JUDGMENT
Surju Thakur, J.
1. This appeal under Section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) (wrongly styled as L.P.A.), is against the order and judgment dated December 11, 1986, of the learned single judge, whereby he dismissed the application of the appellant filed under Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956.
2. The petitioner-appellant filed a suit for recovery of certain money from Thakur Ram Ganga Prasad Private Limited, a company registered under the Act. That suit was decreed on May 4, 1976. The appellant started execution proceedings against the company by filing an execution case, which was numbered as Execution Case No. 25 of 1976. In pursuance of the execution proceeding the property of the company was sold and was purchased by the appellant. The proclamation of sale was made on April 3, 1978, in favour of the appellant and confirmed on July 6,
1978. Meanwhile, it appears that a petition was filed under Section 433 of the Companies Act for winding up of the company. This was made on September 30, 1977, and the winding up order was passed on November 2, 1979. The appellant moved this court on the company side for continuation of the execution proceeding in order to take possession of the property, which he has purchased in execution of the decree. This application was filed under Section 446 of the Companies Act some time in 1986. This was dismissed and against this order the present appeal has been preferred.
3. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 441 of the Act, proceedings for winding up of a company by the court shall be deemed to commence at the time of presentation of the petition for winding up. In the present case, therefore, the proceeding for winding up of the company commenced on September 30, 1977. Mr. Sharma relied on Section 441 of the Act, in support of his case, which is quoted hereunder :
“441: Commencement of winding up by court.–(1) Where, before the presentation of a petition for the winding up of company by the court, a resolution has been passed by the company for voluntary winding up, the winding up of the company shall be deemed to have commenced and at the time of the passing of the resolution, and unless the court, on proof of fraud or mistake, thinks fit to direct otherwise, all proceedings taken in the voluntary winding up shall be deemed to have been validty taken.
(2) In any other case, the winding up of a company by the court shall be deemed to commence at the time of the presentation of the petition for the winding up.”
4. If, we look at this section at this stage, the contention of Mr. Sharma may be correct. Mr. Ghosh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents drew our attention towards Section 537 of the Act, which is quoted as under :
“537. Avoidance of certain attachments, executions, etc., in winding up by or subject to supervision of court.–(1) Where any company is being wound-up by or subject to the supervision of the court-
(a) any attachment, distress or execution put in force, without leave of the court, against the estate or effects of the company, after the commencement of the winding up ; or
(b) any sale held, without leave of the court, of any of the properties or effects of the company after such commencement ; shall be void.
(2) Nothing in this section applies to any proceedings for the recovery of any tax or impost or any dues payable to the Government.”
5. If we analyse this Section 537 of the Act, it will be evident that when the company is being wound up by or subject to supervision of court, any sale held without leave of the court with respect to any property after commencement of the winding up of the company shall be void. In the present case before us, winding up of the company commenced, as noted above, on September 30, 1977. The sale has been held without leave of the court after the commencement of the winding up. Thus, Section 537 of the Act squarely covered the case against the appellant.
6. We also refer to the following passage from the Guide to the Companies Act by A. Ramaiya, which is based on the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Rajasthan Finance Corporation v. Official Liquidator [1963] 2 Comp LJ 309 :
“This does not mean ‘after the winding up order’ but ‘after the presentation of the petition for winding-up’. This section read with Section 441(2) fixes the date of the commencement of the winding-up as the date of the presentation of the petition. . . .”
7. Mr. Sharma has also referred to two decisions, one of the Supreme Court in the case of Official Liquidator v. Dharti Dhan (P.) Ltd. [1977] 47 Comp Cas 420, AIR 1977 SC 740, and another that of the Patna High Court in Bhagwati Devi Bubna v. Dhanraj Mills Private Ltd., [1969] 39 Comp Cas 1023, These two decisions, however, we do not find any help to the appellant.
8. Mr. Sharma also relied on the case of Janak Raj v. Gurudial Singh, AIR 19C7 SC 608. This decision is under Order 21, rules 89, 92 and 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure and held that the title of the purchaser relates back to the date of sale and not to the date of its confirmation. We are unable to appreciate as to how this decision is applicable in the case of the appellant.
9. Accordingly, we do not find any error in the impugned order to interference with the same in this case, which is accordingly dismissed. However, there will be no order as to cost.