High Court Punjab-Haryana High Court

Sheela vs E.S.I. Corpn. on 31 August, 1989

Punjab-Haryana High Court
Sheela vs E.S.I. Corpn. on 31 August, 1989
Equivalent citations: 1990 ACJ 476, (1991) ILLJ 247 P H
Author: G Majithia
Bench: G Majithia


JUDGMENT

G.R. Majithia, J.

1. This appeal under Section 82 of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (for short ‘the Act’) is directed against the order of the Employees’ Insurance Court, Chandigarh, whereby he dismissed the application filed by the appellant under Section 75 of the Act.

The Facts

2. The appellant’s husband was employed with Electronic Products of India, Industrial Area, Chandigarh. The establishment is covered under the Act. The deceased husband of the appellant was also covered under the Act and was allotted insurance No. 2340621 and the appellant is a dependant within the meaning of Section 2(6A) of the Act. On December 11, 1981, the deceased husband of the appellant left his house at about 8.30a.m. to join his duties at 9 a.m. He used to board a local bus at Sector 19, local bus stand. At about 9.30 a.m. a stranger came to the residence of the appellant and informed her that the person who was carrying the card issued by the Employees’ State Insurance Department had expired at the local bus stand Sector 19, Chandigarh. The appellant gave intimation in this regard to the respondent to release the benefits payable to her under the Act. The same were denied necessitating the filing of a petition under Section 75 of the Act.

3. The respondent contested the application primarily on the ground that the death had not occurred out of and during the course of employment. There was no employment injury. The pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues;

(1) Whether the impungned orders dated 11th October 1982 and 5th November 1982 are illegal, void and liable to be set aside on the grounds mentioned in the petition? OPP.

(2) Whether the petition against the respondent is not maintainable? OPR.

(3) Relief.

The Employees’ Insurance Court found that the deceased had not died due to employment injury. Resultantly, issue No. 1 was found against the appellant. Issue No. 2 was answered in favour of the appellant.

4. There is no dispute that the deceased husband of the appellant was covered under the Act and the appellant being widow of the deceased is a dependant within the meaning of Section 2(6A) of the Act. The appellant appeared as PW-1 at the trial and stated on oath that her husband was in the employment of Electronic Products of India. He used to go to the factory in a local bus. He generally left the residence at 8.15 a.m. On December 11, 1981. in the morning, he went to the office of Mr. Khanna. On his return, he picked up his tiffin from his residence and left for the factory. Within 10-15 minutes of his departure, a gentleman showed her the identity card issued by the Employees’ State Insurance Department and informed her that the bearer of the card expired at the local bus stand. She rushed to the bus stand and collected his deadbody and brought the same to her residence. The evidence of the appellant that her husband expired at the bus stand finds corroboration from the statement of RW-1 A.S. Sareen, Manager, Local Office, Employees’ State Insurance, Chandigarh. He stated on oath that he investigated the case and submitted his report wherein he had stated that the insured person died at the local bus stand of Sector 19, Chandigarh at 8.30 a.m. The time and place of death stands established from the statement of RW 1. The appellant’s version that her husband died when he was on his way to the office could not be shattered in the cross-examination. She was cross-examined at length but she stood like a rock and was categorie about the manner, place and time of the death of her husband. In rebuttal evidence, K.C. Sharma, Insurance Inspector, stated that the deceased did not receive any employment injury. In cross-examination he admitted that he did not investigate the case personally. He did not visit the place of death nor did he make any enquiry from the appellant with regard to the accident in which her husband died. He also did not make any enquiry from the P.G.I, with regard to the death of the deceased. No reliance can be placed on the testimony of this witness.

5. As observed above, the only conclusion which can be drawn is that the deceased husband of the appellant died while he was going to his place of work. While determining whether the accident had occurred in the course of employment, the following proposition emerges from the law declared by the Apex Court in Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. v. Bai Valu Raja, (1958-II-LLJ-249 at 251):

“(i) As a rule, employment of a workman does not commence until he has reached the place of employment and does not continue when he has left the place of employment;

(ii) Notwithstanding the aforesaid rule, it is now well settled position in law that the said proposition (i) is subject to a rider, namely, that it is subject to the theory of notional extension of the employers’ premises so as to include an area which the workman passes and repasses in going to and in leaving the actual place of work;

(iii) Notional extension theory can be taken recourse to in order to extend in both ‘time’ and ‘place’ in a reasonable manner, in order to ascertain whether an accident to a workman may be regarded as in the course of employment though he had not actually reached his employment premises;

(iv) Facts and circumstances of each case will have to be examined very carefully in order to determine whether the accident arose out of and in the course of employment of the workman keeping in view at all times the theory of notional extension.”

6. Each and every one of the aforesaid propositions constitutes the real ratio of the decision. What is of utmost importance is to realise that recognition has been accorded to the notional extension. Once the theory of notional extension is properly applied to the factual situation pertaining to the particular case, it has ‘ to be held that the accident occurred within the area falling within the notional extension theory. The deceased was on his way to the place of his work and the dependants of the employee would be entitled to the benefits under the Act. It will be useful to reproduce the following observations of M.P. Thakkar, J. in Sadgunaben Amrutial v. Employees’ State Insurance Corporation, 1982 ACJ (Supp) 443 (Gujarat), wherein it was held thus:

“Only the bus and the few minutes in the bus, stand between the workman and the factory. The notional extension is permissible in time as also in space, as has been declared by the Supreme Court. Once this formula is applied, as it must be, it can be unhesitatingly said that the employee concerned was within the notionally extended zone. And thus it can be said that the accident occurred in the course of employment for the workman had set out on his journey to the place of work. But for the fact that he had collapsed he would have been at the factory within a couple of minutes. In our opinion, notional extension theory can be meaningfully applied in a situation like the present one, so as to effectuate the intention of the legislature to extend the benefits to the workman who contributes towards the costs of running of the scheme evolved with a benevolent eye in order to appease the social conscience. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the accident had occurred in the course of employment.”

7. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal is allowed. The order of the Employees’ Insurance Court is set aside and the orders dated October 10, 1982 and November 5, 1982 are quashed. The respondent is directed to release all the benefits payable to the appellant under the Act within one month from the date of receipt of this order. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.