BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED: 23/07/2008 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MRS.JUSTICE PRABHA SRIDEVAN S.A.(MD).No.1618 of 1992 and S.A.(MD).No.1619 of 1992 and C.M.P.No.16228 of 1992 1.Sivasamy 2.Manickkam 3.Karuppian ... Appellants in S.A.No.1618/1992 1.Lakshmi (died) 2.Sivasamy 3.Manickam 4.Karuppian (Appellants 2 to 4 brought on record as per the order of this Court dated 26.08.1997 in C.M.P.No.16476/1996) ... Appellants in S.A.No.1619/1992 vs. 1.Poomalai 2.Lakshmi 3.Thirupathi ... Respondents in S.A.No.1618/1992 1.Poomalai 2.Sivasami 3.Manickam 4.Karuppaiyan 5.Thirupathi (Second Appeal was dismissed as against RR-2 to 5 as per order of this Court dated 27.02.2008) ... Respondents in S.A.No.1619/1992 PRAYER Second Appeals filed under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code against the judgment and decree passed in A.S.Nos.74 and 75 of 1991 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Pattukottai, dated 28.08.1992, confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Munsif, Pattukottai in O.S.No.56 of 1988 dated 22.08.1991. (S.A.No.1618/1992) !For Appellants 1 and 2... Mr.S.Sundaresan For Appellant No.3 ... Mr.M.Palanisamy ^For 1st Respondent ... Mr.V.K.Vijayaraghavan For Mr.Ramamurthy For 3rd Respondent ... No Appearance (S.A.No.1619/1992) !For Appellants 2 & 3 ... No Appearance For Appellant No.4 ... Mr.M.Palanisamy ^For 1st Respondent ... Mr.V.K.Vijayaraghavan For Mr.Ramamurthy :COMMON JUDGMENT **************
One unfortunate Masi Ambalam died on 01.11.1987. We do not know
whether his end came by fair means or foul. It is evident that the parties
herein including his only daughter were more interested in the suit properties
than him.
2. The plaintiff, who is the first respondent, is the daughter of
Masi Ambalam. She filed the suit for injunction and declaration that she is the
owner of ‘A’ schedule property, for partition of ‘B’ schedule property and for
injunction and alternatively for possession. Her mother pre-deceased her father.
There was no other issue. Masi Ambalam died intestate. The plaintiff learnt that
her father was abducted by the third defendant on 08.09.1987 and later he was
reported to have died on 01.11.1987, allegedly killed by the third defendant and
his henchmen. As the sole legal heir of Masi Ambalam, the plaintiff performed
the Karumadi on 16.11.1987 at Tiruvayyaru. The plaintiff had also given a
complaint to the Sub-Inspector of Police, Thiruvonam regarding the abduction.
Masi Ambalam was in possession of the suit property till his death and after his
death, the plaintiff went and took possession of her father’s property. The
plaintiff claimed half share in suit ‘B’ schedule 25 to 30,32,34,36,37,39 and 44
and 45. According to her, the defendants 1 to 5 have no title. The defendants 1
to 3 are the sons of the fourth defendant through her deceased husband one
Malayappan. The fifth defendant was associating herself with Masi Ambalam for
some time. She was not a permanently kept concubine of Masi Ambalam. In 1986
Masi Ambalam was very old and afflicted with blood pressure and other ailments.
So, the plaintiff made a publication in Dinamalar claiming her right and stating
that some persons were taking advantage of the old-age of her father to create
certain documents. The plaintiff understood that some persons like defendants 1
to 5 in the name of Masi Ambalam belatedly published a repudiation in Dinamalar
on 01.10.1986. There was no marriage between Masi Ambalam and the fifth
defendant. The sixth defendant is an agnate of Masi Ambalam. The plaintiff
claimed that she was entitled to all the properties mentioned in Plaint ‘A’
schedule and half undivided share in ‘B’ schedule along with the sixth
defendant.
