High Court Kerala High Court

Bharat Petroleum Corporation … vs St.German’S Church on 19 June, 2008

Kerala High Court
Bharat Petroleum Corporation … vs St.German’S Church on 19 June, 2008
       

  

  

 
 
  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

RSA.No. 744 of 2007()


1. BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LIMITED,
                      ...  Petitioner
2. CHIEF DIVISIONAL MANAGER,

                        Vs



1. ST.GERMAN'S CHURCH,
                       ...       Respondent

2. FR. JOSEPH MADAKETHEKKATTU,

3. K.T.CHACKOCHAN,

4. V.C.PATHROSE,

                For Petitioner  :SRI.N.N.SUGUNAPALAN, SC, BPC

                For Respondent  :SRI.SAIBY JOSE KIDANGOOR

The Hon'ble MR. Justice K.P.BALACHANDRAN

 Dated :19/06/2008

 O R D E R
                        K.P. BALACHANDRAN, J.
                -----------------------------------------------------
                           R.S.A. No 744 of 2007
                -----------------------------------------------------
                       Dated this the 19th June 2008


                                 JUDGMENT

The defendants in O.S. No 98 of 1996 on the file of the

Munsiff’s Court, N. Paravur are the appellants they having lost their

case both in the trial court as well as before the first appellate court.

2. The suit aforesaid was filed by the respondents for

declaration and recovery of possession of the schedule property,

inter alia, on the allegation that the schedule property having 7 1/6

cents comprised in survey No 286/19A of Paravur Pakuthy is owned

by the first plaintiff church of which second plaintiff is the Vicar and

third and fourth plaintiffs are the trustees, that the property originally

belonged to Kottekkavu St. Thomas Ferona Catholic Church, that the

schedule property was given under a licence agreement to the

predecessor company of the first defendant Bharath Petroleum

Corporation Limited, namely, Burma Shell Oil Storage and

Distributing Company of India Limited by the said Kottekkavu St.

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Thomas Ferona Catholic Church on 17.08.1958 for the purpose of

running a petrol pump, that the predecessor company has got

amalgamated with the defendant company, that the earlier licence

was for ten years and after the expiry of the initial ten years period

licence was further extended by another agreement with the

defendant company for a further period of ten years, that thereafter a

subsequent renewal also was made for a period of ten years from

17.08.1968 and that even after the expiry of the said period of ten

years the defendants have not vacated the premises, that the

officials of the defendant company intimated the plaintiff that if an

alternate site is provided the present premises would be vacated and

accordingly the plaintiff purchased a suitable plot and informed the

defendant but the officials of the defendant were not satisfied with

the alternate site offered and backed out from their promise, that

therefore notice was issued by the plaintiff through lawyer to the

defendant company on 12.09.1995 demanding vacant possession of

the premises after removing structures erected thereon but the

defendant sent a reply on 17.10.1995 raising untenable contentions

and hence the suit.

3. The defendant resisted the suit filing written statement

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contending that the schedule property was initially taken on lease for

a period of ten years from 17.08.1958 on the basis of lease deed,

that the lease was further renewed to another ten years from

17.08.1968 and it is incorrect to say that the defendant was being

allowed to run the petrol bunk from 11.08.1968 onwards, that the

agreement is however not a licence agreement as alleged, but the

transaction is one of lease with effect from 17.08.1958 and buildings

were constructed by the first defendant thereon long before

20.05.1967; that by virtue of the provisions of the Burma Shell

Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings Act 1972 defendants

remained in possession for a further period of ten years from

17.08.1978 and from that date onwards defendant company

continued in possession and by reason of Section 106 of the Kerala

Land Reforms act the defendant company is a tenant entitled to

benefits under section 106 of the Act. They further contended that

the plaintiffs are not entitled to evict the defendants or recover the

suit property, that there is no arrears of rent and the court has no

jurisdiction to decide the question of tenancy and prayed that the

case be referred to the Land Tribunal under Section 125(3) of the

Kerala Land Reforms Act for decision being rendered on the tenancy

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right claimed invoking Section 106 of the Act.

4. The trial court raised necessary issues for trial. In view of

raising of issue No. 1 regarding tenancy right claimed by the

defendants under Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act the

proceedings in the case were stayed under section 125 (3) of the Act

and the question of tenancy covered by issue No. 1 was referred to

the Land Tribunal for adjudication by the trial court. Before the Land

Tribunal, Ernakulam at Tripunithura the case was registered as R.C.

12 of 1998. Though notices were served on the parties and the case

was posted on 24.04.1998, and adjourned several times the

defendants who advanced the case of tenancy did not appear

continuously for 14 sittings and consequently the Land Tribunal

dismissed the reference numbered as R.C.12/96 for default. When

order in R.C 12/96 was received by the trial court the trial court

proceeded with the trial of the suit. It was listed for trial on

18.01.2001. On that day defendants were absent and there was no

representation even on their behalf. From 18.01.2001 the case was

adjourned to 24.01.2001. On that day also the defendants were

absent and there was no representation. The defendants were

therefore set ex parte and the trial court after examining P.W.1 and

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admitting Exts A1 to A3 in evidence decreed the suit allowing

recovery of possession of the schedule property from the defendants

with damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs 2,000/- per

month from the date of suit and ordering that the order of the Land

Tribunal shall form part of the judgment. The defendants filed A.S.

No 61 of 2006 before the District Court, N. Paravur and the said

appeal was dismissed by the appellate court confirming the decree

passed by the trial court.

