PETITIONER: LAXMI CHAND Vs. RESPONDENT: INDORE IMPROVEMENT TRUST, INDORE AND ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT24/02/1975 BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN KRISHNAIYER, V.R. CITATION: 1975 AIR 1303 1975 SCR (3) 686 1975 SCC (1) 565 ACT: Madhya Pradesh Town Improvement Trust Act 1960--Whether a housing scheme can contain features of industrial and other non-housing scheme--Malafide acquisition in the absence of any provision whether tribunal can award interest from the date of taking possession of the property till the date of determination of compensation. HEADNOTE: The petitioner owned certain land. There was an earlier attempt to acquire the land of the petitioner by sanctioning a housing accommodation scheme by- the Indore Improvement Trust under the Madhya Pradesh Town Improvement Trust Act, 1960. The said scheme was, however, cancelled. The petitioner wanted to develop his. land for industrial purposes and, therefore, obtained No Objection Certificates from various Government Departments as well as from the Trust. The petitioner got his land converted from agricultural purpose to industrial purpose subject to the limitation that the construction work had to be approved by the Trust. The Trust, however, refused the No Objection Certificate for development of the land on individual basis on the ground that a scheme was being approved for the land in question and other neighbouring lands. The Trust framed a scheme which included the land of the petitioner also. The Trust served a notice to acquire the petitioner's land for the purpose of the scheme. The petitioner submitted his objection stating that the land was being developed into industrial area and several small scale industries were functioning there and, as such, development was alreadyin progress. Thereafter, the Trust published a notice acquiring the said land. Before the Trust could take possession of the petitioner's land the petitionerfiled a Writ Petition in this Court. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners : (1) The Housing Accommodation Scheme is invalid because it does not specify the class of inhabitants for whom the same has been made. (2) The scheme being a Housing Accommodation Scheme it is for residential occupation only and it is not competent to include plans for industrial purposes. (3) Section 31 of the Act does not empower the Trust to frame a scheme for industrial purposes at all. (4) There is no application of the mind in terms of section 45 in making the Scheme. (5) The acquisition of the land for the purpose of the Scheme is malafide. (6) Since the Act makes no provision for payment of interest from the date of delivery of possession of the land to the Trust till the determination of compensation by the Tribunal, acquisition of the land is violative of article 31(2) of the Constitution. Petitioner has not challenged vires of any provisions of the Act. HELD : (1) Section 31 of the Act permits combining two or more schemes or supplementing some special features of a particular scheme in another scheme. There is no bar in framing a housing accommodation scheme with some of the features of industrial scheme. A housing accommodation scheme need not necessarily be residential scheme only. It can admit of providing housing accommodation for any other purpose or object. There is nothing in section 31 or any other provision of the Act disabling the Trust from framing scheme for industrial purpose. [690E-G] 687 (2)Section 45 requires that while framing the scheme the inherent utility, efficiency and adequacy of the scheme and the objections and representations of the persons have to be taken into consideration.' The scheme in question was open for inspection. There was no ambiguity or vagueness of the scheme or its purpose. Where factual satisfaction is evident formal recitals being omitted may not matter. At any rate, section 52 (2) Puts a final seat of imprimatur on the scheme after publication of the sanction of the Government. [691C-D) (3) Acquisition is not malafide.. No oblique motive can be inputed to the Trust in making the impugned scheme. There is no allegation of mala fide against the State Government whose sanction was a, pre-requisite for the acquisition. The order of acquisition cannot, therefore. be characterised as I malafide. [691G-H] (4) It is true that there is no provision for awarding interest unlike under the Land Acquisition Act. It is submitted by the respondents that there is no bar under the Act against awarding interest by the Tribunal. It is not possible to hold that the compensation Tribunal which is at par with an arbitrator will be entitled to award interest without any express provision in the Act. The petitioner is, therefore. right in their contention- that this Act does not provide for awarding interest from the date of taking possession of the property to the date of determination of compensation. However, it is not possible to quash the acquisition in the absence of a challenge to the vires of the provisions of the Act. The law being valid the attack will revaperate upon the quantum of compensation pure and simple. It is sufficient to point out that the quantum of compensation cannot be challenged under Article 31(2) of the Constitution. [692D; 694C-G] JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 517 of
1972 & 240 of 1973.
Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
D. V. Patel (In WP. No. 240/73), S. P. Phadnis and S. K.
Gambhir, for the Petitioners (In both the Petitions).
