JUDGMENT
1. The petitioner was not permitted to sit in the examination for Secondary Grade Teacher (Urdu) which was held on 12th July, 1997. She moved this Writ petition and an interim direction was given on 11 -7-1997 after admitting the Writ petition, to permit the petitioner to appear for the written test.
2. Counter has been filed and also a vacate stay application lias been filed, I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties in 1998(4) FR-F-33
detail and with their consent this Writ petition is disposed of finally.
3. The material facts are not disputed. The petitioner is a graduate and she has also completed Teacher Training Certificate course in Urdu medium. Certain posts of Urdu Teachers were to be filled up and she was a candidate sponsored by the Employment Exchange. The petitioner got enrolled in the Employment Exchange in 1984 and from 1984 till 1997 she was never sponsored for any job and it is only in the year 1997 she was for the first time sponsored for the job where her candidature was rejected on the ground that she was not within the age prescribed by the notification. When the petitioner was informed that she could not be considered for appointment and could not sit in the examination she filed this Writ petition and it is stated at the Bar that on the strength of the interim directions by this Court the petitioner was allowed to sit in the examination but her results have not been declared so far as her eligibility is doubtful. The notification which was issued by the respondents laid down the qualification and criteria for eligibility. One of the conditions was that the applicant should have completed 18 years and should not have exceeded 36 years as on 1-7-1996. The date of birth of the petitioner admittedly is 1-7-1960. Her application was entertained, she was issued a Hall ticket. Later on she was informed that her Hall ticket has been cancelled and withdrawn on the ground that she was over aged. Now, the only controversy which lias to be decided in this petition is, as to whether the petitioner was over aged on 1st July, 1996 or not.
4. The petitioner is admittedly born on 1st July, 1960 and the case of the respondents is that she completed 36 years of age on 30th June, 1996 the cut-off date was 1st July, 1996 and therefore she was not eligible as she had completed 36 years of her age one day prior to the cut-off date as given in the notification. It is well settled that in Gregorian calendar the day starts at 12.00 hours in the midnight as
I has been laid down by the judgment of Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co.Lld, vs. Ram Dayal, , and also a judgment of High Court of Jammu & Kashmir in United India Insurance Company Ltd v. Master Bunty, . Applying the judgment of the Supreme Court to the facts of the present case one will definitely come to the conclusion that by midnight of 30th June, 1996 and 1st July, 1996 the petitioner completed 36 years of her age and her age would exceed by one day by midnight of 1st July, 1996 and 2nd July, 1996. The requirement under the notification was that she should not exceed 36 years, the requirement under the notification was not that she should not be more than 36 years of age on 1st July, 1996. Exceeding 36 years means that she should exceed her age atleast by one day because one day is the basic minimum unit in the calendar which can be taken for the purpose of computing the age. Therefore, I am of the view that she would exceed 36 years by midnight of 1st and 2nd July, 1996 and not by midnight of 30th June, 1996 and 1st July, 1996, It is true that she had completed 36 years on 1st July, 1996 but she had not exceeded 36 years of age on 1st July, 1996 which was the requirement under the notification. The contrary interpretation is also possible but I am favouring the interpretation as given herein above on the ground that for 14 years the petitioner did not get a chance of consideration for employment and this is her last chance to be considered because of her age and if she is not considered now she loses chance of getting a job in the Government permanently. The Courts have always tried to interpret even the statutes in a manner in which potentiality of injustice is avoided. In a judgment reported in Union of India v. B.S. Agarwal, , while interpreting a statute concerning the service of a person the Supreme Court was of the view;
“The Court should lean in favour of such interpretation of a statute which conforms to justice and fair play and prevents
potentiality to injustice by liberally construing the provision without intrinsically violating the language of the statute and the purpose intended to be
achieved.”
Keeping in view the observation of the Supreme Court, this Court is favouring the interpretation as placed by it herein above to the clause relating to the age in the notification concerned.
5. For these reasons, I allow this writ petition and direct the respondents to treat the petitioner within the age and consider her for appointment if otherwise qualified. No costs.