ORDER
Kanakaraj,J.
1. The appellant in all the writ appeals is one and the same and he had filed writ petition Nos. 374 to 376 and 379 of 1996 against the giant of leases for quarrying blue metal in favour of the fourth respondent in each of the cases. The writ petitions were dismissed by a common order of a learned single Judge of this Court, dated 12-9-1996.
2. The case of the appellant as disclosecd in the affidavits filed by him before the learned single Judge is as follows : He is an ex-lessee of an extent of 78.78 acres of land in Thiruneermalai Village. Saidapel Taluk. Chengalpat MGR District for quarrying blue metal. The period of lease ended on 1-8-1987. He applied for renewal and the same was rejected and the lease was granted to one M. Arumugham. The lease in favour of M. Arumughum also expired and the petitioner again applied lor the grant of lease on 20-5-1994. By a letter, dated 22-8-1994. the appellant was informed that as per the then existing Rules, the Collector would publish a notice, calling for tenders and the lease wouId be granted only on the basis of the highest offer. After the validation of Rule 39 by the Supreme Court of India the appellant again applied on 14-9-1995 and paid the requisite fees. Without calling for any lenders, the lease was grained to the fourth respondents by an order dated 12-12-1995. The contention of the appelant is that the said grant is illegal and liable to be quashed by this Court. In all the writ petitions, the grant was made to the fourth respondent in each case for identical extents of 25 acres of land under Rule 39 of Ihe Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules (hereinafter called as the Rules). The learned single Judge found that the Government had made the grants based on the findings of a high level committee and that there was nothing illegal about the grant. Having granted the lease in favour of the three persons named as fourth respondent in each writ petition the Government found that there was no occasion for the grant of any further lease in the area and therefore rejected the application of the appellanl on 29-12-1995. The grievance of the appellant that his application should have been considered along with the applications of the fourth respondent in each case, was rejected by the learned single Judge on the ground that the applications of the grantees were disposed of even before the receipt of the application of the appellant with the remarks of the Collector. In the affidiivits filed by the appellant, the grams in favour of the three respondents had been challenged on the ground that the Government cannot make a grant, according to its own whims and faneies, but should be satisfied that the grant is in public interest and in the interest of mineral development.
3. Before us. Mr. Vijay Narayan has projected the case of the appellant in a two fold manner. The first contention is that while exercising powers under Rule 39 of the Rules, the Government should have considered all the applications available on the date of grant and should have made a selection on the basis of merits. In this connection, reliance was placed on a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in writ appeal Nos. 1026, 1089 and 1090 of 1995 S. Baskaran v. The Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu. dated 8-11-1995. The second argument of learned counsel for the appellant is that in any event, the grant in favour of the fourth respondent in the writ petition, in each case, was not in accordance with the observations of the Supreme Court in Premium Granites v. State of Tamil Nadu, . The argument is that the Government never considered the public interest or the interest, of the mineral development before making the grant. In fact, a perusal of the orders of the Government would, according to learned counsel show that the Government had proceeded on an incorrect basis and the orders are vitiated by errors of law, apparent on the face of the record.
4. Mr. N.R. Chandran, learned senior counsel appearing for the contesting fourth respondent argues that the judgment of the Division Bench in W.A.Nos. 1026, 1089 and 1090 of 1995, dated 8-11-1995 will not at all apply because the facts in these cases would disclose thai the application of the appellant was not at all available and ripe for disposal, on the date, when the applications of the fourth respondent in each case were disposed of. Secondly, he argues that if the order of the Government is read as a whole, it would follow thai there are no infirmities and the Government had taken into account all the relevant considerations before granting the lease in favour of the respeetive fourth respondents. He would also attempt to argue that in any event at the instance of the appellant, the grants cannot be set aside.