3. Written statements were filed by the third and fifth defendants
denying the averments made in the plaint. According to the third defendant, it
was the plaintiff’s husband who had spirited away Masi Ambalam. He had preferred
a complaint to the effect that the plaintiff’s husband and his associates had
abducted Masi Ambalam, and the fifth defendant had also filed a Habeas Corpus
Petition. The third defendant’s father died, when he was a child. Masi Ambalam
had been bringing up the third defendant and his brothers and managing the
family properties. Masi Ambalam performed the marriage of the plaintiff and
gifted valuable jewels, etc. In fact, the plaintiff and her husband wanted Masi
Ambalam to give them all the properties, which he was not willing to do. While
in a sound and disposing mind, Masi Ambalam had executed a Will on 17.11.1983
and produced the same for registration on 21.01.1983. The plaintiff is not
entitled to inherit the properties of Masi Ambalam. The fifth defendant, who is
the second wife of Masi Ambalam, had a son who died, when he was three years old
in or about 1964 and, therefore, the fifth defendant is entitled to her share in
the properties of Masi Ambalam and also as the mother of her deceased son. The
illness of Masi Ambalam is exaggerated. The so-called publication itself was
made by the plaintiff and her associates, which has been repudiated by Masi
Ambalam during his life time. The fifth defendant is entitled to half share in
the properties. The fifth defendant also filed a separate written statement in
which, she had stated that the plaintiff had pestered her father to give the
properties, which he was not willing to do. She has given her own version of the
death of Masi Ambalam. She has claimed that she is the lawfully wedded wife of
the deceased Masi Ambalam.
4. The Trial Court, on consideration of the materials available on
record, decreed the suit as prayed for. The Appellate Court also confirmed the
same. Against that, the present second appeals have been filed and the following
substantial questions of law have been framed:
“1.Whether the courts below have erred in requiring proof of recitals in
Ex.B.82 and B.83 ignoring the proposition of law that under Section 57(4) of the
Registration Act, production of a copy will prove the contents of the documents
as held in Karuppana Gounder v. Kolandasami Gounder (1953 (II) MLJ 717?
2. Whether the courts below erred in insisting on the proof of the form of
marriage between Masi Ambalam and D.5 Lakshmi ignoring that question of
presumption from long cohabitation is one mode of proof when it is not possible
to prove the actual marriage having regard to the law laid down in 18 MLJ 3?
3. Whether the findings of the courts below with regard to the Will under
Ex.B.36 are sustainable in law when the appellant has produced evidence for the
due execution of the same?”
5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants/defendants
submitted that there is enough evidence to show that the fifth defendant got
married to Masi Ambalam in 1946. There is the birth certificate Ex.B.87 of the
son born to Masi Ambalam and the fifth defendant, which shows that the names of
father/mother are Masi Ambalam and Lakshmi. Letters have been produced to show
that Masi Ambalam had treated Lakshmi as his wife and the learned counsel also
relied on 1987(1) MLJ 149 (Seerangamal v. Venkatsubramanian) and AIR 1978 SC
1557 (Badri Prasad v. Dy. Director, Consolidation) to support his case.
6. The learned counsel also submitted that when a Will has been
executed and an attesting witness has been examined, law does not require that
the doctors should also be examined and both the Courts below erred in
suspecting the Will, merely because of non-examination of the doctor. The
learned counsel submitted that there is enough evidence to show that the
relationship between the father and daughter was not amicable and the daughter
had filed Ex.B.40 and taken other steps against the father. Therefore, the fact
that he had disinherited her is not a ground to suspect the Will, especially
when the relationship was strained. The learned counsel also submitted that it
is clear from Exs.A.11 and A.12, which are the repudiation statement given by
Masi Ambalam to show that Masi Ambalam was duly aware of what was happening and
he had consciously disinherited his daughter.
7. The learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff submitted
that mere living together for ten years cannot be a ground for inferring there
was a marriage. Except for the electoral rolls, there is no other evidence to
show “the long cohabitation”. The learned counsel also submitted that with
regard to a second marriage, even long cohabitation will not give rise to a
presumption of marriage, because a second marriage during the life time of the
first one would not be a valid marriage in any manner. The learned counsel
relied on 1989(2) LW 15 [Govindasami Padayachi (dead) v. Boorasami Padayachi
(dead)], 1970 (2) MLJ 193 (Raghuvir Kumar v. Smt.Shanmughavadivu), 1983(1) MLJ
311 (Alagammai v. Rakkammal) and 1983 TLNJ 285 (S.Varalakshmi v. Alagammal
Achi) to support his case.
