ORDER
1. This writ petition filed by the tenant is directed against the Memo No. 804 Accom.A1/92-2 dated 2-11-1992 issued by the respondent No. 1 directing the petitioner to vacate the premises bearing No. 5-3-191, Zeera, Secunderabad (hereinafter shortly referred to as ‘the schedule premise’) within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order and directing the petitioner to hand over the vacant possession to the third respondent landlord.
2. When the petitioner was working as Chief Clerk in the office of the Chief Personnel Officer, South Central Railways was inducted by the third respondent as tenant of the schedule premise in the year 1968 according to the petitioner, but according to the respondents the petitioner was inducted into the schedule premise not in the year 1968 but in the year 1977. As regards this case is concerned whether the petitioner was inducted as tenant either in the year 1968 or in the year 1977 will not make any difference to decide the controversy which arises for consideration. At this stage itself it is relevant to note that leasing the schedule premise even in the year 1968 or it the year 1977 was admittedly governed by the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (which Act is hereinafter shortly referred to as ‘the Act’). The petitioner was inducted by the third respondent landlord as the tenant into the schedule premise without notifying the Authorised Officer about the Vacancy occurred earlier to induction of the petitioner into the schedule premise as tenant. It seems that subsequently on the basis of the report submitted by the Zonal Inspector reporting that the petitioner was unauthorisedly occupying the schedule premise, the Authorised Officer directed the petitioner and the third respondent to show cause as to why the petitioner should not be summarily dispossessed under Section 3(8)(a)(i)of the Act. The third respondent was also directed by the Authorised Officer to show cause as to why action should not be taken to prosecute him for an offence punish
able under Section 29 of the Act, for letting out the schedule premise to the petitioner in contravention of Section 3(1)(a) of the Act. The petitioner submitted his reply contending that he was not aware of the provisions of the Act and requesting the Authorised Officer not to take further action in the matter and to permit him to continue as tenant in the same schedule premise as he was a serving Central Government employee. The third respondent landlord also filed his reply to the show cause notice contending that he was not aware of the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder when he let out the schedule premise to the petitioner. The Authorised Officer after consideration of the replies submitted by the petitioner and third respondent did not persue the matter further either to evict the petitioner or to proceed against the third respondent for violation of the provisions of the Act. However, the Authorised Officer issued a Memo No. 654/ Accom. A1/80-4 dated 17-7-1980 warning the third respondent not to commit violation of the provisions of the Act in future and directing the third respondent to notify the future vacancies of the schedule premise to the Authorised Officer as required under Section 3(1)(a)(i) of the Act.
3. The petitioner admittedly retired from
service in the year 1981. According to the
third respondent as well as the Rent Control
authorities, after the retirement the petitioner
went to Madras and is staying there permanently after inducting his son into the schedule premise. However, this allegation of the
third respondent and the Authorities is
denied by the petitioner stating that even after
his retirement in the year 1981 he has been
staying in the schedule premise.
4. It seems that in the year 1991 the third respondent wanted to perform the marriage of his son and therefore he wanted the schedule premise also for bona fide self occupation of the members of his family According to the third respondent he re-quested the son of the petitioner by name Sri Raghavan to vacate and deliver a portion of the schedule premise for the purpose of setting up a separate residence to his son after
his marriage. The son of the petitioner did not oblige the third respondent. That made him to approach the Authorised Officer with an application inform in the latter that vacancy in the schedule premise arose and requesting the Authorised Officer to release the schedule premise in favour of the third respondent for bona fide self-occupation. The Authorised Officer issued a show cause notice to the petitioner as to why the premise should not be released for bona fide self-occupation of the third respondent. The petitioner submitted his reply asserting that even after his retirement he is residing in the schedule premise along with his family members though he retired from service in January, 1981. The Authorised Officer after consideration of the reply of the petitioner issued the impugned memo dated 2-11-1992 releasing the schedule premise in favour of the third respondent for his bona fide self-occupation and directing the petitioner to vacate and hand over the vacant possession of the schedule premise in favour of the third respondent within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of the order. Hence this writ petition.
