IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 25.04.2011 Coram: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G. RAJASURIA S.A.No.1074 of 2006 & M.P.No.1 of 2006 M.P.No.2 of 2009 Sakthivel ... Appellant Cause title accepted vide order of Court dated 13.9.2006 made in M.P.No.1 of 2006 vs. 1.Muthu 2.Lakshmi 3.Minor Gurunathan 4.Minor Vijayachandran ... Respondents This Second Appeal is focussed as against the judgment and decree dated 25.1.2005 passed by the Subordinate Judge, Ariyalur, in A.S.No.43 of 2001, reversing the judgment and decree dated 9.4.2001 passed by the District Munsif, Jayankondam, in O.S.No.415 of 1999. For appellant : Mr.A.Thiagarajan For respondents : Dr.R.Gopinath for R1 and R2 JUDGMENT
This Second appeal is focussed by the plaintiff animadverting upon the judgment and decree dated 25.1.2005 passed by the Subordinate Judge, Ariyalur, in A.S.No.43 of 2001, reversing the judgment and decree dated 9.4.2001 passed by the District Munsif, Jayankondam, in O.S.No.415 of 1999, which was filed for declaration and permanent injunction.
2. The parties, for the sake of convenience, are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court.
3. Narratively but precisely, broadly but briefly, the relevant facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this Second Appeal would run thus:
(a) The appellant herein, as plaintiff, filed the suit for declaration and permanent injunction.
(b) The defendants filed the written statement resisting the suit.
(c) Whereupon issues were framed by the trial Court.
(d) On the plaintiff’s side, the mother of the plaintiff examined herself as P.W.1 along with P.W.2, P.W.3 and P.W.4 and Exs.A1 to A12 were marked. On the defendants’ side, the first defendant examined himself as D.W.1 along with D.Ws.2 to 5 and Exs.B1 to B12 were marked. Exs.W1 to DW6 were marked as witness documents.
(e) Ultimately the trial Court decreed the suit, as against which the defendants preferred the appeal. Whereupon the appellate Court set aside the judgement and decree of the trial Court by reversing the findings and dismissed the original suit.
4. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court, the plaintiff preferred this Second Appeal on various grounds inter alia suggesting the following substantial questions of law.
“a) Whether the earlier Will dated 5.11.1988 shall override the latest Will dated 7.3.90?
b) Is it not correct to say that the latest Will itself clases all the past Wills executed by the Testator?
c) Is not the Court has got its inherent power to find out the genuinity of the Will without referring it to hand write experts?
d) When the beneficiary’s right itself is in question, the sale made subsequently to third parties is valid?”
(extracted as such)
5. My learned predecessor framed the following substantial questions of law:
“Whether the findings of the lower appellate Court reversing the judgment of the trial Court is based upon the provisions of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act?”
6. Heard both sides.
7. The epitome and the long and short of the arguments as put forth and set forth on the side of the appellant/plaintiff would run thus:
(i) The trial Court after considering the pros and cons of the matter and also the evidence of Amaravathy-the elderly lady, who happened to be the sister of the testator, gave a finding in favour of the plaintiff, whereas, the first appellate Court, without any valid reason and without considering as to whether Ex.B1-the alleged Will dated 5.11.1988 executed by the testator-Vaidyalingam in favour of defendants 1 and 2 was proved, simply decreed the suit.
(ii) The trial Court also analysed the signature of the testator in Ex.A1 and arrived at the conclusion that there was nothing to doubt the genuineness of it, whereas the first appellate was very much carried away by the absence of the caste name ‘Pandaram’ being suffixed to the signature of the testator, and simply held as though Ex.A1 was not proved.
(iii) The over all circumstances should have been taken into consideration, but the first appellate Court failed to take into consideration the same and decided the appeal.
8. Per contra, in a bid to torpido and pulverise and to take the edge off the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff, the learned counsel for the respondents/defendants would advance his arguments, which could tersely and briefly be set out thus:
(a) The first appellate Court correctly analysed Ex.A1, in which, at the first page there is no signature of the testator, but in the back page alone the purported signature of the testator is found and that too, without caste name.
