IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATE: 2.3.2011. CORAM THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE R.S.RAMANATHAN C.R.P.(PD)Nos.1923 and 1924 of 2010 and M.P.No.1 of 2010 M/s.Sri Annapurna Sri Gowrishankar Hotels Pvt. Ltd., rep by its Joint Managing Director, R.Venkatesh, No.70, East Arokiyasami Road, R.S.Puram, Coimbatore-2. Petitioner vs. 1. N.Andal 2. N.Vijayalakshmi 3. L.Gopal 4. R.Ponni Respondents
Civil Revision Petitions against the order dated 10.3.2010 in R.C.A.Nos.128 and 129 of 2005 on the file of the III Additional Subordinate Judge (Rent Control Appellate Authority), Coimbatore reversing the order passed in I.A.No.174 of 2003 in R.C.O.P.No.64 of 1999 and I.A.No.175 of 2003 in I.A.No.400 of 1999 in R.C.O.P.No.64 of 1999 dated 28.6.2004 on the file of the Additional District Munsif (Rent Controller), Coimbatore.
For petitioner : Mr.A.Muthukumar
For RR 1 and 2 : No appearance.
For RR3 and 4 : Mr.M.Muthappan
COMMON ORDER
These two revision petitions were filed against the orders of the Rent Control Appellate Authority refusing to implead the revision petitioner as petitioner in the Rent Control Original Petition filed by respondents 1 and 2 herein.
2. Respondents 1 and 2 filed the Rent Control proceedings for eviction of respondents 3 and 4 on the ground of wilful default and submitted that during the pendency of the proceedings, they have sold the property to the revision petitioner and therefore, the application was filed by respondents 1 and 2 to implead the revision petitioner as third party to the proceedings and that was allowed by the Rent Controller and reversed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority and hence, the proposed party has filed the revision petitions.
3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that the revision petitioner has purchased the property and is entitled to prosecute the case filed by respondents 1 and 2 and this court also held in the decision in RENGANATHAN v. PANDURANGAN AND ANOTHER (1995-2-LW 160) that the subsequent purchaser can be impleaded to prosecute the petition filed by the original landlords and without considering the same, the Rent Control Appellate authority dismissed the application.
4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for respondents 3 and 4 submitted that the purchaser cannot continue the proceedings initiated by the original landlords and the cause of action will not survive to the purchaser and after the purchase, tenancy was attorned to the revision petitioner and the respondent has been paying rent regularly and the wilful default was only in respect of non-payment of rent towards original landlords, who was the owner of the building and therefore, there is no wilful default as against the purchaser, the revision petitioner and hence, the petition cannot be prosecuted by the revision petitioner on the same cause of action.
5. The learned Rent Control Appellate authority held that the revision petitioner will not come under the definition of landlord on the date of alleged default committed by the tenant and during the alleged period of wilful default, the revision petitioner was not the owner of the property and there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the revision petitioner and respondents 3 and 4 and therefore, the revision petitioner cannot be permitted to prosecute the case filed by the landlords. The Rent Control Appellate authority also held that if the main R.C.O.P is filed for some other grounds, then the position will be different and so far as the ground of wilful default is concerned, the same cannot be continued by the revision petitioner.
6. The learned Rent Control Appellate authority failed to note that the application for eviction was filed on the ground of wilful default and on the ground of subletting. Even according to the learned Rent Control Appellate authority, a petition for eviction on the ground of wilful default cannot be prosecuted by the subsequent purchaser. The Rent Control Appellate authority failed to note that the petition was filed on the ground of subletting also. Further, as per the judgment reported in 1995-2-LW 160, the subsequent purchaser is entitled to implead himself in the original petition and as a matter of fact, in that judgment, the subsequent purchaser was permitted to file application to restore the petition filed by the landlord which was dismissed for default. Therefore, as per the judgment in 1995-2-LW 160, the subsequent purchaser is entitled to continue the proceedings initiated by the original landlord.
