JUDGMENT
Macpherson, J.
1. In execution of a money decree against the petitioner, his property was sold at the, instance of the decree holder opposite party who was apparently his uncle and the record was, on November 21, 1931, directed to be put on December 22, for confirmation of sale. On December 14, the judgment-debtor applied for issue of a chalan and on December 21, a petition on behalf of the decree-holder showing full satisfaction was directed to be put up on the date fixed. On December 22, the order was passed “Above petition put up. Case dismissed on full satisfaction.”
2. Thereafter the decree holder filed an application purporting to be under Section 151 and Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying that the order of December 22,1931, be set aside and the sale to confirmed, giving as his ground that the petition of all satisfaction had been fraudulently filed by his pairvikar who is also a nephew, in collusion with the judgment-debtor. There was also an application to prosecute the judgment debtor and the pairvikar for filing a false satisfaction petition.
3. The learned Munsif did not decide whether the judgment debtor did or did not give money in satisfaction of the decree or whether the satisfaction petition filed was false. He held that the order of December 22, was not liable to be set aside under Order XLVII. Rule 1 or Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure as “the applicant had failed to show that the Court committed a legal flaw in its order or to produce any new material.”
4. The decree holder preferred an appeal to the District Judge who allowed it and remanded the case for a clear finding on the question of fraud in connection with the petition of satisfaction of the decree.
5. In the present application in revision from the appellate order, the only point taken by Mr. B.P. Singh is that no appeal lay, so that the order of remand is without jurisdiction. In reply the opposite party refers to the decision in Jagannath Mandal v. J aladhar Mandal 40 Ind. Cas. 839 : 26 C.L.J. 317.
6. To my mind an appeal did lie because although in his application the decree holder referred to Order XLVII, Rule 1 and Section 151 yet the application was essentially one under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the discharge of the decree. In that application he prayed that the order dismissing the case on full satisfaction should be set aside. It makes no difference that the granting of that prayer would involve vacating the setting aside of the sale. Mr. B.P. Sinha did indeed seek to distinguish the decision cited on the ground that therein the certification of satisfaction had preceded the sale in execution. But there is no difference discernible in principle between the case where there has been an advertisement for sale and an actual sale. I hold that in point of fact the application of a decree-holder was under Section 47 and an appeal lay to the District Judge from the order of the Munsif.
7. Accordingly the appellate order is not without jurisdiction. I may also say that had the decision on the point of law been different, I would have felt inclined to pass in revision the order which has in fact been passed by the learned District Judge in appeal.
8. The Rule is discharged with costs; Pleader’s fee one gold mohur.