JUDGMENT
S.B. Sinha, C.J.
1. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated
13th September 1996 passed in CW 741/90 by a learned single Judge of
this court whereby and whereunder the said writ petition was “allowed
only to the extent of directing the respondents to execute and get
registered, in accordance with law, the requisite perpetual lease deed in
petitioner’s favor within a period of two months from today” (13th
September 1996).
2. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. In May 1988,
an advertisement was published by the respondents herein to the effect
that in respect of sale of Nazul land including plot No. A-1/171-A,
Janakpuri, New Delhi measuring 444 sq. mts., a public auction would be
held. Pursuant to and in furtherance of the said advertisement, the
appellants herein participated in the bid and their offer having been found
to be highest, the same was accepted. The appellants herein deposited
25% of the bid price. According to the appellants, on depositing the said
amount, they found that several persons had encroached upon the land in
question. By a letter dated 16th June 1988, the appellant brought the said
matter to the notice of the respondents and requested them for removal of
the encroachments before any further demand was raised by them.
Allegedly, despite receipt of the said letter, the respondents issued demand
notice on 22nd June 1988. The appellant requested for deferment of the
said notice and requested the respondents to remove encroachments and
hand over possession of the plot, pursuant to or in furtherance whereof, the
appellant deposited the balance amount of 75% of the bid price to save
forfeiture of earnest money in terms of earlier communication on or about
20th July 1988. The petitioner, thereafter, issued several letters for
handing over peaceful possession of the land in question but no reply
thereto was received from the respondents herein.
3. On or about 2nd March 19990, the petitioner filed a writ
petition, inter alia, praying for the following relief:
“b) Direct the Delhi Development
Authority to pay interest @ 24% per annum
on the amount deposited with the Delhi
Development Authority i.e. Rs. 21,05,000/-
(Rupees twenty one lacs and five thousand
only) since the date of deposit till the date
the respondents hand over actual physical
possession of the auctioned plot.”
4. In the said writ petition, orders were passed from time to
time. On or about 24th February, 1994, it was observed:
“Having regard to the circumstances
of the case, the respondents are directed to
finalize the offer of allotment of an alternate
plot within six weeks from today failing
which the respondent-DDA will pay
interest @ 18% per annum on the deposit
from the date the sum was received. List the
matter on 25th April, 1994. Director, Lease
Administration, DDA should be present on
the next date.”
5. As the possession of alternative plot was not made
available, the appellants herein filed contempt petition for not complying
with the said order, which was marked as CCP 232/1994. By reason of an
order dated 13th September 1994 in CW No. 741/1990, it was directed:
“Mr. Bhushan learned counsel for
the respondent submits that jhuggis have
been vacated yesterday and it will take a few
more days to clear the site of the jhuggis. I
direct the DDA to hand over the possession
of the plot in question to the petitioner by
30th September, 1994. As an interim relief
to the petitioner a sum of Rs. 1 lac shall be
paid by the DDA to the petitioner and (his
payment will be without prejudice to the
respondent’s contention that interest should
not be ordered. The question of interest
shall have to be finally decided at the time
of final disposal of the writ petition and in
case the court decides that the interest need
not be paid. The petitioner should be
prepared to refund this amount. It is also
clarified that the DDA shall, make an
attempt to remove the underground wires,
the poles etc. from the plot before handing
over possession of the plot to the petitioner.
If there as any problem it shall be reported
to this court. I am told that there is a Peepal
tree in the centre of the plot. The same shall
be removed.
The interim relief, which is granted
as above, is without prejudice to the claim of
the petitioner vide order dated 24th February,
1994 as well as the contentions of the
respondent. The payment shall be made
within a week.
Call on 3rd October, 1994 for final
disposal in ANMM (at the end), C.C.P. will
also be listed on that date.”
6. Thereafter, possession was handed over to the petitioner on
26th September 1994. After that, the impugned judgment dated 13th
September 1996 was passed.
7. Mr. Raman Kapur, the learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellants, inter alia, would submit that from the conspectus of
events, as noticed hereinbefore, it would be evident that the petitioner was
deprived of lawful possession of the land in question for a period of about
eight years and as such, as suffered immense loss and damages. The
learned counsel would contend that having regard to the fact that
constructions are required to be raised within a period of two years from
the date of grant of possession, had the same been granted in the year
1988, the appellants could have raised constructions thereupon with the
stipulated time. The learned counsel would contend that as a large sum of
amount namely Rs. 21,05,000/- was blocked for a long time, the petitioner
has a right to be compensated by way of grant of interest at the rate of
18% per annum.