5. On the first question there was considerable controversy regarding the dates of the application and the dates when the Collector forwarded his remarks along with the report of the high level committee. We had therefore called for the entire files and we have also perused the same and we will indicate the correct dates, with reference to the files themselves. The fourth respondent in all the three cases had filed their applications under Rule 39 of the Rules, on 9-3-1995. The same were forwarded to the Collector on 3-4-1995, seeking the remarks of the Collector. The remarks of the Collector were sent on 24-9-1995 under proceedings RC No. 730/95.Q4. All the applicants had sought for a lease for five years in respect of the entire extent of 78.78 acres in Survey No, 234/2, Thiruneermalai Village. The Collector says that the high level committee had already examined the area and had submitted a report. Beyond this, the Collector has not made any special remarks. The report of the high level committee which is available in the file shows that the committee had made an inspection on 22-2-1995. The report makes a reference to the lease of one M. Arumugham which had expired on 19-6-1994 and the fact that under the Rules, there was no provision for renewal of the lease and therefore, the area was available for the grant of a fresh lease. The other aspects of the report indicates that (i) the quarry sought for is far away from the residential area (ii) there was no local objection for the grant of lease: (iii) there are approach roads for reaching the quarry sites and (iv) illicit quarry ing was being done in the hillock which extends to an area of 66 acres. The report is of no avail to all the three persons being the fourth respondent in each case because it was not made with reference to any application.
5A. Coming to the appellant, his application was not dated, but received in the Government’s office on 25-9-1995 and he had paid the fees under Chalan dated 14-8-1995, which was forwarded to the Collector for remarks on 26-10-1995. The remarks of the Collector were sent to the Government through the Commissioner of Geology and Mining on 6-12-1995. There is an endorsement that the remarks were despatched by the Collector on 8-12-1995. In the remarks, the Collector only says that the appellant had applied for the grant of lease in respect of an extent of 6 acres out of a total extent of 77.77 acres. He also refers to the fact that the high level committee had already examined the area and the report was available with the Government along with the remarks of the Collector, dated 24-9-1995 relating to the fourth respondent in each case. It was under those circumstance that the grant was made in favour of the fourth respondent in each case on 12-12-1995 and the application of the appellant was rejected on 29-12-1995. The writ petitions were filed on 9-1-1996 and interim stay was obtained. Ultimately, the writ petitions were dismissed on 12-9-1996.
6. We will now take up the first point as to whether the judgment of the Division Bench in writ appeal Nos. 1026 of 1995 etc. dated 8-11-1995 would apply to the facts of the present case. In the case before the Division Bench the undisputed facts were as follows :
“…..Upto a certain stage, all the applications were processed together by the Collector as well as the Director of Geology and Mining. However, while submitted the applications to the Slate Government, the application of the second respondent alone was forwarded and the applications of the writ petitioner and others were forwarded to the State Government later on after the mining lease was granted in favour of the second respondent…..”
In these circumstances, the Division Bench held as follows :
“…..For the present, it is sufficient to mention that a mandamus was available on the date when the order was passed by the State Government considering the application of the second respondent separately and thereafter taking up of the applications of the writ petitioner and twoothers. Hence we are of the view that exclusion of the application of the writ petitioner from consideration, when the application of the second respondent was considered was neither proper nor legal and was opposed to the principles of fair play and justice…..”
7. If we now recapitulate the facts of the present case, we can see that the fourth respondent in each case had filed their applications on 9-3-1995 and they were received by the Goverment on 3-4-1995. The appellant’s applications reached the Government on 25-9-1995. There is a clear time gap of about five months between the two applications. In both the cases, it took neatly a month for the Government’s letter to reach the Collector. The remarks of the Collector were forwarded to the Government, in the case of the fourth respondent on 24-9-1995. In the case of the appeilar.t. the Collector’s remarks were despatched only on 8-12-1995. In other words, the respective applications were ripe for consideration the Government on two different dates, which are far apart. The Government had passed the order in Ihe case of the fourth respondent in each case on 12-12-1995 and in the case of the appellant on 29-12-1995. On 12-12-1995 when the Government passed the order in favour of the fourth respondent in each case, it cannot be said that the Government was aware are of the applications of the appellant. In this view of the matter the ratio of the Division Bench judgment in W. A. No. 1026 of 1995 etc,. dated 8-11-1995 would not at all apply to the facts of the present case. The first contention of learned counsel for the appellant fails.