(b) In Ex.B1, which emerged during the year 1988, and also in other contemporaneous admitted documents, one could find the caste name ‘Pandaram’ having been suffixed to the signature of the testator, when such is the probability, the first appellate Court was right in arriving at the conclusion that the signature as found in Ex.A1 was doubtful.
(c) The trial Judge was not justified in verifying the purported signature of the testator in Ex.B1 by applying his own standard. Simply because Amaravathy happened to be the witness in support of the plaintiff, that it does not mean that the improbabilities and the draw backs found in the evidence of the plaintiff should be ignored by the Court.
(d) The trial Court in fact blindly upheld the case of the plaintiff, whereas, the first appellate Court has seen the reality and decided the appeal, warranting no interference in second appeal.
9. Indubitably and indisputably the relationship among the parties is an admitted one. One Vaidyalingam Pandaram was the absolute owner of the suit property and other properties. He had a brother by name Perumal and a sister by name Amaravathi Ammal. Amaravathi Ammal had two sons, namely, Thangamani and Muthu. Thangamani got married one Manimegalai and they gave birth to a son by name Sakthivel, who happened to be the plaintiff. Lakshmi is the wife of Muthu and they gave birth to two sons namely Gurunathan and Vijayachandran. However, the plaintiff would dispute the legitimate status of Lakshmi.
10. Earlier Vaidyalingam Pandaram executed a Will during the year 9.2.1979, which was a registered one. Subsequently, he cancelled it during the year 1987. Thereafter, as put forth by both sides, his properties, except the suit property, were in one way or other disposed of by Vaidyalingam Pandaram in favour of the descendants of Amaravathi Ammal.
11. The suit property is measuring an extent of 32 = cents of dry land. Each side is claiming possession over it. No doubt, Ex.A1 comprised of one sheet. At the first page there is no signature of the testator, but on the reverse page the purported signature of the testator is found with the caste name ‘Pandaram’. No thumb impression is found either in Ex.A1 or in Ex.B1. Ex.A1 was scribed by an unlienced scribe, so to say, a retired teacher and Ex.B1 was written by a licensed scribe. The scribes were not examined on either side.
12. In this factual matrix, what I could see is that both sides vied with each other in asserting their respective Wills from the available evidence. The trial Judge, in paragraph No.10 went to the extent of making his own verification with regard to the disputed signature in Ex.B1 without taking any Handwriting expert’s assistance.
13. In a matter of this nature, I am of the considered view that either of the Courts below could have very well resorted to the help of a Handwriting expert, so as to find out the genuineness of the respective signatures found in Ex.A1 and Ex.B1. Neither of the parties also took initiative in this regard.
14. No doubt, deciding the lis by placing reliance on the oral evidence of the parties concerned is one thing, but when admitted contemporaneous signatures are available, to verify the genuineness of the purported signature in Ex.A1 and Ex.B1, it is always advisable for the Courts to resort to taking the assistance of a Hand writing expert. No doubt, the opinion of an expert could only be an opinion and no finality could be attached to it; even then, that would go a long way to help the Court to base its decision on a firm footing.
15. At this juncture, I would like to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in (2008) 4 SCC 530 [Thiruvengadam Pillai vs. Navaneethammal and another]; certain excerpts from it would run thus:
“16. When there is no doubt that court can compare the disputed handwriting/signature/finger impression with the admitted handwriting/signature/finger impression, such comparison by court without the assistance of any expert, has always been considered to be hazardous and risky. When it is said that there is no bar to a court to compare the disputed finger impression with the admitted finger impression, it goes without saying that it can record an opinion or finding on such comparison, only after an analysis of the characteristics of the admitted finger impression and after verifying whether the same characteristics are found in the disputed finger impression. The comparison of the two thumb impressions cannot be casual or by a mere glance. Further, a finding in the judgment that there appeared to be no marked differences between the admitted thumb impression and disputed thumb impression, without anything more, cannot be accepted as a valid finding that the disputed signature is of the person who has put the admitted thumb impression. Where the court finds that the disputed finger impression and admitted thumb impression are clear and where the court is in a position to identify the characteristics of fingerprints, the court may record a finding on comparison, even in the absence of an expert’s opinion. But where the disputed thumb impression is smudgy, vague or very light, the court should not hazard a guess by a casual perusal.
