ORDER
Rama Jois, J.
1. In these two Writ Petitions, the following question of law arises for consideration :
“Whether in view of Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (‘the Act’ for short), an Administrative Tribunal constituted under Sub section (1) or (2) of Section 4 of the Act, has no jurisdiction to entertain applications regarding redressal of the grievances of civil servants of the Union or of the State concerned, as the case may be, in respect of service matters or matters relating to recruitment in the absence of an order made by the Government or any other authority and to issue appropriate directions or to make appropriate orders, and if so, whether in such circumstances a Writ Petition praying for the issue of an appropriate direction or order is maintainable before this Court ?”
2. The facts of the case, in brief, are as follow:
(i) In W.P. No. 19860/86: The petitioner is a Medical Officer in the service of the Central Government in the Department of Health. She has presented this Writ Petition on 13-11-1986 praying for the issue of a Writ of Mandamus directing the respondent to treat the service rendered by the petitioner on the establishment of the New Delhi Municipal Committee as the service rendered under the Central Government and to determine her seniority on the said basis.
(ii) Long prior to the presentation of the writ petition before this Court, the Act has come into force and a Central Administrative Tribunal has been constituted with effect from 1-11 1985 and a Bench of the Tribunal has also been established in the State of Karnataka. According to Section 14 of the Act, the Central Administrative Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate upon disputes and complaints in respect of service matters as also matters relating to recruitment of civil servants of the Union. Section 28 of the Act excludes the jurisdiction of all Courts except the Supreme Court and of the Industrial Tribunal and Labour Court in respect of matters which fall within the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal. Section 29 of the Act provides for transfer of all cases pending before any Court except the Supreme Court under Article 436 if the subject matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The petitioner, however, has presented this petition before this Court in view of Section 19 of the Act. It reads :
“19. Applications to Tribunals — (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal may make an application to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance.”
The petitioner’s plea is that as according to Section 19 of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal can be invoked only if there was an order of the Central Government or of any other authority, and as in the present case there was no order rejecting her request for fixing her seniority counting the service rendered by her in the service of the New Delhi Municipal Committee, she has approached this Court. The contention of the petitioner is that if the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an application in the absence of an order, this Court’s jurisdiction is not excluded.
(iii) In W.P.No. 20330/1984: The petitioner is a civil servant of the State being a teacher in a high-school in the Department of Public Instruction of the State Government. Originally, the petitioner was appointed on the establishment of a private high-school called Nehru High School at Amrutur in Kunigal Taluk. The said institution was taken over by the Government. The petitioner made repeated representations before the authorities for fixing his seniority in the cadre of high-school teachers taking into account the service rendered by him on the establishment of the Nehru High-School before its takeover by the Government. As no orders were passed, the petitioner has presented this Writ Petition on 21-12-1984 before this Court.
(iv) During the pendency of this Writ Petition, the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal has been constituted under Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Act with effect from 6-10-1986. Section 15 of the Act is similar to Section 14 of the Act and the said Section provides that the State Administrative Tribunal shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide disputes and complaints relating to all service matters including grievances in matters relating to recruitment. In this case also, the question for consideration is, whether the petition did not stand transferred to the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal as there is no order of the Government or any authority rejecting the claim of the petitioner.
3. The learned Advocate General submitted that when Sections 14 and 15 of the Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Administrative Tribunal, the fact that Section 19 provides for making an application against an order does not me in that unless there was an order of the Government or of any authority, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal cannot be invoked. He submitted that on a reading of Sections 14 and 15 of the Act, which specify the jurisdiction of the Tribunals and Sections 28 and 29 of the Act, which excludes the jurisdiction of all other Courts except the Supreme Court, it becomes clear that the Act confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal to decide all service matters and therefore even in the absence of any order passed by the Government or any other authority, an aggrieved civil servant can make an application before the Tribunal. He submitted that while construing the provisions of the Act, all the provisions of the Act should be read together to make the provisions of the Act consistent so that the purpose for which the Act is enacted, is achieved. In support of this, he relied on the Judgments of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. National Taj Traders, , and in Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., . He also submitted that Section 19 was a provision prescribing the procedure and the well settled rule of construction was that a procedural provision cannot be allowed to whittle down the ambit of a substantive provision. In support of this principle, he relied on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Veluswamy v. Rajanainar, .
