JUDGMENT
V.K. Shukla, J.
1. In this bunch of writ petitions, petitioners are assailing the validity of decision taken by respondents cancelling the order by means of which petitioners, who were full time sweepers, working under G.M.T.D. Mirzapur, were regularized as regular majdoors, have been reverted to their original cadre of full time sweeper/casual labourer and further action of directing recovery of the amount which has been paid in excess to each one of petitioners.
2. Brief background of the case is that each one of petitioners had been performing and discharging duties as part time casual labourers/sweepers. Policy decision was taken by Department of Telecom on 29.09.2000, mentioning therein that Employees Unions were demanding regularization of all the casual labourers and this issue was under consideration for quite sometime and in this background, decision had been taken to regularize the services of casual labourers working in the Department, including those, who had been granted temporary status with effect from 01.10.2000. Relevant extract of said scheme dated 29.09.2000, giving the order of regularisation and scheme to be adhered to is being quoted below:
(1) All casual labourers who have been granted temporary status up to the issuance of orders No. 269-4/93-STN-ll dated 12.2.99, circulated vide letter No. 269-13/99-STN-ll dated 12.2.99 and further letter No. 269-13/93-STN-ll dated 9.6.2000.
(2) All full time casual labourers as indicated in Annexure.
(3) All part time casual labourers who were working for four or more hours per day and converted into full time casual labourers vide letter No. 269-13/93-STN-ll dated 16.9.99.
(4) All part time casual labourers who were working for less than four hours per day and converted into full time casual labourers vide letter No. 269-13/93-STN-ll dated 25.8.2000.
(5) All Ayas and Supervisors converted into full time casual labourers as per order No. 269-10/97-STN-ll dated 29.9.2000.
The number of casual labourers to be regularised in categories (2) to (5) above is given in the Annexure-enclosed. The figures given in the Annexure are based on information received from the Circles.
The casual labourers indicated from Clause (i) to (iv) of communication dated 29.09.2000 were to be adjusted against available vacancies of regular majdoors. However, Chief General Managers are also authorised to create posts of Regular Majdoors as per prescribed norms, and to that extent, the prescribed ceiling for the Circle will stand enhanced.
As per this order, letter No. 269-13/99-STN-ll dated 12.2.99 vide which temporary status was granted to casual labourers eligible on 1.8.98, no casual labourers were to be engaged after this date and all the casual labourers are to be disengaged forthwith. Therefore, there should be no casual labourers after 01.08.1998. Other than those indicated in serial Nos. (2) to (5) above. However, if there is still any case of casual labourers left out due to any reasons, that may be referred to the Head Quarters separately.
3. In the year 2000 merger took place, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, a Government of India Enterprises came into existence, and as per the averments mentioned in paragraph 3 of the supplementary counter affidavit, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. adopted directives contained in letter dated 29.09.2000. In respect of absorption of Group “C” and “D” staff working in B.S.N.L., Employees Federation had been pressing upon for absorption of casual labourers, as such preliminary meeting had been held with three Federations and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited on 09.11.2000, empowered the Management to negotiate with the Unions, pursuant to which meeting was held with three Federations on 02.01.2001 and following proposals were approved:
1. IMPLEMENTATION OF STANDING ORDERS OF THE INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT ACT, 1946
BSNL service rules are to be finalized after discussion with the recognized union formed by the optees of BSNL, and the Standing Orders of Industrial Employment Act, 1946.
2. SERVICE RULES
In the meantime it was agreed that Government will continue to apply existing rules/regulations. This is in line as per the provisions of Rule 1313 of Standing Orders of Industrial Employment Act, 1946. However, certain provisinal terms and conditions for absorption are enclosed as Annexure-I.
3. ABSORPTION OF CASUAL LABOURS
Orders have been issued by DoT for regularising Ayas and all casual labourers including part time casual labourers. Left out cases, if any will be settled by BSNL in accordance with order No. 269-94/98-STN dated 29.9.2000.
4. OPTION OF STAFF FOR ABSORPTION IN BSNL
The BSNL will absorb the optees on as is where is basis. A list of optees will be made available to the three federations/unions.
5. OPTIOINS OF STAFF FACING DISCIPLINARY CASES
It was agreed that the employees with on-going disciplinary cases can also opt for absorption in BSNL but their absorption will be subject to the outcome of the vigilance case. Their pending cases will be expedited on a fast track mode by DOT authorities.
6. PROMOTIONAL AVENUES
After absorption there will be negotiations with the newly formed recognised union regarding promotional avenues. Pending adoption of Standing Orders on promotional policy the present OTBP/BCRACP (whichever is applicable) etc. will continue to be followed by BSNL
7. CHANGE OVER TO DA PAY SCALES
The pay scales and fitment formula will also be adopted through Standing Orders after negotiation with the recognised union in respect of non-executives. After detailed discussions, it was mutually agreed that pending fitment in the IDA Pay scales, the Group C & D optees will continue in the Central Government (CDA) pay scales. In addition to this, they will also be paid an adhoc amount of Rs. 1000/- per month w.e.f. 1.10.2000 which will be adjusted from their IDA emoluments, perks and benefits on fixation of the same in the revised IDA scales. The revised negotiated IDA pay scales will be applicable form the date of absorption i.e. 1.10.2000.
