JUDGMENT
P. Venkatarama Reddi, J.
1. This writ petition arises out of an application filed by the petitioners herein under Section 13 of the Andnra Pradesh Tenancy Act, 1956 for eviction of the 1st respondent-tenant from the land mentioned in the schedule to the said application. The Special Officer designated under the A.P. Tenancy Act (Munsif-Magistrate, Mangalagiri) allowed the application holding that the tenant denied the title of the landlord and committed default in the payment of rent to the real owner. On appeal to the District Judge, Guntur, the order of the Special Officer was revered and the eviction order was set aside. The learned District Judge held that the title of respondents 1 to 4 before him (writ petitioners herein) to the petition-schedule land was not prima facie established and therefore the question of denial of title of the landlord and failure in the payment of rent to respondents 1 to 4 did not arise. According to the findings of tine learned District Judge, the petition-schedule land absolutely belonged to one Smt. Radhamma who executed a registered lease deed in favour of the appellant-tenant (1st respondent herein) in the year 1980 a year before her demise. The Learned District Judge held that by virtue of the settlement deed executed by her husband in the year 1921 and the operation of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, the said Radhamma became a full owner. It is this order of the learned District Judge that is challenged in the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
2. In this writ petition, two respondents were impleaded by the petitioners, they are: (1) the tenant and (2) the District Judge, Guntur. Respondents 5 to 8 before the appellate Court who remained ex parte in the appeal, are not r rties in this writ petition. Four persons claiming to be the executor and beneficiaries under the will, have filed an application viz., WPMP 18952/88 to implead them as parties. That petition was opposed by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners on the ground mat their implead-petition was dismissed earlie. by the Tenancy Court and no further steps were taken by the applicants. As the 1st respondent-tenant has recognised them as landlords and as they have sufficient interest in the subject-matter of the writ petition, I consider it just and proper to implead them. Accordingly, I allow the application for impleading and direct the four applicants to be impleaded as respondents 3 to 6 in the present writ petition.
3. The relevant facts necessary for the disposal of the writ petition are to be briefly stated: Way back in the year 1921, one Sri Mannava Parandhamaiah executed a registered settlement-deed (marked as Ex.A-1) conveying life interest in the landed property including the petition-schedule lands in favour of his wife by name Radhamma with vested remainder to her brother, Guduru Ramarayudu. Radhamma died on 8-7-1981. She leased out the lands to hte 1st respondent for a period of five years by means of a registered lease-deed dated 22-5-1980. In respect of the same land, the brother of Radhamma G. Ramarayudu, being a vested remainder holder executed a will dt. 27-5-1951 to tine mother of the 1st petitioner, father of petitioners 2 and 3, father of 4th petitioner, father of respondents 2 to 4 and husband of the 5th respondent. Ramarayudu died in the year 1952. The 1st petitioner’s mother in turn executed a will in favour of the 1st petitioner and she died on 6-4-1956. Thus the petitioners claim title to the land through Sri Ramarayudu. petitioners issued a notice to the 1st respondent-tenant on 10-11-1981 demanding payment of the rent. The 1st respondent sent a reply stating that by virtue of the lease-deed dated 22-5-80 executed by late Radhamma, he had been paying the rent to the executor under the will (impleaded respondent No. 6) and that the petitioners were not the true owners of the land. This led to the filing of ATC 13/82 in the Court of the Special Officer, Mangalagiri by the petitioners herein. The application was filed for a declaration that the petitioners and respondents 2 to 5 in the ATC were the landlords and seeking for an injunction restraining the tenant from paying rents to any person other than the petitioners and respondents 2 to 5. Subsequently the petition was amended stating that the tenant denied title of the petitioners and therefore he was liable to be evicted from the petitionschedule lands. The summary of the conclusions reached by the Tenancy Court and the Appellate Court has already been set out above.
4. It is agreed by all the learned Counsel that the crucial question that arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether Radhamma’s life-interest in the petition-schedule lands gets enlarged into absolute ownership by virtue of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 so as to confer on her the power of disposition of the property. If Radhamma acquired absolute rights over the lands in question, the petitioners, claiming on the title of the vested remainder holder, obviously will have no right over the property. If on the other hand, Radhamma Remained as limited owner, the petitioners can claim title over the landed property and having regard to the. fact that the 1st respondent-tenant categorically denied the title of the petitioners as found by the appellate court, the 1st respondent is liable to be evicted from the land at the instance of the petitioners herein. This takes us to the consideration of the terms of the settlement deed, tine backdrop to the settlement made by the original owner and the provisions of Section 14(1) and 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
5. First, I would like to refer to the settlement-deed dated 24-11-1921 to the extent it is necessary. At the outset, it is mentioned in the deed that in view of the disputes between the executant and his first wife’s son, the properties were partitioned between them. The settlor (executant) had no issues other than the son through the first wife. It is stated in the settlement-deed that the settlor’s brother-in-law Sri Guduri Ramaraidu was looking after him and his wife, managing his properties and Sri Ramaraidu even undertook the responsibility of discharging the debts that fell to the share of the settlor. Then it is stated – “as I have thought it fit to make necessary arrangement regarding my properties in view of my health condition and in view of love and affection for Radhamma and also keeping her request in view and in order to see that no disputes should arise after my life-time between Radhamma and her step son and having regard to the fact that Guduri Ramarayudu has been discharging my debts, the schedule-mentioned property worth Rs. 8,000/- is hereby made over/handed over to radhamma for enjoying the same upto her life-time without any right of gift, sale, mortgage or other alienation”. It is then stated that the schedule-land should belong to Guduri Ramarayudu and his heirs and successors with absolute rights therein after the death of Radhamma. If Radhamma predeceases the settlor, it is stated that the settlor reserves to himself only the right of enjoyment during his life time without any right of disposition.
