JUDGMENT
A. Gopal Rao, J.
1. Defendants 2 and 3, who are the legal representatives of the 1st defendant, in O.S. No. 688/1983 on the file of I Additional District Munsif Court, Tenali, are the appellants in this second appeal. Second plaintiff in the suit is the respondent-herein. Plaintiffs filed the suit for mandatory injunction to demolish the rice mill and the mill building constructed in plot D and also for permanent injunction to restrain the defendants and their men from operating or working the rice mill in plot D till the same is demolished. Case of the plaintiffs is that the second plaintiff is the daughter of the first plaintiff and they are the owners of the terraced building shown in plot P in the plaint plan, wherein they are residing. First defendant purchased plot D on the western side of plot P. There is a three yards’ width lane for the use of plaintiffs and other neighbourers to go to the street on the northern side. There was a rice mill in the site, which is on the west of the three yards’ width lane in the north-west direction. First defendant had taken that mill on lease and the same was demolished later. The 1st defendant constructed a new rice-mill installing a 55 H.P. motor in plot D and shifted the machinery from the old rice mill to the building constructed by him in plot D. The locality is in the midst of Tenali Town, Block No.l, Ward No. 3, in T.S. No. 79. Some of the plots on the road-side are declared as ‘commercial area’, but it has not been declared as an ‘industrial locality’. The house of the plaintiffs is adjacent to plot D on its southern side. The construction of the rice mill by the defendants is causing danger and nuisance to the plaintiffs and also other residents of the locality in general. The husk from the rice mill is falling in the house of the plaintiffs apart from obstructing the natural light and air resulting in danger to the building of the palintiffs as the working of the mill is resulting in vibration of the walls. At times, the insects from the husk are also creeping into the house of plaintiffs, causing health hazards to the inmates of the plaintiff’s house; the defendant No.l constructed the rice mill without obtaining the necessary permission as per law and he did not also obtain the running licence from the municipality; in fact he obtained permission from the municipality for constructing a godown, but surruptitiously installed the rice mill as he is a powerful man; the complaints given by the plaintiffs to the higher authorities did not yield any results. Therefore, the plaintiffs filed the suit, for the reliefs mentioned above.
2. Pending trial, 1st defendant died and his sons, defendants 2 and 3 are brought on record as his legal representatives. First defendant had already filed a written statement denying various allegations made in the plaint. It is stated in the written statement filed by defendant No.l that – the plaint plan is incomplete and incorrect; the position of the old shed in which the rice mill was existing has not been correctly shown in the plaint plan; the eastern wall of the old shed of the rice mill is the western boundary of the joint lane; the southern wall of the old shed of the rice mill extended upto the point which is in line with the southern boundary of the D marked plot; the entire area is located in T.S.No.79 of Tenali Municipality, which is classified as ‘commercial area’; there was a steel factory in plot-D earlier; the old shed and the rice mill were in existence for more than 55 years prior to their demolition and the same were owned by the grant-father of the 2nd plaintiff and the rice mill in that old shed was functioning till the building was demolished and the rice mill was shifted to plot D by the defendant; first plaintiff or his predecessors-in-title never complained of any inconvenience or nuisance on account of operation of the rice mill in the old shed; the old shed and the place where the new mill is located in plot D are at equal distance from the house of the plaintiffs; therefore, the position regarding sound or pollution of air by husk has not been atered by the shifting of the mill to plot D so far as the plaintiffs are concerned; all the necessary permissions from all concerned authorities were in fact obtained by the 1st defendant for locating and running the mill in plot D; the construction of the building was done after obtaining necessary permission from the municipality and none of the provisions of the Rice-milling Industries Act or the A.P. Municipalities Act or Public Health Act or the Indian Easements Act have been violated by the defendant; plaintiffs have no right to question the orders passed by various authorities granting permission to the defendant to run the rice mill in plot D; there is neither a window nor a door-way in the wall separating the house of the plaintiffs from plot D and, therefore, the question of husk directly falling into the house of the plaintiffs does not arise; the existence of insects in the husk and paddy is inconceivable as the husk is being cleared off almost every day or once in two days; the suit filed is premature as the same is filed even before the rice mill in plot D started functioning; the allegation of the plaintiffs that their house will become unfit for human habitation is false; no valid grounds are made out for demolition of the rice mill in plot D, and the suit is, therefore, not maintainable.
