for the Parliament to prescribe qualifications or disqualifications for being a member of Legislature or Parliament and it is not for the State Legislature. So, merely because such a disqualification was not prescribed for being a member of the Parliament or Legislature, Section 17 of the A. P. Gram Panchayat Act cannot be challenged as discriminatory, for such a challenge is open in regard to the acts of the same Legislature, but not in comparison with the Acts of other Legislatures or Parliament.
50. It was next argued that in majority of the Gram Panchayats in the Singareni Collieries area majority of the voters are employees of the Singareni Collieries and if they are disqualified from being elected as member or Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, it is undemocratic and unconstitutional, for minority has to administer the affairs of the Gram Panchayat. But it may be noted that only the employees of industrial undertakings owned or controlled by the State or Central Government are disqualified and their spouses or other members of the family who are otherwise qualified, are not disqualified. Hence, even if it is a case where the majority of the families in some of these villages within the area of Singareni Collieries, belong to the employees of the Singareni Collieries, it cannot be stated that all the other members of the family of such employee, if otherwise qualified, are disqualified. It is not stated as to which provision of the Constitution is violated, when majority of the voters are disqualified from being a member/ Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat or member/President of M. P. P. Hence, it cannot be held that Section 17 of the A.P. Gram Panchayats Act in disqualifying the employee of an industrial undertaking owned or controlled by the State or Central Government, is unconstitutional.
51. One more argument was. advanced in regard to W.P.No. 11868/89. While the A.P. Mandala Praja Parishads, Zilla Parishads and Zilla Pranalika Abhivrudhi Mandalas Act, 1986 is Act 31 of 1986, Section 17 of the A. P. Gram Panchayats Act was amended by Act 32 of 1986 i.e., later Act. Section 10(g) of Act 31 of 1986, lays down that a person who is disqualified to become or continue as a member of Gram Panchayat under Section 17 of the A P. Gram Panchayats Act 1964, is disqualified for being a member of M. P. P. and by virtue of Section 5(6) of Act 31 of 1986, such a person is disqualified for being a President of M. P. P.
52. It was argued for the above writ petitioner that Section 10 (g) of Act 31 of 1986 is a case of legislation by incorporation and not a case of legislation by reference.
53. The question that arises is whether it is a case of legislation by incorporation or whether it is a case of legislation by reference, when Section 17 of the A. P. Gram Panchayats Act was referred to in Section 10 (g) of Act 31 of 1986?
54. If it is a case of legislation by incorporation, it incorporates the provisions of other statute as existed at the time of enactment of Act into which they are incorporated. But if it is a case of legislation by reference, it may be presumed that the legislative intent was to include all the subsequent amendments also made, from time to time in the provision that was referred to in the later statute. (Vide: Bajaya v. Gopikabat,
55. In Mahindra and Mahindra v. Union of India, , it was held that Section 55 of the Monopolies and Trade Restrictive Practices Act is an Act of legislation by incorporation, when it was laid down in Section 55 that any person aggrieved by an order made by the M. R. T. P. Commission under Section 13, may prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court on one or more of the grounds specified in Section 100 C.P.C. of 1908. Hence, it was held therein that the subsequent amendment of Section 100 C.P.C. cannot be imported into Section 55 of the M.R.T.P. Act, 1969.
56. But, if it is a case of legislation by reference, then it is not the section that existed as on the date of reference has to be looked into but it is the section that existed as on the date of cause of action had to be looked into. It means that it is the modified or amended section, if it is modified or amended, which has to be considered.
57. So, it is necessary to consider as to whether this is a case of legislation by incorporation or legislation by reference. This is a case of laying down the disqualification for being a member or President of M. P. P. The disqualification which is laid down for being a member or Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat, was made applicable to the member or President of M.P.P. As already observed, both the Gram Panchayat and M.P.P. administer or deal with the affairs of the rural areas. So, it cannot be stated that the Legislature intended that the disqualifications for being a member or Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat should be different for being a member or President of M.P P. Act 31 of 1986 and Act 32 of 1986 i.e., the Act for amendment of Section 17 of the A.P. Gram Panchayats Act and some other provisions therein, were considered in the same year. No material is placed to show as to whether they were considered in the same session. Any how as they were considered in the same year and the object for laying the disqualification for both the institutions, is the same, it is just and proper to hold that it is a case of legislation by reference.
58. Hence, for considering Section 10 (g) of the M.P. Act, the amended Section 17 of A. P. Gram Panchayats Act has to be referred to. As employees of industrial undertakings owned or controlled by the State or Central Government are disqualified under Section 17 of the A. P. Gram Panchayats Act as amended by Act 32 of 1986, it has to be held that after the said amendment, the employees of an industrial undertaking owned or controlled by State or Central Government, are disqualified from being a member or President of M. P. P.
59. Hence, it has to be held that the Election Tribunal rightly held that the petitioner in W. P. No. 11868 of 1989 was disqualified from being President of M. P. P. and hence the order of the lower Tribunal setting aside his election, does not warrant interference.
60. The other writ petitions are also liable to be dismissed as the contentions therein that Section 17 is unconstitutional and that the employee in Section 17 of the A. P. Gram Panchayat Act does not include workman, are negatived.
61. In the result, all these writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Advocate’s fee Rs. 300/- in each.
62. The learned counsel for the petitioner in W. P. No. 11868/89 prayed for suspension of the operation of this Judgment as the petitioner, if so advised, may prefer a writ appeal. In the circumstances the operation of the Judgment is suspended till 19-6-1991 in regard to petitioner in W. P. 11868/89 only.