4. Sri Shivashankar Bhat, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Central Government, also contended that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to adjudicate disputes and complaints of civil servants was complete and the provisions of Section 19 of the Act cannot be interpreted as curtailing the jurisdiction, which is conferred on the Tribunal in clearest terms under Sections 14 and 15 of the Act. He also relied on Section 20 of the Act which provides for admitting an application by the Tribunal if no order was made on appeal or representation of the civil servant concerned within six months, by the authorities concerned. He submitted that when jurisdiction is conferred under Section 14 and 15 of the Act on the Tribunal to decide all disputes relating to service matters it must be held that every power required for the effective exercise of the power was included in the grant. In support of this proposition, he relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. National Tobacco Co. off India Ltd, .
5. The scope of Sections 14, 15, 28, and 29 of the Act has been the subject matter of consideration by this Court in the case of S. M. Pattanaik v. Secretary to Government of India, ILR 1986 KAR 3954 In that case the question for consideration was, whether the jurisdiction of the High Courts to decide the constitutional validity of the laws regulating the recruitment and conditions of service was excluded and got vested in the Administrative Tribunal ? After ascertaining the scope and ambit of Article 423-A of the Constitution pursuant to which the Act has been enacted by the Parliament and the provisions of Sections 14, 15, 28 and 29 of the Act, it was held as follows : The jurisdiction of the Tribunal constituted under the Act was to adjudicate disputes and complaints of civil servants and this was exclusive. Having regard to the scheme of Article 423-A and the provisions of the Act, the question relating to constitutional validity of laws regulating conditions of service, whether enacted by or under an Act, of appropriate Legislature or made by the President or the Governor, as the case may be, under the proviso to Article 409 of the Constitution or in the absence of both, any order issued by the executive in exercise of its executive power, is exclusively vested in the Courts established by the Constitution, namely, the High Courts and the Supreme Court. The expression ‘disputes and complaints’ used in Article 423-A as well as the definition of ‘service matters’ in Section 2(r) of the Act did not take in questions relating to constitutional validity of any service law, but included every other matter relating to conditions of service and recruitment. Therefore, except the question relating to constitutional validity of service laws, ail other matters relating to servic conditions or recruitment falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in view of the provisions of Sections 14 and 15 of the Act. Consequently, the jurisdiction of this Court is diminished to that extent by the force of provisions of Clause (2)(d) and Clause (3) of Article 423A read with Sections 28 and 29 of the Act. Therefore, the first petition cannot be entertained and the second petition cannot be retained by this Court as the grievances of the petitioners in these petitions is with regard to their seniority which is certainly a matter which forms part of the conditions of service of the petitioners From this it follows that as the High Court had the jurisdiction to make appropriate orders or to issue appropriate directions to the Government or any authority in enforcement of any Jaw regulating the conditions of service before the Act came into force, after the coming into force of the Act, the Tribunal has the power to issue appropriate directions or to make appropriate orders.
6. That being the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, Section 19 of the Act which provides for making an application only against orders and Section 20 which provides that application against an order under Section 19 should not ordinarily be entertained unless the civil servant had exhausted all the remedies available under the service rules, but could be entertained if no order is passed by the higher authority on the appeal or representation preferred under the relevant rules within six months after the presentation, being procedural provisions, cannot have the effect of diminishing the jurisdiction of the Tribunal conferred under Section 14 or Section 15 of the Act, as the case may be. Therefore, in cases where the complaint is not gainst any order but it is against inaction by the authority concerned, an application could be made invoking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 14 or Section 15 of the Act. To such an application against inaction, Section 21, which prescribes limitation, also would not be attracted, for, unless an order is made, the period of limitation would not commence. But in such cases the Tribunal could decline to exercise its jurisdiction applying principles like inordinate delay, laches, acquiescence etc., which were governing the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Whatever that may be, the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to entertain applications in respect of grievances of civil servants in all service matters even in the absence of an order.
7. In the result, I answer the question set out first as follows :
“An Administrative Tribunal constituted under Subsection (1) or (2) of Section 4 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, has the jurisdiction to entertain application, regarding redressal of the grievances of civil servants of the Union or of the State concerned, as (he case may be, in respect of service matters or matters relating to recruitment in the absence of an order made by the Government or any other authority and to issue appropriate directions or to make appropriate orders and therefore in such circumstances a Writ Petition praying for the issue of appropriate directions or making of appropriate orders is not maintainable before this Court.”
8. Accordingly, I make the following order :
(i) In W.P.No. 19860/1986 : The Writ Petition is dismissed leaving liberty tor the petitioner to file an application before the Central Administrative Tribunal.
(ii) In W.P.No. 20330/1984 : The Writ Petition has statutorily stood transferred to the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal with effect from 6th October, 1986. The Office is directed to transmit the records to the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal.