JUDGMENT
Bharati Sapru, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed against the order dated 10.12.2004 passed by the Administrator appointed by this Court in two Special Appeals No. 703 of 2004 and 513 of 2004. These are the second innings, which are being fought by 15 persons who sought to be made members of the society known as Kanyakubja Education Trust situated at Kanpur (hereinafter referred to as the Trust).
2. By the impugned order dated 10.12.2004, the Administrator had come to the conclusion that induction of 15 members to the Trust should not be granted approval.
3. The facts of the case are that Trust is a society registered under the provisions of Societies Registration Act, 1860. Clause 3 of the Rules of the society provides for membership, which is reproduced below:
3. Constitution –
(a) The membership of the Trust will be open to all persons without distinction of caste or creed who pay Rs. 500/- (Rupees five hundred) at least to qualify themselves for membership of the Trust. Each case of membership will have to be approved by the Board of Trustees.
In addition to the aforesaid lump sum of Rs. 500/- each member of the Board of Trustees will be required to pay monthly subscription of Rs. 3/- per month.
4. Clause 3 (d) of the Rules provides that the office bearers of the trust shall be elected by the Board of Trustees for a period of four years. Clause 3 (g) provides for persons who would not be eligible for the membership of the Board of Trustees, Thus a cumulative reading of the provisions of the Rules and the Constitution of the Trust, which is appended as Annexure 1 to the writ petition, provide as to who can be inducted as member of the Trust and what he ought to do to be duly admitted into the Trust.
5. On 10.6.1999 the last elections to constitute the Board of Trustees was held and therefore its life was in operation till 9.6.2003 that is for a period of four years under the Rules.
6. The present story begins from 31.5.2002 when according to the petitioners, Board of Trustees held a meeting on 31.5.2002 and resolved to enroll fresh members. It is the allegations of the petitioners No. 1 to 14 and one Sri Dayal Saran Awasthi that in the meeting dated 31.5.2002, they were inducted as members of the said Trust by majority of the six members, out of the Board of Trustees numbering 11 in total.
7. It is the petitioners’ allegation that the minutes of the meeting dated 31.5.2002 was confirmed on 30.6.2002 and thereafter, fresh elections were held on 7.6.2003 in which the newly inducted 15 members also participated. However the elections dated 7.6.2003 were challenged by the rival groups. The respondents filed a petition under Section 25 (2) of the Societies Registration Act, before the Deputy Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, Kanpur, who by his order dated 13.8.2003 held that the petitioners and Sri Dayal Saran Awasthi were illegally enrolled as members of the Trust.
8. Being aggrieved by the order dated 13.8.2003, two writ petitions were filed – one by the Trust itself being writ petition No. 38344 of 2003 and the other was filed by the disqualified members No. 1 to 14 being writ petition No. 39800 of 2003. The matters were decided by the learned Single Judge of this Court who by his order dated 25.5.2004 held that the petitioners No. 1 to 14 and Sri Dayal Saran Awasthi had rightly been enrolled as members of the Trust and therefore they were eligible to participate in the elections and directed by his order dated 25.5.2004 that the Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, Kanpur Region, Kanpur to hold fresh elections under Section 25(2) of the Act.
9. The rival groups being dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment, filed two special appeals – one appeal filed by the Trust being special appeal No. 703 of 2004 (Kanyakubj Education Trust v. Deputy Registrar and Ors.) and other special appeal No. 513 of 2004 (Onkar Nath Awasthi v. Kanyakubj Education Trust). Both the special appeals were heard together and were decided by the Division Bench of this Court by a common judgment and order dated 9.7.2004. I extract hereunder the operative portion of the judgment dated 9.7.2004:
…However, under Rule 3 (a) of the constitution of the Trust in addition to deposit of Rs. 500/- it is also necessary that the application for membership should be approved by the Board of Trustees before a person can be declared to be a member of the society. Since by this order we have appointed an Administrator in place of the Board of Trustees, in our opinion, such Administrator legally steps into the shoes of the Board of Trustees. Hence the question of approval of membership of these 15 persons shall be decided by the said Administrator very expeditiously and before the election process starts.
