JUDGMENT
S.D. Anand, J.
1. The present F.A.O. has been preferred by appellant to call into the question of validity of decree dated 11.8.2000 vide which the Additional District Judge, Amritsar, allowed the petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act (hereinafier referred to as the Act) filed by respondent-wife ordered the marriage between the parties to be dissolved with effect from the date of the decree.
2. The respondent-wife filed a divorce plea on allegations which may be indicated as under:
3. The marriage between the parties, by way of Anand Karaj, was solemnized at Amritsar in the Indian Calender of Harr 1993. The parties co-habited at the matrimonial house and one female child was born out of their union. The child died at a later point of time. In spite of the fact that parents of the respondent had provided huge dowry articles, the appellant and member of his parental family were not satisfied with the adequacy thereof. The appellant and other members of his parental family subjected the respondent to merciless belabouring and Mal-treatment. She was, at times, confined to a room and the basic necessities of life were denied to bear. The appellant would belabour the respondent under the influence of liquor and would also abuse her and her parents. The respondent was turned out of the matrimonial house about two years prior to the filing of the petition. The appellant held out a threat that the respondent would be done to death if she ever dared enter the matrimonial house. A panchayat of respectables approached the appellant-husband for restoration of the respondent to the matrimonial house but he declined to oblige and threatened them with dire consequences. It was on the above averments that the respondent-wife came forth with a divorce plea.
4. Appellant offered a plain denied of the averments aforesaid. It was averred that it was the respondent wife who left the matrimonial house on the pretext of attending a relative’s marriage but did not return to the matrimonial house thereafter. She had also taken along 5 to las of ornaments and valuable clothes while leaving the matrimonial house. She had otherwise announced at the matrimonial house that she would not like to live with the husband as his wife as she does not like him and her marriage had been performed by her parents against her wishes. It had come to the notice of the appellant that the respondent has contracted a second marriage with one Sarbjit Singh of Chheherta and had received a shagun of Rs. 5,000/- from Punjab Government.
5. In the course of replication, the respondent denied having left the matrimonial house on the averred pretext. She also denied having entered into and second marriage with the named individual or having received a sum of Rs. 5,000/- as Shagun from the Punjab Government.
6. The trial proceeded on the following issues:
1. Whether the respondent has treated the petitioner with cruelty as alleged. If so its effect? OPA
2. Whether the petitioner is entitled for decree of divorce as alleged? OPA
3. Relief.
7. The learned trial Court recorded finding adverse to the appellant and favourable to the respondent under both the issues and ordered dissolution of marriage with effect from the date of the decree. The husband-appellant appeals against the impugned decree.
8. I have heard Mr. B.R. Mahajan, learned Counsel for the appellant and Mr. Dalbir Singh Pheruman, learned Counsel for the respondent and perused the record.
9. Mr. B.R. Mahajan, learned Counsel for the appellant-husband, assailed the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge by arguing that there was not even an iota of substantive evidence on the file to prove that the appellant-husband had ever raised any dowry demand or that he and members of his parental family had ever subjected the respondent-wife to dowry-related torture or that she had been otherwise mal-treated in any manner. Learned Counsel also pointed out that the respondent-wife had herself made a statement in the course of the proceedings under Section 97 of the Cr.P.C. (initiated by appellant-husband) that she was residing at her parental house of her own. He also argued that the evidence obtaining on the file (in the record-based statement of RW-4 Sh. Sukhwinder Singh, Clerk S.D.M. Office, Amritsar-II) proves that the father of the respondent had received a shagun of Rs. 5,000/- from the Punjab Government for her second marriage.
10. Resisting the pleas aforesaid, the learned Counsel for the respondent argued that the trial Court had validly placed reliance upon the testimony on oath of the respondent-wife, her father Munsha Singh (AW-3) and her uncle-Gian Chand (AW-2), all of whom had taken a consistent plea that the respondent-wife was subjected to the dowry-related torture and had been turned out of the matrimonial house. It was further argued that the statement attributed to respondent-wife under Section 97 Cr.P.C. is of no consequence inasmuch as it (statement) does not bear her signatures and she has categorically denied having made any such statement. It was further argued that the respondent-wife has not re-married the named individual and that the amount of Rs. 5,000/-, disbursed to father of the respondent-wife in pursuance of Punjab Government policy, was in respect of another daughter.
