JUDGMENT
Neeladri Rao, J.
1. The two revision petitions were heard together, as the same point is involved.
2. The respondent in the two revision petitions filed O.S.Nos.908 and 909 of 1979 on the file of the Vth Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for possession of the ground floor and 1st floor of the premises bearing No. 5-8-528/A situated at Abids, Hyderabad. Admittedly, the revision petitioner is the tenant of the respondent herein in the ground floor and 1st floor of the said premises belonging to the respondent herein. Two suits were filed, as separate rent deed was executed for each of the premises.
3. Section 32(b) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short ‘the Rent Control Act’) was struck down by the Supreme Court in Motor General Traders v. State of A.P., AIR 1984 SC 121.’ Then, on 27-2-1984, the lower Court passed similar order in both the suits and it is as under:
“In the plaint para 4 it is clearly averred that the suit mulgi was completed construction somewhere in 1970. The suit is filed for eviction of the tenant in per CO. Buildings whose constructions were completed within ten years were only exempted from A.P. Buildings Rent and Eviction Control Act. As such this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Accordingly I find the Additional Issue. The plaint is ordered to be returned to be presented in proper court.”
4. It was stated for the plaintiff-respondent that the plaints were taken return of a day or two earlier to 23-10-1989, and they were represented in the Court of the Vth Additional Judge with the following endorsement by the learned counsel tor the plaintiff:
“The case was originally instituted in the Assistant Court and the same was allocated to IV Asst. Judge Court. The court-docket clarifies the position. Thereafter as per the order of the Chief Judge in O.P. No. 185 of 1979 the case was made over to this Court Under Section 24 C.P.C. This Court in view of the S.C. judgment returned the suit due to lack of jurisdiction on 27-7-84. When the Chief Judge u/s.24 C.P.C. transfers the suit, it has to be retained and tried by the same court.”
On 9-11-1989, the Presiding Officer of the said Court ordered as under, in both the suits.
”Number, if otherwise in order.”
5. The said orders are assailed in these revision petitions.
6. When as per order dt.27-2-1984, the plaints were returned for presentation in the proper Court, the Court has no power to entertain the suits again, urged the learned counsel for the tenant.
7. But, the learned counsel for the plaintiff -respondent contended as under:
8. This Court held in S.A. Hakim Saheb v. P.V.K. Shetiy, 1989 (2) ALT 28 that when the suit was filed at a time when Section 32{b) of the Rent Control Act was in force, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of the same and it means that the right of the party was crystalised on that date to file the suit, and such right is not adversely affected by the striking down of Section 32(b) of the Rent Control Act subsequently, Thus, the Civil Court had Jurisdiction to entertain the suits, as they were filed before Section 32(b) of the Rent Control Act was struck down. Further on the basis of the impugned order, it cannot be stated that it is a ‘case decided’ as contemplated under Section 115 C.P.C. So, the-revision petitions are not maintainable. Even if it can be held as maintainable, the C.R.Ps. are liable to be dismissed, as there is no failure of justice.
9. As per the orders dt.27-2-1984, these plaints were ordered to be returned for presentation in the proper Court. The proper Court referred to therein is the Rent Control Court. When once plaints in these two suits were ordered to be returned by the Court of the Vth Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, the said Court has no power to re-entertain these suits, unless the orders dt. 27-2-1984 are set aside. The Court can set aside its own order by way of review. Admittedly, no petition for review was filed. If a petition for review is filed and if the Court feels that it is a matter for review, notice had to be given to the opposite side, and only after hearing the opposite side, the order can be set aside by the same Court. But, no notice was given to the revision petitioner herein before the impugned orders dt.9-11 -1989 were passed. The order of that Court can be set aside by an Appellate Court or a Court of Revision. But. neither appeal nor revision was preferred against the order dt.27-2-1984. So, the said orders have become final. It is not open to the Court to ignore its own order, even if it is erroneous. As such, there is no need for consideration of these revision petitions as to whether the orders dt.27-2-1984 are illegal or erroneous.
10. The lower Court passed the laconic order dt.9-11-1989 “Number, if otherwise in order”. The plaints in these suits were registered in 1976. Later, they were transferred from the Court of the Assistant Judge to the Vth Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad and then, re-numbered as O.S.Nos,908 and 909 of 1979 on the file of the Vth Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. It is not clear as to what was meant by the lower Court in ordering ‘number again’ when they were already numbered as early as in 1976. Then, can it be stated that the lower Court meant that it is a case of restoration either the order of dismissal for default or an ex parte decree is set aside, the suit can be restored to file by the same Court. But, the orders dt.27-2-1984 are not orders dismissing the suit for default. So, the lower Court has no jurisdiction to order restoration of the suits in this case. It is not a case of remand by the Appellate Court. So, restoration does not arise.