3. On the basis of the above pleadings, the trial Court framed appropriate issues and on consideration of the entire material on record, oral and documentary, decreed the suit in part, granting permanent injunction restraining the defendants from running the rice mill, but denied the relief of mandatory injunction for demolition of the building and the rice mill. The appeal filed by the defendants/appellants-herein, A.S. No. 51 of 1993 in the Court of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Tenali, was also dismissed, confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Aggrieved by the same, the present second appeal is filed.
4. Sri M. Chandrasekhar Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants contended that the appellants shifted the rice mill from the old premises from western side of the road to his plot on the eastern side of the very-same road, and the distance between the old mill and the new mill is only 15 feet and the new mill being only 10 feet on the north of the plaintiff/respondent’s house, there is no alteration or increase in the volume of sound or pollution of air by husk etc., by the working of the mill in the new premises; that the old mill had been functioning for the past sixty years and the respondent, though being a resident of the same locality, did not raise any objection for running the mill in the old premises; that in fact, in addition to the appellant’s rice mill there are three other rice mills within the same locality which are being operated without any objection. In other words, the learned Counsel for the appellant contends that, in fact, the respondent acquiesced for running of the mill in the locality without any objection for all these years and, therefore, she cannot justifiably object to the running of the mill in the new premises, which is similarly situate as that of the old premises. The learned Counsel contended that, assuming that the running of the mill in the new premises may cause some nuisance, unless and until it is established that the nuisance caused is actionable as per law, no injunction can be granted by the Court restraining the appellants from the running the mill. ‘Nuisance’, according to the learned Counsel for the Appellants, must be proved to be such that an ordinary person cannot bear the same, and the test is -whether it is a new source of nuisance or the person objecting is subjected to more nuisance than what was in existence when the rice-mill was functioning in the old premises. Learned Counsel for appellants also contended that the evidence on record did not establish the existence of any vibrations in the walls of the building of the respondent/plaintiff or there is any diminution in the enjoyment of light or air by the respondent/plaintiff. It is further contended that the locality in question having been declared as a ‘light industrial area’, naturally there will be some sound and pollution of air, which have to be borne by the respondent/plaintiff, being a resident of the said locality.
5. In opposition to the above submissions, Sri B.V. Subbaiah, learned Counsel for the respondent/plaintiff, contended that the new rice mill with 50 Horse Power Motor is located adjoining the separating wall between mill and the house of the respondent/plaintiff, resulting in a lot of nuisance by the sound and pollution of air by husk and also the same is endangering the life of the plaintiff /respondent as the insects in the husk are creeping into the house of the respondent/plaintiff and the building of the respondent/plaintiff is also likely to be damaged because of the continuous vibrations caused by the running of the mill by the appellants. In fact, according to the learned Counsel for respondent, there is ample open space adjoining the house of the appellants and in front of the area where the present mill is located, where the appellants can locate the mill, and instead of doing so, on the ground that it causes nuisance to himself, the deceased father of the appellants (first defendant in the suit) has located the mill adjacent to the wall of the respondent/plaintiff. Learned Counsel for the respondent also contended that the distance where the old mill was located is nearly 30 feet away from the house of the plaintiff and the present mill is located within about 9 feet from the house of the respondent/plaintiff with a motor of increased Horse Power resulting in lot of nuisance to the respondent/plaintiff. He submits that the father of appellants (first defendant) obtained the permission from the Municipality for constructing a shed only, but not for the purpose of locating a rice mill, but the appellants are running the rice mill without obtaining the necessary permits from the various authorities and also without obtaining the running licence for the mill. The nuisance caused by the very fact that a 55 H.P. motor is installed within a distance of 9 feet from the house of the respondent/plaintiff itself, is actionable and there is no definite formula to establish whether the nuisance is actionable or not, and the same must be judged from the facts and circumstances of each case, contends the learned Counsel for the respondent/plaintiff. He submits that both the Courts below have considered the entire evidence on record and concluded that the running of the mill by the appellants adjacent to the house of the respondent/ plaintiff results in unbearable nuisance to the respondent/plaintiff, and the findings recorded by the Courts below/being findings of fact, cannot be interfered with by this Court in this second appeal.
6. In view of the rival contentions, the point for determination in this second appeal is – whether the Courts below are right in granting permanent injunction restraining the appellants from running the rice mill in the premises in question, adjacent to the house of the respondent/plaintiff?
