JUDGMENT
Vinod K. Sharma, J.
1. This revision petition is against an order passed by the Rent Controller, Chandigarh, assessing the provisional rent for the demised premises to be Rs. 2,000/- p.m., instead of Rs. 375/- p.m. as assessed earlier on 9.8.2003.
2. The respondent-landlord filed a petition for eviction of the petitioner herein and claimed that the rate of rent of the booth in dispute was Rs. 2,000/- p.m., with a stipulation of increase of 10% after every year. It was further claimed in the eviction petition that the rate of rent was Rs. 2,622/- p.m. upto 10.12.1996 and Rs. 2,928/- p.m. w.e.f. 1.12.1997 and Rs. 3,220/- p.m., w.e.f. 10.12.1998 onwards. The petitioner opposed this application and claimed that the rate of rent was Rs. 375/- p.m. The learned Rent Controller noticed that as the respondent landlord had claimed that a rent note has been executed, it was his duty to have produced the same, but he did not. The learned Rent Controller further noticed that an injunction suit was filed by M/s. Mehra Enterprises against the petitioner in which ex parte proceedings were taken and in said suit the rent claimed was made at Rs. 375/- p.m. and accordingly assessment was made at Rs. 375/- p.m. Thereafter, application was moved by the respondent landlord for placing on record a copy of the rent note executed between the parties. The said application was opposed primarily on the ground that no review is permissible under the provisions of the East Punjab (Urban Rent Restriction) Act. The execution of the rent note was also disputed. The learned Rent Controller accepted the application by observing that the provisional rent was assessed in the absence of the rent agreement. As the same has been produced now, it would be in the interest of to assess the provisional rent in view of the said rent agreement. The learned Rent Controller also expressed an opinion that the re-assessment of provisional rent would not amount to review of order dated 9.8.2003.
3. Sh. V.K. Jain, Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has challenged the order passed by the learned Rent Controller, primarily on the ground that the impugned order is without jurisdiction as the learned Rent Controller has assumed the jurisdiction of review which did not vest in him. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner therefore, is that the remedy of review is a statutory remedy created by the statute and in the absence of the same the court does not have any inherent jurisdiction to review an order passed by the said authority. In support of this contention, learned Counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. v. Balkishan Nathani and Ors. . He also placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh and Ors. , wherein the Supreme Court was pleased to lay down that there was no provision in the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act to review and therefore, in the absence of any such express power, the Director, Consolidation of Holdings, was not competent to review the order passed under Section 42 of the Act. The learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the petitioners thereafter placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Bimla Bai v. Baijnath Singh Chandel 2000(2) R.C.R. (Rent) 598 (M.P.) : 2001(1) R.L.R. 58 to contend that the Rent Controller has no power to review its own order. Paras 4 and 5 of the said judgment read as under:
4. The Rent Controller Authority dismissed all the cases filed by the applicant against all the tenants by order dated 31.12.1997. It held that since the applicant did not produce the registered sale-deed 14.6.1985, she could not claim to be the landlady of the non-applicants.
5. The order dated 31.12.1997 was subsequently reviewed by the Rent Controlling Authority by order dated 30.3.1998 and it was set aside. The applicant was given an opportunity to lead further evidence.
4. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners thereafter placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kewal Chand Mimani by Lrs. v. S.K. Sen to contend that power of review is not an inherent power and it has to be conferred by law specifically or by necessary implication. He also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of National Hotel (Firm) Bombay and Ors. v. Rukalyabai and Ors. 1985(2) R.C.R. 112 to contend that power of review was not inherent as it has to be conferred by law specifically or by necessary implication. He further placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Jagdish Parshad v. Mehar Chand and Anr. (1993-1)103 P.L.R. 66, to contend that the Rent Act does not confer any power on Rent Controller or Appellate Authority to review their own order. In the said judgment, it was also held that the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority are not courts and therefore, the review exercised by the Civil Court under C.P.C. cannot be exercised by them. The learned Senior Counsel also placed reliance on the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Monm and Anr. v. Gopinath 1999(1) R.L.R. 510, to contend that when there is no provision of filing a review petition in the Act, the review cannot be held to be maintainable. Learned Senior Counsel thereafter placed reliance upon judgment in the case of Rakesh Wadhawan and Ors. v. Jagdamba Industrial Corporation and Ors. to contend that under the provisions of the Act, it is a duty of the Controller to asses the arrears to rent, the interest on such arrears and also the cost of the application. Thus the decision in respect of provisional rent has to be taken as a decision which cannot be subsequently reviewed. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner lastly placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Han Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa and Ors. 2001(1) S.C.C. 169 to contend that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to lay down that power to review cannot be exercised even under inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
5. On the other hand, Mr. Chetan Mittal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has supported the order by placing reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case of N.K. Vij v. Sh Kamal Kapur 1982(1) R.C.R. 353, wherein it has been held as under:
The Rent Controller dismissed the application of tenant who requested that landlord may be directed to answer interrogatories. The application was dismissed. The tenant submitted a review application pointing out that provisions of Order 11 Rule 1 C.P.C. were applicable to proceedings under Rent Act and that interrogatories could be issued to the landlord. The tenant cited a ruling in his favour C.R. 65 of 1961, decided on 14.3.1961 Bhagwan Singh v. Harbans Singh. The Rent Controller reviewed its own order and issued the interrogatories as prayed for by the tenant. It was contended on behalf of the landlord, that Rent Controller had no power to review its earlier order.