8. TIME FRAME FOR VARIOUS POST ABSORPTITION ACVITIES It was agreed that options will be called in January, 2001 providing about one month time to employees to give their options and the entire activity is expected to be completed by the end of 28th Feb. 2001. A list of optees of BSNL will be exhibited to rectify inaccuracies, if any.
The existing system of informal meetings with applicant Unions, as on 30.9.2000 and formal meetings with the three Federations shall continue.
9. The employees who opt for permanent absorption in BSNL would be governed by the provisions of Rule 37-A of CCS Pension Rules, notification for which was issued by the Department of Pension Welfare on 30.09.2000. for the purpose of reckoning emoluments for calculation of pension and pensionary benefits, the emoluments as defined in CCS Pensions rules, on PSU in the IDA pay scales shall be treated as emoluments.
10. DoT has already clarified that the word “formula” mentioned in clause 8 of the Rule 37-A means payment of pension as per Government Rules in force in force at that time. It has also been clarified by the DoT that BSNL will not dismiss/remove an absorbed employee without prior review by the Administrative Ministry/Department.
11. The Group C & D employees who appear for any provisional examination whether direct or departmental and qualify in such examinations/outsiders coming through direct recruitment process, would rank junior to all the other employees in the promotional cadre, who had already been qualified in earlier examinations even though they get absorbed in BSNL subsequently.
The above modalities have been worked out in consultation with the following three federations for termination of the deemed deputation status in BSNL and the parties have put their signatures in token of their consent and agreement on this date 02.01.2001.
4. Thereafter, on 14.05.2001, from the office of the Chief General Manager Telecom, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, Lucknow, communication was issued, mentioning therein that for conversion of part time casual labourers working for not less than four hours duty into full time casual labourers, exercise be undertaken with the condition specifically provided for and same is one time relaxation, and was effective w.e.f. 25.08.2000. Thereafter on 21.06.2002, Deputy General Manager, B.S.N.L., UP. (East) Circle, Lucknow, addressed letter in accordance with instructions contained in DOT New Delhi dated 14.08.1998, 25.08.2000, approved by CGMT UP. (East) Circle Lucknow for conversion of part time casual labourers into full time casual labourers (performing duty four hours or more and less than four hours per day), as per enclosed Annexure I and II, on the following terms and conditions:
1. The sanction of part time casual labourers by the competent authority and their continuously service till date with minimum 240 days working in the preceding 12 months as on 25.8.2000.
2. The Head of SSAs should personally verify the payment records of these approved part time casual labourers and obtain a certificate of the payment made from his IFA and therefore verify their eligibility as per the rule on the subject before ordering the conversion of the part time to full time casual labourers. It may further ensure that the payment of the part time casual labourers has been made directly by the department and not by any other agency like contractor etc.
3. The part time casual labourers should be engaged as full time casual labourers only where there is shortage of Gr. D staff (i.e. Existence of vacant Gr. D posts accounting for all SM and existing full time casual labourers) and no post should be created for the purpose. In the event there is no shortage in Gr. D posts as full time casual labourers, the part time casual labourers will not be converted into full time labourers.
4. Payment to the above full time casual labourers may be made as provided of under Rule 331 P & T FHB Vol. I under circumstances should they are paid through MUSTER ROLL.
5. In case of any violation to the above instructions/departmental instructions on the subject, the Head of SSAs will be personally responsible. It may also be ensured that no part time casual : labourers have been engaged after the cut of date given by the DOT New Delhi. The Head of SSAs must get satisfied himself personally in each case before converting part time casual labourers into full time causal labourers and ensure that all the conditions laid down on the subject and departmental instructions are followed.
6. The name of part time casual labourers, who are found suitable for conversion into full time are attached to Annexure I & II. This is based on the report received from SSA concerned.
5. Requisite steps were undertaken in this direction and thereafter each one of petitioners, who were working as part-time casual labourers, were converted into full time casual labourers and requisite letter in this respect was issued by General Manager, Telecom District Mirzapur on 10.10.2002. Decision was taken on 23.01.2006 that all those part time casual labourers, who had been converted into full time casual labourers, qua them proceedings be undertaken for extending the benefit of regularization against Group ‘D’ vacancies. Requisite direction was issued in this behalf by General Manager, East Circle, Lucknow along with communication dated 23.01.2006 sent by the office of the Chief General Manager, Telecom, UP. Lucknow. List was also appended therewith. In the said letter it was categorically mentioned that directives were issued for undertaking requisite exercise and for verification of records. As against sanctioned strength of 116 regular majdoors, only 64 had been functioning as on 31.03.2006, as such there was shortage of 52 regular majdoors. Thereafter letter dated 17.05.2006 was sent by the office of the General Manager, Telecom, U.P. Circle, Lucknow, asking therein to forward the list after extending the benefit of regularization. Thereafter, requisite exercise was undertaken pursuant to said letter and on 20.07.2006, General Manager, Telecom District Mirzapur issued letter of regularisation qua each one of petitioners converting them from casual labourers to regular majdoors. Pursuant to said order requisite fixation of pay was done, and petitioners were paid their salary accordingly. Thereafter, impugned order has been passed qua each one of the petitioners.