I. N. Shroff, for the Respondent No. 1 (In WP. No. 517/72).
S. M. Jain, for the Respondents Nos. 1-2 (In WP. No. 2401
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Goswami, J. This judgment will govern Writ Petitions Nos.
517 of 1972 and 240 of 1973.
The applications are directed against what is described as a
Housing Accommodation Scheme sanctioned by the Indore
Improvement Trust (briefly the Trust) under the Madhya
Pradesh Town Improvement Trust Act 1960 (briefly the Act).
Brief facts of Writ Petition No. 517 of 1972 may alone be
sufficient. There was an earlier attempt to acquire the
land of the petitioner by sanctioning a scheme in July 1961
but the same was cancelled some time, in September 1962.
The petitioner personally wanted to develop his land for
industrial purposes and with that end in view obtained No
Objection Certificates from various Government Departments
as well as from the Trust. The petitioner also succeeded in
converting his patta from agricultural purpose to industrial
purpose, subject, inter alia, to the limitation that the
construction work on the land shall be carried out in
accordance with the plans sanctioned by the same
688
Improvement Trust (Annexure ‘G’) Later, however the
petitioner found from a letter of the. Trust of October 26,
1964, that a scheme was being approved for his land and
other neighbouring lands and, therefore, the, Trust was
unable, to issue the, No Objection Certificate for
development of his land on individual basis. The Trust
framed a Scheme No. 62 under section 46(1) of the Act and
published a notice to that effect in the Gazette and in
local newspapers in 1965. The Scheme includes the, land of
the petitioner. The representations which the Petitioner
made against the Scheme were of no avail. The Trust served
a notice dated February 10, 1965, upon the petitioner under
section 48(1) of the, Act proposing to acquire his land for
the purpose of the Scheme. The petitioner submitted his
objections on April 15, 1965, stating, inter alia, that the
land was being developed into industrial area and several
small scale industries were functioning there and as such
development was already in progress. It was also stated
that the land having been put to the use of industrial
purposes could not be re-converted for the purposes of
housing accommodation’. It was further stated that the land
was mortgaged to the State Bank for about Rs. 2 lakhs and
the compensation that would be required to be paid by the
Trust would be necessarily higher than in the case of other
suitable vacant lands. The Petitioner was given a hearing
but ultimately the representations were , rejected. The
Trust duly applied to the State Government for sanction of
the Scheme which was accorded on April 19, 1968, under
section 51 of the Act. The Trust published a notice’ dated
July 12, 1968, under section 68(1) of the Act declaring its
intention to acquire the land. The petitioner filed his
objections under section 68(2) against the proposed
acquisition of the land but these were rejected and the
Trust obtained sanction of the State Government (respondent
No. 2) to acquire the land under section 70 of the Act, and
the Notification was duly published on September 27, 1968.
Therefore the Trust published a Notification in the
Government Gazette dated September 8, 1972, acquiring the
said land and under section 71(2) of the Act the land vested
absolutely with the Trust free from encumbrances from the
date of the publication. Before the Trust could take
possession of the petitioner’s land, he filed the writ
application under article 32 of the Constitution and
obtained Rule Nisi and interim stay of dispossession was
granted pending disposal of the matter.
The following are the common submissions made on behalf of
the petitioners :-
1. The Housing Accommodation Scheme’ is
invalid because it does not specify the class
of inhabitants for whom the same has been
made.
2. The Scheme being a Housing Accommodation
Scheme, it is for residential occupation only
and it is not competent to include plans for
industrial purposes.
689
3. Section 31 of the Act does not empower the Trust to frame
a scheme for industrial purposes at all.
4. There is no application of the mind in terms of section
45 in making the Scheme.
5. The acquisition of the land for the purpose of the Scheme
is mala fide.
6. Since the Act makes no provision for payment of interest
from the date of delivery of possession of the land to the
Trust to the, determination of compensation by the Tribunal
acquisition of the land is violative of Article 31(2) of the
Constitution.
At the very outset it should be pointed out that the
Petitioners have not challenged the, vires of any provisions
of the Act.
In order to appreciate the first three submissions, which
may be taken up together, we may note a few relevant
provisions of the Net.
Chapter IV of the Act describes the contents of improvement
schemes. Section 30 provides that “an improvement scheme
may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely-
* * * *
(i)the provision for accommodation for any class of
inhabitants : ”
Section 31 may be set out in full
31. “Types of improvement schemes.-
An improvement scheme shall be of one of the following
types or may combine any two or more of such types or of
special features thereof, that is to say-
(a) a general improvement scheme;
(b) a re-building scheme;
(c) a re-housing scheme;
(d) a street scheme;
(e) a deferred street scheme;
(f) a development scheme;
(g) a housing accommodation scheme;
(h) a town expansion scheme;
(i)a drainage or drainage including sewage disposal
scheme; and
(j) a playground, stadium and recreation ground scheme.”