10. Thus the learned Division Bench appointed an Administrator to step into the shoes of the Board of Trustees who would decide the question as to whether the membership of these 15 persons who were alleged to have been admitted as members on 31.5.2002 was to be approved or not.
11. The second set of proceedings now emanate from the order of the Administrator who had conclusively come to the conclusion that the induction of these 15 members on 31,5.2002 was not by way of bonafide proceedings but rather was a false case set up by rival groups and therefore attributed wrongful motive to the induction of these persons and came to the conclusion that the general body of the members and the majority of the Trustees were not even informed about this meeting rather they were kept in the dark.
12. The Administrator has recorded four findings – firstly that the Ex-President and Secretary and their supporters had come into the minority and therefore in order to retain majority over the Trust, they had surreptitiously inducted new members, who were close relatives and had attributed wrongful intention to the former President.
13. Secondly, he has recorded that the rules which were to be followed for inducting new members were not followed and the mode and manner in which the new members were inducted and the subscription money, which was accepted from them as induction fee, was also done wrongfully.
14. Thirdly, he records that, the procedure adopted to induct these 15 members was done surreptitiously and without giving due information to all concerned. Although, there were 11 members who are in the Board of Trustees, only six members were given notice of the meeting held on 31.5.2002 and that too only to those individuals whose close relatives were to be inducted as members of the Trust.
15. Fourthly, he has recorded that interpolations were made in the applications for membership itself and as in particularly the case of one Anjali Shukla, whose membership form was filled in the month of May i.e. 28.5.2002 in which telephone number of seven digits was noted whereas in the city of Kanpur, seven digits telephone numbers were introduced in the month of December, 2002. This itself showed that the interpolations were made in the procedures adopted and the applications were made fraudulently and were back dated.
16. Haying recorded these findings, the Administrator has passed an order that the procedure adopted in the induction of 15 members were fraudulent. He has attributed motive to the Ex-President and Secretary and has said that they did not follow the due procedure and therefore the 15 members, who were sought to be inducted were nor bonafide members of the Trust and therefore has refused to grant approval to them.
17. Learned Senior Advocate Sri Vibhav B. Upadhyaya assisted by Sri Arvind Srivastava, has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition and has argued that it is not open to the petitioners to challenge the order of the Administrator in these writ proceedings because the order of the Administrator is not an order which has been passed in any judicial process, but rather it is an order which has been passed between the private parties who are disputing questions of memberships and induction into a society as member and these disputed matters cannot be decided in writ proceedings and can only be decided in a suit by the civil court.
18. Sri Upadhyaya has argued that it is not as if the order of the Administrator is equal or parallel to an order of the Registrar under the Societies Registration Act and it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of the Administrator is co-terminus with the jurisdiction of the Registrar under Section 4 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. He has also argued that the special appeal Court appointed an Administrator to step into the shoes of the Board of Trustees and therefore his role cannot be extended to be co-terminus with the Registrar under Section 4 of the Act or any other provision of the Act. The Administrator was given life by the orders of the Division Bench of this Court, who created him simply as a measure of convenience and to put an end to the lis regarding membership so that the process of election could commence and be completed
19. In support of his argument, learned Counsel for the respondents has cited 1995 (2) UPLBEC 1242 (Committee of Management, Kisan Shiksha Sadan, Banksahi v. Asstt. Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits and Anr. ) wherein this Court held that the question relating to the facts to the issue whether a person is a member or not, can only be decided by the civil court and if any person is aggrieved by a decision that a person is not a member then proper course open for him to approach the civil court.
20. Learned Counsel for the respondents also relied upon another decision of this Court reported in 2000 (3) UPLBEC 2063 (Sri Ram Laxmi Narain Marvadi Hindu Hospital Godaulia v. Asstt. Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits and Ors. ) in which also this Court has held that where there is dispute about the membership of a person then it is the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide such a question.
21. Learned Counsel for the respondents has also cited a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in the 2005 (5) Supreme 371 (Supriya Basu and Ors. v. West Bengal Housing Board and Ors. ) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a dispute relating to the claims of the two rival groups of the private individuals was not open to be dealt with in writ proceedings.