6. Claim of petitioners has been rejected as per respondents solely on the ground that by no stretch of imagination, after pronouncement of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi regularisation could have been made, and in ; this background, it has been contended that action taken is strictly inconsonance with the said verdict, as the benefit of regularisation has been extended in ignorance of the directives of Hon’ble Apex Court, as such claim of petitioners is unsustainable.
7. In the present case pleadings inter se parties have been exchanged in the shape of counter affidavit, supplementary counter affidavit on one hand and rejoinder affidavit and supplementary rejoinder affidavit, on the other hand. Thereafter with the consent of the parties, present writ petition has been taken up for final hearing and disposal.
8. Sri R.C. Pathak, learned Counsel, appearing along with Sri Girish Kumar Gupta, representing the petitioners, contended with vehemence that in the present case benefit of regularization has been extended as per the terms and conditions of agreement in between Unions and B.S.N.L., and thereafter said benefit has been revoked without providing any opportunity of hearing, as such impugned order in question is liable to be quashed, and further as there was no fraud or misrepresentation on the part of petitioners, as such recovery directed is vitiated in law.
9. Sri Subodh Kumar, learned Counsel representing Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, contended with vehemence that benefit of regularization has been admittedly extended after the judgment in case of Secretrary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi , decided on 10.04.2006, wherein Hon’ble Apex Court has clearly ruled that no further regularization can be extended in violation of constitutional provisions, as such writ petition on admitted position is liable to be dismissed.
10. After respective arguments have been advanced, factual position, qua which there is no dispute, is that as far as petitioners are concerned, their engagement as part time casual labourers/sweepers had been made without following any process of selection, and each one of petitioners had been performing and discharging duties as part time casual labourers, and thereafter as per agreement entered into between labourers’ union and the Management, categorical decision was taken that part time casual labourers who were working for not less than four hours per day, their claim be considered. Petitioners who were working as part time casual labourers, their claim was considered and they were converted into full time casual labourers on 10.10.2002. Agreement dated 29.09.2000 categorically provided that casual labourers indicated from Clause (i) to (iv) of communication dated 29.09.2000 were to be adjusted against available vacancies of regular majdoors. In the said letter itself there was a categorical mention that no casual labourers were to be engaged after that day and all the casual labourers were to be disengaged forthwith, and there should be no casual labourers after 01.08.1998. Petitioners who were part time casual labourers and were accorded status of full time casual labourers were intending to get adjusted against the regular vacancy of regular majdoors. Policy decision had been taken on 23.01.2006 for undertaking exercise of extending the benefit of regularization. Before such exercise could be undertaken and concluded, Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi , came out with the judgment, wherein regularisation has not at all been approved, and it has been categorically mentioned that regularisation, if same has already been made, then the same would not be reopened based on the said judgment, but there should be no further by passing of constitutional requirements and regularising and making permanent, those not duly appointed as per constitutional scheme. Paragraphs 39, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52, 53 and 54 being relevant being are quoted below:
39. There have been decisions which have taken the cue from the Dharwad (supra) case and given directions for regularization, absorption or making permanent, employees engaged or appointed without following the due process or the rules for appointment. The philosophy behind this approach is seen set out in the recent decision in The Workmen of Bhurkunda Colliery of M/s. Central Coalfields Ltd. v. The Management of Bhurkunda Colliery of Central Coalfields Ltd. , though the legality or validity of such an approach has not been independently examined. But on a survey of authorities, the predominant view is seen to be that such appointments did not confer any right on the appointees and that the Court cannot direct their absorption or regularization or re-engagement or making them permanent.
43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a Court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because, an employee had continued under cover of an order of Court, which we have described as ‘litigious employment’ in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in” the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates.
44. The concept of ‘equal pay for equal work’ is different from the concept of conferring permanency on those who have been appointed on ad hoc basis, temporary basis, or based on no process of selection as envisaged by the Rules. This Court has in various decisions applied the principle of equal pay for equal work and has laid down the parameters for the application of that principle. The decisions are rested on the concept of equality enshrined in our Constitution in the light of the directive principles in that behalf. But the acceptance of that principle cannot lead to a position where the court could direct that appointments made without following the due procedure established by law, be deemed permanent or issue directions to treat them as permanent. Doing so, would be negation of the principle of equality of opportunity. The power to make an order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before this Court, would not normally be used for giving the go-by to the procedure established by law in the matter of public employment. Take the situation arising in the cases before us from the State of Karnataka. Therein, after the Dharwad decision, the Government had issued repeated directions and mandatory orders that no temporary or ad hoc employment or engagement be given. Some of the authorities and departments had ignored those directions or defied those directions and had continued to give employment, specifically interdicted by the orders issued by the executive. Some of the appointing officers have even been punished for their defiance. It would not be just or proper to pass an order in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution or in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India permitting those persons engaged, to be absorbed or to be made permanent, based on their appointments or engagements. Complete justice would be justice according to law and though it would be open to this Court to mould the relief, this Court would not grant a relief which would amount to perpetuating an illegality.
