JUDGMENT
R.J. Kochar, J.
1. The present petition is filed by the Shivaji University Kolhapur through its Vice Chancellor and the Registrar to impugn the Judgment and Order of the Second Joint Civil Judge (SD) Kolhapur passed on 19-8-1991 in Regular Civil Suit No. 1165 of 1990 filed by the present respondent No. 1.
2. In the Suit respondent No. 1 (Orig. Plaintiff) had sought declaration that the promotion Orders dated 20-3-1989 and 20-10-1990 of the Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 to 16 were illegal, bad in law and void ab-initio and that the Defendant Nos. 4 to 16 be precluded from accepting those promotions given by the aforesaid promotion orders and further the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 i.e. the present petitioners be restrained from implementing the aforesaid promotion orders. A further direction was sought against the petitioners that they should prepare seniority list as per the Standard Code applicable to Shivaji University and to give promotions as per the seniority list.
3. The petitioners and the other defendants before the Court had filed their written statement to contest the suit. It was submitted that the suit was misconceived, baseless, untenable and that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try and entertain the said suit. It was further submitted that Shivaji University was an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and therefore, the allegations made against the University were covered by the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 197,1. According to the petitioners the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was ousted under Section 60 of the MRTU & PULP Act, and therefore, the Civil Court could not take cognisance of the grievance made by the respondent No. 1 (Orig. Plaintiff).
4. Since the question of jurisdiction was raised by the petitioners (Orig. Deft. Nos. 1 and 2) the learned Judge tried the said issue as preliminary issue and held that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try and entertain the said suit. The learned Judge has considered the submissions made on behalf of both the parties and has also considered the question of the University being an industry under Section 2(j) of the Act in the light of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa and Ors. . The learned Judge has observed that the respondent No. 1 (Orig. Plaintiff) did not make any allegation of unfair labour practice against the petitioners on account of victimisation or his legitimate trade union activities or that he was victimised by not giving him his legitimate promotion. The learned Judge has further observed that the allegations levelled in the plaint were simply “administrative lapses” of the petitioner No. 1 (Orig. Defendant No. 1) and not preparing list according to the Standard Code Rule, 1984 which was mandatory upon the petitioner No. 1. Considering the grievance made by the respondent No. 1 in the Plaint I am in agreement with the learned Judge that the grievance of the respondent No. 1 (Orig. Plaintiff) pertain to administrative lapses in preparing seniority list which was not in accordance with the Standard Code Rule, 1984. Though he might have described the conduct of the petitioners to allege practice of favouritism on the part of the petitioners I am afraid whether the cause of action would fall within the four corners or the MRTU & PULP Act. The grievance of the respondent No. 1 is of civil nature and I don’t see any reason why the Civil Court cannot entertain such a Suit to consider whether to grant the declaration prayed for by the respondent No. 1. I further agree with the learned Judge that the allegations levelled in the Plaint do not tantamount to unfair labour practice, and therefore, Section 60 of the said Act will have no application. I do not find any infirmity in the Judgment and Order of the learned Judge to hold that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the Suit.
5. The Supreme Court has observed in the case reported at , M. P. Electricity Board, Jabalpur v. Vijaya Timber Co. as under :
9. It is well settled that the exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Court cannot be readily inferred and the normal rule is that Civil Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature except those of which congnisance by them is either expressly or impliedly excluded. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. had laid down several propositions in this regard. The first proposition is opposite for the fact of this case. It reads as under :
(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure." And in another recent Judgment [ State of Andhra Pradesh v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (D) by L. Rs. and Ors.] on the very point the Supreme Court has observed as under:
5. The normal rule of law is that civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those of which cognizance by them is either expressly or impliedly excluded as provided under Section 9 of the Code Civil Procedure but such exclusion is not readily inferred and the presumption to be drawn must be in favour of the existence rather than exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try civil suit. The test adopted in examining such a question is (i) whether the legislative intent to exclude arises explicitly or by necessary implication, and (ii) whether the statute in question provides for adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party aggrieved by an order made under it. In Dhulabhai and Ors. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr., , it was noticed that where a statute gives finality to the orders of the special tribunals jurisdiction of the Civil Courts must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil
Courts would normally do in a suit and such provision, however, does
not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have
not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in
conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.
