JUDGMENT
V.S. Aggarwal, J.
1. The present appeal is directed against the award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Amritsar, dated 24.2.1988. By virtue of the impugned award, the learned Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs. 98,496 to respondent Punam Gurung with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of application, i.e., 28.2.1986.
2. The relevant facts are that respondent Punam Gurung is the mother of the deceased. She had filed a claim petition under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, with respect to the death of her son Sandeep Gurung on 14.12.1985. It had been alleged that the deceased was standing with his mother and aunt for crossing the road. All of them had come to Chowk Putlighar, Amritsar, for purchasing certain household goods. After making purchases, they were standing near the chowk and were about to cross it at about 2.30 p.m. when truck No. PBN 6337 belonging to Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd., Amritsar, and driven by Tirath Singh came at a high speed. It struck the deceased Sandeep and crushed him. Sandeep Gurung died at the spot. The deceased was about 5 years of age. Compensation of Rs. 1,00,000 was claimed.
3. Needless to say that in the reply filed, petition for compensation had been contested. It was asserted that at Putlighar there is always a great rush. Thus the question of driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner does not arise nor the vehicle could be driven at a high speed. The speed of the vehicle was stated to be slow. There is no negligence on the part of the driver.
4. Learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal framed issues and held that San-deep Gurung had died as a result of the accident. It was further held that it was a case of fast and negligent driving of vehicle by Tirath Singh that Sandeep Gurung died. The learned Tribunal held that even if the child would not have been employed later, he could earn Rs. 500 per month on attaining adulthood. His mother, as claimed, was wholly dependent upon him. The dependency was assessed at Rs. 400 per month and applying the multiplier of 20, compensation was awarded. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeals have been filed; one by Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd., Amritsar and Tirath Singh and the other (F.A.O. No. 756 of 1988) by Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd., Amritsar and National Insurance Co. Ltd., Amritsar. Since question involved in both these appeals is identical, by this common judgment both the appeals can be disposed of together.
5. The sole controversy raised on behalf of appellants has been to the effect that the compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal is excessive and that, according to them, for the death of a child not more than Rs. 10,000 should have been awarded as compensation. At this stage, it is worth mentioning that during the course of trial the defence of the appellants had been struck off but inadvertently they were allowed to produce the evidence. Certain basic facts cannot be disputed. The claimant-respondent who is the mother of the deceased had lost her husband sometime before the present accident. The deceased was only about 5 years of age. It is not in controversy that he died as a result of the accident with the vehicle of Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd.
6. It is well settled that in the matter of determination of compensation there cannot be any hard and fast rule. The compensation has to be reasonable and adequate. It is not to be excessive. Money compensation is never real for the calamity that falls on a mother who is a widow. The court cannot give a person what he has lost, more so to a mother who has lost her son. It can only compensate her for the loss of the son as well as for the earnings for which she may be hoping that can only make her life worth living. Certain amount of conjectures, therefore, creeps in. Supreme Court in the case of R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd., 1995 ACJ 366 (SC), in para 12 of the judgment held as under:
In its very nature whenever a Tribunal or a court is required to fix the amount of compensation in cases of accident, it involves some guesswork, some hypothetical consideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of the disability caused. But all the aforesaid elements have to be viewed with objective standards.
7. Reliance in this regard was placed on the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Bimla Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 1988 AC J 981 (P&H). Herein also the Full Bench held that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in awarding compensation is wide and comprehensive. However, the element of speculation cannot be ruled out. It all depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case as to how the compensation is to be fixed. In fact, the Supreme Court in the case of C.K. Subramonia Iyer v. T. Kunhi Kuttan Nair, 1970 ACJ 110 (SC), while dealing with the question of payment of compensation when a child had died even felt that the court has to exclude all considerations of matter which rest in speculation though some speculations are necessary. The compensation could be fixed for loss of pecuniary benefit reasonably to be expected after the child attained majority. In para 13 of the judgment it was held as under:
…In assessing damages, the court must exclude all considerations of matter which rest in speculation or fancy though conjecture to some extent is inevitable. As a general rule parents are entitled to recover the present cash value of the prospective service of the deceased minor child. In addition they may receive compensation for loss of pecuniary benefits reasonably to be expected after the child attains majority. In the matter of ascertainment of damages, the appellate court should be slow in disturbing the findings reached by the courts below, if they have taken all the relevant facts into consideration.
8. In the cited case, lesser compensation was granted because of the fact that the father of the child was a substantial person. He has a good business. He did not need assistance from his son. Therefore, compensation of Rs. 11,000 awarded under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was deemed adequate.
9. Can we apply the said principle in the present case? The answer in principle is yes. But keeping in view the facts, the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of C.K. Subramonia Iyer, 1970 ACJ 110 (SC) is not attracted. In the first part, the respondent-claimant could certainly claim compensation for the loss of pecuniary benefits that were reasonably to be expected when the child was to grow. The learned Tribunal took the income at Rs. 500 per month on the growth of the child and fixed the dependency at Rs. 400 per month which looks reasonable. The multiplier of 20 was applied. Keeping in view the young age, it is not excessive. As regards the facts of the case, the same are different from the case of C.K. Subramonia Iyer (supra). Reasons are not far to fetch. In that case the father of the child was well off and could not expect financial assistance. Here is a lady who has lost her husband and now her son. It is not shown that she has enough income. In fact, she could only hope to be dependent on his eldest son who is no more in the world. In the peculiar facts, therefore, it is improper to interfere in the compensation awarded. It is known from the decision in the case of Jagbir Singh v. General Manager, Punjab Roadways, 1987 ACJ 15 (SC), that when the compensation is determined on the basis of material on record, interference by the High Court will not be proper. Same is the position herein. The compensation awarded is based on the material on record and, therefore, there is no ground to interfere.
10. For these reasons, the appeals being without merit must fail and are dismissed.