45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularized or made permanent, courts are swayed by the fact that the concerned person has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain – not at arms length – since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succor to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The argument that since one has been working for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
46. Learned Senior Counsel for some of the respondents argued that on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the employees, especially of the Commercial Taxes Department, should be directed to be regularized since the decisions in Dharwad (supra), Piara Singh (supra), Jacob, and Gujarat Agricultural University and the like, have given rise to an expectation in them that their services would also be regularized. The doctrine can be invoked if the decisions of the Administrative Authority affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there have been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn {See Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service 1985 Appeal Cases 374, National Buildings Construction Corpn. v. S. Raghunathan and Dr. Chanchal Goyal v. State of Rajasthan . There is no case that any assurance was given by the Government or the concerned department while making the appointment on daily wages that the status conferred on him will not be withdrawn until some rational reason comes into existence for withdrawing it. The very engagement was against the constitutional scheme. Though, the Commissioner of the Commercial Taxes Department sought to get the appointments made permanent, there is no case that at the time of appointment any promise was held out. No such promise could also have been held out in view of the circulars and directives issued by the Government after the Dharwad decision. Though, there is a case that the State had made regularizations in the past of similarly situated employees, the fact remains that such regularizations were done only pursuant to judicial directions, either of the Administrative Tribunal or of the High Court and in some case by this Court. Moreover, the invocation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot enable the employees to claim that they must be made permanent or they must be regularized in the service though they had not been selected in terms of the rules for appointment. The fact that in certain cases the court had directed regularization of the employees involved in those cases cannot be made use of to found a claim based on legitimate expectation. The argument if accepted would also run counter to the constitutional mandate. The argument in that behalf has therefore to be rejected.
47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post.
48. It was then contended that the rights of the employees thus appointed, under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, are violated. It is stated that the State has treated the employees unfairly by employing them on less than minimum wages and extracting work from them for a pretty long period in comparison with those directly recruited who are getting more wages or salaries for doing similar work. The employees before us were engaged on daily wages in the concerned department on a wage that was made known to them. There is no case that the wage agreed upon was not being paid. Those who are working on daily wages formed a class by themselves, they cannot claim that they are discriminated as against those who have been regularly recruited on the basis of the relevant rules. No right can be founded on an employment on daily wages to claim that such employee should be treated on a par with a regularly recruited candidate, and made permanent in employment, even assuming that the principle could be invoked for claiming equal wages for equal work. There is no fundamental right in those who have been employed on daily wages or temporarily or on contractual basis, to claim that they have a right to be absorbed in service. As has been held by this Court, they cannot be said to be holders of a post, since, a regular appointment could be made only by making appointments consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The right to be treated equally with the other employees employed on daily wages, cannot be extended to a claim for equal treatment with those who were regularly employed. That would be treating unequals as equals. It cannot also be, relied on to claim a right to be absorbed in service even though they have never been selected in terms of the relevant recruitment rules. The arguments based on Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution are therefore overruled.
49. It is contended that the State action in not regularizing the employees was not fair within the framework of the rule of law. The rule of law compels the State to make appointments as envisaged by the Constitution and in the manner we have indicated earlier. In most of these cases, no doubt, the employees had worked for some length of time but this has also been brought about by the pendency of proceedings in Tribunals and courts initiated at the instance of the employees. Moreover, accepting an argument of this nature would mean that the State would be permitted to perpetuate an illegality in the matter of public employment and that would be a negation of the constitutional scheme adopted by us, the people of India. It is therefore not possible to accept the argument that there must be a direction to make permanent all the persons employed on daily wages. When the court is approached for relief by way of a writ, the court has necessarily to ask itself whether the person before it had any legal right to be enforced. Considered in the light of the very clear constitutional scheme, it cannot be said that the employees have been able to establish a legal right to be made permanent even though they have never been appointed in terms of the relevant rules or in adherence of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
52. Normally, what is sought for by such temporary employees when they approach the court, is the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the employer, the State or its instrumentalities, to absorb them in permanent service or to allow them to continue. In this context, the question arises whether a mandamus could be issued in favour of such persons. At this juncture, it will be proper to refer to the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Dr. Rai Shivendra Bahadur v. The Governing Body of the Nalanda College (1962) Supp 2 SCR 144. That case arose out of a refusal to promote the writ petitioner therein as the Principal of a college. This Court held that in order that a mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on the authority and the aggrieved party had a legal right under the statute or rule to enforce it. This classical position continues and a mandamus could not be issued in favour of the employees directing the Government to make them permanent since the employees cannot show that they have an enforceable legal right to be permanently absorbed or that the State has a legal duty to make them permanent.
