ORDER
R.M.S. Khandeparkar, J.
1. By the present revision application the petitioner challenges the order dated 10th April 1997 passed by Additional District Judge (A), Margao in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 107/96 whereby the learned Additional District Judge has set aside the order dated 31st October 1996 passed by Civil Judge, Junior Division, Margao in Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 217/95/C in Regular Civil Suit No. 134/95/C and further thereby has allowed the application for temporary injunction filed by the respondent herein and the petitioner has been restrained from interfering in any manner with the suit urinal as well as from demolishing or removing the same till the disposal of the suit.
2. The facts in the matter relate to a urinal situated by the side of Station Road at Margao in the property of the petitioner herein. It is the case of the respondent that he is the tenant in respect of a shop attached to the staircase in the building EXR Pereira situated at Station Road in the property bearing Chalta numbers 306 and 307, wherein he conducts the business of bar and restaurant under the name and style of Bar Cardozo or Cardozo Bar and Restaurant on payment of rent of Rs. 100/- per month to the petitioner and for the purpose of business he holds a valid licence from Margao Municipal Council. According to the respondent one of the conditions of grant of licence to conduct the activity of restaurant in the leased premises was that it should have the essential service of urinal provided for the same and as such the respondent was provided with such urinal facility from the time of commencement of the lease. Adjoining the leased premises there is a godown, which has been let out by the petitioner to one Ambe, who has sold the same to a third person with the consent of the petitioner herein and on instigation from the buyer of the godown, the petitioner is intending to demolish and/or remove the suit urinal to the prejudice of the respondent and his customers. According to the respondent, the said urinal is an essential service and the petitioner has no right to get the said urinal removed and to put the respondent to disgraceful situation by which his business will be ruined totally. The respondent, therefore, filed a suit for injunction to restrain the petitioner from interfering with the suit urinal and demolishing the same and pending the suit prayed for interim relief by an application for temporary injunction.
3. On the contrary the case of the petitioner is that his father was a businessman and had office on the first floor of the building in question and the business was of transport contractor and as there was no urinal attached to the office the petitioner erected the said urinal exclusively for the use of the petitioner and his father. The construction of the urinal was done by one Alex Martins. Though there are several premises on the said first floor of the building no lessee is granted the facility of using the said urinal including Mr. Ambe, who occupies the godown premises adjoining the suit urinal and this is to the knowledge of the respondent. It is his further case that the respondent has nothing to do with the suit urinal and
is in no way connected to the business or activities of the respondent in the shop premises leased out to the respondent and as such, the respondent is not entitled for any relief from the Court.
4. The trial Court on the basis of the material placed before it and on analysis thereof held that the respondent had failed to show that he had exclusive right to the urinal, or that his licence could be revoked if urinal was removed and that the affidavit of Manu Fernandes did not support the case of the respondent and as such the respondent had failed to make out a prima facie case for grant of relief and, therefore, dismissed the application for temporary injunction. In an appeal preferred by the respondent, the lower Appellate Court held that though agreement between the parties did not contain the urinal as part of the leased premises, it is to the common knowledge that a bar and restaurant should be provided with W.C./urinal under the Bye-laws controlling the trade and that the trial Judge erred in discarding the affidavit of Manu Fernandes, who was having licence to run the bar in the same premises and that at the stage of temporary injunction it was sufficient for the plaintiff to claim the relief if he had established that there was a urinal and the respondent was using the same right from the time he entered into agreement with the appellant. On the basis of the said findings the lower Appellate Court further observed that being a bar and restaurant, the urinal was a requisite for the customers as well as for the very existence of the bar and restaurant and in the absence thereof there would be difficulty in getting renewal of the licence for running the same bar and restaurant from the Municipal and Health Authorities and it will deprive the respondent from running the said business which he was otherwise having since 1978. The lower Appellate Court, therefore, set aside the order of the trial Court and granted the application for temporary injunction and thereby restrained the appellant from interfering with the suit urinal or from demolishing and/or removing the same.
5. While assailing the said impugned order Mrs. Agni, learned advocate appearing for the appellant, has submitted that the impugned order has been passed in total non-application of mind by the lower Appellate Court to the matter in issue. Applying the test laid down by the Apex Court in Wander’s case the Appellate Court ought not to have interfered with the order of the trial Court unless it had come to the conclusion that the order of the trial Court was arbitrary or capricious or perverse. In the absence of any such finding by the lower Appellate Court, it was not permissible for the lower Appellate Court to re-assess the materials on record and to grant the application for temporary injunction. In any case the findings arrived at-by the lower Appellate Court are not borne out from the record and they are mere inferences without any foundation being laid down in support thereof by the respondent. Drawing my attention to the lease agreement between the parties, Mrs. Agni submitted that undisputedly the agreement does not include the suit urinal as being part of the premises leased out to the respondent and there is nothing in the agreement to suggest that the respondent was allowed to use the urinal facility in the suit urinal for the purpose of running the business of bar and restaurant in the shop which was leased to the respondent. According to the learned advocate the trial Court had rightly disbelieved Manu Fernandes as the contents thereof are clearly disproved by the facts fully established by the materials on record. She further submitted that undisputedly the urinal is not a part of the building itself and the same is situated in the property of the respondent. There is no affidavit of any customer of the respondent to establish the claim of the respondent to the effect that the customers were using the suit urinal at any time.
