ORDER
Navaniti Prasad Singh, J.
1. Heard.
2. The State has appeared and filed counter-affidavit. With consent of the parties this application is heard and is being disposed of at the stage of admission itself.
3. The present application has been filed by the petitioners who are plaintiffs in the Court below, being aggrieved by the order dated 18-8-2005 by which the trial Court has rejected the application dated 17-5-2005 filed by the plaintiffs in the Court below for a direction to the respondents to restore status-quo ante.
4. It appears that in 1996 apprehending forceful and unlawful demolition of their small shops along road flanks the plaintiffs had filed the present suit. They had made a prayer for an injunction in terms of Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 to restrain the opposite party Corporation and the State from taking any action to remove them except in accordance with law. As no precipilative action was taken the injunction application re mained pending. On 11-5-2006 the State officials forcefully demolished certain such premises along the Company Bagh Road even though their injunction was also pending in the same suit. Apprehending that shops at Old Bus Stand Road would meet with similar fate on 12-5-2005 the injunction application filed earlier was moved clearly stating that action had been taken on 11-5-2005 against shopkeepers of Company Bagh Road. The application being urgent was taken up by the trial Court on 12-5-2006 and the defendants were represented by the learned Government Pleader. The Court passed an order of status-quo in presence of the learned Government Pleader.
5. It is then stated that the Government Pleader informed the Collector and the Sub-divisional Officer of the order of the status-quo. The plaintiff-petitioners also met the Collector and the Sub-divisional Officer. It is then stated that notwithstanding the said order of the trial Court and the order having been communicated to the Officer concerned in total disregard thereof the shops situated at the Old Bus Stand road were unauthorisedly, illegally and forcefully demolished and the plaintiff-petitioners were evicted. On 16-5-2005, with Second Saturday and Sunday intervening, an application was filed giving detailed sequence of events and specific averments as regards communication of order and of demolition etc. The State filed a rejoinder. After hearing the parties the impugned order was passed. The prayer of the petitioners as made in their application dated 18-5-2005 for restoring status quo ante, meaning thereby status quo as on the date when the Court passed status quo order on 12-5-2005, was rejected not because of any dispute nor that the possession of the plaintiff-petitioners was not accepted but merely on the ground that it would be considered along with the merits of the case. The grievance of the plaintiffs petitioners are that such an order is wholly without jurisdiction and caused serious prejudice to the petitioner apart from affecting the majesty and dignity of the Court itself.
6. In the aforesaid circumstances it is first to be determined as to what actually happened. It is not disputed that on 12-5-2005 an application was made apprehending forceful illegal dispossession and demolition of shops. It is not in dispute that the status quo order was passed. After the alleged demolition and eviction the application for restoration of status quo was filed with the necessary averments by the plaintiff-petitioners as contained in paragraphs 33, 34, 35 and 36 thereof. In paragraph 33 it was stated that having apprehension they had moved the Court on 12-5-2005 and the Court had passed the status quo order. In paragraph 34 there is a detailed narration how the learned Government Pleader informed the Collector and the Sub-divisional Officer and how the petitioners met them and what transpired there. In paragraph 35 they stated that they informed the Additional Collector at the spot of the order of the Court and he too passed contemptuous remarks about Court and said that orders of Collector should b complied with and accordingly plaintiff-petitioners’ shops were pulled down and they were forcefully evicted after Court’s order. It is then stated in paragraph 36 that in view of this illegal action the petitioners immediately left for Patna to consult High Court lawyer but the lawyer at Patna High Court advised that the application should be filed in the trial Court itself and as such, they came back and the next day being Second Saturday and Sunday filed the present application on 16-5-2005 praying for restoration of their possession which was disturbed after the status quo order. To this application in the trial Court itself on behalf of the defendants a rejoinder was filed. To paragraph 33 and 34 the reply is to be found in paragraph 22 which is quoted hereunder:
That contents of para 33 and 34 of the petition are also denied and it is submitted that both sides of the road in town there are drains which the plaintiffs have obstructed and the removal of the said obstruction was within the direction as order of the Hon’ble High Court Patna.
To paragraph 36 the reply is in paragraph 23 which is quoted hereunder:
That contents of para 36 of the petition is also denied and shop keepers of Dak Bungalow road have themselves removed the obstruction at the time of encroachment removal drive.