53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa (supra), R.N. Nanjundappa (supra), and B. N. Nagrajan (supra), and referred to in paragraph 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of courts or of tribunals. The question of regularization of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularize as a one time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularization. if any already made, but not sub-judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further by-passing of the constitutional requirement and regularizing or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme.
54. It is also clarified that those decisions which run counter to the principle settled in this decision, or in which directions running counter to what we have held herein, will stand denuded of their status as precedents.
11. In the present case undisputed position is that on the date of delivery of judgment on 10.04.2006, petitioners continued to function as full time casual labourers (sweepers) and till then benefit of regularization as regular majdoor had not been extended, and the said exercise has been undertaken only after the said judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court had come and thereafter based on same regularization accorded has been cancelled.
12. Hon’ble Apex Court in Appeal (Civil) No. 3765 of 2001, U.P. State electricity Board v. Pooran Chandra Pandey and Ors. decided on 09.10.2007 has taken the view that often Uma Devi’s case (supra) is being applied by the Courts mechanically without seeing the facts of particular case as a little difference in facts or even one additional fact may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision, as such Uma Devi’s case cannot be applied mechanically without seeing the facts of a particular case as a little difference in facts can make Uma Devi’s case inapplicable to the facts of the case. Relevant paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 of the said judgment are being extracted below:
11. Learned Counsel for the appellant has relied upon the decision of this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Uma Devi (3) and Ors. and has urged that no direction for regularization can be given by the Court. In our opinion, the decision in Uma Devi#s case (supra)is clearly distinguishable. The said decision cannot be applied to a case where regularization has been sought for in pursuance of Article 14 of the Constitution.
12. As observed by this Court in State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra vide para 13:
A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides.
What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. On this topic this is what Earl of Halsbury, LC said in Quinn v. Leathern 1901 AC 495:
Now before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood (1898) AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case In which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actuallydecides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.#
13. In Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat and Ors. (vide para 18) this Court observed:
#The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it.#
14. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. , this Court observed:
It is well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision.
15. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. N.R. Vairamani and Anr. AIR 2004 SC 4778, a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual situation. In the same Judgment this Court also observed:
Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of the context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes.
In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton 1951 AC 737 at p. 761, Lord Mac Dermot observed:
The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge.
In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. 1970 (2) All ER 294 Lord Reid said, Lord Atkin’s speech. is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition; it will require qualification in new circumstances.# Megarry, J. in (1971)1 WLR 1062 observed: #One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell L. J. as if it were an Act of Parliament.# And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board 1972 (2) WLR 537 Lord Morris said: There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.
The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo, J.) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive. Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path of justice clear of obstructions which could impede it
16. We are constrained to refer to the above decisions and principles contained therein because we find that often Uma Devi#s case (supra) is being applied by Courts mechanically as if it were a Euclid#s formula without seeing the facts of a particular case. As observed by this Court in Bhavnagar University (supra) and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (supra), a little difference in facts or even one additional fact may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision. Hence, in our opinion, Uma Devi’s case (supra) cannot be applied mechanically without seeing the facts of a particular case, as a little difference in facts can make Uma Devi case (supra) inapplicable to the facts of that case.
17. In the present case the writ petitioners (respondents herein) only wish that they should not be discriminated against vis–vis the original employees of the Electricity Board since they have been taken over by the Electricity Board in the same manner and position*. Thus, the writ petitioners have to be deemed to have been appointed in the service of the Electricity Board from the date of their original appointments in the Society. Since they were all appointed in the society before 4.5.1990 they cannot be denied the benefit of the decision of the Electricity Board dated 28.11.1996 permitting regularization of the employees of the Electricity Board who were working from before 4.5.1990. To take a contrary view would violate Article 14 of the Constitution. We have to read Uma Devi#s case (supra) in conformity with Article 14 of the Constitution, and we cannot read it in a manner which will make it in conflict with Article 14. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and any judgment, not even of the Supreme Court, can violate the Constitution.