5. It is contended before me by the learned counsel for the

appellant that as per the mandate of Section 125 (3) of the Kerala

Land Reforms Act the order in R.C. 12 of 1998 passed by the Special

Tahsildar, Land Tribunal dismissing the reference for default could

not have been accepted as a finding rendered by the Land Tribunal

and the trial court should not have proceeded with the trial of the suit;

that the trial conducted accepting the said order passed by the Land

Tribunal as a finding is per se illegal and that therefore no order of

eviction could have been passed by the trial court against the

appellants-defendants without adjudicating their claim under Section

106 of the Land Reforms act and that the appellate court also did not

appropriately consider the question of law thus involved and that

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therefore this R.S.A deserves to be admitted to file.

6. Consequent on the raising of the contention by the

appellants-defendants before the trial court claiming benefits under

Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act the trial court

appropriately made a reference for a finding on that issue covered by

issue No. 1 for decision by the Land Tribunal. The Land Tribunal

registered it on its file as R.C. 12 of 1998 and after service of notice

to the parties the Tribunal posted the case on 14 sittings and the

appellants-defendants who advanced the claim under section 106 of

the Act did not turn up to substantiate their claim. Hence the

reference registered in 1998 was dismissed by the Land Tribunal

vide order dated 09.06.2000, after two years. Inasmuch as the

appellants did not establish their claim for benefit under section 106

of the Act adducing any evidence in the matter, this is a case where

the appellants-defendants had not established their tenancy right

claimed under Section 106 and therefore it was appropriate for the

Land Tribunal to send back the records to the trial court entering a

finding against the appellants-defendants answering their claim in the

negative. The contention that the Land Tribunal was dismissing the

case for default is advanced on the basis of the words used by the

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Land Tribunal in the order In the circumstances in which the Land

Tribunal was disabled to proceed with the adjudication of the claim

advanced by the appellants-defendants the order of the Land

Tribunal could only be considered as an answer in the negative to

the claim advanced by the appellants for benefit under Section 106 of

the Kerala Land Reforms Act covered by issue No.1 framed by the

trial court in the suit. In terms of Section 125 (3) of the Kerala Land

Reforms Act the trial could not but accept the order of the Land

Tribunal as one rendering a finding in the negative on the issue

referred to it. Further though the case was listed for trial in the trial

court on 18.01.2001 and the case was adjourned to 23.01.2001 and

thereafter to 24.01.2001, the appellants-defendants were absent and

there was no representation even on their behalf. Consequently they

were set ex parte and the trial court proceeded to decree the suit. It

was the said ex parte decree that was assailed by the appellants

before the first appellate court. The appellate court considered the

case on merits and dismissed the appeal. Hence this Regular

Second Appeal.

7. It is vehemently contended before me by the learned counsel

for the appellants that the trial court should not have disposed of the

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case, accepting the order passed by the Land Tribunal in R.C. No

12/98, as it is not a finding rendered as envisaged under Section

125 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, but is an order dismissing the

reference for default. The contention so advanced is devoid of any

merit for two reasons. Firstly, the appellants should have submitted

this matter before the trial court, which made the reference if at all

they were desirous of having the issue of tenancy being got

answered by the Land Tribunal. Secondly, even when the trial of the

case was listed before the trial court, the appellants did not turn up to

submit anything and the disposal was an ex parte one. If at all such

an ex parte decree has to be re-opened and they wanted the matter

to be considered on merits, such an application should have been

made before the trial court. That also was not done. When the

matter has been disposed of ex parte and the appellants-defendants

preferred an appeal against that ex parte decree, what could be

challenged is only the propriety or otherwise of the disposal of the

case ex parte and the correctness of the ex parte decree so passed

and not advancing any further claim on the merits of the contentions.

Even the said appeal happened to be dismissed for default initially

and it was got set aside only by a direction obtained from this court.

RSA 744/07 9

8. The first appellate court observed, while disposing of the

appeal on merits after hearing the parties, that the “B” diary in the

case showed that throughout the case, the appellants-defendants did

not, at all, actively participate in the trial and were pursuing their

case without a clear and specific case of their own and that on

reference being made, as mandated by Section 125 (3) of the Kerala

Land Reforms Act, the appellants did not appear before the Land

Tribunal and the Land Tribunal was constrained to dismiss the

reference petition consequent on the continued absence of the

appellants in the proceedings. The appellate court held that the

Land Tribunal, in the circumstances, could not be found fault with for

not answering the reference on merits, without any evidence

whatsoever adduced before it and therefore, it was of the view that

the contentions regarding the propriety of answering the reference

made by the Land Tribunal does not merit consideration and that the

contentions have only to be rejected. The use by the Land Tribunal

of the words that the case is dismissed for default is only a defect in

the manner of answering the reference and it can only be taken as

an answer against the appellants’ claim for the benefit under Section

106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, they having not established the

RSA 744/07 10

benefit claimed by them under Section 106 of the Kerala Land

Reforms Act. There is no infirmity on that account, in the disposal

of the case by the trial court as also by the first appellate court,

repelling the claims of the appellants.

9. The appellate court has further observed that even in the

appeal, there was no ground taken and no request also was made

for setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court

and making any kind of remand for affording the appellants an

opportunity to have their case considered on merits. The first

appellate court, therefore, came to the conclusion that disposal of the

case by the trial court ex parte, in the circumstances of the case was

proper and has only to be confirmed, confirming the findings of the

trial court. The contention that under Section 125 (7) of the Kerala

Land Reforms Act, the trial court could not have accepted the order

of the Land Tribunal as a finding is devoid of merit in the

circumstances in which the order happened to be passed by the

Land Tribunal as discussed above. There is absolutely no merit at all

in this Regular Second Appeal and no substantial question of law

arises for consideration by this court in this Regular Second Appeal.

10. In the result, I dismiss this Regular Second Appeal in limini,

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refusing admission.

Sd/-

K.P. BALACHANDRAN
Judge

19/06/2008
en

[true copy]