6. The learned Counsel for the petitioners Mr. B.V. Subbaiah and the learned Counsel for respondents 3 to 6 Mr. Chandrasekhara Rao place reliance on the relevant recitals and terms of the will to make out their respective points of view and I will advert to them a little later.
7. What is tine effect of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act on the proprietary rights of late Radhamma over the petition schedule-lands which were the subject-matter of the gift by her husband in the year 1921? This is the crucial question to be answered. If Section 14(1) applies, Radhamma would have become full owner with absolute rights over the lands in question in which case the contention of the writ petitioners would fail; If on the other hand, Section 14(2) applies, the writ petitioners will succeed on the main issue subject to the alternative arguments put forward by the learned Counsel for respondents 3 to 6 on certain subsidiary issues which it is not necessary to deal with.
8. The relative scope of Section 14(1) and 14(2) is no longer in doubt though in the application of the well-settled legal principles, prolonged arguments aimed at unravelling the subtleties are often heard. In Jaswant Kaur v. Harpal Singh, the Supreme Court succinctly summarised the legal position as follows:
“It is now settled law that if a female Hindu acquires property under a written instrument or a decree of the court and where such acquisition is not traceable to any antecedent right, then Sub-section (2) of Section 14 alone would be attracted and where an antecedent right is traceable, a document in the nature of will is of no consequence and the case will be covered by provisions contained in Section 14(1).”
In V. Tulasamma v. V. Seshareddi, AIR 1977 SC 1944 the Supreme Court laid down that subsection (2) of Section 14 must be read in the context of Sub-section (1) so as to leave as large a scope for operation as possible to Sub-section (1) and so read, “it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as grant without any pre-existing right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property.” Bhagwati, J. further observed:
“Where, however property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of subsection (2) even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property prescribes a restricted estate in the property….”
9. It is implicit from the above exposition of the provisions embodied in Section 14, the Hindu woman shall not suffer any disability merely by virtue of restricted estate prescribed by tine written instrument or the decree under which she came into possession of the property. The prescription of the restricted estate may be merely by way of reiteration or re-statement of the then existing Hindu Law principle; even where the property was intended to be given to her in recognition of the pre-existing right which she had. But, if no pre-existing right can be reasonably inferred and the intention of the settlor was to deliberately leave a restricted estate to a Hindu woman, Sub-section (2) comes into play.
10. Mr. B.V. Subbaiah, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that Radhamma cannot be said to have had any existing right in relation to the property at the time of execution of the settlement deed by her husband and there was no whisper in the document about the maintenance claims of Radhamma. According to him, the conferment of limited estate was in the nature of fresh grant made to her out of love and affection but not for any other reason. He also emphasises on the point that the settlor Sri Parandhamaiah was determined to confer the ultimate benefit of the estate on his brother-in-law Ramarayudu who was helping him in every manner. It is precisely for this reason, he submits, that the settlor purposely gave a life interest to his wife in respect of the properties. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for respondents 3 to 6 (impleaded parties) Mr. Chandrasekhara Rao contends that the settlementdeed executed by Parandhamaiah gives sufficient indication that the properties were intended to be given to his wife with immediate right of possession and enjoyment in order to provide for her maintenance. The document also indicates that Parandhamaiah wanted to settle the properties on his wife at her/ instance, keeping her claims in view. The learned Counsel therefore submits that the settlement deed is referable to the pre-existing right of Radhamma and the prescription of limited estate is therefore of no consequence. The learned Counsel for the 1st respondent-tenant, Mr. Viswanadha Reddi supported the arguments of Mr. Chandrasekhara Rao and contended \hatpriina facie the title does not vest with the writ petitioners.