13. Now the facts of the present case are being looked into. Petitioners, who are from the lowest strata of the society; initially were inducted as part time casual labourers for performing and discharging duty and function of sweeper and then their status was converted into full time casual labourers and thereafter, they have been absorbed as regular majdoors. In the case of Uma Devi (supra), there was no statutory agreement in between the Employees Union and the authorities and powers of courts were being looked into as to whether courts have authority to issue direction for regularisation, qua incumbents, whose appointment is dehors the provisions of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Here, in the present case undisputed position is that on 29.09.2000 one time policy decision was taken by the Department of Telecom Service for converting part time casual labourers into full time casual labourers and thereafter they were to be adjusted as regular majdoors. Not only this, after incorporation of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. in connection with absorption of Group ‘C and Group ‘D’ staff, primarily meetings were held with three Federations and after long negotiation with unions, it was categorically agreed on 02.01.2001 for implementation of the Standing Orders of the Industrial Employment Act, 1946 and BSNL Service Rules were to be finalized after discussion with the recognised union formed by the optees of BSNL and the Standing Orders of the Industrial Employment Act, 1946. Further it was also categorically agreed for absorption of casual labourers in accordance with the order dated 29.09.2000. This particular agreement dated 02.01.2001 entered into between three Federations and BSNL in connection with absorption of Group ‘C and Group ‘D’ staff was there and consequent to the same decision had been taken to absorb. One time policy decision was taken in this regard after BSNL had come into existence taking into account earlier agreement and in between the employer and employees union once such an agreement has taken place, then it was binding and the benefit which has been conferred for regularization was strictly in consonance with the said agreement, which has statutory flavour in terms of Section 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In the case of Uma Devi, such a situation was not there, as there was no statutory agreement in between the workers’ union and employer in question, as such this is the most distinguishing feature available in the present case, as such the principle laid down in the case of Uma Devi could not have been invoked mechanically in the present case, as here regular status has been accorded on account of settlement made by BSNL and the three employees Federations, which was finalized on 02.01.2001. Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 clearly provides that settlement arrived at by means of agreement in between employer and the workers otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. The respondents do not dispute that there is agreement and it is binding on them. The only reason which has come, is that on account of Uma Devi’s case no regularization is feasible. The fact of the agreement entered into inter se Employees union and BSNL has been totally ignored by the authorities while proceeding to cancel the regularization, whereas said agreement has statutory effect and was binding inter se parties in terms of Section 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and as one time measure once decision has been taken for extending the benefit of regularization, the ratio of law laid down in the case of Uma Devi (supra) could not have been applied mechanically, as has been done in the present case.
14. Such settlements between workers union and employer have been approved by the courts time and again. Clause (p) of Section 2 of the ‘Act defines “settlement” as under:
2 (p) “settlement” means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written agreement between the employer and the workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding where such agreement has been signed by the parties hereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent to an officer authorized in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the Conciliation Officer.
15. An analysis of the above mentioned clause would show that it envisages two categories of settlements (i) a settlement which is arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings, i.e. which is arrived at with the assistance and concurrence of the Conciliation Officer who is duty bound to promote a right settlement and to do everything he can to induce the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute and (ii) a written agreement between employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding.
16. The consequence of the aforesaid two categories of settlement which are quite distinct are set out in Section 18 of the Act reads as under:
18 (1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to agreement.
(2) Subject to the provisions of Sun Section (3), an arbitration award which has become enforceable shall be binding on the parties to the agreement who referred the dispute to arbitration.
(3) A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding under this Act or an arbitration award in a case where notification has been issued under Sub-section (3-A) of Section 10-A or an award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal which has become enforceable shall be binding on:
(a) all parties to the industrial dispute;
(b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board, arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause;
(c) where a party referred to in Clause (a) or Clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates;
(d) Where a party referred to in Clause (a) or Clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case maybe, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all person who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part.
17. A bare perusal of the above quoted section would show that whereas a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding is binding on the parties to agreement, a settlement arrived in the course of conciliation proceeding under the Act is binding not only parties to the industrial dispute but also on other persons specified in Clauses (b), (c) and (d) of Sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act. Therefore, if the settlement arrived at between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding with which we are concerned in this case it shall be binding on the parties to the settlement. The phrase, “parties to the settlement” includes both employer and an individual employee or the union representing the employees. If the settlement is between the employer and the workmen it would be binding on that particular employee and the employer; if it is between a recognised union of the employees and the employer, it will bind all the members of the union and the employer. That it would be binding on all the members of the union is a necessary corollary of collective bargaining in the absence of allegation of mala fides or fraud.
18. The aims and objects of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act Include industrial peace which is essential to the industrial development and economy of the nation. Great emphasis is, therefore, laid on the settlement as they set at rest all the disputes and controversies between the employer and the employees. In the case of Herbertsons Limited v. The Workmen of Herbertsons Ltd. and Ors. 1976 (4) SCC 36, the Supreme Court considered the effect of the settlement arrived at by the recognized union of majority workers. It was observed by Goswami J., speaking for the Court that when a recognised union negotiates with an employer, the workers as individuals do not come into the picture. It is not necessary that each individual worker should know the implications of the settlement since a recognized union, “which is expected to protect the legitimate interest of labour enters into a settlement in the best interest of labour. This would be the normal rule. There may be exceptional cases where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But in the absence of such allegations a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration. In connection with justness and fairness of the settlement is observed that this has to be considered in the light of the conditions that were in force at the time of the reference. When, therefore, negations take place which have to be encouraged, particularly between labour and employer in the interest of industrial peace and well being, there is always give and take. The settlement has to be taken as a package deal and when labour has gained in the manner of wages and if there is some reduction in the matter of dearness allowance so far as the Award is concerned, it cannot be said that the settlement as a whole is unfair and unjust. It was further observed that it is not possible to scan the settlement in bits and pieces and hold some parts good and acceptable and others bad. Unless it can be demonstrated that the objectionable portion is such that it completely outweighs all the other advantages gained the Court will be slow to hold a settlement as unfair and unjust the settlement has to be accepted or rejected as a whole.
