ORDER
T. Vaiphei, J.
1. These two revision petitions involving identical questions of fact and of law are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. Whether the decrees dated 12-4-2001 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Udaipur, South Tripura in Title Suit No. 11 of 1999 and Title Suit No. 14 of 1999 are executable or not is the moot point in these two revision petitions. Having held them to be executable by the learned Civil Judge in the impugned orders dated 12-1-2004 in Misc. 9(A) of 2003 in Ex(T) 04 of 2003 and Misc. 9(B) of 2003 in Ex.(T) 03 of 2003, the two revision petitions have been filed by the State of Tripura and others. The two decrees, out of which the impugned orders have been passed by the executive Court are in identical terms and, therefore, it is sufficient to refer merely to one of such decrees, as illustrative of the nature of the decrees, which is as follows :–
“(i) Plaintiffs are entitled to get the scale of Rs. 1450 to 3710/- as initial scale of S.I. of Police w.e.f. 1-1-86 i.e., from the date of implementation of the R.O.P. Rules, 1988 along with all financial benefits as the scale of Rs. 1450 to 3710/- is declared as initial pay scale of the S.I. of Police from the date of introduction of the R.O.P. Rules, 1988;
(ii) That the plaintiffs being the senior S.I. of Police are also entitled to get the scale of Rs. 6500 to 12300/- equal to the scale of their juniors from the date on which their juniors were given that scale with all financial benefits;
(ii) That the order of D.G.P. dated 5-3-99 is illegal, void and inoperative and the plaintiffs are entitled to get perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from giving effect the said Memo issued by the D.G.P. on 5-3-99.
The defendants are directed to implement the decree within two months from the date of decree.”
3. The principal contention of Mr. S. Deb, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is that the decree so passed is not executable since it is merely a declaratory decree as there is no consequential direction. According to the learned senior counsel, the only alternative for the respondents-decree holders herein is to file a suit and get the decree executed. It is further contended by the learned senior counsel that the decree does not mention the amount to be paid by the petitioners and also does not spell out who are juniors to the decree holders and consequently, the decree is incapable of execution. Per contra, Mr. S. Talapatra, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that the decree is not merely a declaratory decree as it mandates the implementation by the petitioners. Even if there is any ambiguity in the decree so passed, contends the learned counsel for the respondents, reference could always be had to the pleadings and the Judgment passed thereon to comprehend what the decree contemplated. The learned executing Court has taken the view that the decree holders are the employees of the Judgment Debtors (i.e. the petitioner herein) and as such it was within the knowledge of the Judgment Debtors as to who are the juniors of the decree holders and that moreover the seniority of the decree holders and their juniors are maintained by the Judgment Debtors.
4. It is true that the decree is lacking in material particular in simply directing the Judgment Debtor to implement the decree within two months from the date of decree. But it is also equally true that once the decree has specified the pay scale to be paid by the petitioners to the respondents, it is not necessary for the trial Court to make calculation or computation of the exact amount payable to the respondents. All the relevant records and accounts are in the custody of the petitioners. The petitioners also have competent Officials and Accountants to work out the exact amount to be paid to the decree holders. The question is whether the decree passed by the trial Court, which has attained finality can be said to be a declaration simpliciter or a declaratory decree with a consequential direction. In Bapurao v. Hanumanthrao, reported in AIR 1950 Hyderabad 48, the High Court was considering the question as to whether the following decree was executable or not:–
“The plaintiffs suit is decreed. A decree is passed in favour of this plaintiff in these terms that he would be entitled to receive from the defendant every year half of the POTGI amount after deduction of the amount payable to the Gumasthu.”
The Division Bench of the High Court held as follows :–
“Where a decree directs that the plaintiff is entitled to receive from the defendant every year half of the Iskel (emoluments) of Patwari Giri the decree, is not declaratory but executable. The mere fact that the decree does not mention any fixed amount or the date on which it is payable cannot make it in executable when the amount and the date can be ascertained from a construction of the decree.”
The Division Bench therein has come to the above conclusion on the ground that the date and the amount could be ascertained from a construction of the decree and this is allowed under the law. Thus, the Division Bench rejected the contention of the appellant therein as regards the in executable of the decree. I am in respectful agreement with the views of the Division Bench of the Hyderabad High Court in that case.
5. It is a settled law that a decree is incapable of execution if it is null and void or if the same was passed in ignorance of provisions of law or if any law is promulgated making the decree in executable after its passing or if it is passed in the absence of a necessary party. In the instant case, no case has been made out by the petitioners that the decrees suffer from any of the aforesaid infirmities. It is, however, contended by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that by directing the execution of the impugned decrees, the executing Court has gone beyond the four corners of the decree. The question as to how far the executing Court can act and what it should do if the decree happens to be an ambiguous decree has been dealt with by the Apex Court in Bhavan Vaja v. Solanki Hanuji, AIR 1972 SC 1371 and the Apex Court after discussing the scope of Section 47 Code of Civil Procedure held (at page 1374) :–
“It is true that an executing Court cannot go behind the decree under execution. But that does not mean that it has no duty to find out the true effect of that decree. For consuming a decree, it can and in appropriate cases it ought to take into consideration the pleadings as well as the proceedings leading up to the decree. In order to find out the meaning of the words employed in a decree, the Court often has to ascertain the circumstances under which these words came to be used. That is the plain duty of the executing Court and if that Court fails to discharge that duty it would be deemed to have failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it.”
In Tapanmal v. Kundomal Gangaram, AIR 1960 SC 388, the Apex Court while dealing with the power of the executing Court to construe a decree which is ambiguous, also held :–
‘The decree passed, at the worst, could be said to be an ambiguous decree and it is the duty of the executing Court to construe the decree and for that purpose it would be certainly entitled to look into the pleadings and the judgment.”
6. On the above conspectus what emerges is that when there is ambiguity in the decree, certainly it is competent for the executing Court to go behind the decree and look into the pleadings and the judgment so as to have the assistance from them in order to have the ambiguity dispelled. Therefore, Section 47, C.P.C. would hot be a bar and the Court can call in aid the contents of the pleadings as well as the judgment. But however, where the decree is clear, unequivocal and is not ambiguous, the executing Court cannot call for the assistance of any of the documents, viz., pleadings’ judgment and so on. It has to be spelled out from the decree itself as to whether it is a declaratory decree simpliciter, or whether there are accompaniments to the decree with consequential directions in case the right conferred is not given effect to.
7. Insofar as the decrees in question are concerned, in my judgment, they cannot be held to be declaration simpliciter inasmuch as there is also a direction made by the trial Court to the effect that “the defendants are directed to implement the decree within two months from the date of decree”. May be, the decrees are not happily worded. May be, the decrees suffer from detail particulars. But a bare reading thereof will show that there is no ambiguity in those decrees in such a manner that it is not possible for the Judgment debtors to understand or make out the nature of the directions passed by the trial Court. To accept the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners will be stretching the concept of technicalities of law a bit too far. The exact amount which have become payable to the decree holders and the juniors of the decree holders, in my considered view, can be reasonably worked out by the concerned officials of the petitioners by due application of mind and by proper computation by referring to the records available in their custody. Under the circumstances, in my view, there is no improper exercise of jurisdiction by the executing Court in passing the impugned orders. In other words, the petitioners cannot make out any case of excess of jurisdiction or want of jurisdiction in the impugned orders passed by the executing Court. For what has been stated above, I do not find any ground for interference in the impugned orders, which are in order.
8. In the result, these revision petitions are without merit and are, accordingly, dismissed There shall be no order as to costs.