11. When once the Court passed an order finally disposing of a suit or proceeding, it becomes functuous officio unless it is a case of review or restoration, it can alter, modify or set aside by way of review or it can order restoration, if the suit or proceeding is dismissed for default, or if an ex parte decree is passed. Thus, it is a case where the lower Court acted without jurisdiction in passing the impugned orders, when these suits were finally disposed of by orders dt.27-2-1984.
12. It has to be next seen as to whether it is a ‘case decided’. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent referred to Baldevdas v. Filmistan Distributors, to contend that every order of the Court in the course of a suit does not amount to a case decided and the case may be said to be decided only if the Court adjudicates for the purpose of the suit, some right or obligation of the parties in controversy.
13. In Ram Das v. Subhash Bakshi, it was observed as under:
… it is clear that the object of Section 115 of the Code is to remove such jurisdictional errors from the record of the case as preclude a true adjudication of the rights or obligations of the parties in controversy. They are the rights or obligations to determine which the proceeding has been initiated in court by the plaintiff or the appellant. The grant of jurisdiction to the subordinate court and the conditions for the manner of its exercise are designed for that sole object-the true adjudication of those rights or obligations. An order which affects the correctness of that adjudication in point of jurisdiction falls within the purview of the revisional powers. And so we come to the meaning of the expression “case decided” in Section 115.”
After reviewing all the judgments and also after considering S.S. Khanna v. F.J. Dhillon, , Baldevdas case (3 supra) and Ram Das case (4 supra), a Division Bench of this court in M. Anasuyamma v. Ch. Lakshmamma, 1991 (1) ALT 430 accepted the view expressed in Ram Das Case (4 supra). Thus, what had to be seen is as to whether the adjudication by the lower Court would have the necessary affect of deciding the rights or obligations between the parties.
14. In this case, by orders dt.27-2-1984, it was held that it is the Rent Control Court, but not the Civil Court, which has the jurisdiction to entertain the suits. But, the impugned orders are to the effect that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suits. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent argued that as per the impugned orders, the rights and obligations of the parties are not decided and hence, it is not a case decided coming within the ambit of Section 115 CP.C
15. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioner relied upon S.S. Khanna v. F.J. Dhillon (5 supra). There, one of the issued raised is as under:
“Whether the suit is not maintainable and the plaintiff is not entitled to institute the suit as alleged in paras 15 to 18 of the written statement.”
The same was tried as a preliminary issue. The trial Court found on the said, issue that the said suit was not maintainable. But, the trial Court did not dismiss the suit on the basis of the said finding. The said finding was challenged in the revision petition filed under Section 115 C.P.C. There, it was held that the said revision was not maintainable. The issue in regard to the maintainability of the suit is a material issue and the finding thereon affects the rights and obligations of the parties. It is a valuable right of the tenant to question the maintainability of the suit in a civil court, as the provisions of the Rent Control Act are beneficial to the tenant. Hence, when any finding is given in regard to the maintainability of the suit, the same had to be held as a case decided for it goes to the root of the matter. The very purpose of conferring the revisional powers with the High Court is to strike down the orders passed by the Subordinate Court, if such orders are passed when the court has no jurisdiction or when it acted illegally or irregularly in exercise of its jurisdiction or to interfere with the orders of the Subordinate Court, if it refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. So, the contention for the plaintiff-respondent that it is not a case decided had to be negatived.
16. As already observed valuable rights are conferred upon the tenants under the Rent Control Act. After the Court finds, that the Rent Control Act is applicable and hence the suit is not maintainable, and when same court again passed order that the said Court has jurisdiction and when passing such order the court acted without jurisdiction or illegally or irregularly in exercise of its jurisdiction, the same can be challenged by the tenant, for it affects his valuable rights, as it was already found that it is only the Rent Control Court which can entertain the case. One gets valuable right, even on the basis of erroneous order, if it had been final. So, when the tenant complains that by impugned order, his valuable rights are affected, and if the revision court finds that it is a case of passing the order illegally or irregularly in exercise of its jurisdiction or without jurisdiction, it cannot be stated that there is no failure of justice. Hence, In the Matter of B.H.P. & Ltd. v. Visakhapatnam, AIR 1985 AP 207 is also not helpful to the plaintiff-respondent in these revision petitions.
17. As already observed, these are cases where the impugned orders are passed even after the Court had become functus officio and thus without jurisdiction. As the impunged orders have the affect of deciding the rights and obligations of the parties, it is one of case decided. Further, as to whether by the ‘ impugned orders, the rights or obligations of the parties are adjudicated arises only when such an order is passed during the pendency of the suit or proceeding. But, if it is a case of an order passed after the suit or proceeding is disposed of, it is one of case decide for it is inconsistent to the final order passed earlier in the suit or proceeding. There is also failure of justice as the rights of the revision petitioner-tenant prejudicially affected. Hence, the revision petitions lie.
18. In the result, these revision petitions are allowed and the impugned orders are set aside. No costs.