19. In the case of K.C.P. Ltd. v. Presiding officer and Ors. 1996 (4) STC 725 (SC) : 1996 (2) LL.N. 970 : 1996 (74) F.L.R., the Supreme Court considered the concept of settlement entered into between the employer and the union representing the employees. In that case settlement arrived at by the union with the company was not in course of conciliation proceedings. The facts were that the issue of dismissal of 29 workmen, by way of punishment was pending for adjudication and during such pendency, the recognized union entered into a settlement with the management regarding these 29 dismissed workmen as well and it was agreed that an option would be given to them either to accept reinstatement without back wages or a lump sum amount of Rs. 75,000/- with other monetary benefits may be accepted by the concerned workmen in lieu of reinstatement; 17 workmen accepted the settlement and remaining 12 challenged the said settlement and pressed for adjudication being continued by the Labour Court. The contesting workmen contended before the Supreme Court that the settlement regarding their interest as entered between the management and the recognized union during the pendency of adjudication of the dispute was illegal and was not binding on them. It was also submitted that they were not parties to the settlement and hence it did not bind them. The Supreme Court held that the settlement arrived at by direct negotiation is between the management and union was valid and legal and the recognized union had represented 29 dismissed workmen. Speaking for the Bench Majumdar, J, observed:
It has to be kept in view that under the scheme of labour legislations like the Act in the present case, collective bargaining and the principle of industrial democracy permeate the relations between the management on the one hand and the union which reports to collective bargaining on behalf of its members-workmen with the management on the other. Such a collective bargaining which may result in just and fair settlement would always be beneficial to the management as well as to the body of workmen and society at large as there would be industrial peace and tranquility pursuant to such settlement and which would avoid unnecessary social strife and tribulation on the one hand and promote industrial and commercial development on the other hand. Keeping in view the aforesaid salient feature of the Act the settlement which is sought to be impugned has to be scanned and scrutinised. Settlement of labour disputes by direct negotiation and collective bargaining is always to be preferred for it is the best guarantee of industrial peace which is the aim of all legislations for settlement of labour disputes. In order to bring about such a settlement more easily and to make it more workable and effective it may not be always possible or necessary that such a settlement is arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings which may be the first step towards resolving the industrial dispute which may be lingering between the employers and their workmen represented by their unions but even if at that stage such settlement does not take place and the industrial disputes gets referred for adjudication, even pending such disputes, the parties can arrive at amicable settlement which may be binding to the parties to the settlement unlike settlement arrived at during conciliation proceedings which may be binding not only to the parties to the settlement but even to the entire labour force working in the concerned organisation even though they may not be members of the union which might have entered into settlement during conciliation proceedings.
20. In the case of Balmer Lawrie Workers Union and Anr. v. Balmer Lawrie & Consolidation Officer Ltd. and Ors. 1985 (50) F.L.R. 186, Clause 17 of the settlement entered into between the management and the recognized union came to be challenged and as per the said Clause the company was to collect, fromeach workmen, an amount equivalent to 15 per cent of the gross arrears payable to each employee under the settlement as contribution to the union fund, and it was in turn, to be paid to the union within three days of the payment of the arrears. It was inter alia contended by the petitioner union that the said clause was in breach of the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act and while rejecting the challenge the Supreme Court observed:
It is well known that no deduction could be made from the wages and salary payable to a workman governed to be the Payment of Wages Act unless authorized by the Act. A settlement arrived at on consent of parties can however permit a deduction as it is the outcome of understanding between the parties even though such deduction may not be authorized or legally permissible under the Payment of Wages Act.
21. Thus, all these judgments clearly and categorically take the view that agreement arrived in between workers union and the authorities have binding force, and said agreement is in form of package, and in the present case said agreement till date has not been cancelled, and based on the same, policy decision has been taken, which forms terms and conditions of absorption of Group ‘C and ‘D’ employees, and petitioners have been offered the status of substantive majdoors, as per the same, then same cannot be faulted.
22. Much emphasis has been laid on the fact that petitioners have not been appointed in regular manner as they were never registered with the Employment Exchange. Sri Subodh Kumar, Advocate, has placed reliance on paragraphs 6 and 7, which are extracted below:
6. Appointment in Group ‘D’ Posts.-Casual labourers not registered with the Employment Exchange should not be appointed in regular posts. Those appointed through Employment Exchange and possessing minimum 2 years’ continuous service as casual labour in the office/establishment are eligible for appointment to regular post without further reference to Employment Exchange. Those recruited directly without reference to Employment Exchange should register and then put in 2 years’ service for becoming eligible for regular appointment if nominated by Employment Exchange.
7. Two years’ continuous service.- The benefit referred to in previous para, will be available if the casual labourer has put in at least 240 days of service (206 days in the case of office observing 5-day week) including broken periods of service during each of the two years’ service.