8. With regard to the Will, the learned counsel submitted that it is
extremely unnatural and while the Testamentary Court ought not to be a Court of
suspicion, when there are many suspicious features, then the Court is bound to
take note of the same. The learned counsel pointed out the following features
around suspicion:
“(a) Only to explain his presence at the time of execution of the Will.
D.W.3 would say that the testator took him along to Tanjore, while he was going
to a doctor. This is artificial.
(b) When there is a registration office is close by, there was no reason
why the testator should want to go to Tanjore.
(c) Even assuming the testator was of the opinion that he had sufficiently
provided for his daughter, the plaintiff, no explanation is given as to why no
provision was made for the fifth defendant, who claims to be his wife.
(d) Though the examination of one attesting witness is sufficient, when a
doubt is cast regarding the second attesting witness and it is contended that he
is fictitious person, the propounder of the Will has to dispel the suspicion of
the Court in this regard.
(e) When the plaintiff was far away from her father and the testator was
solely in the control of the beneficiaries of the Will, then the Court ought to
look at the Will more carefully.
He relied on 1998(4) SCC 384 (Gurdial Kaur v. Kartar Kaur) and 1962(2) MLJ
(SC) 27 (Rani Purnima Debi v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb).
9. The Existence of Marriage:
Two substantial questions of law referred to above relate to the
existence of marriage and the genuineness of the Will. I will first take up the
question as regards the existence of marriage and to see if the Courts below had
drawn the correct conclusion and for this regard, I am constrained to look at
the pleadings and evidence. According to the fifth defendant, she was married to
Masi Ambalam in 1946. D.W.1 had stated that the fifth defendant is the second
wife and a son was born to them and died after three years. He has also stated
that it is only Masi Ambalam, who took care of them. D.W.5 is the second wife of
Masi Ambalam, whose marriage is now put in issue. She has stated that Ex.B.87 is
the birth certificate of her son and that the marriage took place between her
and Masi Ambalam. She has produced two documents Exs.B.82 and B.83, which are
sale deeds executed by third parties in her favour. One is of the year 1955,
where she is referred to as Masi Ambalam’s wife. This is long before the
dispute. The other is dated 27.06.1955 in which document also, she is stated as
Masi Ambalam’s wife. Ex.B.87, which is the birth certificate, also shows that
the child was born to Masi Ambalam and Lakshmi. The electoral rolls have been
produced to show that they were living at the same address. So, there are
documents from 1955 at least, which shows that the world looked upon her as the
wife of Masi Ambalam. It is true that she has stated in her evidence that when
the plaintiff’s mother was alive, Masi Ambalam had married her.
10. Now, I will examine the decisions cited in this regard. In
1983(1) MLJ 311 cited supra, it was held that when a person is already married
to a woman and had a child by her, and then it is alleged that he had married
another woman and there is no evidence of the woman being treated by the
community as the wife of the man, no presumption of a second marriage arises by
reason of long cohabitation.
11. In 1983 TLNJ 285 cited supra, after a detailed discussion of the
Acts in force, namely the Hindu Marriage Act and the Madras Hindu (Bigamy
Prevention & Divorce) Act. 1949, etc, it was concluded that the alleged marriage
with the second wife was hit by Section 4(1) of the Madras Hindu (Bigamy
Prevention & Divorce) Act of 1949 and it is void in law.
12. In 1970 (2) MLJ 193 cited supra, the Division Bench accepted the
second marriage, but however the learned counsel distinguished this on the
ground that on facts, it was established that some form of marriage was
celebrated, whereas in the present case, it is not there, and, therefore, that
judgment would actually be adverse to the case of the appellants.
13. Finally, in 1989(2) LW 15 cited supra, it was held that extract
from births and deaths registers are relevant only with reference to the fact of
date of birth and death. They do not prove the marriage between the parents
referred therein and in that case, they had lived together for ten years and
they had lived separately for more than that and in those circumstances, the
Court refused to raise the presumption of marriage.
14. AIR 1978 SC 1557 cited supra is a brief order, which deserves to
be extracted, where the Supreme Court held as follows:
“For around 50 years, a man and a woman, as the facts in this case unfold,
lived as husband and wife. An adventurist challenge to the factum of marriage
between the two, by the petitioner in this special leave petition, has been
negatived by the High Court. A strong presumption arises in favour of wedlock
where the partners have lived together for a long spell as husband and wife.
