ORDER
Abdul Hadi, J.
1. The tenant, who is the respondent in R.C.O.P. No. 23 of 1992 on the file of the District Munsif, Ramanathapuram, (filed by the respondent for the said tenant’s eviction on the ground of owner’s occupation, in relation to a non-residential, building), is the petitioner in this revision petition. The said revision is against the order, allowing I.A. No. 33 of 1994 in the said R.C.O.P. The said I.A. was filed by the respondent for amendment of the petition in the said R.C.O.P., so that the said petition included another ground for eviction, viz., denial of title. Admittedly the said application was filed since subsequent to the filing of the abovesaid R.C.O.P., the petitioner had denied the title of the respondent, in the counter to the said R.C.O.P.
2. The only question argued by learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the Rent Controller has no power to amend the pleadings in the R.C.O.P., which affects the rights of parties. In other words, Order 6, Rule 17, C.P.C., as such is not applicable to the rent control proceedings though the Rent Controller has been held to be a “court” for certain purposes, like Section 5 of the Limitation Act. He also relied on the decisions in Munisami Naidu v. Kasim Khan (1971) 2 M.L.J. 379 : A.I.R. 1972 Mad. 437 : 84 L.W. 521, In re., S.N. Komaraswami Gounder , Aruppukottai Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. M. Periaswami and Anr. 1974 T.L.N.J. 247 and Jalaluddin v. Mohammed Ismail and Anr. 1986 T.L.N.J. 83.
3. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent contends Rent Controller, has such jurisdiction and he relied on the decisions in Raju v. Mohamadabi 19932 L.W. 171, Ganapathy Ammal v. Chandaresan (1994) 2 L.W. 622 and Sukhdev Prasad v. Rambhujarati A.I.R. 1982 Bom. 25 (D.B.).
4. After going through all the above decisions and also one other decision in Satyanarayana v. S.Satyanarayana Murty (1967) 2 An. L.T. 355, which is in favour of the respondent’s contention, it is quite clear to me that the Rent Controller has jurisdiction to make the abovesaid amendment. In re., S.N. Komaraswami Gounder , did not deal with such an amendment but deal t with a proposed amendment pursuant to an inadvertent error in the pleadings before the Rent Controller and the question was whether how far Section 151, C.P.C. could be invoked. That decision may not have strict application to the present case. Likewise Jalaluddin v. Mohammed Ismail and Anr. 1986 T.L.N.J. 83 also will not help the petitioner. There, the amendment before the rent control court was sought for with reference to description of property, whether it is tiled building or thatched roof building. In such a context, this Court held that by the said amendment the rights and liabilities of the parties were not affected. So, the amendment was upheld. Therefore, it is clear that this decision also will have no application to the present case.
5. Then Munisami Naidu v. Kasim Khan (1971) 2 M.L.J. 379 is also distinguishable. There, the amendment sought for though was similar to the present case (i.e.) affecting rights of parties it was sought tor at the appellate stage i.e., before the Appellate Authority under the Rent Control Act, only in that context, this Court observed thus:
…the appellate authority in this case is not justified in allowing the amendment at the appellate state more or less permitting the respondent to seek a review of the judgment rendered by the Rent Controller…. What the respondents wants to do is to have the petition for eviction amended and to test the correctness of the judgment of the Rent Controller on the basis of such an amendment.
[Italics supplied]
This decision may not have strict application to the present case, where the amendment is sought for before the Rent Controller himself and that too before evidence is taken in the R.C.O.P. Aruppukottai Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. M. Periaswami and Anr. 1974 T.L.N.J. 247 dealt with the applicability of Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. to the rent control proceeding. The said decision arose when the decision in Rayala v. Syed and the decision is Seethalakshmi Ammal v. Rajammal (1965) 1 M.L.J. 287 which held that the Rent Controller was not a court, were holding the field. While so, it was held that Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. as such would not apply to the rent control proceeding.
6. But, now, admittedly the settled law is that the Rent Controller is a court and not a persona designate The said view has also been reiterated subsequently in Raju v. Mohamadabi (1993) 2 L.W. 171, where this Court has held that the Rent Controller “has got all the trappings of a civil court.” Further, a recent decision of mine in Ganapathy Ammal v. Chandaresan (1994)2 L.W. 622 also says thus:
So, the correct view, as held in the above referred to Raju v. Mohamadabi (1988) 1 L.W. 73 and Raju v. Mohamadabi (1993) 2 L.W. 171, is that the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority are not persona designata but only a court not only for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, but for other purposes as well.
[Italics supplied]
7. But, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that Ganapathy Ammal v. Chandaresan (1994) 2 L.W. 622 does not say that the Rent Controller is court for all purposes. But, I am unable to read the said my decision as well as the earlier decision in Raju v. Mohamadabi (1993) 2 L.W. 171 in that way. In fact, in the above referred to Sukhdev Prasad v. Rambhujarati A.I.R. 1982 Bom. 25 (D.B.), which arose under Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act of 1947, application filed to raise additional grounds for eviction, which became available in view of denial of title, was allowed, on the ground that the amendment was only consequential on the denial of title found in the amendment to written statement, which was allowed.
8. That apart, in Satyanarayana v. S. Satyanarayana Murty (1967) 2 An. L.T. 355, a case arising under Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that Order 6, Rule 17, C.P.C. would apply to a rent control proceeding also in the absence of specific provision regarding the same under the said Rent Control Act.
9. The Rent Control Act of Tamil Nadu is also silent about the abovesaid amendment jurisdiction. Further, in the present case also, the abovesaid amendment is necessitated because of a subsequent event after the filing of the R.C.O.P., where the petitioner denied the title of the respondent. Therefore, I am of the view that even though Order 6, Rule 17, C.P.C. as such is not applicable, the principle behind the same is certainly applicable and there is no point in driving the respondent landlord to another R.C.O.P. on the ground of denial of title. The main principle is, multiplicity of proceedings must be avoided, unless the amendment sought for totally alters the character of the original action which is not the case at all in the present case. Therefore, the civil revision petition j has necessarily to be dismissed.
10. One other aspect also must be mentioned here that in view of the decision in Hussain Lorry Booking Service v. A. Sirajuddin (1991) 2 L.W. 197 the above referred to amendment petition itself may not be necessary. There, the main rent control petition for eviction was only o the ground of owner’s occupation and demolition. But, in that proceeding, the tenant denied the title of the landlord-petitioner. That denial was found to be not bona fide by the Rent Controller. In such a situation, it was held that on the ground of abovesaid denial of title, eviction could be granted (even though there was no amendment of the rent control petition including the said ground relating to denial of title also as a ground for eviction).
11. Therefore, the civil revision petition is dismissed. – Nocosts, Consequently, C.M.P. No. 9982 of 1995 for stay is also dismissed.