690
Section 38. “Housing accommodation scheme.-
Whenever the Trust is of opinion that it is expedient and
for the public advantage to provide housing accommodation
for any class of the inhabitants within the Trust area, the
Trust may frame a housing accommodation scheme for such
purpose.”
Section 39. “Town expansion scheme.-
(1) Whenever the Trust is of opinion that it is expedient
and for the public advantage to control and provide for the
future improvement or expansion of a town to which this Act
is applicable, the Trust may frame a town expansion scheme
for such town.
* * * * * * *
(3) Such scheme shall show the methods in which it is
proposed to lay out the area to be developed and the
purposes for which the particular areas are to be
utilised.”.
* * * * * * *
It is submitted on behalf of the petitioners, that the
impugned scheme is not a housing accommodation scheme under
section 38 but a scheme purely for industrial purposes. It
is pointed out that there is no reference in the Scheme to
the class of inhabitants within the Trust area for whose
accommodation the Scheme has been framed under section 38.
Since it is a housing accommodation scheme it cannot include
plans for industrial purposes.
The argument fails to take count of section 31 which permits
in terms for combining two or more schemes or supplementing
some special features of a particular scheme in another
scheme. In other words section 31 envisages composite
schemes. Section 39 which provides for a town expansion
scheme authorises under sub-section (3) to indicate the
method of layout as well as the purposes for which
particular areas under the scheme may be utilised. This
section goes to show that there is no legal bar in framing a
housing accomodation scheme with some of the features of a
town expansion scheme which will even indicate the purposes
for which particular areas may be utilised. There is
nothing in the Act to ban industrial purposes from
consideration under section 39(3). The fact that a scheme
is described merely as a housing accommodation scheme does
not prevent the adaptation of the scheme to the incidental
requirements which may be overlapping in another scheme. We
are also not satisfied that housing acoommodation scheme
must necessarily be a residential scheme only and that it
cannot admit of providing housing accommodation for any
other purpose or object. The Madhya Pradesh High Court took
the same view in Beni Prasad Tandon and Others v. Jabalpur
Improvement Trust, Jabalpur(1).
Again it is difficult to appreciate how section 31 prevents
the Trust from framing an industrial scheme. We do not find
anything in section 31 or in any of the provisions of the
Act disabling the
(1) [1970] M. P. L. J. 292.
691
Trust from framing a scheme for industrial purposes. To
mention only section 39, it is clear that under that section
a town expansion scheme may be framed even without the
limits of the town and that would indicate that a town
expansion scheme may envisage industrial expansion to meet
the growing needs of the community. We, therefore, do not
see any substance in the aforesaid three submissions on
behalf of the petitioners.
With regard to the fourth submission of the petitioners, it
is difficult to accept the same. Section 45 requires
‘certain matters specified in (a) to (C)’therein to be
considered when framing an improvement scheme. The
specified matters touch on the inherent utility, efficiency
and adequacy of the scheme and the objections and repre-
sentations of the persons affected will be, directed to
negative such assumptions. The Scheme in question was open
to inspection. There was no ambiguity or vagueness about
the Scheme or its purposes. From even the nature of the
representations and objections it is apparent that the Trust
did have all relevant matters in their mind in framing the
Scheme. Indeed without actually taking into consideration
the various matters specified in section 45 it may not her
possible to frame a scheme and finally to obtain sanction of
the Government in the teeth of objections and
representations against the same. Where factual
satisfaction is evident formal recitals being omitted may
not matter. At any rate sub-section (2) of section 52 puts
a final seal of imprimatur on the scheme after publication
of the sanction of the Government. The submission ‘Is,
therefore, devoid of merit.
With regard to the fifth submission, which is actually urged
by the petitioner in writ petition No. 517 of 1972, we are
not satisfied that the acquisition of the land for the
purpose of the present Scheme is mala fide. It is submitted
that the Trust by formulating the present Scheme had an
oblique motive to change the ownership of the land already
under a private scheme for development to let it out to
tenants who will run the existing enterprises already
started on the land. We are not satisfied that any oblique
motive can be attributed to the, Trust in making the
impugned Scheme. It is clear that the land was originally
owned by the petitioner for agricultural purposes and when
he obtained a patta converting it to indusrial purpose, it
was clearly made subject to a condition that construction
work on the land shall be carried out in accordance with the
plans sanctioned by the Trust. The petitioner had been
given reasonable Opportunity to submit representations and
was given a hearing by a Committee constituted under the
Act. The State Government on the application of the Trust
examined the Scheme and sanctioned the acquisition of the
land under section, 70 when it was satisfied that the
acquisition was in public interest. There is no particular
allegation of mala fide against the State Government whose
sanction was a pre requisite for the acquisition. The order
of acquisition cannot, therefore, be characterised as mala
fide and the submission fails.
