JUDGMENT
Vinod K. Sharma, J.
1. The present revision petition has been filed against the orders passed by the learned Courts below vide which the application moved under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 C.P.C. has been ordered to be dismissed.
2. The plaintiff-respondents have filed a suit in representative capacity for restraining the defendants from raising any construction over the property in dispute on the plea that it is joint property being used for common purpose.
3. The learned Courts below on the basis of documentary evidence placed on record as well as the pleadings of the parties have come to the conclusion that the rights of the parties on the property qua which Mustarka Maalkan is yet to be determined and has been ordered the maintenance of status quo.
4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the plaintiff respondent had no prima facie case as their petition under Section 11 of the Punjab Village Common Lands Act has already been dismissed. The learned Courts below have been taken note of the said order in which the Collector refused to interfere in the matter of holding that the land is in the ownership of Jumla Malkan and, therefore, the Collector has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the title over the property. The learned Counsel for the petitioner thereafter argued that the order passed by the learned Courts below cannot be sustained in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kishore Kumar Khaitanv v. Praveen Kumar Singh . The Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to lay down as under:
4. It is necessary to notice at this stage that in an original suit of this nature, it was not appropriate for the Additional District Judge to pass an order directing the parties to maintain status quo, without indicating what the status quo was. If he was satisfied that the appellant before him had made out a prima facie case for an ad interim exparte injunction and the balance of convenience justified the grant of such an injunction, it was for him to have passed such an order of injunction, but simply directing the parties to maintain status qua without indicating what the status quo was, is not an order that should be passed at an initial stage of a litigation, especially when once court had found no reason to grant an ex-parte order of injunction and the appellate court was dealing with only the limited question whether an ad interim order of injunction should or should not have been granted by the trial Court, since the appeal was only against the refusal of an ad interim ex-parte order of injunction and the main application for injunction pending suit, was still pending before the trial Court itself. Therefore, we are prima facie of the view that the Additional District Judge ought not to have passed an equivocal order like the one passed in the circumstances of the case. But of course, that aspect has relevance only to the extent that before ordering an interim mandatory injunction or refusing it, the court has first to consider whether the plaintiff has proved that he was in possession on the date of suit and on the date of order and he had been dispossessed the next day. Unless a clear prima facie finding that the plaintiff was in possession on those dates is entered, an order for interim mandatory injunction could not have been passed and any such order passed would be one without jurisdiction.
5. The reading of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court shows that the order passed by the trial Court was reversed by the appellate Court without indicating as to what the status quo was to be maintained. In the present case, both the parties have been directed to maintain status quo qua the Jumla Malkan property till the same is partitioned. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner has no application to the facts of the present case.
No ground for interference is made out.
Dismissed.