IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 11.04.2011 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.CHANDRU CONTEMPT PETITION No.1095 of 2007 in O.A.No.319 of 1993 K.Vembu ... Petitioner Vs. Chief Educational Officer, Cuddalore, Cuddalore District. ... Respondent This Contempt Petition is preferred under Sections 10 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, to punish the respondents for having committed contempt of Court for disobeying the order dated 12.10.1993 made in O.A.No.319 of 1993. For Petitioner : Mr.P.Ganesan For Respondent : Mr.A.Suresh,G.A.(Edn) O R D E R
This Contempt Petition is filed by the petitioner for punishing the respondent for violating the order of the Administrative Tribunal filed under Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Under Section 17, the power to punish for contempt has been vested on the Administrative Tribunal incorporating the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. As against the order passed by the Tribunal in a contempt petition, an appeal lies only to the Supreme Court in terms of Section 19(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
2.The Supreme Court in L.Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 has held in paragraphs 93 and 94 as follows:
“93….We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned.
94.The directions issued by us in respect of making the decisions of Tribunals amenable to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts will, however, come into effect prospectively i.e. will apply to decisions rendered hereafter. To maintain the sanctity of judicial proceedings, we have invoked the doctrine of prospective overruling so as not to disturb the procedure in relation to decisions already rendered.”
3.This view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the subsequent pronouncement in Rajeev Kumar Vs. Hemraj Singh Chauhan reported in (2010) 4 SCC 554. The relevant passages found in paragraphs 13 to 16 of the said judgment may be usefully extracted below:
13.In view of such repeated and authoritative pronouncement by the Constitution Bench of this Court, the approach made to the High Court for the first time by these appellants in respect of their service disputes over which CAT has jurisdiction, is not legally sustainable. The Division Bench of the High Court, with great respect, fell into an error by allowing the appellants to treat the High Court as a court of first instance in respect of their service disputes for adjudication of which CAT has been constituted.
14.The grievances of the appellants in this appeal are that they were not made parties in proceedings before the Tribunal. But in the impleadment application filed before the High Court it was not averred by them that they were not aware of the pendency of the proceedings before the Tribunal. Rather from the averments made in the impleadment petition it appears that they were aware of the pendency of the proceedings before the Tribunal. It was therefore, open for them to approach the Tribunal with their grievances. Not having done so, they cannot, in view of the clear law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar1, approach the High Court and treat it as the court of first instance in respect of their grievances by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. CAT also has the jurisdiction of review under Rule 17 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987. So, it cannot be said that the appellants were without any remedy.
15.As the appellants cannot approach the High Court by treating it as a court of first instance, their special leave petition before this Court is also incompetent and not maintainable.
16.The principles laid down in L. Chandra Kumar1 virtually embody a rule of law and in view of Article 141 of the Constitution the same is binding on the High Court. The High Court fell into an error by allowing the appellants to approach it in clear violation of the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar1.
4.Since the State Administrative Tribunal has been abolished, the Original Applications pending before the Tribunal were retransferred to this court and were treated as writ petitions and are being heard by this Court. In other respects, this court is not empowered to deal with the Contempt petitions filed before the Tribunal to punish any person for violating the order of the Tribunal as under the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, there is no provision either for re-transferring the matter to the High Court on its abolition or as to what should be done in case of abolition of the Tribunal. If the Tribunal is in existence, then the Tribunal will be treated as a Court of first instance.
5.The Tribunal also cannot be treated as the Court subordinate to the High Court in terms of Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Therefore, this court is unable to entertain the contempt petition filed by the petitioner arising out of the alleged disobedience of the order of the Tribunal in the absence of any legal provisions enabling to deal with it.
6.In view of the above, this contempt petition will stand dismissed. However, this will not prevent the petitioner from filing an appropriate writ petition seeking for enforcement of the Tribunal’s order.
svki
To
Chief Educational Officer,
Cuddalore,
Cuddalore District