ORDER
A.P. Misra, J.
1. This revision is directed as against an order dt. 9-2-1988 by virtue of which application for making additional issue so far as it relates to Issues Nos, 10 and 11 was rejected. Issues Nos. 10 and 11 in terms raise question of title and they are quoted as under:–
“10. Whether no valid title passed in the plaintiffs through the sale deed dt. 9-8-1983 relied upon by the plaintiff? If so, its effect.
11. Whether the sale deed dt. 9-8-1983 is understamped and unenforceable and inadmissible in evidence?”
2. In the present revision notice was issued at the admission stage. Since parties are represented and counter and rejoinder affidavits having been exchanged this revision is being disposed of finally at the admission stage itself.
3. The main contention on behalf of the applicant was that the trial court should not have rejected the said two issues since the question regarding transfer of title by the erstwhile landlord to the transferee by means of sale deed dt. 9th Aug. 1983, was pleaded to be illegal. It was urged, since question of title was specifically raised such an issue should have been framed. On behalf of the respondents it is urged that earlier the matter came up for consideration before this Court when amendment to the pleading was made on behalf of the applicant by virtue of which dispute regarding title of the disputed accommodation was specifically raised and such an amendment was rejected by means of order dt. 13th Feb. 1986, against which a revision (Civil Revision No. 524 of 1986) was preferred before this Court and this Court by means of judgment and order dt. 19th March, 1986, also rejected the revision of the applicant. When the finding has been recorded in the aforesaid revision the present applicant Ghanshyam Das Agarwal cannot be heard to raise the same issue again It has not been disputed that that order has become final between the parties. It was urged that the said finding has been recorded while rejecting the Amendment sought. Thus, it would not exclude the applicant from raising such a plea on the residue of the pleading where he has already pleaded, disputed the title, and refusing to permit such an issue would amount committing an error of jurisdiction.
4. Learned counsel for the applicant for this purpose placed reliance on the case Devi Das v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1982 SC 1213. That was a case where a transfer was made by the father in favour of his son and it was challenged that no sale consideration was paid for the purpose and thus the transfer was a sham transaction. The Supreme Court held that the question raised in that case ought to have been decided whether such a transfer was valid or not.
5. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand relied on the case reported in Tilak Rarn v. IInd Addl. District Judge, Lucknow, (1982) 1 All Ren Cas 103. In this case it was held that the original landlord sold the house in dispute to plaintiffs and after selling it he informed the tenant about the sale to the plaintiffs. Thereafter, the plaintiffs by notice terminated tenant’s tenancy and filed a suit for ejectment and for recovery of rent. The tenant in such a case is estopped from denying title of such plaintiffs. That was a case where tenant although admitted original landlord as his landlord but denied plaintiffs’ title.
6. In the earlier proceeding, as aforesaid, this Court recorded finding that the present applicant cannot be heard to say that the transfer in plaintiff’s favour was invalid, which has become final between the parties. The applicant in his own application under Section 30 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 under column No. 6 has described the transferee as his landlord. Even in his pleading in the written statement he has admitted that he deposited cent under Section 20(4) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 admitting the defendant respondent as his landlord. However, in para 19 of the written statement, it is further stated that in reply to the notice dt. 30th Dec. 1983, it was stated that the applicant will be taking recourse on thebasis of legaladvice regarding thelegality of the transfer. On the other hand, it has been argued that para 22 of the written statement refers to the clarification sought in reply to the said notice and, since deposit was made under Section 30(2) of the Act thus bona fide dispute of title was raised. It was urged, since the clarification was not given hence the deposit was made under Section 30. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents referred to the said clarification as only asking the details regarding the payment of rent as to whom it has to be made and in what proportion. The clarification was not regarding the title.
7. By perusing column 8 of the said application under Section 30 coupled with the averments in the written statement it reveals prima facie that the said deposit under Section 30 was made only since the clarification sought was not replied. Thus it would not constitute denial of title. It is not in dispute that intricate question of title could not be agitated before the court of small causes. It is open to a party to raise such an issue before the competent civil court. It is made clear that the finding recorded by this court by means of this order rejecting the framing of issue is without prejudice to the right of the applicant of raising such a plea before a competent court. However, since earlier as aforesaid the applicant tried to raise such dispute of title in this very suit and that having been rejected the finding recorded by the trial court rejecting the framing of such an issue could not be said to be such, which calls for interference by this court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.
8. Accordingly, the present revision is dismissed. However, on the facts and circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs. Ad interim order dt. 11-7-1988.