7. In order to establish that there is acquiescence on the part of the respondent/plaintiff for running the rice mill in the locality without any complaint regarding the nuisance etc., the learned Counsel for the appellants contended that the house of the respondent is equi-distant from the place where the old mill was located and the present area where the new mill is located, viz., 11 feet; there are three other mills existing in the same locality; the locality is in the heart of Tenali Town; the area in question was already declared as ‘commercial area’ and now the same has been converted into ‘light industrial area’; whatever nuisance or inconvenience that was in existence earlier is continuing to be there without any increase and hence injunction cannot be granted restraining the appellants from running the mill. He pointed out, in support of the above contention, that the plaintiff as P.W.I admitted the existence of the old mill on the north-west direction of plot t) and the old mill was about one or two feet away from the jointgully on its west. Learned Counsel for appellants submits that the width of the gully being 9 feet, adding 2 feet to the same as deposed by plaintiff, the distance will be only 11 feet from the house of the respondent to the old mill and the present mill is at a distance of 9 feet from the house of the respondent, and, therefore, there is absolutely no changed circumstance regarding the distance of the new mill from the house of the respondent/plaintiff. He further contended that in view of the admission made by the plaintiff as P.W.I, the distance as admitted by her alone must be taken into consideration and the distance as recorded by the Commissioner in his report Ex.C-2 has to be ignored. He submits further mat the 1st plaintiff’s father himself given the site on lease only for establishment of the old mill and absolutely there was no objection for the running of the rice mill, at any point of time. In the circumstances, it is contended by the learned Counsel that the respondent, having acquiesced for the running of the rice mill in the old area cannot now have any objection. Sri B.V. Subbaiah, learned Counsel for the respondent/plaintiff, however, contended that the width of the gully was 9 feet but now it is 15 feet and the Commissioner who made local inspection gave the distance as 37.6 feet.from the house of the respondent to the old mill and that report of the Commissioner must be accepted as it pertains to the groundrealities; that the appellants were originally running the old rice mill with a motor having 20 Horse Power which was later increased by 10 Horse Power, making it to a total Horse Power of 30, whereas now a motor with 55 Horse Power is installed, in the new mill, adjacent to the separating wall between the house of the respondent/plaintiff and the new mill, which is causing nuisance to the respondent/plaintiff on account of the high sound created and also as the new mill is now immediately adjacent to the house of the respondent/plaintiff; the husk is directly blown into the house of the respondent, in addition to causing vibrations to the wall of respondent’s house. All these aspects were noticed, according to the learned Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff, by the Commissioner and the said facts cannot be assailed now by the appellant in this second appeal.
8. A close scrutiny of the plans, filed by Commissioner as well as the plaintiff, will disclose that the old mill was diagonally situated at a tangent from the house of the plaintiff/respondent with a considerable distance viz., 37.6 feet, whereas the present new mill is just adjacent to the separating wall between the house of the respondent/plaintiff and the new mill. Certainly, the new mill, located next/adjacent to the house of the respondent/plaintiff, is far nearer to the house of the respondent/plaintiff than the old milK Merely because the respondent/plaintiff did not raise any objection for the running of the old mill, it cannot be said that the respondent/plaintiff is debarred from contending that the running of the new mill adjacent to her house will result in nuisance. A reading of G.O.Ms. No. 784, Municipal Administration Department, dated 7-9-1987 will disclose that the site on which the new mill has been located alone has been declared as ‘light industrial area’ and not the entire locality. The other rice mills are located at a distance, the running of which is not directly causing any nuisance to the respondent/plaintiff. Further, at present, admittedly, a 55 H.P. motor is installed by the appellants in the new mill, next to the separating wall between the house of the respondent/plaintiff and the new mill, which itself resulted in increasing sound and causing vibrations to the walls, resulting in nuisance to the respondent/plaintiff. In the circumstances, the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants that the respondent/ plaintiff is experiencing the same intensity of nuisance as it existed when the old mill was being operated, cannot be accepted. A reading of the deposition of the plaintiff as P.W.rwill disclose that there is absolutely no admission that the distance from her house to the old mill was only 11 feet. What all that was stated by P.W.I is that the old mill was located 2 feet away from the compound wall and the width of the road was 9 feet. The location of the old mill was not in line with the house of the respondent/plaintiff, as disclosed from the report and plan, filed by the Commissioner and also the plaint plan. The old mill was diagonally situated at a tangent with considerable distance from the house of the respondent. Therefore, the report of the Commissioner and the plan filed by him must prevail. The decisions in-Punnamma v. Venkata Subba Rao; , Basai v. Hasan Raza Khan, and Sadasiva Chettiar v. Subramaniam, (1977) IMLJ 67 relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellants which are to the effect that injunction cannot be granted by the Courts when the position regarding the nuisance which was already in existence has not been altered or increased by shifting the mill, cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case, in view of the fact that the present new mill is locatedjustadjacentto the house of the respondent/plaintiff whereas the old mill was at a distance from the house of the respondent, separated by a lane with a width of 11 feet.
