JUDGMENT
1. In this writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, Punjab Agro Industries Corporation Limited, the petitioner, challenges the award of the Labour Court Annexure P-3, dated February 24, 1992, whereby dismissal of Kapil Dev Sharma-respondent No. 2 was held to be illegal. His re-instatement with 50% of the back wages was ordered. The dismissal was held to be illegal as proper procedure was not followed in conducting the enquiry. The case of the petitioner is based on the plea of constructive resjudicata, as respondent No. 2 had challenged the action of the petitioner in a civil suit and failed. On February 17, 1981, a charge-sheet was framed against respondent No. 2 by the Management-petitioner. On that very day respondent No. 2 was placed under suspension. After the enquiry was held, the order of dismissal was passed on June 15, 1982. Respondent No. 2, Kapil Dev Sharma filed a civil suit claiming re-instatement after one year of suspension and arrears of pay. The suit was filed on October 14, 1983. After trial the suit was dismissed on December 9, 1986. The appeal was filed before the District Judge, which was dismissed on December 1, 1987. At this state, it may be noticed that an application was filed before the Appellate Court for amendment of the plaint to challenge the order of dismissal, which was rejected. A demand notice was issued by respondent No. 2 on February 12, 1988, on which the State Government referred the dispute to the Labour Court under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Ultimately, the Labour Court gave the award on February 24, 1992-Annexure P/3.
2. On notice of motion having been issued, respondent No. 2 has contested the writ petition by filing the written statement. We have gone through the pleadings of the parties and the documents produced. We have heard counsel for the parties.
3. The petitioner-Corporation is a State Undertaking and its employee respondent No. 2 if aggrieved by the order of dismissal, had alternative remedies, i. e. either before the civil court or by reference before the Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Supreme Court in The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke, A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 2238, laid down four principles with respect to the respective jurisdiction of the civil court as well as the Labour Court in such like matters Such principles are as under :-
“(1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does ill relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the civil court.
(2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy.
(3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suiter is to get an adjudication under the Act.
(4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either section 33C or the raising of an industrial dispute as the case may be.”
The matter was considered by the Full Bench of this Court in Sukh Ram v. State of Haryana, (1982) 84 P. L. R. 717. The rule of law as laid in the case of The Premier Automobiles Ltd. (supra), was relied upon. The case of the present type would be fully covered by the second principle, as laid down by the Supreme Court in The Premier Automobiles’ case (supra). Respondent No. 2 had alternative remedy, i.e. either to approach the civil court or to get the dispute referred to the Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act. He chose to file the civil suit. The decision in the civil suit would, thus, operate as resjudicata, applying the principles of constructive resjudicata. Respondent No, 2 was, therefore, debarred from raising an industrial dispute on the same cause on which civil suit was filed.
4. Learned counsel for the contesting respondent has argued that in the civil suit the respondent No. 2 did not challenge the order of dismissal and his suit was merely based on the plea that after one year of the suspension order, he was entitled to reinstatement and, thus, respondent No. 2 had an independent right of getting the matter adjudicated before the Labour Court under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act with respect to termination of his services. This contention cannot be accepted because the order of dismissal was passed on June 15, 1982, whereas the civil suit was filed on October 14, 1983 It was open to respondent No. 2 to challenge the order of dismissal in the aforesaid suit and if he gave up the aforesaid plea, he could not subsequently challenge the same by filing a fresh suit in view of the bar contained under Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If he was barred from raising such a plea in the subsequent suit, obviously he could not be permitted under the law to raise such a plea before the Labour Court to challenge the order of his termination. The principles of natural justice also require that the parties should not be left in dark and allowed to continue litigation for all times to come. There has to be end of the litigation with respect to a particular cause at some stage, which is the basic principle enshrined under section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and such principle constructively would apply to different forums for claiming such reliefs. The judgment of the civil court, thus, would operate as resjudicata in proceedings before the Labour Court under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court was not correct in law in coming to the conclusion that Civil Court’s judgment would have no effect on the power of the Labour Court to determine the lis. No doubt, when reference is made under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court could not decline to answer the same. However, by applying the principle of resjudicata, the Labour Court could hold that no relief was to be allowed, applying principles of constructive resjudicata to the present respondent.
5. Another ground of attack in this writ petition to the award of the Labour Court is the ground of delay. Demand notice was issued on February 12, 1988, whereas order of dismissal was passed on June 15, 1982, i.e. there is six years delay. On this ground also the State Government could decline to refer the dispute to the Labour Court. As already observed above, on that ground the labour Court could not decline to adjudicate upon the dispute. However, while on granting the relief, this matter or plea could be taken into consideration, i.e. as to whether on holding the order of termination to be bad, payment of back wages could be denied to the workman.
6. Since we are of the opinion that no relief could be granted to the workman under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act by the Labour Court, as the workman had filed a civil suit, the award of the Labour Court Annexure P-3 cannot be sustained in law and is, therefore, quashed. However, there will be no order as to costs in this case.