692
With regard to the sixth and last submission there was a
good deal of argument at the bar. The respondents urged
that this point was not specifically taken in the petitions.
Under section 72(1) of the Act where any land is acquired by
the Trust it shall pay for such acquisition “compensation
the amount of which shall be determined in accordance with
the provisions hereinafter contained”. Under section 73 a
Tribunal is constituted for the purpose of determining the
amount of compensation. Section 77 provides for matters to
be considered for determining compensation, namely,
“firstly, the market value of the land at the date of the
publication of the notification under sub-section (1), of
section 68” and six other factors. It is also provided in
the same section that the Tribunal shall not take into
consideration certain factors mentioned under eight heads.
Under sub-section (2) of section 77 “in addition to the
market-value of the land as above provided, the Tribunal
shall in every case award a sum of fifteen per centum or
such market-value in consideration of the compulsory nature
of the acquisition”. There being no provision for payment
of interest from the date of compulsory acquisition of the
land upto the date of payment, acquisition, it is submitted,
is invalid in law.
it is true that there is no provision for awarding interest
unlike under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (see sections 28
and 34 of that Act). It is, however, submitted on behalf of
the respondents that there is no bar under the Act against
awarding interest by the Tribunal even though there is no
enabling express provision to that effect under the Act. It
is stated that the Tribunal under section 78 exercises
powers for summoning witnesses and enforcing attendance etc.
in the same manner as provided in the case of civil courts
under the Code of Civil Procedure. Under section 147 an
appeal from the Tribunal lies to the High Court in cases
where the value of the claim exceeds Rs. 500/- and in any
other case to the District Judge. It is, therefore,
submitted that the Tribunal is empowered even as a civil
court to award interest under section 34 of the Civil
Procedure Code. Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code,
however, authorises the court to award interest from the
date of the suit to the date of the decree and thereafter to
the date of payment. Section 34, therefore, would not come
to the aid of the Tribunal to award interest from the date
of delivery of possession of the land to the date of
determination of compensation.
The respondents relied upon the decision of this Court in
Satinder Singh and Others v. Amrao Singh and Others(1) In
this case this Court had to deal with section 5(e) of the
East Punjab Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable
Property (Temporary Powers) Act, 1948 (briefly the Punjab
Act) which provided that an Arbitrator in making his award
shall have regard to the provisions of sub-section(1) of
section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 so far as the
same can be made applicable. The submission in that case
was that since sub-section (1) of section 23 is alone
mentioned, sub-section (2) of section 23 is impliedly
excluded and necessarily also section 28 and
(1) [1961] 3 S. C. R. 676.
693
section 34 stand excluded. The argument, therefore, was
that die Tribunal was not empowered to award interest under
the Punjab Act. Repelling the said argument this Court held
as follows:–
“It would be legitimate to hold that by the
application of S. 23(1) in terms the
provisions of S. 23(2) are by necessary
implication excluded. If the Legislature has
provided that only one part of s. 23 should be
applied it would be reasonable to hold that
the other part of s. 23 was not intended to be
applied; but we do not see how it would be
reasonable to hold that by the application of
S. 23(1) the principles underlying the
provisions of ss. 28 and 34 are also excluded.
Therefore, it is necessary to examine this
question on general grounds and principles
without assuming that the application of these
general considerations is excluded by any of
the provisions of the Act”.
This Court finally held as follows
“The power to award interest on equitable
grounds or under any other provisions of the
law is expressly saved by the proviso to S. I
(of the Interest Act 1839)…… we have
already seen that the right to receive
interest in lieu of possession of immovable
property taken away either by private treaty
or by compulsory acquisition is generally
regarded by judicial decisions as an equitable
right; and so, the proviso to s. 1 of the
Interest Act saves the said right”.
The Court in that case, therefore, awarded interest to the
claimants.