5. The learned counsel appearing for the parties were heard.
6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the show cause notice dated 7-10-1992 and the final order dated 2-11-1992 issued by the Authorised Officer are without jurisdiction and therefore they are null and void. Further the learned counsel contended that the schedule premise is not a premise allotted by the Authorised Officer and therefore the Authorised Officer could not have resorted to the power given to him under Section 3 of the Act. He further submitted that if the third respondent has any grievance and if he seeks eviction of the petitioner from the schedule premise, the only remedy available to him is under S. 10 of the Act and not otherwise. He also contended that the petitioner is still continuing as tenant in the schedule premise and therefore there is no vacancy in the schedule premise. For these reasons, the learned counsel submitted, that the writ petition be allowed and the impugned order be quashed.
7. Countering the claim of the petitioner, the learned counsel appearing for the third respondent vehemently contended that the argument that the Authorised Officer lacks jurisdiction either to release the schedule premise in favour of the third respondent or to evict the petitioner is totally baseless. He also submitted that a combined reading of provisions of sub-sections (3), (6) and (8) of Section 3 of the Act clearly demonstrates that the Authorised Officer is armed with necessary power to make the impugned order and therefore the impugned order and the show cause notice issued by the Authorised Officer cannot be termed as one without jurisdiction. The learned counsel also contended that S. 10 of the Act is not at all applicable to the facts situations of the present case. Dilating this submission the learned counsel for the third respondent argued that S. 10 occupies altogether a different field and it governs only those premises/buildings which go out of the perview of sub-section (3) of S. 3 of the Act. The learned counsel for the third respondent further contended that having regard to the fact that the petitioner admittedly retired from the service in the year 1981 itself, the petitioner is not entitled to continue as tenant of the schedule premise both in law and in view of the decision of the Division Bench of this court rendered in the case of M. Narasimhachary v. State of A.P., 1985 (1) APLJ 373 wherein it was ruled by this court that after retirement a Government employee cannot have any right to continue in the premise allotted to him unless the concerned Authority grants him permission 10 continue. The learned counsel further submitted that the contention of the petitioner that the premise in question is not a premise allotted by the Authorised Officer is also baseless.
8. After careful consideration of the rival contentions put forth by the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that there is no merit in any of the contentions put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner and consequently the writ petition is devoid of merit.
9. The contention of the petitioner that the Authorised Officer lacked jurisdiction in
issuing the show cause notice dated 7-10-1992 and the impugned memo dated 2-11-1992 and that the schedule premise was not a premise allotted by the Authorised Officer is not correct, having regard to the provisions of sub-sections (3)(6) and (8) of Section 3 of the Act. Sub-sections (3)(6) and (8) of Section 3 read thus:
(3) If, within fifteen days of the receipt by the authorised officer of a notice under subsection (1) or sub-section (2), the Government or the authorised officer does not intimate to the landlord in writing that the building is required for the purposes of the State Government or the Central Government or of any local authority or of any public institution under the control of any such Government or for occupation of any officer of such Government the landlord shall be at liberty to let out the building to any tenant or to occupy it himself.
(6) If the building is required for any of the purposes or for occupation by any of the officers, specified in sub-section (3) the landlord, shall deliver possession of the building to the authorised officer or to the allottee, named by the authorised officer, as the case may be, and the Government shall be deemed to be the tenant of the landlord, with retrospective effect from the date on which the authorised officer received notice under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) the terms of the tenancy being such as may be agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant and in default of an agreement as may be determined by the controller.
(8) Any Officer empowered by the Government in this behalf may summarily dispossess –
(i) any landlord, tenant or other person occupying any building in contravention of the provision of this section or any landlord who fails to deliver to the Government possession of any building in respect of which they are deemed to be the tenant by virtue of this section; or
(ii) any officer, local authority or public institution continuing to occupy, or failing to deliver possession of any buidling in respect
of which the Government are deemed to be the tenant by virtue of this section after the termination of his or its licence to occupy such building and take possession of the building including any portion thereof which may have been sub-let.