8. Ms. Sangeeta Chandra, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the respondents, on the other hand, would contend that the action of the
DDA was neither arbitrary nor unlawful. It was pointed out that for the
purpose of removal of the said encroachment, the encroachers were
required to be relocated at the alternative site wherefor the DDA was
required to pay a sum of Rs. 29,000/- per jhuggi to the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi. An amount of Rs. 22,33,000/- was paid by the DDA
on 13th April 1994 and 16th April 1994 where after the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi was requested to initiate the work of rehabilitation of
jhuggi-dwellers on top priority basis. A joint survey of jhuggi clusters
was carried out by the staff of the DDA and MCD and despite having sent
the cheques and reminders issued, the jhuggi clusters had not been
removed wherefor on 7th June, 1994, another reminder was sent. The order
of the court had also been communicated to the Director (Slum & JJ) of
the Municipal Corporation of Delhi.
9. According to the learned counsel, even extension of time
was sought for delivery of possession to the appellants herein. He had
been put in possession prior to 6th December, 1994, which was the
stipulated period.
10. In the afore-mentioned backdrop of events, the question
which arose for consideration before the learned single Judge was as
regards payment of interest only.
11. The learned single Judge, inter alia, held:
(i) That the unauthorized encroachments being not a
latent defect, the petitioner could have become
aware thereof when he participated and made the
highest bid inasmuch as the encroachment being a
patent defect, the same could have been noticed by
him.
(ii) It was for the petitioner to ensure that the plot is
such of which physical possession could be
obtained immediately on deposit of the balance
amount.
(iii) Encroachment by jhuggi-dwellers is not unknown in
Delhi. In any event, before the bids was offered, the
appellant ought to have carried out the inspection of
the plot.
(iv) The appellant knowing fully well that the
encroachment still existed, deposited the balance
amount of 75% and thus would “be deemed to have
acquiesced with the situation that he would get
physical possession only when the encroachers are
removed by the respondents”.
(v) The respondents paid a sum of Rs. 22,33,000/- for
getting is more than the amount deposited by the
appellants herein towards the bid amount.
(vi) As the appellants herein had already been paid a
sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- by the respondents under the
direction of this court, no further amount can be
directed to be paid by way of damages or interest.
(vii) The inconvenience caused to the petitioner in not
taking prompt action was the controversy when
attention of the respondents was drawn by the
appellant in the year 1988 and, thus, the action on
the part of the respondents cannot be considered to
be unreasonable or inadequate.
12. Although it is true that the appellant had suffered loss,
having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the
opinion that it is not a fit case where this court should interfere with the
impugned judgment.
13. The learned single Judge has assigned cogent and valid
reasons for not granting any interest in favor of the appellants herein.
Having regard to the encroachments made by the jhuggi-dwellers, the
respondent has also suffered a loss and in fact, its loss was more than the
appellant himself inasmuch as they had to bear a heavy expenditure which
is more than the amount deposited by the appellant herein.
14. Furthermore, this court in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere in the matter by way
f grant of interest or otherwise only in the event it is found that the action
on the part of the respondents was wholly arbitrary and unreasonable. It is
true that ordinarily, a person who had been deprived of an amount for a
long tim, would be directed to be compensated by way of interest but
before a writ court exercise its discretionary jurisdiction, the court may
have to adjust the equities between the parties. It is true that a learned
single Judge of this court by an order dated 24th February 1994 observed
that interest at the rate of 18% per annum would have to be paid from the
date the sum was received. But an interim order passed by this court by a
learned single Judge of this court had merged with the final order. While
passing the final order the learned single Judge has taken into
consideration all the relevant facts.
15. Having regard to the fats and circumstances of this case,
we are of the view that if in a case of this nature no interest was directed to
be paid by way of damages, this court may not interfere with the
impugned judgment although there are two possible views in the matter.
16. The court, it is trite, does not interfere when the order is not
right, but interferes when it is clearly wrong (See Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd.
etc. etc. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha and Ors. , .
17. For the reasons afore-mentioned, we do not find any merit
in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly but in the facts and
circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.