ORDER
Amar Saran, J.
1. In this case Sri V. K. Sharma requested me to reserve the judgment on 25-8-2004 and stated that he would be submitting written arguments in this case. The written arguments have been submitted. I have perused the same and also the other material on record.
2. The present application has been filed under Section 482 Cr. P.C. for quashing criminal proceedings in Case No. 8656 of 1991, Veer Narayan v. Hari Prasad and Anr. pending in the Court of C.J.M. Allahabad and the non-bailable warrants and processes issued under Sections 82/83, Cr. P.C.
3. A complaint, was filed on 23-9-1991 alleging that the applicants were brothers who used to reside in one room in the house of the complainant opposite party No. 2 and they used to engage in the business of selling Jaipuri Chunaris and sarees. The complainant also used to ferry clothes, and for this purpose he would purchase Jaipuri chunaris from the applicants. The complainant had actually made a payment of Rs. 1,300/- for a lot of clothes purchased from the applicants, but the applicants had not made the necessary entries in their copy with regard to the payment received. This had resulted in a hot exchange of words between the parties causing the complainant turn out the applicants from his house. As a sequel to this action, on 20-9-1991 at about 6-30 p.m. when the complainant was returning to his house, he was assaulted by the applicants with dandas near the gate of Kesar Vidyapeeth, Meerganj, Allahabad. The complainant fell down as a result of the assault and he was medically examined at Moti Lal Nehru Hospital. The incident was witnessed by Pooran and Babloo. The complainant sent information about this incident by registered post to the S.S.P., Allahabad, and thereafter he filed the complaint on 23-9-1991.
4. After examining the complainant under Section 200, Cr. P.C. and his witnesses Pooran and Babloo under Section 202, Cr. P.C., the learned C.J.M., Allahabad was pleased to summon the applicants by the order dated 29-1-1992.
5. In the written arguments, the grounds for quashing the FIR were (I) that the applicants belonged to a well to do farmer family of Dhaulpur, Rajasthan who were engaged in the business of cultivation. The complainant is Beria by caste and belonged to Dhaulpur, which is famous for prostitution. He had lodged a false complaint on petty grounds, as the applicants were repudiating his claim that he had already paid Rs. 1,300/-. Also the liability for Rs. 1300/- was not proved prima facie by filing any bill, voucher or receipt in the trial Court; (2) the offences are of petty nature and the chances of conviction are very remote and prosecution of the applicants 13 years after the alleged incident was absolutely illegal and untenable in the eyes of law. The applicants could deposit Rs. 1,300/- at any time, as the applicants had engaged a counsel, who charges Rs. 5,000/- and the opposite party had engaged five counsel in the case, who had not appeared to argue their case before this bench (3) because the summoning order is not a speaking order and in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, reported in 1998 (36) All Cri C 20 : (1997 All LJ 2406) : (1998 Cri LJ 1), the High Court, had full power to quash a frivolous and false complaint and even Hon’ble Bhagwan Deen, J. was pleased to quash a summoning order in a murder case, which was not a speaking order, and that case had been remanded to the lower Court with directions to pass a speaking order; (4) because Hon’ble O. P. Saxena, J. in a remarkable judgment, Criminal Revision No. 249 of 1983, A. S. Nayal v. Avnendra Singh Nayal, in which allegations of beating by a Magistrate and snatching of a wrist watch were levelled by their peons, the High Court had quashed the proceedings in exercise of the very wide power conferred under Section 482, Cr. P.C. and thus the present such a complaint was nothing but an attempt to increase the work load of the subordinate judiciary and a mockery of law; (5) the complainant had not given prima facie evidence to show that applicants were ever tenants in his house and no other address of the applicants was shown in the complaint except that of Rajasthan of Dhaulpur.
6. So far as the first ground for quashing the proceedings is concerned, about the status of the applicants being wealthy farmers. This is a question of fact raised by way of defence that cannot be considered in an application under Section 482, Cr. P.C. The allegations that the complainant was Beria by caste, which was famous for prostitution is neither here nor there. Likewise, the allegations that the men from the area of Dhaulpur like the applicants had been dragged into this case on the petty ground of non-fulfilment of a demand of Rs. 1,300/-cannot be appreciated in this application under Section 482, Cr. P.C. These are essentially questions of fact, which can only be seen at the trial of the case. Also there appears no reason at this stage for the complainant to have invented such a story if there had never been any dispute about payment of Rs. 1,300 as was alleged in the complaint. Secondly, there is no reason for the applicants to suppose that because the offence is described as a petty offence, it should be presumed that the chances of conviction were very remote or that the continuation of criminal proceedings should terminate ipso facto as 13 years had elapsed after the incident. It is only on account of the stay order having been obtained by the applicants on 18-1-1993, that the proceedings have remained undecided for such a long period of time, and the applicants cannot get any advantage on this account. Significantly, the complaint in this case was filed with great promptitude within three days of the occurrence and although the applicants having not filed a copy of the injury report of the injuries received by the complainant along with their application under Section 482, Cr. P.C. but it has not been denied in the application or in the written arguments submitted later that the complainant had not been medically examined or that he had not received any injury in the incident. The averments by the learned counsel for the applicants that the applicants have engaged a counsel, who charges Rs. 5,000/- and therefore they would have no difficulty in depositing Rs. 1,300/- is wholly irrelevant and has no bearing in a case under Section 323, IPC.