6. Applying the law laid down by the Supreme Court above we do not find
any specific exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under the Shiyaji
University Act, 1974. Unless there is specific exclusion or ouster of the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court such exclusion or ouster cannot be lightly inferred
and cannot be held to be implicit. No doubt in Chapter XII of the Act, Section 74
refers to Tribunal of Arbitration to decide certain disputes regarding service
conditions. Relevant sections 73 and 74 are reproduced hereinbelow for ready
reference.
73. (1) Except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, the Vice-Chancellor and every salaried officer and Teacher of the University shall be appointed under a written contract, which shall be lodged with the Registrar and a copy thereof furnished to Officer or Teacher concerned, but the contract with the Vice-Chancellor shall remain with the Chancellor and a copy thereof with the Vice-Chancellor.
(2) The contract of service of Teachers of the University and of officers other than the Vice-Chancellor shall be as prescribed by the Statutes, and the contract of service of the Vice-Chancellor shall be as determined by the Chancellor in consultation with the State Government.
(3) The emoluments and terms and conditions of service of all employees of the University shall be as prescribed by the Statutes.
(4) All salaried officers and employees of the University, including those appointed by the University for specified periods or for specified work, or who receive any remuneration such as allowances, fees or other payments from the University fund, shall be deemed to be public servants for the purpose of all criminal laws for the time being in force.
75. Any dispute arising out of, or relation to the contract between the University and any officer or Teacher of the University shall, on the request of the officer or Teacher concerned, be referred, within thirty days from the receipt of such request, to a Tribunal of Arbitration consisting of one member appointed by the Executive Council, one member nominated by the officer or Teacher concerned and an umpire appointed by the chancellor, and no request based on such dispute shall, for any reason whatsoever, be declined or withheld. The decision of the Tribunal shall be final, and no suit or other legal proceeding shall lie in any Civil Court in respect of the matter decided by the Tribunal. Every such request shall be deemed to be a submission to arbitration on the terms of this section within the meaning of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and the provisions of that Act shall apply accordingly.”
It is possible to argue that the Special Act has provided for a special remedy and special forum to resolve the grievances of the officers and teachers of the University. For such grievances Section 74 has established a Tribunal of Administration and such Tribunal is empowered to decide any dispute arising out of, or relating to, the contract between the University and the officer or teacher in University. It is significant to note that in this section the jurisdiction of Civil Court is ousted after the decision of the Tribunal and not prior thereto. It means that after the Tribunal decides, the parties cannot approach the Civil Court making a grievance against the decision of the Tribunal. It is however further pertinent to note that the disputes which can be referred to the Tribunal of Arbitration are confined only to the disputes of officers and the teachers of the University and the category of the employees is specifically excluded in this provision. It is therefore, clear that the employees have no benefit of this forum, which is available to the officers and the teachers of the university only. Section 73(3) prescribes that the emoluments and terms and conditions of service of all employees of the University shall be as prescribed by the Statutes. The Act has made clear distinction between the three categories of the Staff of the University viz. Officers and the teachers who are defined under Section 8 of the Act, and the third category belongs to the employees other than the officers and the teachers. Section 74 therefore specifically excludes the dispute in respect of the three categories of the staff i.e. the employees. It therefore means that any dispute relating to the terms and conditions of service of the employees cannot be referred to the Tribunal of Arbitration. There is no forum provided under the Act for resolution of the disputes of the employees while there is a specific separate forum created for the disputes relating to the contract between the University and any officer or teacher of the University under Section 74 of the Act. Section 77 empowers the Government to prescribe standard code for employees of the University and affiliated Colleges and Recognised institutions. Even in the said standard code there is no forum established for resolution of the disputes of the employees. There is, therefore, no bar of civil jurisdiction as there is no alternative forum created for the employees. In these circumstances it cannot be said that such disputes cannot be resolved by the ordinary Civil Courts. Any employee having any dispute in relation to his terms and conditions of service is therefore, entitled to approach the Civil Court for resolution of his grievance/dispute. We cannot therefore, infer by implication that the Civil Court’s jurisdiction is excluded, whether the officers or teachers can approach the Civil Court for their disputes is left open and is not being decided as it is outside the purview of this Writ Petition.
7. Considering from any angle it will have to be held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to consider and decide the disputes in relation to the terms and conditions of the employees. There is no substance in the petition and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs. Rule is discharged. The Civil Court shall dispose of the Suit as early as possible.