9. In the Book, – “Anand and Iyer’s Specific Relief Act”, 9th Edn. Volume 2, the learned authors, after discussing the entire case-law on the subject, pointed out at p.131: “Acquiescence is only a form of estoppel and it is of the essence of acquiescence that the party acquiescing should be aware of and by words or condut should represent that he assents to, what is a violation of his rights and should have been deluded by the representation into thinking that his wrongful action was assented to by the other party”. To this effect, there is absolutely no evidence in this case, that the respondent/plaintiff consciously acquiesced for the nuisance, if any, for running of the old mill by the appellants/defendants and there is no justification to say that the respondent/plaintiff acquiesced for the nuisance that will be caused by the running of the new mill by the appellants. Therefore, I hold that the acquiescence of the respondent/plaintiff, if any, for running the Old mill, cannot be a bar for objecting to the running of the new mill causing nuisance to the plaintiff/ respondent as the same is located now adjacent to her house.
10. Learned Counsel for the appellants contended that the nuisance, if any, must be established to be actionable perse, for granting the injunction against the appellants/defendants and if the nuisance is not actionable, the same cannot form the basis for granting the injunction. According to him, nuisance must be substantial and the degree of nuisance is not an abstract thing, but depends upon the place, time and the intensity, which necessarily has to be established for obtaining the relief of injunction. He further contended that the nuisance complained of should be by a reasonable person but not by a highly sensitive person. He submitted that the old mill was in existence for more than sixty years without any complaint by the respondent/plaintiff or any other person of the locality and the same mill has been shifted now to the new place, adjacent to the house of the plaintiff/respondent; that the locality was treated as commercial area and now it is declared as light industrial area; there are three more mills existing in the same locality and in each of the houses in the locality some commercial activity or the other is going on without any objection; therefore, there is no valid reason to grant injunction restraining the appellants from operating the new mill. In support of the above submissions, he relied upon the following decisions:-
Behari Lal v. James Maclean; AIR 1924 All. 392;
K. Karunanidhi v. R. Renganathan; ;
Cawashah Bomanji v. Prafulla Nath; AIR 1941 Nagpur 364;
A. Venkata Rao v. N. Satyanarayana, 1988 (2) ALT 738.
11. In Behari Lai’s case, AIR 1924 All. 392, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that a ‘discomfort’ must be substantial and must be to any person irrespective of age, health or status, and must be actionable. In K. Karunanidhi’s case”, it was held that “in deciding whether in any particular case this right has been invaded and a nuisance thereby caused, it is necessary to determine whether the act complained of is an inconvenience materially interfering with the ordinary physical comfort of human existence, not merely according to elegant or dainty modes and habits of living, but according to plain and sober and simple notions obtaining among the people in that locality. It is also necessary to take into account the circumstances and character of the locality in which the complainant is living, and any similar annoyance which previously existed there”. To the same effect is the decision of a Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Cawashah Bomanji v. Prafulla Nath AIR 1941 Nagpur 364. In Ram Rattan v. Munna Lal, , a learned Judge of the Punjab High Court held that “the standard of comfort differs according to the situation of the property and the class of people who inhabit it”. In A. Venkata Rao’s case6, a learned single Judge of this Court held that “in view of the great advances in modern technology and engineering and the methods evolved for preventing different types of pollution, the Court must consider before granting a permanent injunction, whether the noise, smoke or dust can be adequately prevented by the defendant complying with the conditions imposed by the relevant statutory authorities or whether any further conditions are to be imposed. The Court also has to see the nature of the locality, the pre-existing conditions and whether the defendant’s unit will or will not substantially add to the existing inconvenience.”