10. A combined reading of the provisions of sub-sections (3), (6) and (8) clearly demonstrates that the Authorised Officer is armed with the power to issue the show cause notice and the impugned Memo in exercise of the power vested in him under Section 3 of the Act. On two facts there is no dispute between the parties. Admittedly the petitioner was a Government servant. Further, in the course of argument the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner fairly and correctly submitted that even the letting out of the schedule premise is governed by the provisions of the Act. But, his only contention in this regard is that the remedy available to the third respondent lies under S. 10 of the Act and not under S. 3 of the Act. It s relevant to note that when the premise was let out to the petitioner by the third respondent unauthorisedly in the year 1968 or 1977 as the case may be, leasing of the schedule premise was governed by the provisions of the Act, to be specific, provisions of S. 3 of the Act. Since the vacancy which occurred in the schedule premise was not notified to the Authorised Officer before inducting the petitioner into it, the Authorised Officer took action against both the petitioner and the landlord third respondent and that culminated in the issuance of the memo dated 17-7-1980 warning the third respondent landlord and directing him to notify the vacancy in future and the petitioner
was permitted to continue in the schedule premise. The sequence of events referred to above clearly indicates that the Authorised Officer by issuing Memo dated 17-7-1980 recognised the petitioner as an allottee of the premise under S. 3 of the Act. Otherwise, the Authorised Officer would have directed eviction of the petitioner and taken steps to allot the same premise to others. At this juncture it is also relevant to note that when the Authorised Officer issued show cause notice on 11-6-1980, it was not the content ion of the petitioner that leasing the schedule
premise was not governed by the provisions of the Act and therefore the show cause notice issued by the Authorised Officer was one without jurisdiction. Therefore it should not lie in the mouth of the petitioner to contend now that the teasing of the schedule premise is outside the provisions of S. 3 of the Act and therefore the impugned memo is one without jurisdiction. It is true that there is no specific order made by the Authorised Officer allotting the schedule premise in favour of the petitioner. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and sequence of the earlier proceedings, the earlier memo issued by the Authorised Officer on 17-7-1980 should be construed as the one impliedly allotting the schedule premise in favour of the petitioner tenant and permitting him to continue in the schedule premise as tenant. This position clearly emerges if the deeming provision and fiction of law as set out in sub-section (6) of Section 3 of the Act is kept in mind.
11. In the light of the view taken by me on the question whether the Authorised Officer has the jurisdiction to pass the impugned order or not, it is not necessary to consider the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the only remedy available to the third respondent to seek eviction is only under Section 10 of the Act. However, it may be noted that Section 10 of the Act governs altogether different field. Section 10 governs only to those premises and buildings in respect of which the landlords are at liberty to let out to any tenant as provided under sub-.section (3) of Section (3) of the Act. Such a fact situation is not obtaining here.
12. The writ petition is liable to be dismissed on other ground also. The petitioner admittedly retired from Government service in the year 1981. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of M. Narasimhachary v.’State of A.P. (supra) has ruled that Government servant is not en,titled to continue in a premise allotted to him by the Government after his retirement unless the Government or the Competent Authority permits him to continue as tenant in such premise allotted to him. It is not the case of
the petitioner that after his retirement the Government or Governmental Authorities have permitted him to continue in the schedule premise as tenant.
13. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned memo issued by the Authorised Officer. Consequently the writ petition fails and is dismissed. Rule discharged. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case the parties are directed to bear their own costs.
14. The learned counsel for the petitioner prayed for grant of certain reasonable time to his client to vacate the premise. The petitioner is therefore granted two months time from today to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the schedule premise to the third respondent subject to payment of agreed rent.
Petition dismissed.