JUDGMENT
S.R. Nayak, J.
1. This writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge dated 12.2.1999 made in WP No. 13933 of 1998 and it is filed by the Special Deputy Collector (Tribal Welfare), Rampachodavaram, East Godavari District, the Special Deputy Tahsildar (Tribal Welfare), Rajavommangi, East Godavari District and the Mandal Revenue Officer, Rajavommangi, East Godavari, the appellants 1, 2 and 3 respectively. The 1st respondent herein filed the above writ petition praying for the following relief:
“..the High Court will be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, declaring the action of the 1st respondent in entertaining. L.T.R.P. Nos. 110/ 96, 19/97 and 88/97 as illegal, without jurisdiction and barred by res judicata under Rule 8 of the Agency Rules and consequently direct respondents 1 and 2 to drop all further proceedings in this regard.”
The learned single Judge having opined that the LTRP Nos. 110/96, 19/97 and 88/97 filed
before the Special Deputy Collector (Tribal Welfare), Rampachodavaram, East Godavari District, are not maintainable in view of the earlier order made by his predecessor in office on an application filed by Kalimkota Rajulamma, the 2nd respondent herein (4th respondent in the writ petition), allowed the writ petition.
2. The case of the petitioner (1st respondent herein) as stated in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition be summarised briefly as under: The lands i.e., Sy. Nos. 244/2 ad measuring Ac. 1-03 cents. S.No. 244/1 ad measuring 0-78 cents. 244/8 ad measuring 1-08 cents situate in Rajavommangi Village, East Godavari District (hereinafter referred to as ‘schedule lands’) were acquired by the father of the petitioner after obtaining required permission from the then Assistant Agent to the Government in the year 1940 and since then the petitioner’s father, and after his demise, the petitioner has been in possession and enjoyment of the schedule lands. At the instance of the 2nd respondent, L.T.R.P. No. 688 of 1979 was instituted before the Special Deputy Collector (Tribal Welfare), against the petitioner for restoration of the schedule lands. The 1st appellant after necessary enquiry, dismissed L.T.R.P. No. 688 of 1979. Aggrieved by the said order, the 2nd respondent filed appeal C.M.A. No. 75 of 1980 to the Agent to the Government. The Agent to the Government, by his order dated 3.9.1984, allowed the appeal and directed restoration of the schedule lands to the 2nd respondent. Against the said order of the Agent to the Government, the 1st respondent herein filed W.P. No. 13 847 of 1984 in this Court and this Court quashed the above order of the Agent to the Government by its order dated 22.8.1985. Against the said order of the learned single Judge, W.A. No. 32 of 1984 was preferred and that was also dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court on 3.2.1994 and the said order was allowed to become final.
3. The 2nd respondent, again, filed L.T.R.P. No. 110/96 before the 1st appellant seeking re-delivery of the schedule lands on the ground that some new facts had come to her notice with regard to the schedule lands. Smt. Cheedipalli Tutayya s/o Nookaraju, the third respondent herein, filed a petition before the 2nd appellant herein seeking restoration of the lands measuring in all Ac.9-25 cents in S. Nos. 44/2, 44/3, 244/3, 244/5, 244/12 and 244/13 of Rajavommangi Village. The same was taken on file by the 1st appellant as L.T.R.P. No. 19 of 1994. The first appellant, after conducting necessary enquiry, dismissed LTRP No. 19 of 1994 on 30.6.1994 and that order had become final. Again, the 3rd respondent herein filed L.T.R.P. No. 88 of 1997 before the 1st appellant seeking the above same relief. Thus, the 2nd respondent filed the above noted L.T.R.P. Nos. 110/96, 19/97 and 88/97 on behalf of respondents 2 and 3 herein. In the premise of the above facts, the 1st respondent herein filed the above writ petition praying for the relief already noticed above.
4. Before the learned single Judge, on behalf of the writ petitioner, it was contended that the proceedings now initiated in L.T.R.P. Nos. 110/96, 19/97 and 88/97 are barred by the doctrine of principle of res judicata, inasmuch as in the earlier application filed by the 2nd respondent, it was already decided that the transfer of the schedule lands in favour of the 1st respondent is in order and not illegal and in that view of the matter, the present proceedings are not maintainable. Opposing the writ petition, on behalf of the respondents in the writ petition, it was contended that the doctrine of res judicata had no application as regards the proceedings under the A.P. Schedule Areas Land Transfer Regulation (Regulation I of 1959 as amended by Regulation I of 1970), (for short, the ‘Regulation’).