17. The decision in Murari Lal and Lalit Popli should not be construed as laying a proposition that the court is bound to compare the disputed and admitted finger impressions and record a finding thereon, irrespective of the condition of the disputed finger impression. When there is a positive denial by the person who is said to have affixed his finger impression and where the finger impression in the disputed document is vague or smudgy or not clear, making it difficult for comparison, the court should hesitate to venture a decision based on its own comparison of the disputed and admitted finger impressions. Further, even in cases where the court is constrained to take up such comparison, it should make a thorough study, if necessary with the assistance of counsel, to ascertain the characteristics, similarities and dissimilarities. Necessarily, the judgment should should contain the reasons for any conclusion based on comparison of the thumb impression, if it chooses to record a finding thereon. The court should avoid reaching conclusions based on a mere casual or routine glance or perusal.
19. The trial court had analysed the evidence properly and had dismissed the suit by giving cogent reasons. The first appellate court reversed it by wrongly placing onus on the defendants. Its observation that when the execution of an unregistered document put forth by the plaintiff was denied by the defendants, it was for the defendants to establish that the document was forged or concocted, is not sound proposition. The first appellate court proceeded on the basis that it is for the party who asserts something to prove that thing; and as the defendants alleged that the agreement was forged, it was for them to prove it. But the first appellate court lost sight of the fact that the party who propounds the document will have to prove it. In this case the plaintiff came to court alleging that the first defendant had executed an agreement of sale in his favour. The first defendant having denied it, the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that the first defendant had executed the agreement and not on the first defendant to prove the negative. The issues also placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove the document to be true. No doubt, the plaintiff attempted to discharge his burden by examining himself as also scribe and one of the attesting witnesses. But the various circumstances enumerated by the trial court and the High Court referred to earlier, when taken together, rightly create a doubt about the genuineness of the agreement and dislodge the effect of the evidence of Pws. 1 to 3. We therefore of the view that the decision of the High Court, reversing the decision of the first appellate Court, does not call for interference.”
16. There is also one other decision rendered by me reported in 2008 (3) CTC 470 [Ganapathy Thevar v. Shanmuga Thevar]; certain excerpts from it would run thus:
“14. …….The Court cannot assume the role of an expert in comparing the disputed handwriting with that of the admitted ones. No doubt, the Court as per Section 73 of the Evidence Act, in certain circumstances could exercise its power with caution. In such an event, it is the bounden duty of the Court to specify clearly as to what are the salient features based on which the finding is arrived at.
15. It is common knowledge that the science of analysing the questioned documents contemplates certain principles and theories. Here, both the Courts below were not objective in analysing the impugned handwriting.
16. No carte blanche is given to any Court to simply compare the disputed handwriting with that of the admitted handwritings and arrive at a subjective satisfaction about the similarities and dissimilarities. There should have been reasons set out for arriving at such conclusion, but here, both the Courts below have not resorted to such a procedure. The subjective satisfaction of both the Courts below cannot be taken in favour of the defendant.”
(iii) (1979) 2 SUPREME COURT CASES 158 THE STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION) V. PALI RAM.
17. A mere poring over and perusal of the above precedents would highlight and spotlight the fact that the Court is not expected to assume the role of an expert and arrive at the conclusion in one way or other relating to the genuineness or otherwise of a document unless extraordinary circumstances warrant so, and furthermore, once the Court assumes the role of an expert necessarily, the various characteristics as found recognised in the science of handwriting analysis should be referred to, so to say, at least a famous treatise on handwriting analysis should be referred to and accordingly, there should be a detailed judgment. Mere subjective satisfaction would not be sufficient. No carte blanche is given to any Court to simply look at the disputed signature with some admitted signatures and give a finding that the Court is satisfied in one way or the other.