8. Even so, Mr. Vijay Narayan, argues that the impugned orders in favour of the fourth
respondent in each of the writ petitions are liable to be quashed on the ground that they are vitiated by errors of law apparent on the face of the record and totally contrary to the dictum of the Apex Court in Premium Granites’s case . The said case of the Supreme Court arose out of a judgment of this Court holding that Rule 39 of the Rules is not unconstitutional and violative of Art. 14 of the Constiiution of India. The Apex Court, reversing the judgment of this Court observed as follows (at page 2248 (of AIR) :
“The power of relaxation under Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules is to be exercised for ‘mineral development’ and ‘in public interest’ after recording reasons for such exercise of power. In our view, it has been rightly contended by the learned counsel in support of the validity of Rule 39, that the exercise of power under the said Rule 39 cannot be made areitrarily, capriciously and on subjective satisfaction of the concerned authority but the same is to be exercised within the parameters of mineral development and in public interest which as aforesaid are not vague and indefinite concepts. Such exercise of power must satisfy the reasonableness of State action before Court of law if any challenge of improper action in exercise of the said power under Rule 39 in a given case is made…..”
Therefore, the impugned orders of the Government have to be scrutinised with reference to the above observations of the Apex Court. If we now turn to the impugned orders which are identical in nature, the following defects are (sic)
(i) there is no reference at fill to public interest and/or the interest of the mineral development before the Government decided to grant the lease in favour of the three respondents; (ii) the Government was under a misapprehension that the high level committee had recommended the quarry lease application of the fourth respondent in each case lor quarrying blue metal. This is because the inspection and the report was made by the high level committee did not have in mind any particular applicant. It was a general report regarding the area in question and the availability of the area for quarrying purpose. The Government in the impugned orders had merely repeated the general findings of the high level committee regarding the area being available for the purpose of quarrying blue metal: (iii) beyond re-producing the general observations of the high level committee with reference to the area, the Government did not consider whether and how the mining lease would be in public interest and in the interest of mineral development to grant lease to the three respondents. The specific directions of the Supreme Court that the power must be exercised within the parameters of mineral development and public interest, which according to the Apex Court are not vague and indefinite concepts. There can be no grant of a mining lease by the Government under Rule 39 of the Rules without being satisfied that it would be in public interest and/or in the interest of mineral development.
9, There was an argument by learned counsel for the fourth respondent as well as the learned Government Pleader that the fourth respondent in each case were found to be educated unemployed youth and therefore the Government had in fact considered the public interest. We cannot accept this argument because even this reasoning was not given in the impugned orders, but only in the counter affidavit of the Deputy Secretary to the Government in the writ petitions filed by the appellant. It is well known that (sic) order has to be sustained on the reasons given in the order and not on the BAsis of the subsequent reasons given in tile counter affidavit. See Mohinder Singh Gill v. Election Commissioner we are therefore of the clear opinion that the impugned orders are vitiated by errors of law appearant on the face of the record and they are accordingly liable to be quashed.
10. Mr. N. R. Chandran, learned Senior Counsel made an attempt to argue that in any event, the orders cannot be quashed at the instance of the appellant. According to Mr. N.R.Chandran the appellant is none other than member of the Syndicate comprising of himself, one M. Arumugham and one Regina Bai. all of whom where interested in preventing the grant in favour of the competent persons like the 4th respondent. We are of the opinion that it is go into the antecedents of the appellant or his previous conduct in all these proceedings. So long an illegal order regarding the grant of a quarry lease is brought to our notice, we are duly bound to set aside the same. In this particular case, the appellant has sufficient interest in me invalidity of the grant because he himself had applied for the grant of the very same site for quary lease. In this view of the matter the (sic) of Mr. N. R. Chandran, learned senior counsel appearing for the fourth respondents in all these appeals is rejected.
11. The order of the learned single Judge, in our opinion, cannot be approved or affirmed because learned single Judge has not considered the queslion of validity of the impugned orders in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Premium Granite’s case (cited above). For all the foregoing reasones, the impugned orders are liable io be quashed. The order of the learned single Judge, is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the writ appeals are allowed. The orders of the learned single Judge
in the writ petitions are set aside. The writ petitions are allowed and the impugned orders are quashed. However there will be no orders as to cost.
12. Petitions allowed.