6. Shri S.G. Dessai, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the fact of existence of urinal from the time of grant of premises on lease to the respondent is not in dispute. The records disclose that the respondent had been using the suit urinal from the time the shop was leased to the respondent. Besides, the very nature of the business in the premises requires such facility. According to the learned Advocate, no business of bar and restaurant could be carried out effectively unless urinal is provided and this is apparent from the Bye-law No. 9 of the Bye-laws of the Municipality which clearly provides that the Chief Officer while granting the licence for such business has to be satisfied that the premises are provided with water supply, wash basin, W.C. etc. The affidavit of Manu Fernandes placed on record clearly shows that he had been using the said premises on lease and for the effective use of the bar and restaurant, he had constructed the said urinal pursuant to the complaint of the doctor in the locality of illegal use of the open area for passing urine by his customers. Though urinal is not a part of the building, it being an essential facility required for the beneficial enjoyment of the leased premises, merely because the urinal is situated away from the shop premises no presumption can be drawn that the same is not required for the beneficial enjoyment of the premises. The very nature of the premises and the fact that the premises were leased out for the purpose of carrying on the business of bar and restaurant goes to show that the urinal was in existence and was used by the respondent and his customers.
7. Upon hearing the learned advocates for the parties and on perusal of the records it is seen that the respondent had filed a suit for injunction to restrain the appellant from interfering and/or demolishing or removing the suit urinal which, according to the respondent, is necessary as essential service for the beneficial enjoyment of the business in the leased premises of the respondent. Undisputedly at the time of grant of lease the parties had executed a written document, a copy of which is placed on record at page 51 of the paper-book, which specifies that the appellant’s predecessor had granted the shop premises attached to the staircase in the building EXR Pereira on lease basis for the purpose of carrying on business of bar and restaurant in the said shop. Undisputedly the said agreement does not include any clause permitting the use of any urinal or facility for such purpose for the enjoyment of the shop premises which is undisputedly granted on lease basis for the purpose of carrying on business of bar and restaurant. The document permitting the use of the premises by the respondent on the face of it, therefore, does not disclose any right in favour of the respondent to use such facility or the suit urinal for the purpose of enjoyment, either beneficial or otherwise, of the leased premises. Considering this important aspect, the trial Court refused to grant the temporary injunction as prayed for by the respondent. The trial Court while doing so had considered the case of the respondent regarding the difficulty in obtaining and/or continuing to have licence from the authorities for the purpose of running bar and restaurant in the premises in the absence of urinal facility to the premises. However, the trial Court refused to exercise its discretion on that ground and held that merely because the respondent will not be able to get licence for running his bar and restaurant in the absence of urinal, that by itself would not create any right for enjoyment of the suit urinal by the respondent. The lower Appellate Court, however, while upsetting the said finding arrived by the trial Court held that it is to the common knowledge that a bar and restaurant should be provided with the facility of urinal by virtue of Bye-laws relating to such business and that in the absence of such facility it would not be possible for the respondent to run the bar and restaurant. However, the perusal of the
records shows that the lower Appellate Court has not referred to any materials on record to arrive at such finding. No doubt the Bye-law No. 9 of the Bye-laws framed by the Municipal authorities provides that the licensee shall provide in the premises proper water supply, wash basins, W.C. whenever specific trade or occupation so demands, according to the satisfaction of the Chief Officer. However, that Bye-law itself cannot create any right in favour of a lessee to say that the landlord has to make arrangement for urinal facility whenever a lessee wants to have the business of bar and restaurant in the leased premises. The requirement of law to have urinal for the purpose of running the business of bar and restaurant cannot make it obligatory for the landlord of a premises let out for running the business of bar and restaurant to provide such facility of urinal. It is also not the case of the respondent that at the time of the grant of permission to use the premises, the petitioner had agreed to provide such facility. Plain reading of the lease agreement, prima facie, discloses that the premises which were subject matter of use by the respondent were specifically described in paragraph 1 (one) of the agreement. As against this agreement, there is nothing on record to suggest that the petitioner had agreed for any additional facility in the nature of urinal or otherwise being provided for the use of the leased premises by the respondent.
8. The order of temporary injunction by the lower Appellate Court on the assumption that it is to common knowledge that a bar and restaurant should be provided with W.C./urinal in accordance with the Bye-laws cannot be justified. The said Bye-low does not create any right in favour of the respondent for the use of suit urinal in the absence of such facility being provided and used right from the beginning or thereafter with the consent of the petitioner. This consent has, however, to be proved with proper evidence to be adduced by the parties. At this stage in the absence of any material on record in that respect, prima facie, the lower Appellate Court could not have held that the respondent was entitled to use the suit urinal.
