JUDGMENT
S.S. Sodhi, J.
1. Where a matter is referred to arbitration Under Section 55 of the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, is initiation thereafter of criminal proceedings, on the same cause of action against the person concerned, barred? Herein lies the controversy referred to a larger Bench by A.P. Chowdhri, J. noticing an apparent conflict of views on the subject in a string of judicial precedents of this Court. These being Janak Raj v. State of Punjab, 1979 Ch LR (Pb. & Hy) 236; Harbhagwan Das v. The State of Punjab (1983) 2 RCR 156 Bant Singh v. The Dulley Cooperative Agricultural Service Society Ltd. (1987) 2 RCR 435, (i) Kashmira Singh v. The State of Punjab; (1989) 1 RCJ 175 and; Criminal Misc. 429-M of 1987 Hakam Singh v. State of Punjab decided on February 20, 1987 on the one hand, where it has been held that after reference to arbitration, criminal proceedings on the same cause of action are barred, while on the other, the contrary opinion that such criminal proceedings can be taken finds expression in Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab (1972) 74 PLR 26 and Rajpal Singh v. The State of Haryana, 1977 PLR 624 (1978 Cri LJ 609).
2. In referring this controversy to a larger Bench, A.P. Chowdhri, J. made clear his preference for the latter view as set forth in Harbans Singh and Raj Pal Singh’s cases (Supra).
3. The point to note at the very outset is that the matter in issue already stands settled and decided by the judgment of the Division Bench in Criminal Revision 245 of 1979 Laxmi Narain v. The State of Haryana decided on March 25, 1981, where, precisely the same question arose for consideration, namely, “whether after the passing of an award against an accused by the arbitrator under the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), criminal proceedings could be initiated and continued against him for an act on his part which gave rise not only to civil liability, but also criminal liability.” In dealing with this matter, the Bench observed :–
The Civil liability of an accused who misappropriates an individual’s property or the property of an institution like the Cooperative Society etc. is based upon the right of such individual or institution be reimbursed by such person to the extent of the misappropriated amount, while his criminal liability springs from the fact that the society at large is interested in seeing that the individuals constituting the society do not deviate from the right conduct and thus law envisages imposition of punishment, physical or otherwise, to deter such persons and others from doing so in future. It is for this reason that the State, which represents the society, takes upon itself the role of a prosecutor. Even when an individual upon whom the crime had been committed refrains from prosecuting the accused and even when he petitions that the accused should not be prosecuted, the State is not only not debarred from prosecuting the accused, but it is in law duty-bound to initiate the criminal proceedings and punish the accused for the crime.
4. In holding so reference was specifically made to Janak Raj’s case (supra) which was distinguished on facts with the observation that it had not been held there that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the accused after an award had been made against him by the arbitrator.
5. Be that as it may, in the subsequent rulings of this Court, Janak Raj’s case (supra) appears to have been construed to imply that once a matter has been referred to the arbitrator Under Section 55 of the Act, criminal proceedings on the same cause of action were barred. This view was taken in Harbhagwan Das; Bant Singh Hakam Singh and Kashmira Singh cases (supra). Janak Raj’s case (supra) being specifically mentioned as the judicial precedent in support of this view. The matter of material significance to note here is that the judgment of the Division Bench in Laxmi Narain’s case (supra) was not brought to the notice of the Hon’ble Judges dealing with these cases and curiously enough it appears that the leading Law Reports too omitted to publish this obviously important judicial pronouncement even though it had been approved for reporting.
6. After giving the matter our most careful consideration we not only feel bound by it but also respectfully agree with and endorse the view expressed by the Division Bench in Laxmi Narain’s case (supra) and consequently hold that reference to the Arbitrator Under Section 55 of the Act constitutes no bar to criminal proceedings on the same cause of action being initiated or continued against the person concerned. We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the view to the contrary expressed in Janak Raj; Harbhagwan Das; Bant Singh; Hakam Singh and Kashmira Singh cases (supra) which we consequently constrained to disagree with and differ from. They must thus stand overruled.
7. The reference is answered accordingly. The matter is now remitted to the learned single Judge for decision of the case, on merits.