JUDGMENT
Natarajan, J.
1. The interesting question raised in this revision is whether the sisters of a person, who died in a motor accident, can seek impleadment in a petition filed under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, and Rule 3 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, by the widow and minor child of the deceased, for seeking compensation from the owner of the motor vehicle and his insurer.
2. One K. Nagarajan died in a motor accident. Petitioners 1 and 2 herein who are the widow and minor son of the deceased Nagarajan, filed M.A.C.T. O.P. No. 796 of 1983, against the owner of the lorry involved in the accident and the Insurance company, to claim compensation for the death of Nagarajan. Respondents 1 and 2 herein, who are the sisters of Nagarajan filed M. P. 2045 of 1983 seeking impleadment on the ground that they were being maintained by deceased Nagarajan and as such they also constitute his dependants and consequently, they are also interested in the proceedings instituted for getting compensation from the owner and insurer for the death of Nagarajan. The petitioners herein opposed the impleadment of respondents 1 and 2. But the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has overruled their objection and ordered impleadment of respondents 1 and 2. The correctness of this order is challenged in this revision.
3. For passing an order in favour of respondents 1 and 2, the Tribunal has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Perumal v. Ellusamy Reddiar . That was a case where a bachelor died in a motor accident leaving behind him as heirs only his sisters and brothers. When the sisters and brothers filed a petition under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, their claim was resisted by the owner and the Insurer on the ground that they are not the legal representatives or heirs and hence they cannot maintain the petition. A Division Bench of this Court consisting of P.S. Kailasam, J., (as he then was), and N.S. Ramaswami, J., considered the matter elaborately and held that the term ‘legal representative’ in Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act will take in all persons covered by the term ‘representative’ occurring in Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, and that the term ‘representative’ occurring in the said Act should be understood as referring to the next of kin who were the dependants of the deceased as contemplated under that Act. While N. S. Ramaswami, J., went to the extent of saying that the definition of the term ‘legal representative’ in Section 2(11), C.P.C., would not include all persons who are entitled to apply for compensation under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act and that Rule 2(c) of the Madras Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals Rules, 1961 which provides that the term ‘legal representative’ shall have the meaning assigned to it under Clause (11) of Section 2, C.P.C., is ultra vires the rule-making powers of the Government, Kailasam, J., (as he then was), held that the term ‘legal representative’ can be construed as including all claimants under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. Taking this decision as authority, the Tribunal has held that respondents 1 and 2, being the dependent sisters of deceased Nagarajan, are entitled to seek impleadment in the petition filed by the petitioners.
4. I am afraid, the view taken by the Tribunal cannot be sustained. In the very Bench decision that has been relied upon, N.S, Ramaswami, J. has summed his view in paragraph 48 in the following manner:
The resulting position from the above discussion is that in respect of applications under Section 110-A of the Act, for the death of a person in a motor accident, the claimants must prove that the accident amounted to a tortious act and if that is proved, compensation can be awarded for loss of benefit to the claimants if they are dependants as contemplated under the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, and compensation can also be awarded towards loss to the estate of the deceased, whether the claimants are dependants under the Fatal Accidents Act or not.
5. Kailasam, J. as he then was, has expressed his view in paragraph 66 as under:
Under Section 110-A to 110-F of the amended Motor Vehicles Act the procedure has been made simpler and a suit by the executor, administrator or representative of the deceased on behalf of the claimants has been dispensed with and all the persons entitled to compensation are enabled to maintain an application under Section 110-A, thereby giving effect to the extended meaning of the word ‘representative’ in Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act rendered in Johnson v. Madras Railway Co. 28 Mad. 473. In the circumstances, the term ‘legal representative’ can be construed as including all claimants under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act.
6. In this context, reference must be made to Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. The relevant portion reads as follows:
Every such action or suit shall be for benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor, administrator or representative of the person deceased.
7. Applying this definition it may be seen that respondents 1 and 2 being the sisters of Nagarajan will not be entitled to maintain an action for compensation, especially in the presence of the widow and son of the deceased. Nor can respondents 1 and 2 claim to be the executors or administrators of the estate of deceased Nagarajan. In fact, they only seek impleadment on the ground that they were being maintained and supported by Nagarajan during his life time and as such they also constitute dependants. It is not every dependant who will be entitled to seek payment of compensation, but only the dependants Whom the deceased was bound in law to maintain and support.
8. Learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 would say that the first petitioner and Nagarajan had misunderstandings between them and they were living separately and Nagarajan was only providing maintenance and as such, the first petitioner cannot represent his estate. This contention is alien to the controversy on hand. Admittedly, the first petitioner is the wife and the second petitioner is the son of deceased Nagarajan and as long as that relationship lasts they are entitled to seek compensation for the death of Nagarajan.
9. Even assuming that respondents 1 and 2 were being maintained by Nagarajan and they have a right in law to seek a share in the compensation amount that may be awarded against the owner and insurer of the vehicle, they have got to work out their rights in separate proceedings in a civil court. They cannot seek determination of their rights in proceedings under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. For the aforesaid reasons, this revision is allowed and M.P. 2045 of 1983 will stand dismissed. No costs.