The petitioners on the other hand drew our attention to a
decision of this court in the Godhra Electricity Co. Ltd.
and another v. The State of Gujarat and another (1) where
one of us Mathew J., speaking for the Court held as
follows:-
“There can be no doubt about the correctness
of the general rule under which a purchaser
who takes possession is charged with interest
on his purchase money from that time until it
is paid. This rule has been applied to
compulsory purposes (see Satinder Singh v.
Amrao Singh) (supra). But the question is
whether the arbitrator has power under the Act
to award interest on the purchase price. In
Toronto City Corpn. v. Toronto Rly. Corpn.,
[1925] AC 177 at pp. 193-194 the Privy Council
held that the general rule under which a
purchaser who takes possession is charged with
interest on his purchase money from that time
until it is paid was well established, and bad
on. many occasions been applied to compulsory
purchases but the duty of the arbitrators in
that case was not to determine all the rights
of the company, but only to ascertain the
actual value of certain property at a certain
time and that it was a truism to say that such
value could not include interest upon it and
that the liability for interest lay outside of
the’ arbitration for its enforcement”.
(1) A. T. R. 1975 (January) S. C. 32.
694
Although in the Godhra Electricity Co’s case (supra) the
Court has noticed the decision in Satinder Singh’s case
(supra), it may be observed that the Court’s attention in
the latter case was not drawn to ,section 5 (g) of the
Punjab Act to the following effect :
“Save as provided in this section and in any
rules thereunder, nothing in any law for the
time being in force shall apply to arbitration
under this section”.
And the Court, therefore, in that case rendered the decision
“without .assuming that the application of these general
considerations is excluded by any, of the provisions of the
Act”. In view of the Godhra Electricity Co’s case (supra)
it is not possible to hold that the Cornpensation Tribunal,
which is at par with an Arbitrator, will be entitled ,to
award interest without any express provision in the Act.
This is particularly so since under the Act the Tribunal is
en-titled to take into consideration some given factors and
to peremptorily ignore certain other specified factors in
determining the compensation. it has also been empowered to
grant solatium as similarly provided for under the Land
Acquisition Act. In the, entire scheme of the self-
contained Act, in absence of a provision to authorise the
Tribunal to award interest, it is not possible to hold that
it can award interest on the amount of compensation
determined by the Tribunal subsequent to the acquisition ,of
the land. The petitioners are, therefore, right in their
contention that this Act does not provide for awarding
interest from the date of taking possession of the property
to the date of determination of cornpensation, which will
always be on a later date under the provisions of the Act
(see sections 72 and 73).
The petitioners, however, have an indirect object. They are
not interested in the interest as such but want the land
back and will not be satisfied unless the order of
acquisition is quashed. Unfortunately, however, it is not
possible for this Court to quash the acquisition in these
cases in absence of a challenge of the vires of the
provisions of the Act. Presumption of constitutionality
will forbid casting an evil eye on the Act in absence of a
clear challenge. The Act must be assumed to be valid for
the purpose of these petitions and we wilt proceed on that
basis. Then law being valid the attack will reverberate
upon the quantum of compensation, pure and simple. It is
sufficient to point out that the quantum of compensation
which may be determined according to the provisions of the
Act for acquisition of the land cannot be challenged under
article 31(2) of the Constitution. In that view of the
matter this submission of the learned counsel also fails.
ln Writ Petition No. 240 of 1973, Mr. Patel additionally
urged that publication of the notice of the Scheme Was not
made in accordance with section 46(2) of the Act which
requires weekly publication in the Gazette for three
consecutive weeks. Apart from the fact, in this case, that
the petitioner was well aware of the Scheme and submitted
objections and representations, section 52(2) appears to be
conclusive on the question. That sub-section provides that
the publication of a notification by the State Government
sanctioning the scheme shall be
695
conclusive evidence that the scheme has been duly framed and
sanctioned. In view of this, ticklish skirmishes over
publication on technical grounds at a distant date are
completely out of place. The submission is devoid of merit.
In the result both the Writ Petitions fail and are dismissed
with no order as to costs.
We should observe that Mr. Shroff pointed out that in view
of the decision of the Supreme Court in Satinder Singh’s
case (supra) and another decision of the Madhya Pradesh High
Court in Lakhanlal and others v. Town Improvement Trust,
Jabalpur and others,(1) the Tribunal has been always
awarding interest in acquisition cases under the Act and he
undertakes on behalf of the respondents, irrespective of our
decision, to pay interest to the petitioners at 6% per annum
from the date of actual delivery of possession upto the date
of payment of the compensation.
P.H.P.
Petitions dismissed.
(1) [1970] M. P. L. J. 316.
696