11. I have given any careful consideration to the rival pleas. Even at the cost of repetition, it would be appropriate to notice here that the respondent-wife had made categorical averment in the petition that she had been subjected to dowry-related torture by the appellant-husband and members of his parental family as they were not satisfied with the adequacy of the dowry brought by her. The further averment in the context was that she had been subjected to merciless belabouring and was, at times, confined to a room and the basic necessities of life were denied to her. As AW-1, the respondent-wife testified that the appellant-husband had broken her right hand elbow and, on that account, she is still not able to work properly with her right hand, that the appellant used to throw her on the floor and that the appellant had once hung her with a fan. It was also averred by her that the appellant had removed her ear rings and other articles of dowry and that the appellant “even tried to put me in death and I escaped saving my life from the hands of the respondent.” Her statement to the above effect is beyond the scope of pleadings and cannot, accordingly, be taken into consideration. If there was an iota of truth in her statement qua the above facts, there is no reason why these facts would not have been averred by her in the petition. It is noticeable in the context that she conceded in the course of cross-examination that she did not get herself medically examined when the appellant had broken her elbow. AW-3 Munsha Singh, who is respondent’s father, also conceded that no medical examination was got conducted at the hospital when the elbow of the respondent was broken by the appellant.
12. AW-2 Gian Chand, real uncle of the respondent conceded that she never addressed any letter to him in the course whereof she may have complained of mal-treatment (at the hands of the appellant). It is in his testimony that it was the respondent-wife who had told him about the dowry demand. He was otherwise not in a position to indicate the date, month or year when the information was furnished to him by the respondent. The respondent-wife nowhere averred that she had brought that fact to the notice of her uncle. Likewise, respondent’s father Munsha Singh (AW-3) also conceded in the course of cross-examination that respondent never addressed any letter to him in the context of the dowry-related treatment or mal-treatment and that she had also not sent any message through anyone in the context. He conceded that he had not himself seen the appellant belabouring the respondent by locking her in room. It is in his statement that it is the respondent who had furnished that information to her. However, the respondent-wife did not utter even a word in her statement to the effect that she had brought the facts aforesaid to the notice of her father.
13. Further, AW-3 would want the court to believe that it was an uncle of the respondent who broke open the door (of the room where the respondent had been confined) and removed her from the room. He was not in a position to tell the date, month and year in which that occurrence had taken place. He refrained from naming that uncle to whom the above role had been attributed. AW-2 Gian Chand is the only uncle of the respondent who was examined at the trial. He does not own any such role. In fact, he stated that he had not at all visited the house of the parties after marriage.
14. It is, thus, apparent from the record that the respondent-wife has not been able to prove that she had been subjected to any mal-treatment or dowry-related torture at the hands of the appellant and members of his family. If a female is subjected to dowry-related torture and the magnitude of the torture goes to the extent of breaking of elbow, confinement in a room and denial of basic necessities of life, one would expect her to indicate facts to the members of her parental family in one way or the other. In this case, she does not say that she had done so. It is only the over-zealous relations who claim to have been so informed by her. By the very nature of things, the derivative information testified to by AW-2 and AW-3 does not become substantive in character till it is proved to have been actually conveyed to them by the source of information i.e. the respondent-wife. It is also fairly unnatural that the respondent never made a complaint in the context to the police or any other authorities or even the village functionaries or any other respectable of village. She went to the extent of averring that she did mention in the petition that the appellant had hung her with a ceiling fan. She denied, as incorrect, a suggestion that the fact aforesaid does not stand recorded in the petition. Nevertheless, this fact does not find mention in the petition.
15. I, otherwise, agree with the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that the appellant had not been able to prove that the respondent-wife had entered into second marriage. Though the appellant did aver (in the examination-in-chief) that the respondent is the only female child of her parents, he conceded in cross-examination that the respondent has another sister and two brothers. Apart therefrom, it is also not established that her father had obtained shagun of Rs. 5,000/- from Punjab Government in connection with the second marriage of the respondent. He is proved on the file to have obtained a shagun in respect of the marriage of his other daughter.