Although the presumption is rebuttable, a heavy burden lies on him who seeks to
deprive the relationship of legal origin. Law leans in favour of legitimacy and
frowns upon bastardy. In this view, the contention of Shri Garg, for the
petitioner, that long after the alleged marriage, evidence has not been produced
to sustain its ceremonial process by examining the priest or other witnesses,
deserves no consideration. If man and woman who live as husband and wife in
society are compelled to prove, half a century later, by eye-witness evidence
that they were validly married, few will succeed. The contention deserves to be
negatived and we do so without hesitation. The special leave petitions are
dismissed.
Special leave petitions dismissed.”
15. In 1987 (1) MLJ 149 cited supra, a Division Bench has held as
follows:
“22.The other point taken by defendants is, if the origin was one of
concubinage, it continues to be so for ever, and that once a concubinage always
a concubinage. It depends upon facts and circumstances of each case. During the
lifetime of a wife, an irresponsible husband may develop incestuous relationship
with another woman, but if he continues the said relationship after the death of
his wedded wife, and thereafter lives exclusively with the other woman treating
her as his wife and begets children through her; and recognises them as
legitimate children; lives together as a family for ever to the knowledge of the
general public and if the documents executed by him confer rights upon them in
any of his properties with unstinted intention of treating them as wife and
children; then, as pointed out in the decisions above referred to, the evidence
on record must be taken into account cumulatively to conclude on wifehood.
Hence, for the reasons stated above, the first three aspects relied upon as if
they are destructive factors, do not in any manner outweigh the other weighty
materials on record in favour of first plaintiff, and which have been referred
to above.
23. Regarding the contents of affidavit and written statement (i.e. items
4 and 5); being interested in the usufructuary mortgage, and being relations,
they would not have tolerated in those years, a Naidu woman claiming status of
the wife of a Brahmin. It is not as if that status could be derived, only if
relations recognise. Outside world had treated her as wife, as found in notices
by Bank (vide Exhibits A-31 and A-32), election records, Ration cards, etc., and
in entries found in school records about plaintiffs 2 to 4. When he had himself
recognised her as having lived with him as a devoted, sincere, faithful wife,
and duration of cohabitation not being disputed; though the origin was in the
nature of a concubinage; after the death of Bagirathi Ammal in 1940, for 15 long
years Ranganatha had treated her as his wife, lived with her in the same house
and three children were born to them and he had intended to confer upon them
rights in the property. But unfortunately, as happens when entire legal aspects
are not properly understood, the composition deed (Exhibit A-34) having not
brought forth what was aimed at when his brother was in difficulties; plaintiffs
could not derive the advantage under Exhibit A-33 will. As held in Muthayya
v.Kamu alias Kamala Ammal, (1981) 94 L.W.193 multitude of materials exist to
show that Society had treated her as wife of Ranganatha. The status acquired by
long cohabitation cannot also be lost.”
16. In this case, the fifth defendant claimed that she got married
to Masi Ambalam in 1946. It is true that she has not referred to any form of
ceremony of marriage, nor she has examined anyone, who had attended the
marriage. But it may be well nigh impossible for her to examine a witness on the
date of suit that a marriage took place in 1946. But we have two documents of
the year 1955, in which she has been referred to as the wife of Masi Ambalam.
Till the date of the suit 1988, and till Masi Ambalam died in 1987, evidently
there has been cohabitation between her and Masi Ambalam i.e. over 30 years. So,
the judgment, which referred to mere ten years of cohabitation, will not come to
the aid of the respondents, nor the judgment, which holds there is no
presumption regarding a second marriage. In fact, in that judgment, there was no
evidence that the community treated them as husband and wife. But in this case,
the community had treated Lakshmi as Masi Ambalam’s wife. In the judgment of the
Division bench referred to above, wherein Paragraph-22 has been extracted, it
was held that even if the association had commenced during the life time of the
first wife, but the relationship continued after the death of the first wife for
long number of years and the second wife had borne children, then the
presumption of marriage can definitely be taken. Here in this case, even if the
marriage of the fifth defendant with Masi Ambalam was in 1946 during the
lifetime of the plaintiff’s mother, it continued after the first wife’s death
till Masi Ambalam died in 1987. All gender based discriminations, all practices
which affect the dignity of women are contrary to the Constitution & Convention
on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. The status of a
woman who claims she is the wife and had lived as such for 40 years cannot be
reduced to a mere “association” at the instance of the plaintiff merely because
she wants the property especially when the world had labelled the fifth
defendant as the wife of Masi Ambalam. To deny her status would rob her of the
dignity to which she is entitled to. On the materials before me and the
following AIR 1978 SC 1557 and 1987 (1) MLJ 149, I find that the construction
placed on the evidence by the Courts below is erroneous and the second
substantial question of law must be answered in favour of the appellants.
