JUDGMENT
H.H. Kantharia, J.
1. The petitioner-workman filed Complaint (ULP) No. 15 of 1979 in the Second Labour Court, Kolhapur against respondents No. 2 and 3 alleging unfair labour practice covered by item 1 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 on account of his dismissal from service. At the hearing of the said unfair labour practice complaint it was urged on behalf of the second and third respondent-employers that the petitioner was neither governed by the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 nor by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and, therefore, the complaint would not be maintainable. The learned Labour Judge by his reasoned order dated October 30, 1981 upheld the contentions raised on behalf of the second and third respondents and dismissed the complaint of the petitioner. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed revision application (ULP) No. 13 of 1982 in the Industrial Court at Kolhapur. At the hearing of the said revision application, only one point was canvassed on behalf of the petitioner whether respondent No. 2 industry was covered by the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. On scrutiny of the record produced before him, the learned Member of the Industrial Court, Kolhapur came to the conclusion that it was not covered by the provisions of Bombay Industrial Relations Act and accordingly by his judgment and order dated October 5, 1984 dismissed the revision application. Hence the petitioner invoked the supervisory writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution by filing the present writ petition.
2. Now, it will be seen from the record that for the purpose of canvassing a point that the petitioner was governed by the provisions of Bombay Industrial Relations Act what was relied upon was a Resolution No. 1131-46 dated 5th October, 1952 passed by the Development Department of the then Government of Bombay which reads as under:
“SUGAR INDUSTRY
Development Department
Secretariat (Annexe),
Fort, Bombay
4th October, 1952.
BOMBAY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT, 1946.
No. 1131-46- In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (4) of Section 2 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Bom.XI of 1947), and in supersession of Government Notification in the Labour and Housing Department No. 1131-46, dated the 19th January 1952, the Government of Bombay is pleased to direct that all the provisions of the said Act shall apply to the following industry, namely:-
The manufacture of sugar and its by products, including-
(i) The growing of sugarcane on farms belonging to or attached to concerns engaged in the said manufacture or on farms which immediately before the date on which the canals comprised in such farms are taken possession of and vest in the State Government under Section 21 of the aharashtra Agricultural Lands, (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, belonged to or were attached to such concerns, and which from that date are run or managed by a Corporation (including a Company) owned or controlled by the State under that Act; and
(ii) all agricultural and industrial operations connected with the said manufacture or with the growing of sugar-cane on the said farms.
Note : For the purposes of this notification all services or employment connected with the conduct of the above industry shall be deemed to be part of the industry when engaged in or by an employer engaged in that industry.
By order of the Governor of Bombay.
K.L. PUNJABI
Secretary to Government.”
It was canvassed in both the Courts below as also in this Court on behalf of the petitioner that the word “and” appearing in this Resolution where it is stated. ‘The manufacture of sugar and its by-products, including……..” should be read as “or”.’ I
am afraid there is no substance in this contention raised on behalf of the petitioner because the wordings of this Resolution clearly show that the Resolution concerned the manufacturing of sugar and its by-products and not of by-products of sugar independently. As a matter of fact, the by-products of sugar were also pointed out by giving some of the illustrations. In other words, the Resolution of the then Government of Bombay clearly indicated that it was concerned with the manufacturing activity of sugar and its by-products and not or by-products. As a matter of fact, respondent No. 2 which is a distillery was concerned with the manufacture of alcohol by obtaining molassis from various sugar factories all independently and had nothing to do with the manufacturing of sugar. Thus, Respondent No. 2 was by itself a manufacturer of alcohol and had absolutely no connection with the manufacture of sugar which was done by a karkhana called ‘Shriram Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana’. The said Shriram Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana had no connection whatsoever with respondent No. 2 which was an establishment of distilling alcohol. The learned Judge of the lower Court, therefore correct in nonsuiting the petitioner by holding that he was not governed by the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act inasmuch as the above quoted Notification did not cover the petitioner.
3. Not before the Industrial Court but before the Labour Court it was urged on behalf of the respondents No. 2 and 3 that the petitioner was not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, In order to prove that point respondents No. 2 and 3 submitted in the Labour Court that the petitioner was drawing monthly wages of Rs. 889/- and that he was working in the supervisory and managerial capacity which fact was not controverted by and on behalf of the petitioner. In addition, respondents No. 2 and 3 also relied upon documentary evidence inasmuch as they produced in the Labour Court an application for leave of one R.B. Kate on which there was an endorsement which shows that the petitioner had recommended leave for the said Kate which also clearly proves that the petitioner was working in a supervisory and managerial capacity and was not merely a Clerk. The Labour Court was, therefore, justified in coming to a conclusion that the petitioner was not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and was, therefore, not governed by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.
4. Thus, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the impugned orders passed by the Labour Court and the Industrial Court were in any manner perverse. It also cannot be said that there were errors apparent on the face of the record in the impugned orders. This Court while exercising supervisory writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is not required to interfere with such orders which abundantly appear to be in accordance with law.
5. In this view of the matter, the writ petition fails and the same stands dismissed. Rule is accordingly discharged but with no order as to costs.