11. In order to resolve the issue, it is necessary to notice the settled legal position with regard to the nature and extent of a Hindu wife’s or widow’s right to claim maintenance against the husband or the estate of the husband. In V. Tulasamina’s case (2 supra) Fazal Ali, J. after exhaustively considering the authoritative treatises on Hindu Law and the case law on the subject, summed up the position as follows:
“The Hindu female’s right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claimbeing conceded as a matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law and has been strongly stressed even by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a right against property and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has property, the female has the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If a charge is created for the maintenance of a female, the said right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate, even without a charge, the claim for maintenance is doubtless a preexisting right so that any transfer declaring or recognising such a right does not confer any new title but merely endorses or confirms the preexisting rights.”
12. The legal position enunciated by Fazal Ali, J. was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Maharajapillai Lakshmi Ammal v. Maharaja Pillai T. Pillai,
13. With regard to Hindu widow’s claim for maintenance, Fazal Ali, J. approved the dicta laid down by Palekar, J. in B.B. Patil v. Gangabi, and summarised the propositions emerging from that case as follows:
“The widow’s claim to maintenance is undoubtedly a tangible right though not an absolute right to property so as to became a fresh source of title. The claim for maintenance can, however, be made a charge on the joint family properties and even if the properties are sold with the notice of the said charge, the sold properties will be burdened with the claim for maintenance; Section 14(2) applies only to cases where grant is not in lieu of maintenance or in recognition of pre-existing right but confers a fresh right or title for the first time and while conferring the said title, certain restrictions are placed by the grant or transfer. Where, however, the grant is merely in recognition or in implementation of a pre-existing right to claim maintenance, the case falls beyond the purview of Section 14(2) and comes squarely within the explanation to Section 14(1).”
In the same case, Bhagwati, J. speaking for himself and A.C. Gupta, J. observed:
“It is, therefore, clear that under the Sastric Hindu Law a widow has a right to be maintained out of joint family property and this right would ripen into a charge if the widow takes the necessary steps for having her maintenance ascertained and specifically charged on the joint family property and even if no specific charge is created this right would be enforceable against joint family property in the hands of a volunteer or a purchaser taking it with notice of her claim. The right of the widow to be maintained is of course not a jus in rem since it does not give her any interest in the joint family property but it is certainly jus ad rem i.e., a right against the joint family property.”
14. Viewed in the light of the settled legal position as enunciated above, there can be no doubt that Radhamma had a right to claim maintenance against her husband and there was a corresponding obligation on Parandhamaiah to provide for the support and maintenance of his wife. If he failed to do so, the properties of Parandhamaiah either in his hands or in the hands of his heirs should have been subject to the paramount claims of Radhamma for maintenance. There is no evidence to the effect that Radhamma was otherwise taken care of by Parandhamaiah by making an adequate provision for her maintenance before executing the settlement deed. It is true that Sri Parandhamaiah while executing the settlement deed was dictated by an inclination to give away the properties to his wife’s brother – Sri Ramaraidu after the life-time of his wife Radhamma for certain substantial reasons. But it is equally true that Parandhamaiah was very much conscious of the need to provide for support and maintenance of his wife-which was his foremost obligation. In the circumstances, the reasonable inference or presumption to be drawn is that Sri Parandhamaiah settled the properties on his wife with rights of enjoyment during her life time in recognition of her pre-existing right to maintenance. The legal and moral obligation to maintain his wife was uppermost in his mind. If Sri Parandhamaiah had omitted to do that, it could very well be that Radhamma would have laid claims for maintenance by proceeding against the properties either during or after the life-time of her husband. It is in mis background that the settlement-deed of 1921 has to be understood. The mere fact that mere was no express reference in the settlement-deed to the maintenance of tine wife or her pre-existing right to claim maintenance is not a material factor. I am fortified in the conclusion which I have reached from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Maharaja Pillai Lakshmi Ammal’s case (3 supra). The following observations of Jagannatha Shetty, J. at paragraph 6 are most apposite:
“The deed or any other arrangement by which the husband gives the property to his wife for maintenance need not specifically state that it is given in lieu of maintenance. It is not an act of charity the husband does. It is out of his personal obligation to maintain her. The right to maintenance of a Hindu woman is a personal obligation of the husband. If, therefore, the wife is put in exclusive possession of the property with the right to take the income for her maintenance, it must be presumed that the property is given to her in lieu of maintenance. The very right to receive maintenance which is inherent in her, is itself sufficient to enable the ripening of possession of any property into full ownership under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act…”
The above observations of the Supreme Court furnish a complete answer to the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners Mr. B.V. Subbaiah. In that case the Supreme Court rejected the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent that the properties not having been given to the wife ‘in lieu of maintenance’, Section 14(1) read with Explanation thereto does not apply. No doubt, in the present case there are no express words that the income which Radhamma would get from the lands was meant for her maintenance. But it is implicit that one of the objects of settlement was only to provide sufficient income to Radhamma for her maintenance. It cannot be said that the property given to Radhamma was de hors her antecedent right to get maintenance.
15. In the light of the above discussion, I confirm the conclusion of the learned District Judge and dismiss the writ petition. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.