Conspicuously the main allegation of unauthorised demolition and defiance of Court’s order being in paragraph 35 the same has not been controverted in any manner. The petitioners are right in submitting that applying rule of non-traverse it should be taken that the allegation made in paragraph 35 is admitted. Learned State Counsel pointed out various other pleadings including those made in paragraphs 7 and 8 would show that State’s case was that the plaintiff-petitioners had voluntarily themselves removed encroachment prior to moving the Court for injunction and obtaining the order of status quo. It is not said in so many words. Specific averments of the plaintiff-petitioners have been deliberately left out to be answered. This by itself is clearly to show that the State was seeking to hide the truth rather than disclose the truth. A reference to the rejoinder of the State would also show that they were trying to justify their action on basis of some orders passed by this Court in a Public Interest Litigation writ application commonly referred to as Arun Mukherjee’s case as to the directions of this Hon’ble Court in the said case. This Court is not aware of any directions issued by this Court in the said case to remove encroachment without having resort to procedure established by law. India is a democratic country and governed by rule of law. No one howsoever high and mighty he may be, can take law into his hands. There are laws which deal with such situation. They have to be complied with. Any authority cannot take shield of order of this Court or any Court can take law into their own hands. Such an action would be destructive of basic principles of rule of law.
7. Reference may be made to the case of Bishan Das v. State of Punjab a Constitution Bench judgment and in particular to what is said in paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 thereof:
…and has contended that Ramji Das himself admitted that he was a mere trustee. Be that so; but that does not give the State or its executive officers the right to take the law into their own hands and remove the trustee by an executive order. We must, therefore, repeal the argument based on the contention that the petitioners were trespassers and could be removed by an executive order. The argument is not only specious but highly dangerous by reason of its implications and impact on law and order.
It is enough to say that they are bona fide in possession of the constructions in question and could not be removed except under authority of law. The respondents clearly violated their fundamental rights by depriving them of possession of the Dharmsala by executive orders.
Before we part with this case, we feel it is our duty to say that the executive action taken in this case by the State and its officers is destructive of the basic principle of the rule of law. The facts and the position in law thus clearly are (1) that the buildings constructed on this piece of Government land did not belong to Government, (2) that the petitioners were in possession and occupation of the buildings and (3) that by virtue of enactments binding on the Government, the petitioners could be dispossessed, if at all, only in pursuance of a decree of a civil Court obtained in proceedings properly initiated. In these circumstances the action of the Government in taking the law into their hands and dispossessing the petitioners by the display of force, exhibits a callous disregard of the normal requirements of the rule of law apart from what might legitimately and reasonably be expected from a Government functioning in a society governed by a Constitution which guarantees to its citizens against arbitrary invasion by the executive of peaceful possession of property. As pointed out by this Court in Wazir Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh , the State or its executive officers cannot interfere with the rights of others unless they can point to some specific rule of law which authorises their acts. In Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi v. State of Bihar , this Court said that nothing is more likely to drain the vitality from the rule of law than legislation which singles out a particular individual from his fellow subjects and visits him with a disability which is not imposed upon the others. We have here a highly discriminatory and autocratic act which deprives a person of the possession of property without reference to any law or legal authority. Even if the property was trust property it is difficult to see how the Municipal Committee, Barnala, can step in as trustee on an executive determination only. The reasons given for this extra-ordinary action are, to quote what we said in Sahi’s case (supra), remarkable for their disturbing implications.
In view of the averments as made in the trial Court it is apparent that the State did acted in a highhandedness manner and sought to justify its action on basis of some uindisclosed orders passed in some cases by this Hon’ble Court. When specific averments and allegations were made and they have not been replied to, rather ignored which appears to be not by way of any mistake but deliberate, to avoid answering difficult factual issues which would have exposed them to purjury.
8. In my view, this was a clear case of violation of status quo order. The plaintiff-petitioner were well within their right to move, the Court for restoration of status quo ante. The Court instead of coming on other issues was required to deal with this matter as indicated above. It was a question of majesty of Court. If orders of Court even if wrong, are allowed to be flouted in the manner in which it has been done then people will loose faith in judicial system which is an essential feature of a democratic country. If the State officials had any reservation about the orders passed, they had legal remedies but they cannot be permitted to take law into their own hands and defy Court’s order.
9. In that view of the matter, 1 find that the trial Court has acted wholly without jurisdiction in not deciding this issue rather rejecting the application of the petitioners and has only successded in undermining its authority and dignity.
10. However, as the matter is more than one and helf years old it would be difficult now to direct the Opposite parties to restore status quo ante which could have been done immediately when the application was filed as the matters were fresh and burning. Even though I find that the defendant Opposite parties wilfully and deliberately violated the orders of the Court and ought to have been taken to task by the trial Court itself, I am unable to grant any further reliefs to the petitioner. In the said facts and circumstances of the case, however, I direct that as the suit is of the year 1996, the trial Court will take all expeditious steps to dispose of the same at an early date preferably within six months from today so that all controversies as between the parties are settled once and for all.
11. With this observation the application is disposed of.