17. Genuineness of the Will:
Now we come to the Will. In the Will, the testator has not only
disinherited his daughter but also his wife. Therefore, we must be convinced
that it is genuine. The suspicious features in the Will are the fact that the
testator did not execute the Will in his place of residence. Of course, there is
no presumption that merely because a Will is executed far away from the
residence, it must be false. When a Will is executed and the normal course of
inheritance is deviated from, the testator may naturally want to maintain some
secrecy and, therefore, execute the Will away from his residence. But we have to
look at the cumulative effect of the various suspicion features referred to
above.
18. D.W.3 is the attesting witness. According to him, he had been
taken by Masi Ambalam to Tanjore. After seeing the doctor on the way, Masi
Ambalam had told him that a Will must be written and they went to a park and
there, Masi Ambalam is said to have dictated the recitals to some scribe and
some one told Masi Ambalam that there should be two attesting witnesses and,
therefore, Masi Ambalam went and brought one Vaithiya Nathan Iyer. Thereafter,
both D.W.3 and the attesting witness saw the testator signed the Will and they
saw each other attesting. Four days later, the Will was registered and again the
same two persons had been taken along as witnesses during the registration. It
is seen from the evidence that this witness did not know the other attesting
witness. He did not know whether Masi Ambalam knew the other attesting witness.
A question was asked to him as to whether there is such a person as Vaithiya
Nathan Iyer. D.W.1 is the third defendant, who is the beneficiary under the
Will. He had denied the suggestion that D.W.3 is a close friend. He did not know
the identity of the other attesting witness. The trial Court has commented upon
the non-examination of the doctor, whom testator had allegedly visited before
execution of the Will. It is not necessary to examine the doctor for proof of a
Will, if the evidence of the attesting witness is sufficient. In this case, the
examination of the doctor is not so important in the context of the mental
capacity of the testator, but it would help to corroborate the narration of
events leading towards the execution of the Will as spoken to by the defendant
witnesses. It is here that Exs.A.11 and A.12 assume importance. Ex.A.1 is a
notice given by the first respondent/plaintiff, where she claims that she is the
sole heir of her father Masi Ambalam and that certain persons are attempting to
create a Will or a settlement by fraud. This is denied allegedly by the testator
by Ex.A.11, which is produced by the plaintiff, where he has said that whatever
is stated in Ex.A.1 is contrary to truth and that his condition of health is
good. Reference to the Will at this juncture, in Ex.A.11 would have dispelled
all suspicion regarding the Will. While it is true that the doctor need not have
been examined, it does create a doubt in our mind as to why Masi Ambalam went
suddenly to Tanjore. According to D.W.3, the execution of the Will seems to have
been more on an impulse on his return from the doctor’s house. Masi Ambalam
seems to have said, “let me go and execute the Will”. This is very unnatural,
since execution of a Will is not done on an impulse. It is preceded by much
thought and consideration as to how the property should be bequeathed. Then
again, no one appears to know as to who is this Vaithiya Nathan Iyer, who is
alleged to be the second attesting witness. If the evidence of the first
attesting witness inspires confidence regarding the fact that the Will has been
duly executed and attested by two witnesses, then the examination of the second
attesting witness may not be necessary. But when there is some doubt regarding
the very existence of the second attesting witness, the propounder of the Will
should dispel the suspicion of the Court by proving that in fact, such a person
exists, but is not available to give evidence or produce the said second
attesting witness to speak about the attestation. Nothing has been done and it
is very curious that even when the testator went to have the Will registered
four days later, he again picked up the same Vaithiya Nathan Iyer, whose
residence itself is now in doubt and about whom no one knows anything. Was the
Will duly attested i.e., attested by two witnesses?.