16. Upholding of the finding recorded by the trial Court on point of second marriage of the respondent-wife notwithstanding, the respondent wife had not been able to prove that the appellant-husband had treated her with her cruelty.
17. Insofar as the plea of desertion is concerned, it was not available to the respondent-wife at the time of petition was filed. In terms of the provisions of Section 13(1)(b), a petition on plea for desertion can be filed only if the offending spouse had deserted the party filing it for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. Thus, a party filing a petition has to make a categorical averment in the context. In the present matter, the respondent-wife made a vague averment that she had been turned out of the matrimonial house more than two years ago. She indicated that she was raising that plea ‘Alternatively’. She did not even indicate the date (of ouster from matrimonial house) even by proximation. The provisions of a statute have to be strictly interpreted, particularly in the matter of litigation under the Act and any loose interpretation would defeat the very purpose of providing strict provisions requiring the parties to a matrimonial alliance to raise a precise plea before requesting the leave of the Court for the grant of a divorce plea. On that point also, the plea raised by the respondent-wife is found to be deficient.
18. The learned trial Judge dealt with the matter in a casual fashion. The judgment under appeal consists of 10 paras. Paras 1 to 8 consist of the pleadings of the parties, the evidence adduced and the plea raised on the basis thereof. Para 10 pertains to the relief clause. The entire finding is contained in para 9 of the impugned judgment. In the course thereof, the learned trial Judge noticed that the appellant has not been able to prove that the respondent-wife had entered into the second marriage. Sustenance, in support of the view, was also obtained from the fact that the respondent was proved to have been residing at the house of her parents when she made a statement to that effect under Section 97 of the Cr.P.C. The learned trial Court drew an inference from the fact that her second marriage has not been performed. That part of the finding stands affirmed. Qua the essential grievance of the respondent-wife, all that the trial Judge recorded was that the wife alleged” and has given evidence to prove that there was treatment of cruelty to her from the hands of the respondent”. The trial Court did not at all refer to any particular piece of evidence in support of the finding recorded by it. It is just not done in the mater of appreciation of evidence. The Court is required to relate every finding to the evidence in support thereof. If both sides raise contradictory evidence qua a particular fact, the Court must notice the evidence adduced by both the parties and also the fact in issue and, then, record its own finding in the context with reasons therefor.
19. As already indicated, the present is a case in which the respondent-wife made statements beyond the scope of pleadings. That matter stands adverted to in para No. 11 of this judgment. She did not aver that she had communicated her torture to any member of her parental family or parental relations. She further did not claim to have verbally furnished that information to AW-2 and AW-3, though they exhibited a sense of over-zealousness by testifying that the respondent wife had indeed done so. In the absence of owning of the role attributed to her by AW-2 and AW-3, the derivative testimony of last two indicated does not become substantive in character.
20. The following proven facts emerge from the above discussion:
(a) The statement made by the respondent-wife to the effect that her elbow was broken by the appellant-husband, that she was hung by the ceiling fan by the appellant-husband, that he used to throw her on the floor, that he had removed her ear rings and dowry articles and that the appellant” even tried to put me in death and I escaped saving my life from the hands of the respondents” is beyond the scope of the pleadings.
(b) The respondent-wife had not concededly communicated her dowry-related torture to the members of her parental family. She did not claim to have verbally informed either AW-2 Gian Chand or AW-3 Munsha Singh (who are her uncle and father respectively), though those witnesses exhibited over-zealousness by stating that she had furnished the relevant information to them. Their derivative testimony, in the absence of corroboration from the source thereof, does not become substantive in character.
(c) The evidence adduced by the respondent-wife on point of dowry-related torture does not inspire confidence.
21. In the light of foregoing discussion, it is held that the respondent-wife has not been able to prove a case for grant of a decree for divorce. This FAO shall stand allowed. The judgment under appeal shall stand reversed. The petition under Section 13 of the Act filed by the respondent-wife against the appellant-husband shall stand dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs of the cause throughout in the circumstances of the case.