High Court Jharkhand High Court

Jesmine Tiru vs Ram Awdhesh Singh And Anr. on 10 September, 2003

Jharkhand High Court
Jesmine Tiru vs Ram Awdhesh Singh And Anr. on 10 September, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2004 (1) JCR 27 Jhr
Author: G S Sharma
Bench: G S Sharma


ORDER

Guru Sharan Sharma, J.

1. The plaintiffs filed Eviction Suit No. 6 of 1996 purporting to be under Section 14 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act’) against the defendant for eviction from the’ suit premises, detailed in Schedule ‘A’ to the plaint. The suit proceeded ex-parte and was decreed on 11.9.1997.

2. The defendant thereafter on 23.2.1998 filed Misc. Case No. 3 of 1998 under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure , which was allowed on 4.6.1999 and the ex-parte decree dated 11.9.1997 was set aside. On 23.6.1999 the defendant filed petition stating that in the plaint besides the claim of personal necessity, the plaintiffs have also made averments regarding the defendant’s default in payment of rent and damages to the suit premises and thereby commission of breach of tenancy and have also claimed arrears of rent and, therefore, the suit under Section 14 was not maintainable.

3. On 4.8.1999 the plaintiffs filed petition for amendment in the plaint under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code in order to remove certain anomalies therein, which was allowed on 2.9.1999 and thereby the averments as well as the relief sought for in the plaint was amended as per the requirement of Section 14 of the Act.

4. On 9.9.1999 defendant filed affidavit and separate petition under Section 14{4) of the Act and the trial Court by order dated 28.9.1999 granted leave to the defendant to contest the suit.

5. The plaintiffs claimed that one Mohiuddin Saudagar transferred plot Nos. 917 and 918 in the years 1961 and 1966 to Sardar Prithviraj Singh, who by registered sale deed dated 6.11.1971 sold the same to Girdharilal and Jagat Ram. The plaintiffs purchased the same from them by registered sale deed dated 7.8.1978, made . Constructions thereon and inducted the defendant as tenant in the year 1991 on monthly rental of Rs. 250. The defendant stopped payment of rent from May, 1993 and the plaintiffs required the suit premises for the purpose of starting own business therein by their sons, who were five-six in number and were sitting idle, for which Lawyer’s notice was sent to the defendant on 19.9.1995 to vacate the suit premises.

6. The defendant, on the other hand, denied relationship of landlord and tenant and also challenged the plaintiffs’ title over the suit premises. According to her, she was inducted as tenant by one Baburam Manjhi in the year 1985 on monthly rental of Rs. 150/- and is running a School, namely, Holy Family School and paying rent to him.

7. According to the defendant, plot Nos. 917 and 918 stood recorded in the names of Bhola Manjhi, Kasia Manjhi and Budhu Manjhi, ail sons of Khedan Manjhi. Baburam Manjhi is grant son of one of the recorded tenants, namely, Bhola Manjhi, who on partition in his family got the said land in his share and constructed rooms thereon and let out the same to her.

8. It appears that Title Suit No. 19 of 1992 was decreed, wherein the plaintiffs’ title was declared over those two plots. Further Land Restoration Case No. 5 of 1995-96 was filed by Baburam Manjhi against the plaintiffs for restoration of his possession over the suit land was also dismissed on 29.1.1996.

9. The trial Court decreed the suit by impugned judgment dated 21.2.2003 holding that there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, the plaintiffs required the suit premises reasonably and in good faith for their personal use and occupation and partial eviction of the defendant could not satisfy their need. The defendant has, therefore, filed the present revision application under Section 14(8) of the Act against the said judgment and eviction decree dated 21.2.2003.

10. On perusal of the entire order sheet of the suit as well as impugned judgment revealed that the suit after necessary amendments in the plaint allowed on 2.9.1999 proceeded under Section 14 of the Act and after granting leave to contest to the defendant under Section 14(4), the impugned eviction decree was passed. It is true that trial Court discussed defendant’s challenge to the plaintiffs’ title, hut incidentally as there was no question or occasion to go into such question in the present suit at the instance of the defendant. No doubt Baburam Manjhi, who was not a party to the suit was examined by the defendant as DW 7, but in view of the fact that he had himself gone for restoration of possession, vide Restoration Case No. 5 of 1995-96 and that was dismissed, no weight to his statement that he was receiving rent from the defendant in respect of suit premises could have been given. Moreover, if there was dispute between the plaintiffs on the one hand and the said Baburam Manjhi on the other in respect of title over the suit premises that was not to be decided in the present suit and the most important thing herein was fdr the plaintiffs to establish relationship of landlord and tenant. The trial Court considered the oral evidence of the PWs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 10 in detailed in respect of creation of tenancy between the plaintiffs and the defendant over the suit premises and payment of rent by her to the plaintiffs and recorded a finding of fact that there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. I find no reason to interfere with the said finding.

11. So far as the plaintiffs’ claim for personal necessity was concerned, it was not disputed that the plaintiffs got 5-6 sons, who were sitting idle and their witnesses PWs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 and 10 also supported their intention to start stationery as well as furniture business in the suit premises by those unemployed sons of the plaintiffs, which was most suitable for the purpose. Considering the extent of the plaintiffs’ requirement for doing different business by their 5-6 sons, trial Court found that partial eviction of the defendant could not have satisfied the plaintiffs’ need. I find no reason to interfere with the said finding too.

12. In my view, there is no infirmity in
the impugned judgment and decree. There is
no merit in this Revision application. It is
dismissed.