22. Learned Counsel for the respondents has argued that it cannot be said that the claims as set up by the petitioners No. 1 to 14 and Dayal Saran Awasthi are in the nature, which can be legally enforced before the writ court, nor can it be said that the Administrator while passing the order impugned has failed to perform any statutory obligations imposed upon.
23. Learned Counsel for the respondents has also relied upon an old Oudh decision as reported in AIR 1916 Oudh 94 (Abhoy Pado Bose v. Managing Committee of Queens Anglo Sanskrit School) in which the Oudh Court held that the mere payment of any subscription would not entitle the petitioner to accept his offer of his subscription or to admit him to the membership of the society.
24. Learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners Sri V.C. Misra assisted by Sri Saurab Srivastava has very strenuously argued the case and has attacked the impugned order dated 10.12.2004. He argues that the order dated 10.12.2004 is wholly perverse and arbitrary and has been passed in flagrant violation of directions issued by this Court dated 9.7.2004 in special appeal. He has also argued that it was not open to the Administrator to go into the questions of the procedures adopted in holding the meeting dated 31.5.2002. He has argued that the court in its order dated 9.7.2004 categorically gave the findings that a sum of Rs. 500/- had been deposited by the petitioners No. 1 to 14 and Sri Dayal Saran Awasthi and therefore it was no longer open to the Administrator appointed by this Court to go into the modalities as to whether the payment was made properly or not and only issue which remained before the Administrator was to see whether the other rules and constitution of the Trust had been followed or not in order to grant approval to the membership to 15 persons concerned.
25. The second argument as raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that there is no provision in the Constitution of the Trust which prevents the induction of any relatives of the existing member and therefore the reasoning given by the Administrator that the induction of close relatives was bad, is also faulty and deserves to be set aside.
26. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has argued that the order of the Administrator has also been passed in flagrant violation of the provisions of Section 15 of the Act. However the learned Counsel for the petitioners did not specify as to which part of the Section 15 is flagrantly violated.
27. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has also argued that the Administrator has not cared to pass orders in the case of the each and every member who was to be inducted and has not discussed their case individually.
28. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has also argued that the Administrator did not go into the question of the validity of the meeting dated 31.5.2002 and rather simply had to grant approval on the basis of the rules.
29. In reply the learned Counsel for the respondents has argued that on merits also the order of the Administrator is justified. Learned Counsel for the respondents has argued that the Administrator as appointed by this Court has followed the directions of the Division Bench and has applied his mind correctly to the matter in hand before him. The Administrator, according to him, has correctly examined object and motives of the Ex-President, Secretary and members to hold meeting on 31.5.2002 and has correctly come to the conclusion that the object and motives of the Ex-President, Secretary and members were not bonafide but were rather motivated to induct members surreptitiously and wrongfully in order to advance their own cause and to increase their majority wrongfully. They were seeking to add members who collude with them without giving due information of the induction of the fresh members to all other existing members.
30. Learned Counsel for the respondents has argued that Administrator has correctly dissected the manner and mode in which the applications were made for induction of the fresh members by keeping of the other members in dark so that their hidden agenda would not come to light that is why he has argued that although there were 11 members in the Board of Trustees, only six members were given notice to the meeting on 31.5.2002 and that too, notice was given confining it to those six members whose very close relatives were sought to be inducted.
31. Learned Counsel for the respondents has argued that the application made by one Anjali Shukla sufficiently indicated that the application was completely fabricated one as although the application was dated 28.5.2002 which contained telephone number with seven digits whereas the seven digits telephone number in Kanpur was introduced in the month of December, 2002. This clearly indicates that the application of Anjali Shukla was ante-dated.
32. Learned Counsel for the respondents has also argued that from a plain reading of the direction as contained in the order dated 9.7.2004 passed by the Division Bench in special appeals itself it is indicated that the Division Bench did not accept that the meeting dated 31.5.2002 was a valid meeting. In fact he has argued that the direction was given by the Division Bench to ascertain as to whether the meeting was valid one or not, and therefore also the Division Bench directed that after consideration of the validity of the meeting approval was to be granted, otherwise learned Counsel for the respondents argues that the question of approval, would not have arisen.