5. The learned single Judge, though opined that the doctrine of res judicata as such has no application to the facts bf the case, held that in the earlier proceedings which resulted in the order of the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 32 of 1984, the very same issue whether the transfer of the schedule lands in favour of the 1st respondent was valid or not fell for consideration and having regard to the finding of this Court in those proceedings, it was not permissible for the 1st respondent (sic 2nd respondent) to again reopen the same question by initiating the present proceedings in L.T.R.P. Nos. 110/96, 19/97 and 88/97. So opining, the learned single Judge allowed the writ petition by order dated 12.2.1999 and issued a writ of prohibition restraining the appellant-authorities from taking any further steps in L.T.R.P. Nos. 110/96, 19 and 88/97. Hence this writ appeal by the appellants.
6. Learned Government Pleader for Social Welfare, appearing for the appellants, contended that the issue that arose for consideration and decision in the earlier proceedings was altogether different from the issue that is required to be decided in the present L.T.R.Ps. Elaborating the contention, the learned Government Pleader pointed out that, in the earlier proceedings, the question that fell for consideration was whether the acquisition of the schedule lands by the 1st respondent by way of transfer was in contravention of Section 3 of the Regulation or not and that the issue that is required to be resolved in the present proceedings in LT.R.P. Nos. 110/96, 19 and 88/97 is whether the 1st respondent, in alienating the schedule lands in favour of third parties, has contravened the bar contained in Section 3 of the Regulation or not. The learned Government pleader, therefore, contended that the observation of the learned single Judge that the very same issue fell for consideration in the earlier proceedings as well as in the present proceedings is factually incorrect. Learned Government Pleader contended that Section 3 of the Regulation prohibits transfer of immovable property situated in the agency tracts by a person, whether or not such person is a member of the Scheduled Tribe, and such transfer is ex-fade void. Learned Government Pleader contended that even assuming that the acquisition of the schedule lands by the 1st respondent by way of transfer is illegal and valid, even then, the schedule lands cannot be subsequently sold away in favour of third parties by the 1st respondent in breach of Section 3 of the Regulation. Learned Government Pleader, placing reliance on the observations made by this Court in para (7) of the judgment in Gaddam Raghavulu v. Agent to Government (District Collector), E.G. Dist, 1994 (2) An.WR 216, maintained that the principles of res judicata or principles analogous thereto are not applicable to the facts of this case.
7. Sri N. Subba Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the respondent No. 1, on the other hand, contended that the notice issued in Form E by the 1st appellant is very vague and the contents of the complaint received by him are not disclosed in the notice and, therefore, the very initiation of the present proceedings is bad in law. Sri N. Subba Reddy also contended that the subject lands being the same in both the proceedings and having regard to the order of this Court in the earlier writ proceedings, it was totally impermissible for the appellant-authorities again to initiate proceedings on the alleged ground of infraction of provisions of Section 3 of the Regulation. Sri N. Subba Reddy contended that alienation of the schedule lands in breach of Section 3 of the Regulation alleged against the 1st respondent was said to be in the year 1971 and, therefore, initiation and continuation of the present proceedings has to be prohibited by issuing a writ of prohibition on account of enormous delay, and that if that is the allegation, the said allegation was very much available to the appellant-authorities when they initiated the earlier proceedings at the instance of the 2nd respondent.
8. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 3 of the Regulation read as follows:
“3. Transfer of immovable property by a member of a Scheduled Tribe :–
(1) xx
(2) (a) Where a transfer of property is made in contravention of Sub-section (1), the Agent, the Agency Divisional Officer or other prescribed officer may, on application by any one interested, or on information in writing by a public servant, or suo motu decree ejectment against any person in possession of the property claiming under the transfer, after due notice to him, in the manner prescribed and may restore it to the transferor or his heirs.
(b) If the transferor or his heirs are not willing to take back the property or where their whereabouts are not known, the Agent, the Agency Divisional Officer or prescribed officer as the case may be, may order the assignment or sale of the property to any other member of a Scheduled Tribe or a society registered or deemed to be registered under any law relating to Co-operative Societies for the time being in force in the State composed solely of members of the Scheduled Tribes, or otherwise dispose of it, as if it was a property at the disposal of State Government.