18. It appears, the first appellate Court was very much carried away by the absence of caste name ‘Pandaram’ in the purported signature of the testator, whereas, the trial Court was carried away by the fact that there was a long gap between Ex.A1 and Ex.B1 and because of change of social circumstances, the testator dropped his caste name in his signature in Ex.A1.
19. I would like to point out that Ex.B1-the Will was dated 5.11.1988, whereas Ex.A1-the Will was dated 7.3.1990. The gap between the two Wills is only one year and four months, which by no stretch of imagination could be described as an enormous period, which resulted in social change etc as held by the trial Court.
20. The learned counsel for both sides would submit that the original documents, relating to Exs.B9 to B12-the certified copies, do contain the admitted signatures of the testator, which could be taken for verifying the genuineness of the signature in Ex.A1 and Ex.B1 and the respective originals of those documents would be with the respective parties and they could produce before the Court concerned for sending them to the expert for comparison.
21. I am of the considered view that such a course is the best one and even if such documents are not produced, the Court could summon from the Registration Department concerned to produce the signatures of Vaidyalingam Pandaram, which emerged in connection with those registered documents.
22. I recollect and call up the the trite proposition that deciding the case from the available evidence is one thing, but deciding the case based on best evidence that could be secured by the Court is another thing. Here even though the best evidence could have been placed before the Court, both sides have failed to do so. Both sides could not at once enlighten this Court as to why the respective scribes to Ex.A1 and Ex.B1 were not examined and there is nothing to indicate whether they are available at all. However, both sides could be given opportunity to examine the scribes as well, if they are available, in addition to obtaining the expert opinion regarding the genuineness of the purported signatures in both the Wills, namely, Ex.A1 and Ex.B1.
23. Hence in this view of the matter, I am of the considered view that the matter should be remitted back to the first appellate Court.
24. In view of the ratiocination adhered to above, the substantial question of law is answered to the effect that the first appellate Court was not justified in simply reversing the judgment of the trial Court based upon the provisions of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, without having proper evidence before it.
25. Accordingly, the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court are set aside and the matter is remitted back to the first appellate Court to send the disputed signature to the handwriting expert for getting the opinion. The plaintiff and the defendants are enjoined and hereby mandated to furnish before the first appellate Court the contemporaneous signature or authentic ante litem motam signatures of the testator. Whereupon, at the cost of the plaintiff, an Advocate Commissioner shall be appointed :
(a) To carry the relevant documents in connection with this case personally in a sealed cover;
(b) and produce the same before the Forensic Expert;
(c) leave it in his custody under his acknowledgment for as many days as the Forensic Expert may require;
(d) collect the record from the Forensic Expert on the day as may be fixed by him;
(e) bring it back and lodge it with the Court.
The Forensic Expert is directed to complete the examination of the records in any event, within 48 hours after the depositing of the same by the Advocate Commissioner with him.
24. After getting such opinion from the Forensic Expert, both sides should be given opportunity to file objections, if any. The expert also shall be examined as Court witness, and opportunity also shall be given to both sides to cross-examine the expert, if they so desire. If the presence of the scribes relating to Ex.A1 and B1 could be secured, they may be examined. The first appellate Court shall take all endeavors to see that the matter is disposed on merits untrammeled and uninfluenced by any of the observations made by this Court in deciding this Second Appeal, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
25. In the result, the Second Appeal is disposed of accordingly. However, there is no order as to costs. Both sides shall appear before the Subordinate Judge, Ariyalur, on 7.6.2011. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
Msk 25.4.2011 Note to Office: Issue order on 4.5.2011 To 1. The Subordinate Judge, Ariyalur. 2. The District Munsif, Jayankondam G.RAJASURIA, J. msk S.A.No.1074 of 2006 25.4.2011