23. This fact has been accepted that at no point of time vacancy in question had ever been advertised when petitioners had been appointed and entire emphasis is that petitioners have not got themselves registered with the Employment Exchange, as such they cannot be considered for being appointed on regular basis. Apart from the provision quoted above, no other provision has been pointed out. At this juncture provisions of The Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 are being looked into. Under Section 2 (a) of the aforementioned Act “appropriate Government” has been defined. Under Section 2(d) of the aforementioned Act “employment exchange” has been defined. Under Section 2(e) of the aforementioned Act “establishment” has been defined. Under Section 2(f) of the aforementioned Act “establishment in public sector” has been defined. Under Section 2(i) of the aforementioned Act “unskilled office work” has been defined. Section 3 of the said Act provides that the Act is not to apply in certain vacancies. Relevant provisions referred to above are being quoted below:
2 (a) “appropriate Government” means:
1. in relation to:
(a) any establishment of any railway, major port, mine or oil field, or
(b) any establishment owned, controlled or managed:
(i) the Central Government or a department of the Central Government,
(ii) a company in which not less than fifty-one percent of the share capital is held by the Central Government or partly by the Central Government and partly by one or more State Governments,
(iii) a corporation (including a co-operative society) establsihed by or under a Central Act which is owned, contrrolled or managed by the Central Government,
the Central Government:
(2) in relation to any other establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situate:
2 (d) “employment exchange” means any office or place established and maintained by the Government for the collection and furnishing of information, either by the keeping of registers or otherwise, respecting:
(i) persons who seek to engage employees,
(ii) persons who seek employment, and
(iii) vacancies to which persons seeking employment may be appointed:
2(e) “employment” means
(a) any office, or
(b) any place where any industry, trade, business or occupation is carried on;
2(f) “establishment in public sector” means an establishment owned, controlled or managed by:
(1) the Government or a department of the Government;
(2) a Government company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956;
(3) a corporation (including a co-operative society) established by or under a Central provision or State Act, which is owned, controlled or managed by the Central Government;
(4) a local body:
2 (i) “unskilled office work” means work done in an establishment by any of the following vcategories of employees, namely:
(1) daftari;
(2) jamadar, orderly and peon;
(3) dusting man or farras;
(4) bundle or record lifter;
(5) process server;
(6) watchman;
(7) sweeper;
(8) any other employee doing any routine or unskilled work which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be unskilled office work.
3. Act not to apply in relation to certain vacancies: (1) This Act shall not apply in relation to vacancies:
(a) …
(b) …
(c) …
(d) in any employment to do unskilled office work;
A bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions would go to show that “unskilled office work” has been defined as work done in an establishment by any of the categories of employees indicated herein. Sweeper is one of the ategory of unskilled employees. Section 3 (d) clearly provides that this Act would not apply in relation to vacancies in any employment to do unskilled office work. Thus, the unskilled employees were not at all required to get themselves registered with the Employment Exchange, as such the provisions of the said Act were not at all applicable to such unskilled employees. Once this is admitted position that each one of the petitioners are sweepers and have been performing unskilled office work, then they were exempted from being registered with the Employment Exchange under the Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959. In this background, once petitioners were not obliged to get themselves registered under the aforementioned Act and their claim was considered and is covered under the policy decision, then seeing the nature of work being performed by the petitioners, in the present case, it cannot be said that merely because petitioners were not registered under the Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959, they were not entitled to be considered for regularization. The provisions quoted above clearly show that pre-requisite criteria is registration with Employment Exchange with two years continuous service as casual labour. Once petitioners were not required to get themselves registered and they fulfilled other eligibility criteria, then petitioners were fully eligible for consideration for regular appointment under the scheme of policy which has been formulated.
24. There is one more aspect of the matter for consideration. Petitioners have been non-suited on the ground that regularization was not permissible after 10.04.2006. On the recommendation of the Committee as contained in Annexure- SRA-1 to the Supplementary rejoinder affidavit, in all six incumbents have been regularised. It is true that said incumbents who have been regularised were working for the long period, but as far as petitioners are concerned, their claim was covered under the policy decision, and they had been extended the benefit of regularisation, then mechanically by applying the judgment of Uma Devi’s case, it was wholly inappropriate to cancel the regularization of petitioners, which cannot be subscribed, as each case has to be decided on its facts, looking to the peculiar characteristic and the dominant factors of the aforementioned case, which in the present case has been ignored by the authorities that there was agreement between Federation and BSNL and as per policy decision petitioners had been absorbed on regular
25. At last Sri Subodh Kumar has contended that large scale manipulations have been committed in extending the benefit of regularization. The sole ground on which regularisation has been cancelled is the judgment in Uma Devi’s case and no other ground has been disclosed. In case there is any fraud or misrepresentation, then it is open to the authorities to issue show cause notice and thereafter cancel the regularisation, but here said grounds have not been taken in the impugned order, and impugned order is nothing but mechanically following of the judgment in case of Uma Devi (supra), which cannot be subscribed, as Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of UP. Secondary Education Service Selection Board v. Pooran Chandra Pandey (supra) has held that each case has to be decided on its fact and not by blindly following the Uma Devi’s case.
Consequently, writ petitions succeed and are allowed The impugned order are quashed.