12. Keeping the above decisions in mind, now we have to see whether the ‘nuisance’ caused by the appellants’ rice mill to the respondent, warrants granting of injunction restraining the appellants from running the mill?
13. No doubt, it is true that the old rice mill was in existence for a period of 60 years, though in the same locality, away from the house of the respondent. Now, admittedly, the new mill is located adjoining the house of the respondent. In Ex.C-2 Commissioner’s report, dated 14-11-1983, the Commissioner noted that-the distance between the house wall of the respondent-herein and mill wall of the appellants herein is 8 feet, that by the side of the northern house wall of the respondent-herein, there is an open cement drainage channel of 1 feet width and excluding this drainage channel there is only 7 feet open space between the southern wall of the rice mill and the northern house wall of the respondent-herein. The Commissioner also noted that-the husk room of the new rice mill is placed in the 7 feet vacant site opposite to the stair-cases of the 1st floor of the respondent; that the distance between husk room and house wall of respondent is 5-5″ including drainage channel; and that the machinery and motors of the mill are installed on the southern side of the mill. In Ex.C-1, Commissioner’s report, dated 13-10-1992, it was noted by the Municipal Health Officer of Tenali that-“the wall of the husk room of the suit schedule rice mill and the boundary wall of the residence of the petitioner is common. The mill was put in action and observed. It was noted that fine dust was emitted from the husk room and mill shed also”. The Commissioner who filed Ex.C-1 report, being the Municipal Health Officer of Tenali, also noted-“the vegetable dusts like hay or grain dust can cause farmer’s lung (cancer) in which lungs are damaged. I cannot say how much damage is caused to the residents of the petitioner’s house, but the dust emitted from the Rice-Mill is injurious to health. The Commissioner who gave his report on 30-8-1991 (Ex.C-4) was appointed again for re-inspecting the mill. After re-inspection the said Commissioner filed Ex.C-5 report, dated 24-6-1992. In the said report, he noted that-“the mill was running in its full capacity and I observed the vibrations on the compound wall of the petitionerer’s building slightly. But no vibrations were observed on the walls of the petitioner’s building”. He also noted – “I observed that the dust was flying towards the plaintiff’s house while the mill was running. At the time, the wind was blowing from south to north. I observed the deposit fo dust on the floor of the plaintiff’s building and on the walls of the mill”.
14. As mentioned already, the learned Counsel for the appellants contended that the reports filed by the Commissioners regarding the distance of the old mill and the house of the respondent as 37.6 feet, has to be ignored having regard to the admission of the respondent herself as P.W.I to the effect that the distance between the old mill and her house is only 11 feet. This contention cannot be accepted. What P.W.I stated was that the distance between the compound wall of the old mill and the old mill was two feet and the width of the road is about 9 feet. This part of the deposition of P.W.I should not be read in isolation. It must be read together with the other evidence as a whole, which discloses that the house of the plaintiff/respondent is not in line with the old mill and the old mill was located at a tangent from the house of the plaintiff. In the circumstances, it must be held that the distance between the house of the plaintiff /respondent and the old mill is not the same distance between the house of the plaintiff/respondent and the new mill. The Commissioner, who measured the distance, has indicated the distance from the plaintiffs house and the old mill as 37.6 feet, and the said fact has not been established as incorrect by the appellants. The reports of the Commissioners appointed in this case disclose that in fact the husk from the rice mill of the appellants is directly settling on the compound wall and also on the floor of the house of the plaintiff/ respondent. May be, the respondent/plaintiff is not utilising the ground-floor of her building for living purposes. But, that does not mean that there is no nuisance caused to the respondent/plaintiff by the running of the appellants’ rice mill. Apart from the collection of husk in the house of the respondent/ plaintiff, the Commissioners’ reports also disclose that when the rice mill is running in full capacity it is causing vibrations in the compound wall of the respondent’s house. That apart, admittedly, in the new mill a motor of 55 Horse Power is installed within the open space of 7 feet between the new mill and the compound wall separating the house of the respondent/plaintiff. This is clear from Ex.C-3 Commissioner’s report dated 14-11-1983. When the Commissioners appointed by the Court themselves have noted the details regarding the nuisance caused to the respondent/plaintiff by the running of the mill by the appellants, on three aspects – (i) the husk falling on the floor; (ii) vibrations caused to the compound wall, and (iii) the sound emanated by running the new mill with a 55 Horse Power Motor, any amount of oral evidence let in by the parties pales into insignificance and has to be ignored/ excluded. Even though the respondent/plaintiff did not object to the running of the old rice mill by the appellants, certainly she is within her right to raise objection for running the new rice mill, which is located adjacent to her house leaving a distance of only 7 feet. In the circumstances, the nuisance complained of by the respondent/plaintiff and established by the reports of the Commissioners, is certainly an ‘actionable nuisance’. Nuisance, if any, that was in existence prior to the establishment of the new mill, is irrelevant, as the nuisance now caused to the respondent/plaintiff by the working of the new mill located adjacent to her house, is an actionable nuisance.