19. In 2003(2) SCC 91 (Janki Narayan Bhoir v. Narayan Namdeo Kadam),
the Supreme Court has been held as follows:
“9. It is thus clear that one of the requirements of due execution of a
will is its attestation by two or more witnesses, which is mandatory.
10. Section 68 of the Evidence Act speaks of as to how a document required
by law to be attested can be proved. According to the said section, a document
required by law to be attested shall not be used as evidence until one attesting
witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if
there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the court and
capable of giving evidence. …………………….
……………………………………
That cannot be done by simply proving that the signature on the will was that of
the testator but must also prove that attestations were also made properly as
required by clause (c) of Section 63 of the Succession Act. It is true that
Section 68 of the Evidence Act does not say that both or all the attesting
witnesses must be examined. But at least one attesting witness has to be called
for proving due execution of the will as envisaged in Section 63.
……………..
……………………………………
In a way, Section 68 gives a concession to those who want to prove and establish
a will in a court of law by examining at least one attesting witness even though
the will has to be attested at least by two witnesses mandatorily under Section
63 of the Succession Act. But what is significant and to be noted is that one
attesting witness examined should be in a position to prove the execution of a
will.
……………………………………
……………………………………
The one attesting witness examined, in his evidence has to satisfy the
attestation of a will by him and the other attesting witness in order to prove
there was due execution of the will. If the attesting witness examined besides
his attestation does not, in his evidence, satisfy the requirements of
attestation of the will by the other witness also it falls short of attestation
of will at least by two witnesses for the simple reason that the execution of
the will does not merely mean the signing of it by the testator but it means
fulfilling and proof of all the formalities required under Section 63 of the
Succession Act. Where one attesting witness examined to prove the will under
Section 68 of the Evidence Act fails to prove the due execution of the will then
the other available attesting witness has to be called to supplement his
evidence to make it complete in all respects. Where one attesting witness is
examined and he fails to prove the attestation of the will by the other witness
there will be deficiency in meeting the mandatory requirements of Section 68 of
the Evidence Act.”
In the present case, the examination of one attesting witness is not
sufficient, since the existence of the second attesting witness Vaithiya Nathan
Iyer itself is in doubt and it has not been proved by the propounder to the
satisfaction of the Court.
20. It is true that a Will executed far away from the residence,
deviating from the normal course of inheritance need not automatically be
suspected. In this case, no explanation is given as to why the testator has
given his wife, who has been with him for 30 long years, only a life interest
without any right of alienation. He has no doubt given some reason as to why he
is not leaving anything for his daughter. But what about the wife?. The
beneficiaries are only his sister-in-law’s son (bfhGe;jpahs; kfd;). This creates
some doubt.
21. In 1998(4) SCC 384, the Supreme Court held that wherever there
is any suspicious circumstance, the obligation is cast on the propounder of the
Will to dispel the suspicious circumstance and again in 1962(2) MLJ SC 27, the
Supreme Court held that the mere registration of the Will is insufficient to
dispel the suspicion attending the due execution and attestation of the Will.
22. When the existence of the second attesting witness was put in
doubt, the propounder did not do anything to dispel the suspicion of the Court
and the queries, that were raised. So, the Will has not been proved to be
executed and duly attested. In these circumstances, I find that the conclusion
of the Courts below cannot be interfered with and, therefore, the substantial
questions of law 1 and 3 are answered against the appellants.
23. In view of my finding in favour of the appellants, with regard
to the second substantial question of law, the first respondent (deceased)/fifth
defendant is entitled to 1/2 share. Instead of driving the parties to an other
suit, the decree prayed can be modified to a preliminary decree for partition to
do justice to the parties.
24. The decree of the Court below is modified as follows:
“There shall be a preliminary decree for partition. The plaintiff in
O.S.No.56 of 1988, the daughter of Masi Ambalam and the fifth defendant Lakshmi
shall be entitled to half share each in ‘A’ schedule property and half share
each in half of ‘B’ schedule property.”
25. In the result, the Second Appeals are allowed in part as above.
No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
SML
To
1.The Subordinate Judge,
Pattukottai.
2.The District Munsif,
Pattukottai.