7. Further, the Rent Control Act enables the landlord to apply for eviction on the grounds stated in section 10 and section 14(1)(a) and (b). Under section 10(3) and 14(1)(a) and (b), eviction can be sought for the personal requirement of the landlord or for the demolition of the building for the purpose of putting up new construction. Insofar as the grounds of eviction enumerated in section 10 are concerned, a right was given to the landlord to apply for eviction on the ground stated therein which was due to the conduct of the tenant either in committing wilful default in paying the rent, subletting the property, committing act of waste, wilful denial of title of landlord, etc.
8. Therefore, when a landlord wants eviction of the property for his personal requirement or for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction, the requirement is for the benefit of the landlord and therefore, that can be termed to be personal to the landlord and when eviction petition was filed on the ground of own occupation or demolition and reconstruction as per the provisions of sections 10(3) and 14(1)(a) and (b), the subsequent purchaser may not be entitled to prosecute the case or continue the proceedings as the grounds of eviction are personal to the erstwhile landlord.
9. On the other hand, when wilful default was committed by the tenant or when the tenant has sublet the premises without consent of the landlord or committed acts of waste, by reason of the conduct of the tenant, a cause of action was made available to the landlord to file the petition for eviction and it cannot be stated that such cause of action is personal to the landlord. In other words, by reason of the conduct of the tenant, he incurs the disqualification of continuing in the premises as a tenant and when eviction petition is field on the ground of misdeeds committed by the tenant, the eviction petition can be continued and prosecuted by the subsequent landlord. Therefore, when eviction is sought on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent and also on the ground of subletting, the subsequent landlord is entitled to prosecute the case.
10. Further, the definition of the landlord as defined under section 2(6) of the Act and the definition of the tenant as per section 2(8) of the Act will also make the position clear. As per the definition of the landlord, it is an inclusive definition and it is comprehensive enough to take any persons who are not strictly landlords under general law. Further, the definition of the term ‘landlord’ is of a wide amplitude. As per section 2(6) of the Act, the ‘landlord’ includes the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building. Admittedly, the revision petitioner has purchased the property and therefore, he is entitled to receive the rent of the building. Therefore, he comes within the definition of the landlord.
11. Section 2(8) defines ‘tenant’ and it means any person by whom or on whose account, rent is payable for a building. Therefore, on a combined reading of section 2(6) and 2(8) of the Act, in my opinion, a subsequent purchaser, during the pendency of the rent control proceedings also would come within the ambit of landlord and insofar as the tenant is concerned, he is a person who is liable to pay rent for the building and as subsequent purchaser becomes owner of the building, the tenant is liable to pay rent to him. Therefore, the subsequent purchaser is entitled to prosecute the case filed by his vendor.
12. Further, in the judgment reported in DEVARAJAN v. MUNIRATNAM (1981-2-MLJ 97), this court has held that in an application for eviction on the ground of wilful default, the subsequent purchaser can implead himself and prosecute the case. Similarly, in the judgment reported in SUBBANNA v. SESHAGIRI RAO (1979 (I) MLJ 385), it has been held that the purchaser of a property in the course of proceedings under the Rent Control Act was permitted to prosecute the proceedings. Even in the case of eviction on the ground of demolition and reconstruction, this court permitted the subsequent purchaser to proceed the execution of the decree obtained by the erstwhile owner in the judgment reported in SHANMUGAM AND OTHERS v. SATYANARAYANA PRASAD (1964 (II) MLJ 96).
13. Therefore, when the application was filed by the landlord for eviction on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent, as stated supra, a cause of action arose by reason of the conduct of the tenant and that cause of action will survive to the subsequent purchaser.
In the result, the revision petitions are allowed and the order of the rent control appellate authority is set aside. No costs. The connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
ssk.
To
1. The III Additional Subordinate Judge
(Rent Control Appellate Authority),
Coimbatore.
2. The Additional District Munsif
(Rent Controller),
Coimbatore.
3. The Record Keeper,
V.R. Section,
High Court,
Chennai