Bombay High Court High Court

Sudipta Nag vs Deputy Commissioner Of Labour And … on 10 February, 1999

Bombay High Court
Sudipta Nag vs Deputy Commissioner Of Labour And … on 10 February, 1999
Equivalent citations: 1999 (82) FLR 223, (1999) IIILLJ 1331 Bom
Author: N Pandya
Bench: N Pandya


JUDGMENT

N.J. Pandya, J.

1. The petitioner who is a workman was employed by the respondent No. 2 on October 1, 1988 and was put in on probation for three months. It was further extended by order dated January 1, 1989. On January 28, 1989 an incident occurred which led to his eventual termination on February 16, 1989. The workman succeeded in getting a reference made before the Labour Court, Bombay and the learned Presiding Officer of the Seventh Court dealt with Reference IDA No. 96 of 1991 by his order dated November 21, 1996. He disallowed the prayer for reinstatement but directed the employer-respondentNo.2 to pay compensation of Rs. 25,000/- to the workman. This order of the trial Court is not challenged by the employer.

2. The workman of course is not satisfied with this order and seeking reinstatement he has filed the present petition. The termination order is at Exh. A. Page 12. In the first paragraph while informing the petitioner that his services are terminated with effect from February 16, 1989, it has been stated that this action is on disciplinary ground.

3. Naturally this left the petitioner with a grievance that while on probation if his services were terminated as it was unsatisfactory, there probably could have been no grievance with the petitioner. However, when stigma is attached by use of the words “on disciplinary ground” which forms the last three words of the first paragraph referred to above, least that was expected from the employer was to hold an enquiry.

4. In this background the trial Court permitted the parties to lead evidence. The workman has been examined and two witnesses of the employer have also been examined. After considering the evidence, the trial Court has come to the aforesaid conclusion.

5. 1 was taken through the deposition of the petitioner at page 56, Exh.U-4. It clearly indicates that the two incidents referred to by the employer are virtually admitted by him. One relates to non-checking of a vehicle which had entered the premises of the employer. The employer is National Centre for the Performing Arts supposed to be acting at national level. It has been referred to as the employer in the present order.

6. The employer felt and under the circumstances rightly that when a person is on probation and because of instructions given when he is supposed to check the vehicle entering the precinct, not only he does not check the vehicle which was Maruti van containing some plans but when asked for he did not do so. According to the witnesses of the employer, he misbehaved by answering rudely or just shirking it off as a matter of no consequence.

7. In the trial Court, the workman has tried to make out a case of want of instructions in writing for checking vehicles. However, the workman himself admits that he did check the vehicles on previous occasions without any instructions in writing.

8. The second incident no doubt the petitioner has denied but as stated above from the employer’s side there is evidence in that regard. His immediate superior was one Mr. Prasad. He has left the service when the evidence was being recorded. One Mr. Rajput who was the Administrative Officer has been examined as one of the witnesses of the employer. He has referred to the report submitted by Mr, Prasad, has produced the same and has also produced letters dated February 10, 1989 and February 20, 1989 from the petitioner. Report of Mr. Prasad is dated February 13, 1989. Clearly it is stated by the said witness that the performance of the petitioner was not satisfactory as a security guard.

9. In the aforesaid background of the termination order, admittedly when the employer has not held any enquiry and therefore before the trial Court when parties had led evidence and had considered the same and when the trial Court has come to the conclusion as to the correctness of the employer’s action, I do not see any reason to interfere with the same.

10. The evidence before the trial Court as can be seen from the compilation supplied by the employer does contain material which if taken into consideration can lead to the finding as done by the trial Court. I, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the order. I also do not find the trial Court having in any way misdirected itself in considering the evidence. The conclusion is certainly warranted on the basis of the material that is on record.

11. The net result, therefore, is that the petition fails. It is dismissed. Rule is discharged.