ORDER
K.C. Jagadeb Roy, J.
1. The petitioners are the accused persons who are proceeded under Section 452/34 of the Indian Penal Code in the G.R. Case No. 21/85 pending in the court of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Banpur. Charges were framed against petitioner No. 15 under Sections 4 (viii), 7(d) of the PCR Act by order of the trial court dated 25-1-1988. In the present revision application, the petitioners pray that this order of framing charges against the accused persons be set aside. At the time of argument, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners confines his argument to petitioners Nos. 1, 2, 12 and 15 and does not press the application for the rest. This Criminal Revision has been filed under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The investigation was initiated at the instance of one Suryanarayan Sethi of village Pumuraput Sasan. He lodged the FIR on 29-9-1985. Pursuant to the investigation, charge-sheet was filed on 5-5-1986 against the present petitioners. On 8-10-1985 an affidavit was filed by the informant to exclude the names of the petitioners 1, 2, 12 and 15 on the ground that he had not stated the names of these four petitioners in his FIR. According to the informant, the FIR was made orally by him which was reduced to writing by the Sub-Inspector of Police, the contents of which were neither read over nor explained to him and he had inserted the names of these four petitioners in the said FIR. On the basis of the FIR and the investigation report submitted by the police, the trial court passed his order dated 25-1-1988 framing charges against the accused persons.
2. This order framing the charges against the accused persons is no doubt an interlocutory order. An interlocutory order merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues but not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue. An intermediate order is one which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. An order framing of the charge being an intermediate order falls squarely within the ordinary and natural meaning of term ‘interlocutory order’ as used in Code of Criminal Procedure. The order of framing the charges is, therefore, purely an interlocutory order as it does not terminate the proceedings and the trial goes on until it culminates in acquittal or conviction. This view finds support from the judgment reported in AIR 1980 SC 962 : (1980 Cri LJ 690). (V. C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I.) in which case the Apex Court considering a large number of cases decided by the Supreme Court and in English Courts came to hold thus :
Thus, on a consideration of the authorities, mentioned above, the following propositions emerge,
(1) that an order which does not determine the rights of the parties but only one aspect of the suit or the trial is an interlocutory order;
(2) that the concept of interlocutory order has to be explained in contradistinction to a final order. In other words, if an order is not a final order, it would be an interlocutory order;
(3) that one of the tests generally accepted by the English Courts and the Federal Court is to see if the order is decided in one way, it may terminate the proceedings but if decided in another way, then the proceedings would continue; because, in our opinion, the term ‘interlocutory order’ in the Criminal Procedure Code has been used in a much wider sense so as to include even intermediate or quasi-final orders;
(4) that an order passed by the Special Court discharging the accused would undoubtedly be a final order inasmuch as it finally decides the rights of the parties and puts an end to the controversy and thereby terminates the entire proceedings before the court so that nothing is left to be done by the court thereafter;
(5) that even if the Act does not permit an appeal against an interlocutory order the accused is not left without any remedy because in suitable cases, the accused can always move this Court in its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution even against an order framing charges against the accused. Thus, it cannot be said that by not allowing an appeal against an order framing charges, the Act works serious injustice to the accused.
3. Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:
The power of revision conferred by Sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding….
Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, however, relied on a Full Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court reported in (1992) I CCR 290 (Jarnail Singh v. The State of Rajasthan) wherein it was held :
To sum up, we find that an order framing charge is an order of moment; it deprives the liberty of a citizen and puts him to jeopardy of a trial. Such an order finally rejects the plea of the accused that he is entitled to a discharge or that he is not liable to be tried. Such an order concludes the enquiry and the pre-trial proceedings against the accused. The order framing charge taken away a very valuable right of the accused.
This case is clearly distinguishable. The Full Bench was considering the cases where the jurisdiction of the court to proceed with the criminal case was challenged on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or for lack of sanction and the charges were already framed notwithstanding that. This, according to the Full Bench case referred to, could not be treated as an interlocutory order so as to be hit by Section 397(2) of the Cr. P.C. and can be agitated in a revision.
4. In another case, reported in AIR 1978 SC 47 : (1978 Cri LJ 165) (Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra), it was also held (para 12):
‘Ordinarily and generally the expression ‘interlocutory order’ has been understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term ‘final order’.
A paragraph in Vol-22 of the Halsbury’s Laws of England (Third Edition at page 742) is relevant for the purpose which reads thus:
that a judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another or final as to part or interlocutory as to part. The meaning of the two words ‘final’ and ‘interlocutory’ has, therefore, to be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required.
In para 21 of the judgment in (Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra) (supra) it is observed by the Apex Court that in general a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed ‘final’.
5. It is further held by the Apex Court in Madhu Limaye’s case (1978 Cri LJ 165 at pp. 170-71) thus:
On the one hand, the legislature kept in fact the revisional power of the High Court and, on the other, it put a bar on the exercise of that power in relation to any interlocutory order. In such a situation it appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression ‘interlocutory order’ as invariably being converse of the words ‘final order.’ There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami’s case : (1948 (49) Cri LJ 625) (FC), but, yet it may not be an interlocutory order pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in Sub-section (2) of Section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders for the purpose of Article 134 of the Constitution, yet, it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of Section 397(2).
6. The framing of charges ignoring absence of necessary sanction for prosecution and absence of jurisdiction obviously fall in my opinion in such category of non-final order requiring revision by High Court. Accordingly, I have no hesitation to hold in this case that the order dated 25-1-1988 framing charge against the accused persons was an interlocutory order by the test indicated in the decision cited above and therefore, not revisable by this court because of the impediment contained in Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, urges that the petition which was earlier filed under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may now be treated to have been filed Under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. and the court in exercise of its power under inherent power quash the proceedings. The question arises whether this Court in exercise of the inherent power can quash the impugned interlocutory order which it could not quash in exercise of the general powers of revision because of the bar contained in Section 397(2) of the Cr. P.C. It is already held in the case reported in 1978 Cri LJ 165 : AIR 1978 SC 47 (Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra) that the following principles have to be kept in mind in relation to the exercise of inherent power of the High Court.
(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party;
(2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice;
(3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.
8. In the present case, a bar is already engrafted in the Code of Criminal Procedure by way of Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure barring the revisional power of this court against the interlocutory order passed by the court. As such, the inherent power of this court cannot be exercised to achieve the same which it could not do under revisional power Under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, the Criminal Revision has no merit and is dismissed.