15. Learned Counsel for appellants contended that the evidence let in by the appellants was not at all considered, and the evidence let in by the respondent was not considered in the right perspective, by the lower appellate Court, while granting injunction against the appellants.
16. This contention has to be rejected for the simple reason that the lower appellate Court has considered, in fact, the entire evidence on record and concluded thus:
“In these circumstances, the argument of the Counsel, for the appellants that except P.W.I no others complained about the nuisance that is being caused due to the working of the rice mill cannot be accepted and the evidence on record clearly shows that the working of the rice mill is causing nuisance to the plaintiff and it is also health hazard for them and the damage to the respondent cannot be adequately compensated in terms of finance…..”
I have already held that in view of the reports filed by the Commissioners, oral evidence let in by both the parties loses its importance. In the circumstances, whatever material is available on record was in fact considered by the lower appellate Court before recording its findings that the nuisance caused to the respondent by the working of the new mill by the appellants, warrants granting of injunction restraining tine appellants from running the mill. No doubt, the lower appellate Court did not, in so many words, say that the nuisance caused by the running of the new mill by the appellants is an ‘actionable nuisance’. However, a reading of the entire judgment of the lower appellate Court clearly indicates that the said Court had no doubt whatsoever that the nuisance caused by the running of the appellants’ mill is an actionable nuisance for the plaintiff/ respondent. In fact, the lower appellate Court observed that the “working of the rice mill is causing nuisance to the plaintiff and it is also health hazard for them and the damage to the respondent cannot be acquately compensated in terms of finance”. In the circumstances, the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below that the respondent/plaintiff is being subjected to unbearable nuisance on account of the running of the new mill by the appellants, is correct and the Courts below are justified in granting the injunction. The same are hereby confirmed.
17. Relying upon the decision in A. Venkata Rao’s case (8 supra), Sri Chandrasekhar Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants, contended that this Court can permit the appellants to run the mill, which is established incurring heavy expenditure, by laying down any conditions, to prevent the nuisance, if any, caused to the respondent, instead of granting permanent injunction restraining the appellants from running the mill permanently.
18. The location of the present rice mill of the appellants and the installation of a 55 Horse Power motor adjacent to the compound wall of the respondent’s house are such that, no possible conditions can be laid down by this Court, to mitigate the nuisance or to prevent the vibrations caused to the walls of the respondent’s premises. The only condition or possible method, open to the appellants, if they want to run their mill, would be to shift the present rice mill, or atleast the 55 Horse Power motor and the husk chamber, if permissible under the relevant Acts and Rules, to their own open site on the northern side of the present rice mill, adjoining their house.
19. The rice mill, as it exists, if operated, will cause nuisance to the respondent, as already held by me, and therefore, there is no other alternative except to confirm the permanent injunction granted by the Courts below. The said finding is accordingly confirmed.
20. Learned Counsel appearing for both the parties referred to the following decisions of the Supreme Court, wherein the scope and power of this Court in dealing with second appeals filed under Section 100 CPC, is pointed out:-
D. Pattabhiratmaswamy v. Hanymayya, AIR (46) 1959 SC 57;
Ramappa v. Bojappa, AIR (50) 1963 SC 1625;
E. Mahaboob v.N. Sabbarayan, ;
Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh, and
Bhagwan Sharma v. Bani Ghosh, 1993 Supp. (3) SCC 497 = 1993(1) APLJ 55 (SC).
21. I have already confirmed the findings recorded by the Courts below. Therefore, it is unnecessary to advert to the above decisions.
22. In the result, the second appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.