(3)(a) Subject to such conditions as may be prescribed on appeal against any decree or order under Sub-section (2), shall lie within such time as may be prescribed-
(i) If the decree or order was passed by the Agent to the State Government;
(ii) If the decree or order was passed by the Agency Divisional Officer, to the Agent; and
(iii) If the decree or order was passed by any other officer, to the Agency Divisional Officer, as may be prescribed.
(b) The appellate authority may entertain an appeal on sufficient cause being shown after the expiry of the time limit prescribed therefor.
9. Transfer of lands situate within the scheduled areas by a non-Tribal in favour of another non-Tribal is absolutely null and void under the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Regulation. Even the transferee non-Tribal is also not entitled to retain the property. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 3 of the Regulation contemplates initiation of the proceedings by the Agent to the Government or any prescribed officer to restore the property to the transferor or his heirs when they come to know that lands are transferred in breach of the bar contained in Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Regulation.
10. Rule 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Rules, 1969 (for short, ‘the Rules’), framed by the Governor in exercise of the power conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Regulation, 1969, reads as follows:
“7.(1) Where the Agent, the Agency Divisional Officer, or the Officer referred to in Sub-rule 3 receives an application from any one interested or information in writing by a public servant or has otherwise reason to believe that a transfer of immovable property has been made in contravention of Sub-section 3, he shall give notice to any person in possession of the property claiming under the transfer, to show-cause within the period specified in the notice, not being less than fifteen days from the date of its service why he should not be ejected, and property restored to the transferor or his heirs.
(2) The notice referred to in Sub-rule (1) shall be in Form E and shall be served in the manner specified in Rule 10.
(3) xxx
(4) xxx”
Sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 requires that the notice referred to in Sub-rule (1) should be in Form E. Form E prescribed under Rule 7(2) of the Rules is the following:-
“Form ‘E’
Whereas the undersigned has reason to believe that a transfer has been made of the immovable property described in the Schedule below in contravention of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulations, 1959 (A.P. Regulation I of 1959); Whereas you … … son/wife of …..
(name of father/husband) are believed to be in possession of the said property claiming under this transfer. Now, therefore, you are requested to show-cause within……. (from the
date of service of notice) why you should not be ejected and the property restored to the transferor or his/her heirs.
(i) Description of immovable property (Land/ Home and the like);
(ii) Location of the immovable property.
The Schedule
District
Taluk
Village
R.S.No. or Plot No.
Classification
Area
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Agent/Agency Divisional Officer,
Prescribed Officer under Sub-section (2)
of Sections.”
11. The contention of Sri N.Subba Reddy that Form-E notice issued by the 1st appellant under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 of the Rules is vague, is not acceptable to us. Form-E notice issued by the 1st appellant under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 in L.T.R.P. No. 110/96 reads as follows:-
“IN THE COURT OF THE DEPUTY COLLECTOR (TRIBAL WELARE) EAST GODAVARI DISTRICT:: RAMPACHODAVARAM.
LT.RP. No. 110 of 1996 Between:
Kalimkota Rajulamma
D/o late Miriyala Naganna,
Rajavommangi. …. Petitioner.
And
Pusapati Simhachala Raju
S/o Appala Narasimna Raju
Rajavommangi. .. Respondent.
FORM-E
(See Rule 7(2)
Whereas petition has been filed before me stating that transfer has been made of the immovable property described in the Schedule below in contravention of Sub-section of Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled Areas) Land Transfer Regulation I of 1959 as amended by A.P. (S.A.) L.T. Regulation I of 1970 whereas you Sri P.Simhachalaraju are believed to be in possession of the same property claiming under this transfer requested to show within 15 days from the date of receipt of this notice as to why you should not be ejected from the land and the property restored to the transferor or his/her heirs. It is proposed to hold an enquiry on 14.11.1996 at 10.30.a.m. You may appear in person and represent your case with all material evidence proposed to be adduced. Please also note in case you fail to appear before me on the above date the matter will be decided ex parte.
The Schedule :
Date of hearing: 14.11.1996
Time: 10.30.a.m.
Place: MROs. Office
Rajavommangi
District
Mandal
Village
S.No.
Extent Ac. Cts.
East Godavari
Raja Vommagi
Raja Vommagi
244/2
1-03
244/4
0-05
244/9
1.92
244/15
0.78
244/8
1.08
Sdl xx
Deputy Collector
Tribal Welfare
Rampachodavaram.”
