PETITIONER: ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA Vs. RESPONDENT: ALL INDIA ANNA DMK DATE OF JUDGMENT12/05/1994 BENCH: VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N.(CJ) BENCH: VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N.(CJ) VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) BHARUCHA S.P. (J) CITATION: 1994 SCC Supl. (2) 689 ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT:
ORDER
1.This special leave petition arises out of and is
directed against an interlocutory order dated 10-5-1994 of
the High Court of Madras made in WMP No. 13629 of 1994 in WP
No. 8973 of 1994.
2.In the said writ petition, a political party contesting
the two bye-elections in the State assailed the
constitutional validity of Order No. 3/8/94-J.S.II dated 13-
1-1994, made by the Election Commission imposing certain
restrictions on the duration for the use of loudspeakers
mounted on mobile vehicles for the election campaigns. The
relevant and operative part of the Commission’s order which
is in paragraph 3 reads :
“3. After considering all aspects of the
matter, the Commissioner, in exercise of its
powers conferred by Article 324 of the
Constitution and all other powers enabling it
in this behalf, hereby DIRECT that the use of
loudspeakers at future elections shall be
strictly regulated as follows :
(i)The use of loudspeakers fitted on
vehicles of any kind whatsoever for
electioneering purposes during the entire
election period starting from the date of
announcement of election and ending with the
date of declaration-of result shall be
permitted only between 08.00 a.m. and
07.00p.m. No moving loudspeakers shall be
permitted to be used before 8.00 a.m. and
after 7.00 p.m. in any area.
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(ii) If for the purpose of any public meeting
or processions any loudspeakers which are
fully static are to be used beyond the said
hours specific prior written permission shall
be obtained from the Government authorities
concerned……
3. The following reasons are set out as
justification for the promulgation of these
restrictions :
“All political parties, candidates and their
workers, supporters and sympathisers use
loudspeakers for their electioneering
campaigns. These loudspeakers are not only
used from fixed rostrums but also used
mounted/fitted on vehicles like trucks,
tempos, cars, taxies, vans, three wheeler
scooters, cycle-rickshaws etc. These vehicles
move on all roads, streets and lanes and also
go around villages, basties, mohallas,
colonies, localities with the loudspeakers
broadcasting at very great volume. This
results in serious ‘noise pollution’ and
causes great disturbance to the peace and
tranquillity of the general public. The
student community, in particular, gets
seriously disturbed as their studies are badly
hampered because the loudspeakers start
blaring from very early hours in the morning
and continue to do so throughout the day and
till extremely late hours ill the night.
(emphasis supplied)
4. On an interlocutory application for stay made in the
writ petition, the High Court was persuaded to the view that
there was a prima facie case made out and that an
interlocutory order of stay of the operation of the impugned
order was required to be passed. The Election Commission of
India seeks special leave to appeal against the order of
stay.
5.We have heard Shri R.K. Garg, learned Senior Counsel
for the Election Commission of India, and Shri A.K. Sen and
Shri Ashok H. Desai, learned Senior Counsel for the
respondents. We grant special leave.
6. In support of the order of the High Court, Shri A.K.
Sen and Shri Ashok H. Desai strenuously urged that the
essential question is not whether these restrictions are
salutary and beneficial and promote the comfort, happiness
and well-being of the citizens in the locality but really
whether the Election Commission even with the widest
amplitude of the reservoir of its powers contained in
Article 324 of the Constitution, could be said to be the
authority to promote and ensure these otherwise well-meant
measures of public comfort and well-being. It is urged, for
instance, that respecting the facilities for the student
community to pursue studies in a quiet and tranquil
atmosphere etc., however laudable and desirable they might
otherwise be, the question is as to the power of the
Election Commission to appropriate to itself these police
powers and constitute itself the guardian of these values.
The argument, in short, which, prima facie, commended itself
to the High Court, is that there is no nexus between these
restrictions imposed with a view to promoting public good
with the objects and purposes of empowerment under Article
324 of the Constitution. It is urged that these measures
restricting the use of loudspeakers mounted on vehicles are
matters covered by existing laws such as the provisions in
the Police Act and do not fall within the ambit of what can
reasonably be construed as matters touching “supervision,
direction and control” of elections vested in the Election
Commission.
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7.On a consideration of the matter, we are, prima facie,
of the view and we abstain from making any final
pronouncement one way or the other in view of the pendency
of the writ petition that though the specifications in the
preamble of the grounds for the need and justification for
the restrictions are stated in a manner susceptible to the
contentions advanced for the respondents, the plenitude of
those powers under Article 324 in the matter of conduct of
fair and free elections, however, cannot put out of
consideration the element of public inconvenience caused by
the election campaigns. This, prima facie, is an area,
perhaps, of overlapping powers.
8.Indeed, it was argued that the model code of conduct
itself does not refer to this area. That again is a moot
point whether Part 1(5) of the model code may not take this
matter also in its sweep. This, of course, will have to be
considered at the appropriate stage of final hearing of the
writ petitions. For the present, we are persuaded to the
view that the interlocutory intervention of the High Court
cannot be supported. The prima facie position and the
balance of inconvenience seem to be in favour of the aspect
of public good in a matter which cannot be said to be
unrelated to the area of the powers of the Election
Commission under Article 324.
9. The interlocutory order dated 10-5-1994 made by the
High Court, accordingly, requires to be and is hereby set
aside.
10.But, then, we cannot brush aside granting, prima facie,
the existence of the power of the Election Commission the
argument as to the somewhat excessively restrictive nature
and scope of the exercise of that power. Shri R.K. Garg,
after some discussion on what might in the circumstances be
reasonable restrictions on the use of loudspeakers from
mobile vehicles, fairly suggested the time-restriction in
para 3(1) of the impugned order which prohibits the use of
loudspeakers on mobile vehicles between 7 p.m. and 8 a.m. be
modified to read “10 p.m. and 6 a.m.” The impugned order
dated 13-1-1994 of the Election Commission, shall be read
accordingly.
11.The first sentence of para 3(ii) of the impugned order
of the Election Commission, it was urged, should not be
enforced against the Chief Minister of the State of Tamil
Nadu, as the perception of whose security requirements are
quite important and serious. Shri R.K. Garg, again, fairly
stated that the Chief Minister of the State of Tamil Nadu
who is under the ‘Z Plus’ category of security, shall remain
exempt from the restrictions contained in the said part of
para 3(ii), and that she shall be entitled to address
election meetings beyond the restricted hours from the
stationary vehicles equipped with loudspeakers without the
requirement of prior permission. The said para 3(ii) of the
impugned order shall be construed accordingly.
12. The appeal is, accordingly, disposed of in the above
terms. No costs.
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