Held, the Rent Controller could pass the impugned order on the application filed by the tenant though the earlier was dismissed by him. The prohibition, if any, relates to the review of final orders passed by the Courts or the tribunals in the absence of the specific power to review, conferred upon them. The interlocutory orders passed in a proceeding stand altogether on a different footing.
6. Learned Counsel for the respondents also placed reliance upon judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Bharat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Ram Piari 1986 (Supl.) R.C.R. 468, laying down as under:
12. Lastly, J. Nandanlal Javantaraj (supra) was a case under Karnataka Rent Control Act and the question was whether the High Court had power to review in respect of an order made by it in a revision petition under Section 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. Adverting to the cases of National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. and R.M.A.RA. Adaikappa Chettiar and another (supra), a learned single Judge of Karnataka High Court overruled the objection. Hence it would appear to be well established law that where ordinary courts are seized of a dispute in respect of a legal right or liability under a special enactment they must be regarded as having power to adjudicate such disputes according to the ordinary rules of practice and procedure which would include the power to review their judgments and orders, even in the absence of a express provisions in the concerned Act conferring the power of review. A fortiori such a power will inhere in the High Court when it is seized of a matter under a special enactment, it being a court of record and plenary jurisdiction. However, the inherent powers, though ex facie plenary, are not to be treated as unlimited or unabridged but they are to be invoked on the grounds analogous to the grounds mentioned in Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code.
7. Learned Counsel for the respondents then placed reliance upon a judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of Collector of Madras v. G. Logeswara Rao 1987(2) R.C.R. 182, wherein it has been held as under:
It cannot be said that merely because there are no express provisions in the rules framed under the Act empowering the authority constituted under the Act to review their order in appropriate cases such authorities have no such power to do justice or redress a wrong.
8. Learned Counsel for the respondents further placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in case of Aggarwal Hardware Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Kumari C.V.S. Vasantha 1982(2) R.C.R. 193. Paras 17 and 18 of the said judgment read as under:
17. This judgment of the Division Bench was upheld by the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Gokal Chand . In Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh , their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering the construction of certain provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. One of the provisions, which arose directly for consideration, was Sub-section (2) of Section 99, which reads as under:
Subject to the provision of this Act and of any rules made thereunder every election petition shall be tried by the Tribunal as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, ,1908 (Act V of 1908) to the trial suits.
18. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that provisions of Order 7 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code become applicable to the trial of an election petition. Power of amendment is also a power conferred by Order 6 Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure yet the Supreme Court in the case of Harish Chandra Bajpai (supra) while interpreting the aforesaid Section 90(2) took the view that it was a part of the procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure. In same way I am of the firm view that power of view (review ?) conferred by provision of Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure is also applicable to the Tribunal after disposal of the appeal. Only those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are excluded which are inconsistent with the Act or Rules. The power conferred by Order 47 is in no way inconsistent with the Act.
9. Lastly, learned Counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Ramesh Basandara v. Moti Ram 14 2003(2) R.C.R. 508, laying down as under:
Here it will be noteworthy that the Controller is not an ordinary Civil Court but it is a Tribunal though it had all the trapping of a Civil Court. A tribunal has inherent power to render complete justice to the parties. It can set right the wrong committed by it in exercise of its inherent powers, it also has ample power to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable error committed by it. The Controller as such may give relief to the parties under the power of review in accordance with Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C. in terms of Sub-section (9) of the Act or invoke its inherent powers if exercise of such powers is necessary for doing justice in the case or undoing the wrong committed by it.
10. I have considered the arguments raised by the learned Counsel for the parties and find that it cannot be disputed that power of review is a statutory power and has to be conferred by way of statute specially or by necessary implication. In the present case it is not disputed that the order dated 9.8.2003 passed by the learned Rent Controller was merely an interlocutory order fixing the rent provisionally payable @ Rs. 375/- p.m. In view of the judgment in Rakesh Wadhawan’s case (supra), this order was to be reconsidered while passing final order wherein the opportunity again was required to be given to the tenant to make good deficiency in rent, if any, found on final adjudication. The order subsequently passed on 16.4.2005, which is impugned by the petitioners is again provisional order wherein the rights of the petitioners have again been protected as the rent has to be finally adjusted in the final adjudication. Therefore, I am of the opinion that it was within the right of the learned Rent Controller to assess the provisional rent again after material by way of rent note was placed before him. It may also be pointed out that the stand of the respondent landlord from the very beginning was that the rent payable was Rs. 2,000/-. In view of the judgments referred to above, it cannot be disputed that tribunal’s inherent right to do justice is not taken away. It is only after the final decision is taken and the case stands disposed of and if the matter is required to be reviewed, it is only then that the authority seeking to review the decision is required to act under the statute and in the absence of specific provision of review, no review can be done. In the present case the Rent Controller was seized of the matter and therefore, it was always open for him to fix the provisional rent again and thus, there is no error or lack of jurisdiction in the order passed by the learned Rent Controller, which may call for interference by this Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.
Accordingly, revision petition, being without any merit is dismissed.