JUDGMENT
B.N. Srikrishna, J.
1. By this Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner impugns the order of the Industrial Court, Bombay dated July 30, 1996 made in Revision Application (IC) No. 8 of 1995 in purported exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.
2. Briefly stated, the facts leading to the present Writ Petition are as follows:
The first Respondent is a registered Company which carries on the business of manufacture and sale of cotton textile and silk textile goods at its factory in Bombay. The Petitioner joined the services of the first Respondent as a helper sometime in the year 19S4 and was employed in the Art Silk Weaving Department on Ticket No. 151. Sometimes in the year 1975, the Petitioner’s services were terminated on the allegation that he had abandoned his service. The Petitioner challenged this order by this Application (LCB) No. 211 of 1976 under the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (hereinafter called “the Act”). The said application was allowed by the Labour Court at Bombay by an order made on March 11, 1982. The Labour Court held that the purported termination of the service of the Petitioner on the ground of abandonment of service was illegal and directed his reinstatement in service with continuity but without back wages. From February 22, 1983, the Petitioner was reinstated in service in the Art Silk V/eaving Department.
3. According to the Petitioner, the first Respondent employer was displeased with the order of reinstatement of the Petitioner and was looking out for an opportunity to victimise him. It is not in dispute that upto February 22, 1983 the Petitioner’s attendance had been marked in the muster of Art Silk Weaving Department against the post of a helper. From February 23, 1983 the Petitioner was not given work in the Art Silk Weaving Department on the ground that the said department had been closed. While rest of the Operatives in the said Department were given their terminal benefits by way of retrenchment compensation, the Petitioner was directed to report to the Cotton Textile Department where he was assigned work as a “Began” as there was no equivalent post of helper available. It should be mentioned here that the last drawn wages of the Petitioner were Rs. 19.00/-.
4. The Petitioner took up the stand that the post of Begari in the Cotton Textile Department was of lesser status than that of a helper in the Art Silk Weaving Department and that it involved lifting of heavy beams. Because of this dispute, the Petitioner refused to work in the Cotton Textile Department as a Begari. It is not clear from the record as to whether there was any formal order issued to Petitioner on the ground of persistent refusal to work as a Begari.
5. The Petitioner moved the Labour Court once again by his Application (BIR) No. 21 of 1985 in which he alleged that the action of the first Respondent in not assigning him work as a helper in the Art Silk Weaving Department with effect from February 23, 1983 was illegal,
improper and unjust. He sought a declaration to that effect and a direction to the first Respondent to assign him the usual work of a helper in the Art Silk Weaving Department with continuity of service and full back wages with effect from February 23, 1983. This application came to be partly allowed by the order of the Labour Court dated January 27, 1995. The Labour Court after analyzing the evidence before it, took the view that an approach letter dated June 22, 1983 under the proviso to Section 42(4) of the Act had been sent by the Petitioner, that an agreement had taken place between the representative Union and the first Respondent with regard to payment of retrenchment compensation to surplus employees in the Cotton Textile Department and that in the Cotton Textile Department the work of a helper involved lifting of beams. The Labour Court took on record letters dated January 19, 1983, January 28, 1983, February 7, 1983, February 23, 1983 March 7, 1983, March 12, 1983, March 13, 1983, March 26, 1983, December 28, 1984 and January 11, 1985 addressed by the Petitioner to the first Respondent in which the Petitioner had repeatedly sought the relief claimed in the application and certain other reliefs. The Labour Court examined the evidence of the witnesses examined by first. Respondent and came to the conclusion that the witness Shambari was not really the officer who had assigned the alternative work to the Petitioner and was not aware of the exact nature of work assigned to the Petitioner in the Cotton Textile Department. In the result, the Labour Court accepted the evidence of the Petitioner and concluded that the Petitioner was not assigned the work of a ‘helper’ according to his designation, but was assigned the lower categbry work of Began and (hat the Petitioner was not bound to accept work of lower category as alternative work. The Labour Court also took notice of the fact that as far as close of Art Silk Weaving Department was concerned, the other Operatives working therein had been offered their terminal benefits by way of retrenchment compensation, but for some reason the Petitioner was lot given the said benefit. Since the petitioner had already crossed the age of 64 years on April 5, 1984, during the pendency of the Application, the Labour Court concluded that though the Petitioner was entitled to relief he could only be granted monetary benefit upto the date of superannuation. Since the closing of the Art Silk Weaving Department occurred on February 23, 1983, the Labour Court directed payment of half back wages from February 23, 1983 to November 1993 upto the date on which the Petitioner reached the age of 63 years. I would have expected the Petitioner to challenge the order of the Labour Court declining to grant the other half of the back wages in view of the clear conclusion recorded by the Labour Court, but, for some reasons, the Petitioner did not challenge the said order dated January 27, 1995 made by the Labour Court.
6. The first Respondent filed Revision Application (IC) No. 8 of 1995 before the Industrial Court purported by invoking the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under Section 85 of the Act. It is not clear from the record as to why the order of the Labour Court was not treated as an appealable order and as to why it was necessary to exercise jurisdiction of judicial superintendence under Section 85 of the Act. The Industrial Court allowed the application of the first Respondent and dismissed the claim of the Petitioner except that it was held that the Petitioner was entitled to monetary benefits, like Provident Fund, Employees’ State Insurance and Gratuity, but not back wages. Being aggrieved by the said order of the Industrial Court, the Petitioner is before this Court.
7. I have perused the order of the Industrial Court with the help of the learned Counsel and I find it difficult to follow the reasoning of the Industrial Court. The Labour Court’s finding is that the Petitioner was unjustifiably given work of a Begari in the Cotton Textile Department, though he was holding the designation of ‘helper’ in Art Silk Weaving Department of a higher category. The Labour Court further held that in the circumstances the Petitioner was justified in refusing such lower type of work which was not really equivalent alternative work in the Cotton Textile Department. Without analyzing the evidence and recording a finding as to whether the alternative work offered to the Petitioner in the Cotton Textile Department was of equivalent category, the Industrial Court straightway came to the conclusion that there was refusal by the Petitioner to accept the alternative work and that he had no right to claim any employment in any particular section. The Industrial Court also held that since Art Silk Weaving Department had been admittedly closed, though the other workers might be entitled to compensation, inasmuch as the Petitioner had been transferred to the Cotton Textile Department he was not even entitled to compensation. In this view of the matter, the Industrial Court held that Labour Court’s order to pay wages to the extent of 50 per cent back wages was erroneous and set it aside.
8. In my view, the reasoning of the Industrial Court is faulty. It was not possible, for the Industrial Court to interfere with the Labour Court’s finding that the Petitioner’s refusal to accept work as a Begari in the Cotton Textile Department was justified unless the Industrial Court itself came to the conclusion on appreciation of evidence that the work of Begari in Cotton Textile Department was equivalent to the work of a helper in Art Silk Weaving Department. In the absence of such a finding, in my view, the Industrial Court had no reason or ground for interfering with the order of the Labour Court.
9. In the circumstances, Writ Petition is allowed. The impugned order of the Industrial Court dated July 30, 1996 made in Revision Application (IC) No. 8 of 1985 is hereby quashed and set aside and the order of the Labour Court dated January 27, 1995 made in Application (BIR) No. 21 of 1985 is resurrected. The first Respondent is directed to pay to the Petitioner within a period of four weeks from today all monetary benefits flowing from the order of the Labour Court dated January 27, 1995.
10. Rule accordingly made absolute. The first Respondent to pay costs of Rs. 1000/-(Rupees One thousand only) to the Petitioner.