33. In reply, the learned Counsel for the petitioners has argued that the rules and constitution of the Trust do not prevent the induction of relatives as members and there is no bar that the relatives cannot be inducted as members. He has also argued that holding elections and the induction of the members in the meeting is a democratic process and no such bar can be put as it would thwart the democratic process.
34. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has next argued that the finding of the learned Single Judge of this Court with regard to the validity of the meeting was not set aside and therefore the meeting dated 31.5.2002 should have been held to be valid one.
35. In reply he has also argued that the Administrator has failed to decide the case of each of the members, who were seeking induction individually, therefore his order is bad.
36. Having heard both sides and having perused the order of the Administrator, I am of the opinion that the decision of the Administrator suffers from no error. The role of Administrator, so appointed by the Hon’ble Division Bench, was confined to a limited purpose i.e. to see whether an approval was to be granted to the new members or not.
37. The Administrator, on his part, has fulfilled his role. It cannot be said that the payment of Rs. 500/- as subscription, which was accepted by the Division Bench would automatically become the reason for granting approval to the induction of these persons who were seeking to be members. Mere subscription to an amount would certainly not entitle any person to be granted a membership or approval to be inducted as a member. More so, particularly in the present case as even though the Division Bench clearly indicated that the subscription had been paid, it still saw the necessity of going into the question of grant of approval. That, itself showed that the Division Bench also thought that mere payment of subscription was not enough but Administrator would have to go into the questions as to whether it would be justified to grant approval to the persons seeking memberships to be inducted as members in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
38. The Administrator while fulfilling the directions of this Court gave full opportunity of hearing to all parties concerned and has recorded that all persons had appeared before him and had given written submissions with regard to their individual cases.
39. Having examined all these written submissions and after having heard some of the parties concerned in person, the Administrator, came to the conclusion that the meeting dated 31.5.2002 was fraudulent and set up by certain persons for fraudulent and collusive reasons and therefore saw it fit not to grant approval to the induction of such members who were sought to be inducted surreptitiously and without informing the rest of the existing members. The meeting held on 31.5.2002 was not held for genuine reasons and the conclusion of the Administrator was that the members who were sought to be inducted were not bonafide members.
40. I have also examined the rule and constitution of the societies, which also do not provide for any special rule or manner or mode in which the approval was to be granted. The Administrator has used his best discretion in coming to the conclusion that the members were not inducted in a fair and free manner. It cannot be said that decision making process used by the Administrator was bad.
41. The Administrator, undoubtedly was a creation of the order and decision of the Division Bench. His role was confined by the Division Bench to be the same as that of the Board of Trustees and no more than that.
42. If at all, the writ proceedings could be initiated against the order of the Administrator, it would be confined to the judicial review of the decision making process. The decision itself cannot become a subject of judicial review. It is settled law that scope of judicial review in writ proceeding is confined to process of this decision making and is not concerned with the decision itself.
43. I seek to refer a decision of the Supreme Court reported in the case of State of U.P. v. Johri Mal, as and quote extract of para 28 of the reports –
…Decisions and actions which do not have adjudicative disposition may not strictly fall for consideration before a judicial review Court…
44. In my opinion, therefore the present writ petition is devoid of merits and does not warrant any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Even otherwise under the preliminary objection as raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents that that the matter strictly speaking is a matter between two private parties and it cannot be said that the petitioners are seeking enforcement of any legal right nor are they claiming that the authority concerned has failed to perform any statutory obligations. The matter regarding the induction or non-induction of members into a Trust or society is clearly a matter, which would be cognizable by a civil court and not by a writ court.
45. I am in agreement with the decisions as cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents and 1 therefore hold that the matter relating to induction of members of the Trust or the non-induction or removal, would be a matter squarely cognizable by civil court and writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not lie against such matters.
46. For the reasons as stated above, I see no merit in the writ petition, which is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.