ORDER
Lakshmanan, C.J.
(1). Heard both sides. By consent of both the parties,-the main writ petition ltself is taken up for final hearing.
(2). The petitioner, an individual by name Udailal, filed the above writ petition as a public interest litigation impleading State of Rajasthan through the Chief Secretary and three others as respondents. The only contention raised in the writ petition at the time of hearing is that the Slate Government considering the necessity and requirement of Veterinary Hospital, has sanctioned the establishment of Veterinary Hospital and Veterinary Sub-Centres in the various parts of the State of Rajasthan and sanctioned 91 Veterinary Hospital and 336 Veterinary Sub-Centres throughout the State and that among the sanctioned venterinary Sub-Centers, the village Metali was one of them for which sanction was granted by the State Government. However, the State Government without any rhyme or reason, suddenly issued impugned order dt. 29.6.2000 (Annex. 8) by which respondent No.3 had been directed to transfer the Veterinary Sub-Centre from the village Metali to the village Relda (Nathugamada). The above writ
petition has been filed to quash Annex. 8 d(. 29.6.2000. While admitting the writ petition, the learned Judges of the Division Bench of this Court by order dt. 13.7.2000 fiave stayed operation of the order Annex. 8 dt. 29.6.2000 for shirting Veterinary Sub-Centre from village Metali to the village Relda, The State Government has now filed reply to the writ petition.
(3). We have perused the writ petition, reply filed by the respondents and the other relevant records.
(4). In our opinion, the action on the part of the respondents cannot be questioned by the petitioner. It is seitie-d law that the State Government and the Authorities functioning under the State Government are vested with the discretionary powers can pass appropriate administrative orders which is just and proper considering the public interest either establishing any hospital in public interest or shifting a hospital from a particular place to another place. Since, It is purely an administrative action, no interference is called for under the garb of issuing a writ of mandamus. In the instant case, the respondents have recommended shifting of Veterinary Sub-Centre from village Melali to the village Relda. No material has been placed before us to show the malafide exercise of powers by the respondents. As observed by the Apex Court in J R. Raghupathy etc. vs. State of A.P. (I), the lack of hospitals comes within the administrative functions of the State. In absence of any material to show malafide exercise of powers, we do not think this to be a fit case for interference.
(5). It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that a representation has been moved by the petitioner for locating another Veterinary Sub-Centre in village Metali. If such a representation has been made, it is for the respondents to consider Ihe same. Considering all the relevant aspects of the matter in detail, the same shall be dealt with and disposed of in accordance with law.
(6). A Division Bench for this Court, comprising of Hon’ble Shri Shivaraj V. Patil, C,J. (as he then was) and Hon’ble Bhagwati Prasad, J. by order dated 8th October, 1999 in Miss Monika Jain and others vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2), while considering an identical situation have held that the petitioners in that case have not been able-to make out a case where they claim any fundamental right which has been denied to Ihem altogether because there is already a school at Jasma where they can take admission and right of education is not defeated altogether. The Division Bench while considering identical situation, has also followed the decision reported in AIR 1973 S.C 588 (3) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that “So long as there is no violation of any fundamental rights and if the principles of natural justice are not offended, it is not for the High Court to lay down the policy that should be adopted by the educational authorities in the matter of granting permission for starting schools. The question of policy is essentially for the State and such policy will depend upon an overall assessment and summary of the requirements of residents of a particular locality and other categories of persons for whom it is essential to provide facilities for education. If the over all assessment is arrived at after a proper classification on a reasonable basis, it is not for the courts to interfere with the policy leading up to such assessment.”
(7). Respectfully following the decision reported in AIR 1073 S.C. 588 (supra) and judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in-D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2636/99 dt. 8.10.1999 (supra) we dismiss this writ petition. However, there will be no order as’ to costs.