The above notice in clear terms informs the 1st respondent/writ petitioner that the schedule properties have been transferred in contravention of Section 3 of the Regulations 1/1959 as amended by Regulation 1/1970. The full details of the properties are given in the Schedule appended to the notice in Form-E. It is true that the purpose of issuing notice is that the affected person should be apprised and he should be clearly, precisely told what are the allegations against him so that he can offer effective defence against the proposed adverse action and defend himself effectively. There is no hard and fast rule as regards the Form of notice. However, the Form of the notice is also prescribed under Rule 7(2) of the Rules framed under the Regulation. If we keep in mind the Form-E prescribed under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 of the Rules and the allegation disclosed in the notice, it cannot be said that the writ petitioner was prejudiced by the notice issued by the 1st appellant for want of material particulars or on account of vagueness in the notice. Be that as it may, in order to offer effective defence or reply to the Form-E notice, if the petitioner wants some more particulars or information from the 1st appellant or other appellants, he can seek such information or materials from them by raising a demand. Even assuming that the notice issued in Form-E under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 of the Rules is not complete in all respects and that it does not contain all details and information needed by the writ petitioner, on that ground itself, this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot issue a writ of Prohibition prohibiting the 1st appellant, who is the Donee of the statutory power, from exercising the power conferred under Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Regulation. It needs to be emphasised that the proceedings initiated by the statutory authorities by issuing the required statutory notices cannot be interdicted unless such notices are shown to have been issued by incompetent authorities. In so opining, we draw support from the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. B.D. Sharma, , and a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Spl. Officer, Urban Land Ceiling, Hyderabad and Ors. v. M.Vijyalakshmi, (DB). Therefore, we do not find any merit in the first contention of Sri N. Subba Reddy.
12. The provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Regulation make it very clear that there is a statutory bar on alienation of immovable property situate in the agency tracts by a person, whether or not such person is a member of Scheduled Tribe. The bar contained in Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Regulation operates in presenti. Simply because in the earlier proceedings acquisition of the schedule lands by the 1st respondent/writ petitioner by way of transfer was held to be in order and legal, that circumstances itself would not come in the way of the statutory authority, like the 1st appellant, exercising the power conferred upon him under Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Regulation, if he subsequently comes to know that the 1st respondent, after such acquisition, in turn, transferred the schedule lands in favour of third parties in breach of the bar contained in Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Regulations. Therefore, with respect to the learned single Judge and if we may so, His Lordship is not right in opining that the issue that arose for decision in the earlier proceedings and in the present proceedings is one and the same. The issues, as rightly pointed out by the learned Government Pleader for Social Welfare, are different. It is altogether a different matter whether the allegations levelled against the 1st respondent in the notice are correct and justified. The truth or otherwise of the allegations has to be decided in the enquiry now initiated by the 1st appellant by issuing notice in Form-E under Rule 7(2) of the Rules. That question, is therefore, left open.
13. There is also no merit in the other contention of Sri N.Subba Reddy that since the alleged transfer is said to be in the year 1971, that is to say, before initiation of the earlier proceedings under Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Regulation, the 1st appellant should have put forth this allegation also against the 1st respondent in the earlier proceedings, and having failed to do so, it was not permissible for him to again initiate proceedings under Section 3(2) of the Regulation. It needs to be noticed that in the earlier proceedings initiated under Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Regulation, the vendee of the schedule lands was not impleaded as a party. Be that as it may, the principle of res judicata has no application to the facts of this case. The parties to the earlier proceeding and the present proceeding are different. Further, the issue that arose in the earlier proceeding and the issue that arises for consideration and decision in the present proceeding are also different. In addition, this Court in Gaddam Raghavulu’s case (supra) in para 7 held-
“The principle of res judicata or a principle analogous thereto shall be applied with caution and circumspection in dealing with a case arising under the Regulation meant for the protection of the tribes. If the proceedings were dropped earlier for the reason that the 3rd respondent-tribal could not produce sufficient evidence, it does not preclude a subsequent enquiry. Hence, I am not inclined to accept the contention of the learned Counsel in this regard.”
14. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we cannot sustain the order of the learned single Judge. Accordingly, the Writ Appeal is allowed and the order of the learned single Judge dated 12.2.1999 is set aside and Writ Petition No. 13933 of 1998 is dismissed with no order as to costs. As a consequence thereof, it is now open to the Spl. Dy. Collector (TW), Rampachodavaram, the 1st appellant herein, to take further steps pursuant to the notice in Form-E issued to the 1st respondent under Rule 7(2) of the Rules, in accordance with law.