7. No detailed reasons for summoning an accused are needed and this has clearly been stated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deputy Chief Controller of Imports & Exports v. Roshan Lal Agrawal reported in 2003 (46) All Cri C 686 (SC) : (AIR 2003 SC 1900) : (2003 Cri LJ 1698), para 9 of said decision is extracted below :–
“In determining the question whether any process is to be issued or not, what the Magistrate has to be satisfied is whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not, whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction, can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of inquiry. At the stage of issuing the process to the accused, the Magistrate is not required to record reasons. This question was considered recently in U. P. Pollution Control Board v. Mohan Meakins Ltd., AIR 2000 SC 1456 : (2000 All LJ 872): (2000 Cri LJ 1799), and after noticing the law laid down in Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of West Bengal, 2000 (40) All Cri C 441 : (AIR 2000 SC 522) : (2000 Cri LJ 746), it was held as follows :
“The legislature has stressed the need to record reasons in certain situations such as dismissal of a complaint without issuing process. There is no such legal requirement imposed on a Magistrate for passing detailed order while issuing summons. The process issued to accused cannot be quashed merely on the ground that the Magistrate had not passed a speaking order.”
8. Therefore, the decision of the single Judge of this Court i.e. of Hon’ble Bhagwan Deen, J. in the case of Hazi Shafi v. State of U. P., (1991) 1 JIC 163 (All) can render no assistance to the applicants.
9. Significantly, the other case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate reported in 1998 (36) All Cri C 20 : (1997 All LJ 2406) : (1998 Cri LJ 1), the Hon’ble Supreme Court was pleased to quash the criminal proceedings, as the complainant had proceeded in a leisurely manner by filing the complaint on 8-6-1994, i.e. 9 months after the purchase of the offending bottle of Pepsi Cola on 13-9-1993. Also the complainant gave no basis or materials for showing how the 12 accused in the case were connected with the offence, if any, and thus the Court had held the proceedings to be a pure abuse of the process of Court. In the present case however, we have seen that the complaint was filed within three days of the incident, i.e. On 23-9-1991, when the incident had taken place on 20-9-1991. Injuries were received by the complainant and only two persons had been made accused in this case and assigned specific roles of assault, and thus it could not be said to be a case of wild exaggeration, which failed to show how particular accused were connected with the offence. Likewise the case of A.S. Nayal v. Khem Chand, reported in 1983 (2) All Cri C 264 : (1983 All LJ 1074) is also distinguishable on facts as that was a case in which the driver Khem Chand who was working in the Collectorate in district Pithoragarh had filed a complaint against A. S. Nayal and two other Executive Magistrates for offences under Sections 323, 394, 504 and 506, IPC with the allegations that the accused abused, threatened and beat the complainant and robbed him of Rs. 3,000/-. The Sessions Judge had partly allowed the revision against the order of the C.J.M. Pithoragarh summoning the accused and quashed the summoning of the accused in an offence under Sections 394 and 323, IPC and only upheld the summoning of the applicants under Sections 504, 506, IPC. In that back ground this Court had observed that there is a growing tendency on the part of mischievous litigants to file vexatious and frivolous complaints. The present case clearly does not fall within that category. Here, the accused and the complainant appear to be of the same status and engaged in the same business of selling Rajasthani chunaris and sarees and the applicants are even said to be residing in the complainant’s house until this incident. Contrary to the suggestion in the written arguments, there appears to be no reason for the complainant to show the applicants as residents of his house, if they did not indeed reside there, and this incident had not taken place at all.
10. In views of the aforesaid circumstances, I do not think any case is made out for quashing the criminal proceedings against the applicants. The application is accordingly dismissed and the stay order granted earlier is vacated. However, as this matter is very old, if the applicants appear within one month from the date of this order before Court concerned and obtain their bail, the order issuing non-bailable warrants and proceedings under Sections 82/83, Cr. P.C. shall be kept in abeyance for a period of one month. The trial Court is also directed to conclude the trial expeditiously preferably within six months.
11. Application is rejected subject to the aforesaid observations.