9. As rightly submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioner there is no affidavit placed on record of any customer of the respondent to say that the customers were using such facility in suit urinal and that the respondent would suffer irreparable loss in case of non-availability of such facility to the leased premises or to the business of the respondent in the leased premises.
10. The Trial Court based on the materials placed on record had arrived at the finding that the respondent had not disclosed any prima facie right to the suit urinal for its enjoyment as part of the leased premises or as essential service for the use of the leased premises. The said finding was arrived at by the trial Court on analysis of the materials on record and in exercise of its discretionary powers and as such, it was not open for the lower Appellate Court to interfere therein unless the lower Appellate Court had found that the finding of the trial Court was arbitrary, capricious, perverse or had not exercised its discretion judiciously. It was not permissible for the lower Appellate Court in the facts and circumstances of the case to reassess the materials on record from different angle only to arrive at a different conclusion from the one reached by the trial Court. This is well established by now and for authoritative pronouncement on this matter one can safely refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Wander Ltd. and another v. Antox India P. Ltd., reported in 1990 (Supp.) S.C.C. 727, wherein the Apex Court has clearly held that:–
“The Appellate Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely or where the Court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of inter-locutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the Court below if the one reached by that Court was reasonably possible on the material. The Appellate Court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have came to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the Appellate Court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial Court’s exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J., in Printers Mysore Private Ltd. v. Pathan Joseph, (S.C.R. 721) :
“…. These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Biscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton”…. the law as to the reversal by a Court of appeal of an order made by a Judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case.”
11. Mrs. Agni the learned advocate for the petitioner did try to assail the impugned judgment on the ground that Civil Court had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter since the claim of the respondent to the suit urinal was on the basis of essential service as provided under section 35 of the Rent Act. However, I do not find any such ground having been raised either in the pleadings before the trial Court or before the lower Appellate Court and as such the said point deserves no consideration by this Court in this revision application.
12. Shri Dessai, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent, then submitted that considering the fact that relief of injunction being a relief in the nature of equity and considering the fact that the lower Appellate Court has considered the matter from the point of view that the respondent would be put to irreparable loss inasmuch as that he would be forced to close down the business of bar and restaurant, unless the relief asked for was granted, no fault can be found with the impugned order of the lower Appellate Court. According to the learned advocate, the impugned order merely directs to maintain status quo position. It is difficult to accept this contention of the learned advocate. The records do not establish that the respondent had been using the suit urinal as a matter of right either right from the inception of the lease or even thereafter with the consent and knowledge of the petitioner. In the absence of materials on record in that regard, it is difficult to hold that the user of the suit urinal by the respondent is a status quo position in the matter. There being no materials to arrive at such conclusion, it cannot be concluded that the order in question in fact amounts to directing maintenance of status quo.
13. The learned advocate for the petitioner is justified in making grievance regarding too much importance being given to the affidavit of Manu Fernandes by the lower Appellate Court when the trial Court had rightly disbelieved him. Even assuming that the fact disclosed by Manu Fernandes in his affidavit is true, then the same establishes the case counter to one pleaded by the respondent himself. The respondent’s case is that the suit urinal is permitted to be used for the beneficial use of the leased premises by the respondent for his business of bar and restaurant in the leased
premises. In other words if the said urinal was absolutely necessary for such business in the suit shop, one fails to understand how Manu Fernandes was able to have similar business in the premises without such facility being provided by the petitioner to Manu Fernandes. It is the case of Manu Fernandes that on account of complaint by Dr. Naik regarding illegal use of the open area by his customers for passing urine that he had to construct the said urinal. Besides, if the said urinal was already existing at the time of grant of lease of the premises, one fails to understand as to why the same fact was not disclosed in the written agreement executed between the parties. Considering the case put forth by the respondent and the materials on record no much importance can be given to the affidavit of Manu Fernandes to hold that the suit urinal was being used as a matter of right by the respondent.
14. The perusal of the impugned order does not disclose any justification for the lower Appellate Court to interfere in the order passed by the trial Court in its discretion which was judiciously exercised. The lower Appellate Court having set aside the order of the trial Court without finding any fault with the findings arrived at by the trial Court and in the absence of any arbitrariness or perversity on the part of the trial Court in passing the said order of rejecting the application of the respondent for temporary injunction, the lower Appellate Court clearly acted with material irregularity in setting aside the said order and granting the said application of the respondent. The records before me clearly warrant interference by this Court. The respondent having prima facie failed to make out any case of right in his favour to use the suit urinal, and the trial Court, on the analysis of the materials on record, in its discretion, had refused to grant temporary injunction, the interference by the lower appellate Court merely on assumption and surmises cannot be justified and approved. In the circumstances, there cannot be any hesitation in holding that the lower appellate Court has clearly acted with material irregularity and in improper exercise of its jurisdiction while passing the impugned order and the same cannot be sustained.
15. In the result the revision application succeeds and the same is allowed and the impugned order is hereby set aside and the order of the trial Court is upheld. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
16. Application succeed.